

Studies of Classical India

Editors:

Bimal K. Matilal

Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, Oxford University, England

J. Moussaieff Masson

Professor of Sanskrit, University of California, Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.

Editorial Board:

R. P. Goldman

University of California at Berkeley, Calif., U.S.A.

Daniel H. H. Ingalls

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.

A. K. Ramanujan

University of Chicago, Ill., U.S.A.

Bhartrhari and the Buddhists

*An Essay in the Development of
Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*

by

Radhika Herzberger

Director of Studies, Rishi Valley School, India

D. Reidel Publishing Company

A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP

Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster / Tokyo

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data



Herzberger, Radhika, 1938—
Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists.

(Studies of classical India; v. 8)

Bibliography: p.

Includes index.

1. Dignāga, 5th cent. 2. Bhartṛhari. 3. Language and logic.
Buddhist logic. I. Title. II. Series.

133.D654H47 1986 181'.4 86-1011

SBN 90-277-2250-1

Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland

Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
100 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland

Copyright Reserved

© 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording or by any information storage and retrieval system,
without written permission from the copyright owner

Printed in The Netherlands

For my mother
and my daughters

CONTENTS

<i>Preface.</i>	ix
<i>Foreword.</i>	xi
<i>Introduction.</i>	xvii
<i>Abbreviations.</i>	xxv
1. The Historical Background	1
2. Bhartṛhari on Individuals and Universals	9
Translations from the <i>Jāṭisamuddeśa</i>	71
3. Dignāga against Bhartṛhari	106
Translations from the <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> , Chapter 5	145
4. Dignāga	164
Translations from <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> , Chapter 2.8–11	195
Translations from <i>Nyāyavārttika</i> 1.1. 5	197
Translations from <i>Ślokavārttika</i> 5.4. 34–47	198
Translations from <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> 2.30–36	201
5. Dharmakīrti	211
<i>Conclusion</i>	241
<i>Selected Bibliography</i>	243
<i>Index</i>	249

PREFACE

The *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari and the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga* are seminal texts in the history of ancient Indian philosophy. One text deals with grammar, the other with logic, both are the work of committed metaphysicians. Written within a span of less than a hundred years, between the fifth and the sixth centuries A.D., these texts have generally been treated separately, as representing independent schools of thought.

This essay attempts to interpret these texts jointly, as a dialogue between a grammarian and a logician. This way of approaching these texts highlights unexpected facets of Bhartṛhari's and Dignāga's theories of language and is intended to identify the individual achievements of each. Above all, this treatment is an exercise in writing the intellectual history of a period in time, rather than a history of a school of philosophy.

The prevailing view of Bhartṛhari holds that his linguistic techniques are not intrinsic to his metaphysics. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Bhartṛhari's metaphysics underlie his linguistic techniques and articulate their presuppositions.

The prevailing view of Dignāga maintains that for him language deals with illusory entities and must falsify what is real. The conclusions reached in the present essay are that Dignāga's logical rules are designed to ensure that in using language one is not committed to a belief in fictional entities.

My debt to modern scholarship in the field is considerable. Professor Maasaki Hattori's work on Dignāga's theory of perception; the late Professor Tucci's rendering of the *Nyāyamukha* and, above all, Muni Jambuvijaya's reconstruction into Sanskrit of parts of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* form the basis of my interpretation of Dignāga's thought. The late Professor Subramania Iyer's critical editions of the *Vākyapadīya* support my exposition of Bhartṛhari.

I am very much indebted to Professor B. K. Matilal for his patient and generous guidance of several earlier versions of the work, one of which was submitted as a doctoral dissertation to the University of

* Note: I follow the current practice of spelling the logician's name Dignāga rather than Dinnāga.

Toronto in the Spring of 1982. I would especially like to thank him for his skilful and painstaking help in my translation of Helārāja's text.

I am grateful to a number of scholars for giving valuable advice and stern criticism. Among them are Professor Kamaleshwar Bhattacharya, Professor Daniel Ingalls, Professor T. Venkatacharya, Professor Shoryu Katsura and Professor Stella Sandahl.

In the course of writing this essay, I have incurred other obligations. I am grateful to the librarians of the Adyar Library of the Theosophical Society in Madras and to India Institute Library of Oxford University for courtesies extended to me.

Dharmakīrti's stanza translated by Professor Daniel Ingalls in *An Anthology* etc (*An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry: Vidyākara's "Subhāṣitaratnakośa"* by Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Harvard University Press, 1965) is reprinted by permission of the publishers.

Radhika Herzberger

Rishi Valley
India

FOREWORD

The history of the development of Indian logical and epistemological theories constitutes an important chapter in the global history of philosophy. Radhika Herzberger has chosen a very interesting period in the history of Indian logic—the period of the two most outstanding and creative philosophers, Bhartṛhari and Dinnāga. The former was a grammarian, but from his pen we have probably for the first time a philosophical treatise, *Vākyapadīya*, which presented a systematic philosophy of Sanskrit grammar in the broader perspective of what we call today philosophy of language. Concerns over language and meaning led to the problem of universals as well as to the discussion of the reformulation of logical theories and rules of inference embodied in the language. Thus, Dinnāga, father of the school of Buddhist logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*), coming immediately after Bhartṛhari, systematized the logical doctrines from the Buddhist point of view deriving insights from Bhartṛhari's writings but critically examining and refuting Bhartṛhari's fundamental view of language and meaning. What was, to begin with, the Buddhist point of view became, with some modification and understandable adjustments, the *general* point of view from which the logical doctrines in India were examined, modified and reformulated for about eight or nine centuries after Dinnāga. Dinnāga therefore holds unquestionably a key position in the history.

Recent researches on, and interpretation of, Dinnāga's philosophy have been generally based upon the writings of his well-known follower Dharmakīrti as well as some of his Nyāya and Mīmāṃsaka opponents who came after him. Dr. Herzberger has followed a slightly different course. She has gone very deeply into the text of Dinnāga's predecessor, Bhartṛhari, in order to identify the *pūrvapakṣa*, the opponent's view, and thereby to throw more light upon the exegesis of the logical and linguistic theories of Dinnāga. That Dinnāga reacted against the views of Bhartṛhari on several occasions now goes without saying. In the fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Dinnāga quotes a few verses from *Vākyapadīya*. Besides, as the late E. Frauwallner has shown, Dinnāga wrote an earlier treatise called *Trikālaparīkṣā*, which was based upon a portion of Kāṇḍa III of *Vākyapadīya*. But while in the earlier treatise Dinnāga was more sympathetic towards Bhartṛhari's position (he adopted

some of the verses of Bhartṛhari with slight modifications), in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Chapter V, he was mostly critical of Bhartṛhari as he developed his unique theory, the *apoha* or the 'exclusion' theory of names. Dr. Herzberger has taken great pains to analyse portions of Bhartṛhari's texts that were relevant to the problem of universals and the theory of names (see her Chapter II) as well as to underline the fundamental difference between Diñnāga and Bhartṛhari on such matters (see Chapter III).

Dr. Herzberger's challenging thesis is that Diñnāga's *apoha* doctrine was meant to ensure that names (general names such as 'cow') 'apply' directly to the (perceptual) objects. Here the word 'directly' is emphasized. For according to the *usual* interpretation of the Buddhist *apoha*, which might have percolated through the elaborate writings of Dharmakīrti and some later Nyāya opponents, names cannot mean or express anything real but they express only concepts, the imagined universals. Dr. Herzberger has chosen to refer to the views of M. Hattori as representative of this *usual* interpretation. She could have chosen any other scholar including the writer of the present Foreword, for indeed I have followed to some extent Prof. Hattori's interpretation and claimed that the names cannot 'express' the particulars 'directly' but 'the only way a name can identify, or refer to, a particular is through negation and elimination of other concepts'. (See my *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, Mouton, 1971, p.41.) I shall not choose to defend my formulation here, but instead I shall indulge in a more fruitful enterprise — that of explaining briefly how I understand Dr. Herzberger's thesis. The arguments she has presented here are undoubtedly powerful and very complex, being frequently interwoven with interpretative translations of Sanskrit texts. With much of them I am in agreement. I am also in agreement with the point that Diñnāga did not want his doctrine to be understood as that "names cannot bridge the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual", but rather he wanted to insist that the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual is bridged by the *apoha* doctrine. In fact it would be a mistake to think that the world of percepts and that of concepts should be totally exclusive of each other like two water-tight compartments where information never flows into each other. For then it would indeed be like the situation obliquely visualized and criticized by Immanuel Kant: our conceptions are blind and our perceptions are mute. I believe Diñnāga at least did not fall into this error, although the Nyāya opponent would like to attribute such a view to the Buddhists.

The central focus of the book is on Chapter V of *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. Thanks to the effort of Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji, even the Sanskritists today can feel their way through this chapter. Dr. Herzberger has undoubtedly made the best use of this opportunity. In this chapter Diñnāga first argues that scriptures, and by the same token language or *śabda*, yield knowledge in the same way as the *liṅga*, the *hetu*, i.e. the logical reason, yields conclusion, i.e. inferential knowledge. This was tentatively directed against Bhartṛhari's contention that scriptural knowledge cannot be reduced to inferences, for (a) inference, unlike scripture, is fallible, and (b) scriptures have a unique subject matter, such as religious duties and moral and metaphysical truths, where neither perception nor inference are of any help. This by implication might mean that language (*śabda*) is a separate means (source) of knowledge, a separate *pramāṇa*. Diñnāga dismissed this view, as did the early Vaiśeṣikas. Diñnāga's point was that a word or a name tells its hearer something about the object to which it is applied in the same way that a piece of evidence, a *liṅga*, tells its observer something about the object in which it is present as a qualifier.

Having established that verbal communication is not significantly different from inference, Diñnāga moves on to discuss the problem of the meaning of (general) names. The earlier grammarians, such as Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, held two opposite views. Vyādi held that the word designates (means) the thing (the particular) while Vājapyāyana thought that the word designates (primarily) a quality or a shared feature. To this we have to add another older view, that of Kātyāyana (much discussed by Dr. Herzberger), that words are *applied* (cf. *niveśa*) to things on the basis of some qualities or features they possess. I believe that Kātyāyana's principle under some interpretation is compatible with either of the two opposing views, Vyādi's and Vājapyāyana's. For the meaning of, or what is 'spoken of' or designated by a word may be a particular or it may be a universal, but in either case the word may be said to *apply* to or be located in (*nirviśate*, *vartate*, *pravartate*) the particular (the thing) on the basis of some feature, *guṇa* or a quality (which can be a universal if the word is a general term). There is a subtle implicit distinction (made by Sanskrit philosophers and Diñnāga was no exception) between a word's being applicable to, or being located in some objects or group of objects (the objects being within the scope or *viśaya* of the word) and the word's designating or 'speaking about' or 'expressing' an object. In the former case, such expressions as *vartate*, *vṛtti* and *pravṛtti*, are used while in the latter it is conveyed by an old metaphor:

the word 'speaks about' (*āha*, *abhidhatte*) the object or 'announces' the object. It is the latter that I am inclined to call the *meaning* of the word. Roughly the meaning of the word is what the hearer comes to know when the word is uttered. The dispute here centres around this *concept of meaning*. 'The word means an object' would be read in Sanskrit as 'the word announces or speaks about an object'.

During Diñnāga's time, the situation was much more complicated than what the early picture above seems to suggest. Diñnāga refuted one by one several views of his opponents. One such view is that the word (the general name, *jātiśabda*) designates or 'announces' all the particulars or some of them and the less general word or a singular name (*bhedaśabda*) restricts the usage to the particular or particulars intended (as in the phrase "*Māthara brāhmaṇa*"). Other such views are that the general name designates the relation of the universal to the individual or that it designates the possessor of the universal (cf. *tadvat*). Another view that was refuted (verse 10b: *śabdāḥ tulyo'tra kevalaḥ*) is this: the word, i.e. the general name, itself is what the objects have in common (not a real universal). And to refute this, Diñnāga clearly upheld the Kātyāyana principle (*nānimittaḥ sa ca mataḥ* 10 c): without some basis for application the word is not used. While refuting the above views, Diñnāga obviously criticized several points that Bhartṛhari raised in *Vākyapadīya*. Dr. Herzberger has gone into them in detail. After refuting such views, Diñnāga stated his own new theory of names (verse 11d): a word designates, 'announces' or speaks about (*bhāṣate*) its own object (*svārtha*), the particular, by excluding others just as smoke tells us about fire by excluding non-fire possibilities.

A problem apparently arises in this *apoha* theory when we have to explain the phrase "blue lotus" where the two words are in apposition (and hence they should 'announce' or speak about the same object) and there is a qualification relation between them. The difficulty shows itself because either of the two terms excludes different set of things. Diñnāga resolves it (in verse 14) through an ingenious explanation: each of the two words taken independently generates uncertainty concerning the object or the particular it 'announces' or speaks of (*svārtha*), but taken together they remove the uncertainty by implication (*arthāpatti*) from the fact that it would be otherwise impossible for them to jointly designate or 'announce' the same object. That which generates uncertainty about an object or a particular can not designate or 'announce' that particular. Hence the two words taken together *designate* the intended particular or the thing by excluding things which are neither

blue in isolation nor lotuses only. The problem is however much more involved and raises several issues such as that of synonymity. Thus Diñnāga devotes several verses to discuss these issues. Dr. Herzberger has suggested in an elaborate fashion a very original interpretation of Diñnāga's defence of the *apoha* theory in such expressions as "a blue lotus". The readers are invited to examine it.

The present book attempts to add an original viewpoint to the modern researches on Diñnāga. The *apoha* doctrine has been discussed, criticised and reformulated by Diñnāga's successors for about eight or nine centuries. There does not seem to be any agreed solution of our perennial problem with universals. Diñnāga's solution was certainly unique in many respects. Hence it will undoubtedly attract the attention of scholars and philosophers alike for a long time to come. Dr. Herzberger has done a commendable service to us in this respect.

Bimal K. Matilal

All Souls College
Oxford

INTRODUCTION

Il est aussi facile dans l'Inde de constater des prolongements que malaise d'assister à des ruptures.

Louis Renou

Nevertheless the country has one tremendous advantage . . . the survival within different social layers of many forms that allow the reconstruction of totally diverse earlier stages.

D. D. Kosambi

The discovery of the past is never final. Beyond the discovered past there is always an undiscovered residue. The contours of the discovered past are never final. Fresh evidence or conceptual shifts can, like a kaleidoscopic view, cast the material into different patterns.

The problem of shifting perspectives becomes compounded for any historical study of thinkers who themselves were involved in reappraisals of their own more archaic past. This holds true for the thinkers of the period of which I write. During the fifth and sixth centuries in India, fundamental reappraisals were undertaken within philosophical grammar, a discipline which in classical India was regarded as central to religion, logic and metaphysics.

The present essay undertakes to reappraise the achievements of the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, the founder of Indian logic. My thesis is that logical theory in India was an outgrowth of concerns with language. I argue that Indian logic had its origin in cross-currents between a grammarian, Bhartṛhari, and a Buddhist philosopher, Dignāga, who took opposing positions on an aphorism concerning names that had been enunciated many centuries earlier by Kātyāyana.

Bhartṛhari was concerned with restructuring traditional grammar within a coherent system that would be viable for his time. I would not count his efforts as properly historical, partly because he was aiming for systematic certainty, and partly because he was dealing with ideas which were new, his own or current at the time he wrote. I would consider this a "rational reconstruction" rather than a properly historical effort.

The philosophical disagreement between Bhartṛhari and Dignāga, crystallized around Kātyāyana's aphorism, can be summed up in their differing answers to the following questions: What is the basis on which

names are given to things? Is the basis on which names are given a quality (*guṇa*), or a universal (*jāti*)? Is this basis located in words or is it located in the things which are named? Do names 'exceed over' (*ati + ric* or *ati + vrt*) their bearers?

Kātyāyana had held that names are given to spatio-temporal things on the basis of a quality which belongs to them. Bhartṛhari argued that names are given to spatio-temporal individuals not directly on the basis of a quality, but indirectly on the basis of a universal which belongs in words (*śabdajāti*). Dignāga claimed, in opposition to Bhartṛhari, that names convey their bearers directly on the basis of that quality which does not 'exceed over' the bearer. At issue in the dispute was the status of a name's analytic content and the status of the qualifier-qualificand relation. While Bhartṛhari held that these were innately given in the name, Dignāga held that they were constructed out of observed uniformities in experience. And Dignāga's logical rules, defining various rules of exclusion and inclusion between classes, became his tools for constructing relations found in language.

In the debate between Bhartṛhari and Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dignāga's commentator, stood with Bhartṛhari, against Dignāga.

The philosophical issues that divide Bhartṛhari and Dignāga are fairly straightforward; the really difficult issues lie elsewhere. Let me explain.

Ancient philosophers with any claim to originality composed their work in elliptically constructed aphorisms or in tightly constructed metrical stanzas. The aim was to capture within a very limited metrically defined space, through the use of allusions, as much content as possible. Often a philosopher would write an accompanying prose commentary elucidating his own dense utterances.

In the course of time, as the system gained adherents, there grew around this metrical body, like a protective armour, a series of prose commentaries. Often these commentaries were separated from their founder by several centuries. In spite of this, the central text together with its commentaries were considered to form a school of thought.

Philosophy in ancient India had been an intensely competitive affair. It had flourished in public debates sponsored by ruling monarchs and attended by large audiences. The philosophical style of sixth century philosophy bears the stamp of these extremely polemical debates. The writing is marked by the thrust and parry of debate, unfair put downs and sarcastic asides. The thought is marked by the presence of an invisible opponent drawn into a twilight zone of shared assumptions and unshared

dogma. The atmosphere of texts is coloured by memories of victories won, battles lost and defeats avenged. But none of this is explicitly stated; the opponent is seldom named, the philosophical framework of dispute remains tacit. The original elucidatory purpose is eroded when the prose commentaries begin to reflect the prominent features of debate – its heavy dependence on context and its ambiguities.

A remarkable feature of the period is an intense concern with technique. Technical innovations seem to have been prized for the sake perhaps of the advantage they conferred in the context of debate. This is evident from the fact that a new technical achievement of one school almost immediately led to whole series of reduplicating efforts in other schools. Thus Dignāga's discoveries in logic inspired other schools to rewrite their text books on logic, and inspired schools which did not have any such texts to write them. The desire to absorb new techniques was governed by another equal desire: to show that these technical innovations had always been part of the founder's vision.

Insofar as the philosophical commentator cultivated the myth that the founder's thought is endlessly extendable, his perspective came very close to a fundamentalist one. But it was a curious sort of fundamentalism which inspired the philosophical commentator of the sixth century. It was at once less simple and more paradoxical than the motive which prompts the more familiar sort of fundamentalism, such as the fundamentalism associated with Christianity. The latter tries on the whole to reverse the historical process, to work back to the vision given at the beginning. The philosophical commentator's fundamentalism did not attempt to deny change, rather it sought to embrace change and also somehow mask this embrace. Its lack of simplicity as well as its paradoxicality consisted in this. There was never any attempt to restore the founder's vision, that intimate but fragile connection between philosophical purpose and philosophical technique which marks the work of great philosophers. To have delineated the founder's vision too sharply would have risked setting limits to its scope, it would have meant exposing its vulnerability. Not to make the founder appear incompetent (*Uddyotakara's* oft repeated phrase: *akusālah sūtrakāraḥ syāt*) becomes a guiding principle of many a philosophical commentary of the period.

The philosophical commentator accomplished his purpose by treating the founder's words as endlessly elastic; by exploiting the hidden ambiguities of his text, by reading newer material into the nooks and crannies of older, already elliptical utterances, the commentator succeeded in maintaining a posture of timelessness: the metrical utterances

continued to have the same appearance, only the meaning attaching to them changed. The method won for the founder the status of a semi-divine being, and for his utterances the status of ineluctable truths while jeopardizing his vision, the strength which comes from coherence. The method also belittled the commentator's own achievements, his efforts having been given over to concealing exactly where the founder's words end and his gloss begins.

Let us now contrast the form in which Indian philosophy of the fifth and sixth centuries has come down to us with the Sanskrit word for philosophy – *darśana*, a vision. It will pay us then to consider whether Indian philosophers ever lived up to this ideal embodied in the word.

A historian who would undertake to uncover a philosopher's lost vision must come to terms with the fifth and sixth century philosopher's attitude to the past, especially to the past as authority. Attitudes to authority did vary – Dignāga's attitude to Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti's to Dignāga, Bhartṛhari's to Patañjali, represent different facets of a relationship which is very complex. And yet there is a thread which runs through these relationships which is the same. It can be identified as an insistence on vindicating the past. The philosopher's attempts are constantly to bring the past up to date, to reappraise, to justify and, in the process, even to distort and nullify; never to destroy the past or to cultivate it within its historical limitations. The gap between the archaic and the advanced is for the fifth and sixth century philosopher never unbridgeable.

This attitude to the past gives the philosophical material of this period an extremely impacted appearance. This appearance is not restricted to philosophical material of this period. In fact, other historians dealing with different periods in history have remarked on it. Here is an English historian's despair:

Exploring India's history is rather like sailing by some huge irregular cliff face, composed neither of one uniform substance such as Dover's gleaming chalk, or even of well defined strata, but with all the rocks of all the ages jumbled together as though by a series of seismic shocks. At no level (except the most recent) is it possible to rule a horizontal line and say that before this the term 'India' meant one thing; after it something else.

Denys Forest, 1970, p.4.

The survival in a single layer of ideological processes which go back to different levels of time was noticed by the late historian, D. D. Kosambi, "India", he said "is a country of long survivals". Not daunted in the least by the appearance of his material, Kosambi felt, "history is there provided one has the wisdom and insight required to read that history" (Kosambi, 1970, p.22). The ability to read history meant for Kosambi

the ability to frame hypotheses which would link ideological super-structures with tools of production. The impacted look of the Indian material for him represented a unique opportunity to reconstruct earlier layers of time on the basis of these hypotheses.

Taking heart from his example, I try in this essay to reconstruct the thought of the fifth and sixth century Buddhist philosopher Dignāga. Convinced that his thought lives up to the ideal of philosophy embodied in the Sanskrit word *darśana*, I try to uncover this vision. In the process I interpret the thought of Bhartṛhari, the fifth-century grammarian who is the sparring partner of Dignāga's thought. I also separate Dignāga's thought from that of his commentator Dharmakīrti, who had a very different metaphysical axe to grind.

My attempt in this essay is to define the central philosophical issues around which Dignāga's thought revolved. These issues had originally been raised by Bhartṛhari, who had articulated new problems and proposed solutions to them. The framework of his solutions emerged out of the questions posed at the beginning of this introduction: What is the basis on which names are given to individuals? Is the basis on which names are given 'in excess' of their bearers? Can the qualifier-qualificand relation be constructed out of names? These queries were the immediate outcome of Bhartṛhari's discovery of the analytic content implicit in names, a discovery which brought Bhartṛhari in conflict with the terms of Kātyāyana's more ancient theory. According to Kātyāyana names were given to their bearers directly on the basis of a quality which belonged to them. In order to accommodate the analytic content, Bhartṛhari located the basis of name giving in universals residing in names and held that these universals formed a hierarchical network. Bhartṛhari's became a theory of indirect naming in contrast with Kātyāyana's. These conclusions are set forth in the second chapter of this book.

The problems, raised by Bhartṛhari above, and the solutions he sought to them, define the twilight zone of Dignāga's thought. They define the issues at stake, his battlefield, and give shape to his chief opponent. I have in Chapter III presented Dignāga as championing Kātyāyana's cause, as attempting to reconstitute the claims of a theory of direct names. In the process I have reconstructed the weapons used by Dignāga, his critique of Bhartṛhari's theory and his *apoha*-doctrine.

Dignāga's relation with Bhartṛhari is extremely ambiguous: Bhartṛhari was the sparring partner of Dignāga's thought, but he was also the source of many of his most fundamental concepts. I try to establish the embryonic connection of Dignāga's thought with Bhartṛhari's and in

Chapter IV I reconstruct the manner in which Dignāga finally freed himself from these bonds.

In Chapter V I trace the essential discontinuity between Dignāga's thought and that of his commentator, Dharmakīrti. I attempt to pinpoint the exact factors which made Dharmakīrti turn his back on the solutions offered by Dignāga, and embrace Bhartṛhari's views, albeit in a modified form.

Dignāga has always been a controversial thinker; a clear-cut portrait of his thought has, since ancient times, been an issue over which even Buddhists did not agree. In Chapter I, I try to describe the special problems connected with the proper interpretation of his thought.

My own portrait of Dignāga is meant to be historical. It is drawn besides two imposing figures: on the side Bhartṛhari, Dignāga's sparring partner and the source of some of his fundamental concepts; on the other side Dharmakīrti, his commentator, who according to the verdict of Buddhist tradition surpassed Dignāga. My approach consists in defining the philosophically debated problems, in locating these within the texts and in expounding the separate solutions to them. The approach defines the continuity as well as the discontinuity between author and commentator and author and opponent.

The approach I take contrasts with the commentarial approach, which consists in adopting and speaking in the voice of the commentator. It is an extremely precise method and results in a line by line, often word by word, analysis of the text. But for me to rely exclusively on this method would mean turning a deaf ear and a blind eye to a whole series of philosophical and historical questions in which I am particularly interested. Why did Helārāja reject Bhartṛhari's analogy between language and crystals? Why did Dharmakīrti adopt the idea of essential natures (*svabhāva*), when no such idea is found in Dignāga? What are the consequences of reading Dignāga in accordance with the refinements introduced by his commentator? I can entertain these questions only by stepping outside the commentator's framework. By stepping outside the commentator's framework I hope to avoid becoming the victim of his manipulative skills.

There is, on the other hand, the danger of becoming the victim of one's own implicit hypotheses. I try, therefore, in this essay to make my hypotheses as explicit as possible and to closely follow out their consequences in terms of the text. Nor do I completely ignore the commentator. In fact in the case of Bhartṛhari, Helārāja's commentary is my chief entry to the text, and I try to present Bhartṛhari through Helārāja's eyes,

except in those cases where I think Helārāja was distorting Bhartṛhari's intentions and had his own axe to grind. My understanding of Dignāga, on the other hand, is shaped largely by my reading of Bhartṛhari.

At this point I would like most respectfully to submit that one does not escape the dangers of falling victim to one's own implicit hypotheses by speaking in the voice of the commentator: the most literal translation of a text involves interpretation, especially in the case of Indian philosophical texts where the exposition is marked by all the obscurity of vituperative conversations and the masks born of the effort to preserve monolithic appearances. The lines of authority were continually being crossed in the period of which I write; it is a token of the dynamism of the period. And a philosophical commentator of the period is seldom willing to acknowledge the adversary's influence, the ideas that may have been borrowed or the revisions in the theory that may have been forced by his attacks. In relying exclusively on the commentator a historian is forced to neglect this whole dimension of a philosopher's thought.

A proper appreciation of the factors which introduce change requires the historian to step outside the commentarial framework. A proper appreciation of the design that might lie concealed within a philosopher's thought also requires that the historian learn to speak to his subjects directly. My own labour in this essay is directed toward marking the age of some of the ideas which occupy Bhartṛhari, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, establishing links between these ideas and uncovering the overall design these ideas may serve.

Muni Jambuvijaya's reconstructions of parts of Dignāga's text form the foundations of my thesis. At the end of Chapters III and IV, I have provided annotated translations of these reconstructions. My view of Bhartṛhari is also supported by annotated translations of Bhartṛhari's and Helārāja's text, appended at the end of Chapter II. My conclusions rest upon these translations.

ABBREVIATIONS

ALB	Adyar Library Bulletin.
BL	Buddhist Logic. See Stcherbatsky, Th.: 1930–32.
DS	<i>Dravyasamuddeśa</i> ; see Iyer, Subramanya: 1963.
G.O.S.	Gaekwad Oriental Series, Baroda.
H.	Helārāja
H.O.S.	Harvard Oriental Series
NCI	<i>Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram</i> Vol.I. See Jambuvijaya, Muni: 1966.
NC2	<i>Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram</i> Vol.II. See Jambuvijaya, Muni: 1977.
IA	Indian Antiquarian.
JA	Journal Asiatique, Paris.
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy,
JS	<i>Jāṭisamuddeśa</i> , see Iyer, Subramanya: 1963.
Lg.	Language
Khadyota	See Jha, Ganganath: 1925.
MCB	Mélange Chinoise et Bouddhique.
MMK	<i>Mūlamadhyamakārikā</i> . See de La Vallée Poussin: 1913.
ND	<i>Nyāyadarśana</i> . See Thakur, Anantlal: 1967.
NM	<i>Nyāyamukha</i> . See Tucci, Giuseppe: 1930.
NS	<i>Nyāyasūtra</i> . See Jha, Ganganath: 1925.
NV	<i>Nyāyavārttika</i> . See N.D.
NVT	<i>Nyāyavārttikatātparyātika</i> . See N.D.
PD	<i>Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha</i> . See Jha, Durgadhar: 1963.
Pradīpa	For references to Pradīpa on P2.1.57 see Joshi, S.D.:1971. For references to Pradīpa on P5.1.119 see Bhārgavaśāstri, Bhikāji Joshi.

	For references to Pradīpa on P1.2.64 see Kuḍala, Śivādatta.
PS	<i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> .
PV	<i>Pramānavārttika</i> . See Dvarikadas, Sastri: 1968.
SVPV	<i>Svārthānumānapariccheda</i> of the <i>Pramānavārttika</i> . See Gnoli, Raniero: 1960.
SL.V.	<i>Ślokavārttika</i> . See Sāstri, Ramnath: 1971.
SS	<i>Sambandhasamuddeśa</i> . See Iyer, Subramania: 1963.
tp	Tippani page, refers to NC1.
tr	Translations.
trK	Translations from Kumārila. See SL.V.
trPS	Translations from the <i>Pramāṇasamuccaya</i> . See NC1-2 and Vai .S.
TPS	Transactions of the Philological Society.
trU	Translations from Uddyotakara. See ND.
VP1	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> I. See Iyer, Subramania: 1966.
VP2	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> II. See Rau, Wilhelm: 1977.
VP3	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> III. See Iyer, Subramania: 1963 and 1973.
Vai.S	<i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra</i> . See Jambuvijaya, Muni: 1961
vṛ	Vṛtti.
VS	<i>Vṛttisamuddeśa</i> , see Iyer, Subramania: 1971.
VV	<i>Vigrahavyāvartanī</i> . See Bhattacharya, Kamaleshwar: 1971
WZKO	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens.

CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher.

A. N. Whitehead

In a lament written sometime in the seventh century, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti predicted that his ideas would be completely forgotten:¹

Like the waters of the sea my thought will grow old within its body . . .

His fears turned out to be unfounded. Like the waters of a river his ideas fed and enriched many bodies of thought. Subsequent schools of Buddhist epistemology bear the mark of Dharmakīrti's influence. Non-Buddhist thinkers like Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri aesthete, acknowledged their debt to Dharmakīrti.² Dharmakīrti's main work the *Pramānavārttika* (PV) survived intact, as did his lesser works like the *Sambandhaparīkṣā*, the *Nyāyabindu*, the *Vādanyāya*,³ embellished with many commentaries.

Time has been less kind to Dignāga, in whose footsteps Dharmakīrti reputedly trod. Not having been allowed even to grow old within the secure boundaries of his own thought, Dignāga is remembered chiefly through the writings of his more famous follower. Dignāga's last and most definitive work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, (PS) as well as a majority of his lesser philosophical works, have all been lost. Only fragments of them survive in the work of fellow Buddhists and contentious opponents. These surviving fragments have become puddles of water incapable of supporting the forms of life which belonged in the original. Dignāga's PS had always been endangered.

In myths which embody some of the ironies of history, the Tibetan historian Bu-Ston recalled the early vicissitudes of Dignāga's fortunes. The PS was begun in a cave in what is now modern Orissa. Written on rock, the work was thrice erased by the jealous brāhmaṇa Kṛṣṇamunirāja, and thrice rewritten. Prepared to entirely abandon the enterprise, Dignāga was only prevented from doing so upon the intercession of Bodhisattva

Mañjuśrī who predicted that the work would become 'the eye of the śāstra'.⁴ Of more recent origin and less fanciful is the following account:⁵

The Choni texts were purchased in 1926 for the Library of Congress by Dr. Joseph R. Roch at the Choni monastery in Kansu province, China, near the Tibetan border . . . shortly after the Choni texts were purchased by the Library of Congress the library was entirely gutted by fire and every wooden block was destroyed in the tragic conflagration.

You may be interested to know that during their transportation across the vast reaches of China the entire collection was nearly lost, for some of the texts were opened by bandits on the supposition that they were filled with treasure or valuables of some sort. Further in course of transit one of the boxes fell in the Yangtse river.

And yet, natural disaster, even when compounded by an inclement climate, iconoclastic raids, the destruction of monasteries and libraries (Nālandā was razed many times)⁶ and the enmity of jealous rivals, cannot quite account for the loss of Dignāga's writing. Professor Ingalls' question, "Why did India forget one of its most original thinkers?" arises. India has in other cases been known to preserve very ancient memories;⁷ and the themes of survival and loss mark a civilization – what it chooses to remember and what it chooses to forget.

To forget is to make a value judgement; in the case of Dignāga the judgement was made quite early. Sometime after the visit of the Chinese pilgrim, Hiuan-tsang, after about 650 A.D., the works of Dharmakīrti had begun to replace Dignāga's as text-books in the curricula of the universities.⁸ Two traditions arose: one was the tradition that Dignāga's work was rightfully submerged by the greater depth of Dharmakīrti's thought, and the second was that the essential ideas of Dignāga continued in the work of Dharmakīrti; that Dignāga in effect was a rich jewel to be discovered in the depths of Dharmakīrti's thought. Both traditions are expressed in the following account of Bu-Ston's:⁹

Once at the house of Īśvarasena, a pupil of Dignāga's, he (Dharmakīrti) heard the PS. Having heard it the first time, he at once became as proficient as Īśvarasena who had minutely studied the work. When he heard it the second time he became like Dignāga, the author of the work, and when he heard it the third time he recognized several errors in the work. When he mentioned them to Īśvarasena the latter so far from being displeased told him that he was at liberty to condemn all the mistakes of the work and to prepare a critical commentary of it.

Traditionally Dharmakīrti has set the pattern for the investigation of Dignāga's thought, as witnessed by Jinendrabuddhi's commentary.¹⁰ Some modern commentators have found themselves in sympathy with this tradition; for example, Hattori writes:¹¹

The topics dealt with by Dignāga are discussed there-in by the sharp intellect of Dharmakīrti, and new philosophical problems which were current at the latter's time are taken up for investigation. Thus the *Pramāṇavārttika* is much richer in content and more penetrative in argument than the PS(V).

Attempts to show where Dharmakīrti's system differs from Dignāga's are few: Tucci has written of their differing conceptions of construction (*kalpanā*),¹² and Hattori has pointed out that the notion of *arthakriyā-kāritva* (fulfilling purpose), which has a fundamental role in the PV, is missing in Dignāga's PS.¹³ It has been widely noted that the adjectives, *abhrāntam* (non-erroneous) and *avisamvādakam* (non-contradictory), modifying perception and the means of knowledge respectively in the *Nyāyabindu* and the PV, are absent from Dignāga's PS.¹⁴ Attempts to assess these differences have been less widespread. R. C. Pande is persuaded that Dharmakīrti's modifying adjectives constitute improvements.¹⁵ It is, however, taken for granted that these differences are minor, and that it is safe therefore to treat Dignāga as an incomplete Dharmakīrti. Abhinavagupta (latter half of the 10th century), an aesthetician and metaphysician of the Trika school, did not entirely agree (*pramāṇiko'py āryadharmakīrtir āryadignāgagranthānurodhāt tatpakṣapātād evaṃ abhidhatte, na puṇar asya svarucir eṣeti*).¹⁶ And Tucci has voiced a suspicion that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti may not have belonged to the same school of metaphysics.¹⁷ The treatment of the theme in the literature has on the whole been unsystematic and fragmentary.

The judgements of tradition are not sacrosanct, especially when they have been pronounced in the absence of any very well defined and systematic account of the PS, and in the absence of a proper assessment of the differences between the PV and the PS. Dharmakīrti was separated from Dignāga by more than fifty years, and more significantly, by the appearance of some of the most definitive texts of various philosophical schools. Between the PV and the PS are located, for instance, Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha* (PD), Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* (NV), Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāraṇayacakra* (NC), Siddhasenadivākara's *Nyāyāvātāra*, Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* (SL.V), Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, Sthiramati's commentaries on the *Triṃśikā* and *Viṃśikā* and the Sāṃkhya text, *Yuktidīpikā*.¹⁸ Why did these fundamental texts appear so immediately after the PS? Did the PS have any role in shaping the ideas of this prolific age? The traditional view, by identifying the PS, which came at the beginning of this age, with the PV, which came at the close, by denying us a clear view of Dignāga, denies us these questions.

Taking a cue from Abhinavagupta it might be hoped that a more focused portrait of Dignāga's thought would emerge from the work of

the other schools. But this hope is not any more easily realized. This may have something to do with the manner in which philosophical issues were discussed in that period. It was the custom of the time to hold debates between philosophers, as part of the ceremonies marking the coronation of a king. These were public events, celebrated,¹⁹

... with great pomp, in the presence of the king, of his court and a great attendance of monks and laymen. The authorized winner received the support of the king and of his government.

The price of defeat was public humiliation and sometimes exile. Battles won and defeats avenged were vividly described by partisan chroniclers, who drew their metaphors from the progress of conquering princes or the technical holds of wrestling (*vivadamānasya gale pādāṃ kṛtvā jayati*).²⁰ Philosophers called each other bad logicians (*kutārkika*) as well as frauds (*śaṭha*), and the texts of the period reflect this extreme acrimony. Dignāga suffered great mutilation at the hands of his opponents, never achieving a status higher than that of a straw man.

By and large the works of the sixth century were written as commentaries to aphorisms composed sometime between the second century B.C. and the sixth century A.D. The form of the commentary fosters an appearance contrary to the reality of development, progress and change. Even when a text is being readjusted, the idea is to mask change and even the necessity for such change, lest the founder be considered unskilled (*sūtrakāro 'kuśalo bhavet*).²¹ To readjust a system to changing philosophical demands of newer times, to meet advances in technique and to preserve the appearance of a monolithic system are conflicting requirements which impose a great burden on the vocabulary. The original aphorisms, already dense and elliptical, were forced to bear newer content from one commentator to the next. And the danger in all this is an inevitable loss of continuity. Texts fell into obscurity with great rapidity. When Vācaspati Miśra, who wrote not much more than two hundred years after Uddyotakara, compared his work of commenting on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* to the efforts involved in rescuing an old cow deeply sunk in mire, what he was expressing was a loss of communication.²² There is a curious stanza from the Jain tradition which claims that a long dead Buddhist opponent of Mallavādin's,²³

... has seized out of prior enmity two texts. Even though available as books he will not allow them to be read.

Again the complaint here could be interpreted as a complaint against the obscurity resulting when a polemical text is divorced from the con-

text of its time and its opponents. The situation is not without irony: the attempt to preserve a monolithic appearance leads to loss of clarity because the vocabulary becomes overburdened.

To look for a portrait of Dignāga within the work of his opponents, without an idea of what one is looking for, is hopeless.

Nor do the texts of the fifth and the sixth centuries present us with an idea of logic as a formal structure, beyond the disputes of the various schools. If it were as R.S.Y. Chi describes it to be: "The least sophisticated portion of the entire task... (which) can easily be formalized mathematically"²⁴, then the historian's task would be simplified. For one would be then presented with a universal language, a readily extrapolated paradigm, in terms of which the rest of a philosopher's system could be understood and evaluated. Undoubtedly, the term '*anumāna*' which is usually translated as inference, has a core which is formal and which can be dealt with in terms of elementary quasi-mathematical models; however, this core is not readily extrapolated. *Anumāna* is overlaid by elements that are extraneous, which from a purely formal point of view appear to be useless redundancies and which give to the system a look of extreme density. In fact, early scholarship reflects the frustration of imposing the Aristotelian scheme of the syllogism onto the Indian model. Randle calls the Indian argument:²⁵

... an untidy organism, too, with vestigial structures and redundant organs which are changing their function while preserving more or less of their primitive form. And for this reason, perhaps, it may have something to tell us about the 'morphology' of thought which is not so transparently conveyed by the more perfect work of art, the Aristotelian syllogism.

Since a ready-made portrait of Dignāga is not available in the writing of his commentator, nor in that of his opponents, nor does the structure of his logic have immediate correspondence with logical structures, my effort in this essay will be to develop an independent portrait in the form of a hypothesis which would render the text coherent. I shall try to reconstruct Dignāga's aims in the PS, and to fit the technical achievements of his logic and his philosophy of language into the framework of this hypothesis. Dignāga's *anumāna* is very intimately connected with his theories of language, with his epistemology and metaphysical vision. Dignāga is also very much a product of the times in which he wrote, an age dominated by Bhartṛhari. My analysis will take me into areas which are not generally considered to be relevant to logic. But since Dignāga's *anumāna* has an extreme density, it becomes necessary to disentangle the elements which give it this appearance. In order to separate out these

elements one has to have both a historical as well as a synoptic view of the system.

Histories of Indian philosophy are not generally written within the confines of an age. Modern historians have followed the traditional practice of writing histories of the so-called schools. This practice has certain dangers, in that it falls prey to inevitable distortions fostered by a commentarial tradition, which I have mentioned in passing and which I shall elaborate upon throughout the essay. The practice blurs individual achievements; a philosophical work, influenced by its times and its past, is the product of a single mind. Indian philosophical works, bred in an intensely polemical debating atmosphere, are not exceptions.

By developing hypotheses which have their source in Dignāga's text, and which undertake to expose the aims of the text as well as to interpret the text in a coherent manner, I hope also to shed some light on the thoughts of Dignāga's contemporaries and near contemporaries. Dignāga may not have shared a world-view with his contemporaries and his near contemporaries, but he certainly shared with them the sense of what required explanation.

I believe that Dignāga is the key to his age. The PS, reacting so closely and sharply to Bhartṛhari's thought, can teach us how to read Bhartṛhari. Its criticism of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, Mimāṃsa and Sāṃkhya schools helps us to understand the alterations made by Uddyotakara in the PV, by Praśastapāda in the *Padārthadharmaśaṃgraha*, by Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttika*, by the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* in the text which bears that name. The history of this period as well as of the period which preceded it can be brought into sharper focus, if Dignāga's specific contributions are understood. In this essay I shall make a small beginning. On the basis of Dignāga's text, and the historical setting of that text, I shall try to sketch out an outline of the aims of his thought. I shall then discuss how his logical techniques implement this aim. Finally I shall in brief indicate how and in what essential respect Dignāga's commentator Dharmakīrti changed the PS.

My hypothesis will be guided by Dignāga's texts, and in this my task is greatly facilitated by the renewed interest in Dignāga's work, and by the recovery, from the early Chinese and Tibetan translations, of his material which is a result of this renewed interest. The forces of Indian tradition may be like Dignāga's ancient enemy Kṛṣṇamunirāja, barring the way to an understanding of this thought; but the benevolent Mañjuśrī, Dignāga's ancient ally, need not stand alone. Starting with Paramārtha and the Chinese pilgrim I-Ching, who by translating Dignāga's

work into Chinese helped preserve it, there have been a steady stream of dedicated scholars who have participated in the process.

NOTES

1.1. See *Dhvanyāloka* III.41. The full text of the stanza is given below. My translation takes note only of a part of the verse:

*anadhyavasitāvagāhanam analpadhīśaktinā' .
py adṛṣṭaparamārthatattvam adhikabhir yogair api/
matam mama jagaty alabdhasadrṣṭapratigrāhakam
prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva svadehe jarām /*

The full stanza is translated in BL, Ip.36.

1.2. See Masson: 1696, p.34.fn.1.

1.3. See SVPV Gnoli: p.xix-xxvii, where the whole commentarial tradition of the PV is described. Gnoli mentions a Kashmiri, Śaṅkarānanda, who wrote a commentary on the PV as well as one work, "which wanders far from Buddhist orthodoxy." See also BLI, pp.37-47 and Malvania, 1955, Introduction.

1.4. Vidyabhusana, 1909, p.83

1.5. Walter H. Maurer, quoted in the Vai.S, pp. 156-157.fn.1.

1.6. Sankalia, 1972, pp. 238-247.

1.7. D.D. Kosambi discovered at each of the sites of the Buddhist caves that dot Western India aniconic stones, still in worship, commemorating the mother goddess of the paleolithic nomads, Kosambi, 1962.

1.8. See Frauwallner, 1961, p. 138.

1.9. Quoted by Vidyabhusana, 1909, p.106.

1.10. See Hattori, 1968, p.15; and n.III.27;trPS5.34

1.11. Hattori, 1968, p.15.

1.12. Tucci, 1971, p.187-188.

1.13. Hattori, 1968, p.14.

1.14. See Hattori, 1968; BLI, p.159.

1.15. Pande, 1967, Introduction, p.i.

1.16. Quoted in Masson, 1969, p.34.fn.1.

1.17. Tucci, 1930, p.61.

1.18. According to Frauwallner, 1961, Dignāga lived between 480 and 540 A.D.; Dharmakīrti between 600 and 660 A.D.; he assigns 480-540 A.D. as the dates of Sthiramati. Pandit Malvania (1955, p.xvi) suggests that Kumārila was an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti's. Muni Jambuvijaya puts both Mallavādin and Siṃhasūri before Dharmakīrti and Kumārila (NCI. *prākkathanam*, p.30). Malvania (1949, p.141), modifying an earlier opinion, assigns Siddhasenadivākara to the sixth c. A.D.

1.19. BLI, p.34.

1.20. NCI, p.6.17.

1.21. NV.I.1.1. (ND, p.13.26,14.1).

1.22. NVTT.I.1.1. (ND, p.22).

I.23. NCI, p.50, *prastāvanā: mallavādīe buddhānanda nāmanā je baudhavadī ne harāvyo hato te marīne vyantara thayō chhe āne...pūrva janmanā vairthī mallavādīnā nayacakra tathā padmaracita ā be grantho jagatmān vidyamān hovā chhatān koine vāñevā deto nathī*; also fn.7: *tena prāg vairatas tasya granthadvayam adhiṣṭhitam.*

I.24. Chi, 1969, p.xi.

I.25. Randle, 1924, p. 398.

CHAPTER TWO

BHARTṚHARI ON INDIVIDUALS AND UNIVERSALS

In the fifth and subsequent centuries philosophers' ideas of language were greatly enhanced by the work of Bhartṛhari. He was primarily a grammarian, but also a philosopher and possibly a poet. In his long work on philosophical grammar, *Vākyapadīya* (VP), he claimed to have brought to light the forgotten writings of the second century B.C. grammarian Patañjali.

It had been an ancient belief among Indian grammarians that theirs was "the science", the fundamental knowledge that laid the foundations of thought. By the fifth century A.D., however, Bhartṛhari mourned the loss of this tradition. For him it had been betrayed by men of little vision, followers of a dried out logic (*śūkatarkānusārin*) running headlong after their own arguments. The intellect acquires discrimination, he felt, on submitting itself to different traditions of thought and "the Goddess of Learning does not smile on those who neglect the ancients."¹

In the VP Bhartṛhari attempted to restore to grammar this lost vision of its central role vis-à-vis the other systems of thought. He described grammar as the "royal road" to those who seek liberation,² and in rebuilding the royal road he took care to pave the many paths and byways branching out of this central artery; throughout the VP he illuminated the thought of the Sāṃkhyas, the Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists with the help of grammatical insights. Bhartṛhari's even-handed approach was indeed rare for the factious age in which he lived and, in the years to come, his work became very influential. Even those who disagreed with his elevation of grammar to the status of philosophy borrowed his tools of analysis. It would not be an exaggeration to say that for several centuries to come the VP continued to be a vademecum, a guidebook almost, on the philosophical uses of grammar.³

Between Dignāga and his commentator Dharmakīrti, there falls the giant shadow of Bhartṛhari. In order to arrive at a proper understanding of their relationship it will be useful to trace the separate debt each of these Buddhist philosophers owes to Bhartṛhari. By isolating their separate debts it may be possible to identify the historical achievement of

each. My plan in this essay is essentially this: to restore the lost dialogue between Bhartṛhari and Dignāga by identifying the issues which divided them and the issues which united them and then, by locating the discussion of these issues in their separate texts, assess their individual achievements. I shall extend this dialogue into Dharmakīrti's text and thereby judge his contribution to the development of Indian philosophical thought.

Unfortunately this task is not simple; one cannot, for example, find in the literature any ready-made answer to my query: what is the philosophical basis for Bhartṛhari's description of grammar as the "royal road" to philosophy?⁴ This is due to the absence of an integrated portrait of Bhartṛhari's thought, a portrait that would convey the essential links between his grammatical ideas and his metaphysical ones. And to a very large extent a portrait of this type would depend upon a demystification of Bhartṛhari's metaphysical ideas.

A first step in this direction was taken in 1952 by John Brough. Earlier scholars had treated the notion of *sphoṭa* as an "hypostatization of sound" with obscure mystical connotations.⁵ In the course of a pioneering essay, Brough demonstrated that many crucial concepts in Bhartṛhari's thought, including the concept of *sphoṭa*, were grammatical principles that basically fulfilled the explanatory requirements of linguistics.⁶

In 1968, in the course of a historical survey of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, S. D. Joshi quoted with obvious approval a remark of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita's.⁷ The remark suggested that Bhartṛhari, in the course of looking out for grammatical triflings, had discovered the Upaniṣadic Brahman. Joshi then observed:

How far *sphoṭa* is one with *Śabdabrahman* is a matter which has continuously to be re-examined in the light not only of the so-called metaphysical implications involved in the *Vākyapadīya*, but also of the linguistic principles enunciated by Bhartṛhari.

Joshi, 1967 p.42-43

Joshi's suggestion has, however, not been taken up seriously by subsequent scholars; most of the discussion regarding Bhartṛhari's metaphysics has come out of the vocabulary of Vedānta: was Bhartṛhari a *vivartavādin* or *pariṇāmavādin*?⁸ And his linguistic contributions have been described almost exclusively in terms of vocabulary associated with Patañjali.⁹ The following assessment of Subramania Iyer's has not been systematically questioned:

Though Bhartṛhari arranged the material of the *Munitraya* in some kind of a *sequence*, one cannot say that it is all made up into a complete system.

Iyer, 1969, p.404 (the emphasis is mine)

I find this assessment of Iyer's unacceptable; Bhartṛhari's work did not consist of discrete, utterly separate areas, some grammatical, "the contribution of ancient Indian linguistics" and others, objects of mystical contemplation. For Bhartṛhari postulated an intimate connection between grammar and metaphysics believing, for instance, that verbal and nominal stems and the occasioning ground for the use of all names "signify the Great Being".¹⁰ The crucial question here is whether Bhartṛhari saw the relation between the nominal base and the Great Being in esoteric terms, as a relation to be grasped in private mystical moments, or whether he saw it in more systematic terms, as an extension of his grammarian's habits of thought.

In order to trace the influence of Bhartṛhari on Dignāga and Dharmakīrti I will be, therefore, constrained to traverse a section of Bhartṛhari's royal road. I shall traverse a small part of it, that part which received most attention from the two Buddhist philosophers: his treatment of universals and individuals. I shall also be concerned to explain the relation between universals and the *Śabdabrahman*; I hope thereby to make a small contribution toward linking Bhartṛhari's linguistic speculations with his mystical ones, and in the process, to further demystify his thought.

My guide as I attempt to map this section of the royal road will be Dignāga, who, in the fifth chapter of the PS, pointed out its pitfalls. Although Dignāga neither named Bhartṛhari nor paused to admire the originality of his design, his observations have directed my attention to the implications of Bhartṛhari's thought and have enabled me to reconstruct sections of it in a more systematic fashion.

I shall concentrate on Bhartṛhari's idea of universals and individuals because Bhartṛhari as well as defining the philosophical issues connected with these concepts proposed solutions to them. These proposals were in various ways challenged, modified and adapted to their own theories by both Dharmakīrti and Dignāga. Nor did the two Buddhists react in the same way to Bhartṛhari's theories: Dignāga rejected ideas that had already been formulated in Bhartṛhari's thought; and these very ideas which were rejected by Dignāga became an intimate part of Dharmakīrti's PV. Historical facts of this kind must play a large role in our re-assessment of Dignāga's achievements. For whether Dignāga is after

all an incomplete Dharmakīrti and whether Dharmakīrti traversed a road that was overgrown and lonely, depend very much on historians' being able to settle the debt owed by the Buddhist philosophers to Bhartṛhari.

In my presentation of Bhartṛhari's views I intend initially to follow the order of the JS and to claim the support of Bhartṛhari's eleventh century commentator, Helārāja. Because the argument is intricate as well as controversial, I shall provide an annotated translation of relevant stanzas and of Helārāja's comments on them. The annotated translation will run parallel to the main exposition, and is meant particularly for specialists. The relation between the translation of the text and the preliminary exposition is meant to be intimate: they support each other. Although I will concentrate on the JS, I intend also to provide some references to other parts of the VP, and, in the case of Helārāja's commentary, to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's work. For Helārāja's *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa* bears the imprint of the work of these great Buddhist philosophers. These marks, though seemingly enigmatic, shaped Helārāja's exposition of Bhartṛhari. By restoring the historical resonances between Helārāja's text and the texts of the two Buddhist philosophers, I hope to illuminate some of the more elliptical aspects of the *Prakīrṇa-prakāśa* and perhaps account, in some measure, for the respect in which Dharmakīrti, and not Dignāga, was held by the Kashmiri Śaivite schools to which both Helārāja and the great Abhinavagupta belonged.

The *apoha* section of the PS contains Dignāga's theories of language and opens with a statement to the effect that language is not a separate source of knowledge (trPS 5.1). Thereafter an attack, detailed and far reaching, is launched against the view that a word primarily signifies a universal. Various aspects of this claim are examined, among them the following: that through universals words signify all their bearers (*svabhedān sarvān āha*); that they signify universals alone (*jātimātra*); that they signify a universal as related to an individual (*tadyoga*). These various implications that Dignāga draws can be traced to Bhartṛhari's text, for they stem from Bhartṛhari's contention that names are given to their bearers indirectly through the universals belonging in words, rather than directly, through qualities belonging in things. Moreover, Dignāga, in comparing words with crystals, makes use of a crucial analogy which derives from the VP. As crystals take on the colour of things that are put in front of them, so words reflect their spatio-temporal bearers.

The analogy as well as its intent can be traced to the actual text of

the VP. It underpins Bhartṛhari's belief that language inhabits an autonomous cognitive sphere made up of a hierarchy of possible objects, a realm of Possible Being (*upacārasattā*) of which the external world is a mere fragment; the presence of the external object helps to bring into focus a potentiality already given in language.

The link between the idea that language represents an independent cognitive sphere and the idea that words primarily signify universals, which are not dependent on things, is alluded to by Bhartṛhari in the following way:¹¹

Just as all universals belonging in things have word universals as their basis so also, in this world, this is the knowledge which is the principal refuge of all knowledge.

VP1.15

The stanza is elliptical; it does not tell us why, just because thing universals have word universals as their basis (and what that means will be explained later), grammar should be accorded such a very special status. It will be my task in the course of this chapter to expose the links in the chain which connect the idea that words primarily express universals with the idea that language is the source of our understanding, and that the science which is primarily concerned with language, namely grammar, is pre-eminent among the sciences. The essence of Bhartṛhari's theory, as I see it, is the following: words do not designate objects in the external world directly (*sākṣāt*), but indirectly through the intervention (*upadhāna*)¹² of universals which are mental, and which reside in words. Universals which are thus intimately connected with language and mind, on the one hand, and with the Great Plenum of Being, on the other, constitute the basis for our knowledge of the external world.

The following is an outline of my argument:

Section i: The starting point of Bhartṛhari's *Jāṭisamuddeśa* (JS) is an ancient debate between the two grammarians Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana. The debate centred around the question: what is primarily signified by words, individuals or universals? JS2 appears to reconcile these views. I will examine the historical background of these two concepts and their role as tools of grammatical analysis. My effort will be to highlight the solutions to various grammatical and ritualistic problems coordinated around these two concepts. I will try to argue that the notion of universals for Bhartṛhari is multi-faceted and combines semantic, syntactic and phonological features associated with pure form.

Section ii: I will deal with Bhartṛhari's definition of individuals and connect this conception with Kātyāyana's aphorism on name-giving

(vt.5 to P5.1.119), his conception of qualities and his conception of the occasioning ground for the use of names (*pravṛttinimitta*). I shall draw out the hidden implications in this aphorism by connecting it with Kātyāyana's view of compounds such as *vīrapuruṣa* and suggest that an assumption, shared by Helārāja, Dignāga and Bhartṛhari, that names must not 'exceed over' (*ati + vṛt* or *ati + ric*) their bearers, may be traced to this aphorism.

Section iii: I will discuss the relative merits of two translations of JS6 and argue, on the basis of Helārāja's comments to the stanza, that Bhartṛhari was propounding a new theory of names. According to this new theory, names are given to things, not on the basis of a quality which is located in them, but on the basis of a universal located in names. Name-giving thus becomes indirect and must appeal to an additional mechanism called superimposition (*adhyāropa*). I will then explore the analogy between Bhartṛhari's conception of naming and his conception of metaphor. In the latter half of this section I shall present Bhartṛhari's justification of this new theory of names. I see a two-fold justification: the older theory countenanced extended names, names which primarily belong to *x* but are given to *y* because of a certain relation *x* bears to *y*. The new theory is not more radical, names which belong in ideal entities are extended to spatio-temporal ones because the word and the external object happen to be conjoined. However, the new theory has an advantage over the older one, it can account for the analytic and antonymic content of names and for relations between names, which the older theory could not do. I will try to read this two-fold justification of Bhartṛhari's theory into JS7–8. I will then try to show that the analytic content of names was organized by Bhartṛhari into a hierarchical structure.

Section iv: I will argue that the new conception of names as having content that can be organized in terms of a hierarchy provides structures which underlie a great deal of Bhartṛhari's analysis; of compounds such as *abrāhmaṇa*; of substitution in the context of ritual problems; and of his metaphysical conception of the Great Being (*mahāsattā*) as the Supreme Universal (*mahāsāmānya*). I will also suggest that the hierarchical conception results in a newer conception of objects, the conception that universals define classes of objects or individuals and that the distinction between universals and individuals is not hard and fast, but depends upon the speaker's intention and the position an element occupies in the hierarchy.

Section v: I will describe the presuppositions that underpin Patañjali's analysis of *tatpuruṣa* (Determinative) compounds such as *vīrapuruṣa*, *kṛṣṇatila* and *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*, and then briefly examine Patañjali's analysis of compounds such as *kṛṣṇatila*, whose first member is an adjectival name (*guṇaśabda*) with his analysis of *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*, whose first member is a generic name (*jātiśabda*). I will then explore Bhartṛhari's analysis of *kṛṣṇatila*, highlighting those aspects of his analysis which are at odds with Patañjali's. I shall emphasize the fact that he chose to ignore *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*. I will eventually delineate Bhartṛhari's conception of the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) as given *a priori* in language and suggest that the framework he had introduced into the earlier analysis was dictated by his view that the qualifier-qualificand relation is not constructed out of the syntactic features of names, but that an object 'qualified by all its qualifiers' is given *a priori* in language. I shall suggest that Bhartṛhari's unwillingness to give a systematic accounting within the traditional framework of both *kṛṣṇatila* and *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* contributed to his metaphysical view of ideal objects.

Section vi: I shall translate *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (SS) 40–41 where Bhartṛhari presented his analogy between language and crystals. I will suggest that the analogy illustrates a great many features of Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect names.

Section vii: I will note Helārāja's rejection of the crystal analogy and try to trace his motives for rejecting it. I shall contrast Helārāja's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's text in JS6–8 with Vṛṣabhadeva's and suggest that the latter is more of a piece with Bhartṛhari's theories, that Bhartṛhari was not concerned with demonstrating that words applied correctly to things. I will also suggest that Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari's crystal analogy was a contributing factor in Helārāja's rejection of the crystal model of language.

Section viii: I will argue that the hierarchical conception of names, and the structure available on the basis of that conception, support Bhartṛhari's catholicity. I will then explore Bhartṛhari's doctrine that the concept of similarity (*sādhṛśya*) can be substituted for the concept of thing universals, and present his analysis of similarity as composed of repeated acts of abstraction or exclusion (*apoha*).

In my presentation of Bhartṛhari's views and in my choice of translations of his and Helārāja's text, I have been guided by two motives: to show the intimate connection between Bhartṛhari's tools or techniques

of analysis and his metaphysics, and to emphasize those techniques which had a major impact on the thought of the two Buddhists, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

i

The tentative tone of Bhartṛhari's exposition, his catholicity of outlook, as well as the varied vocabulary he employed – all tend to conceal the essential simplicity of his outlook. The first verse of the JS describes a variety of contending theories.¹³

Having first artificially analysed them from a sentence alone, some divide words in two ways, in four or even five ways, in the same way [as a word is artificially divided] into suffix, prefix and base.

JS1

The commentary to the stanza gives the details of these contending theories, details which are unimportant in view of the next stanza, which subsumes these categories under universals and individual things:

When meaning of words is artificially analysed, universals or individuals emerge as what is meant by all words. They have been described as being eternal.

trJS2

'Eternal' (*nitya*) here has a sense of 'indispensable'; for these notions constitute the indispensable tools of grammatical analysis. Without their eternality, said Vṛṣabhadeva, an early commentator of Bhartṛhari, the science of grammar would be impossible.¹⁴ Investigating the grounds for this rather strong claim takes us back to some very early linguistic speculations, speculations of which Bhartṛhari is the spokesman.¹⁵

When that which is signified by all words is understood as a universal then, since a universal is one, [the use of] a single word [to stand for all the occurrences of that word] is described as justified with reference to it.

VS316

The initial appeal of universals lay in this. It allowed grammarians to treat the word as a unit, to formulate rules which would apply to all the occurrences of the item in question. It also allowed ritual theorists to interpret injunctions which had the singular form, for instance, 'A Brahmana should not be killed', as having universal force. Patañjali facetiously illustrated the point saying that if the above injunction were interpreted as referring to individuals then a man, taking care not to kill a particular Brahmana, would freely go about his business of killing the rest of them.¹⁶ What would happen, asked Patañjali, if universals were not

understood when individuals were named? His reply, following Kātyāyana, was that in that case, "not all individuals would be understood" (*asarvadravyagatīḥ*, MB on vt.43 to P1.2.64). Here we have the germ of the idea which was to play an important role in Dignāga's and Bhartṛhari's thought, that universals define classes of individuals. The idea, even in earlier times, was a pivot around which very fundamental problems with regard to language and ritual were coordinated.

Universals, according to this early belief, do not have instances, but are strictly the same throughout the various and idiosyncratic mediums with which they are associated. In this they resemble Devadatta, who is strictly the same whether he is in Mathura or Srughna. But, unlike Devadatta, who cannot be simultaneously both at Mathura and Srughna, universals are simultaneous in many places. In this respect they resemble the god Indra, who is present wherever he is invoked.¹⁷

Bhartṛhari divided universals into thing universals (*arthajātī*) by which he understood phenomenal universals, and word universals (*śabdajātī*) (see Section iii) which he claimed were located in names. According to Helārāja, Bhartṛhari used the words *svārūpa* (own form) and *rūpa* (form) interchangeably with *svā jātī* (own universal).¹⁸ This suggestion of Helārāja's is extremely instructive for it allows us to delineate Bhartṛhari's concept of universals in terms of his concept of the form (*rūpa*) and own form (*svārūpa* or *svam rūpam*) of words. Bhartṛhari held that a speaker has immediate and unerring access to the information contained in the form of a word:¹⁹

That well-established sense, belonging to the meaning of the pure word understood upon [its] utterance, is to be acknowledged as the primary sense, bound to the form alone.

VP2.265

VP.2.266 contrasts the well-established (*prasiddha*) sense of a word with the not-so-well established sense (*aprasiddha*), which as it were is constructed with effort (*prayatnād iva*). I will presently show that the not-so-well established sense of a word for Bhartṛhari includes metaphorical reference and reference to external objects, and that by "the utterance of the pure word" Bhartṛhari wished to exclude sound patterns associated with dialect and incorrectly pronounced words.

In what I consider to be a major departure from traditional analysis, Bhartṛhari sought to introduce a complexity into the structure of universals:²⁰

This science is equipped with universals. So he says:

It is established through the teaching of universals (vt. on P1.1.1).

This universal is different from particular universals [such as] being a word. For [the uni-

versal] being a word co-inheres compatibly in the same thing with all [particular] universals [such as the universals, being a word for tree and being a word for horse] whose co-inherence in the same thing is incompatible. *Particular universals of language (śabdākṛitī-viśeṣā) such as, being the word 'tree', are called manifest words when, in the given presence of the inchoate object (vastusampramoha), they have attained conformity with the cause (nimitta).* Just as there is in the pot a compatible inherence of [universals such as]: being a substance, being earthen, being a pot, so also there is in the word 'tree' a compatible co-inherence of particular universals, such as: being a quality, being a word, being the word 'tree'.

vrVP1.15-23p.52-53

Ignoring, for the moment, the conceptual complexity implicit in the italicised portions of the text above, the point which emerges from the text is as follows: specific universals inhere compatibly in a word, just as, according to Vaiśeṣika belief, universals inhere in external objects. Particular universals can also be mutually incompatible, i.e. not inhere compatibly in the same object. The passage alludes to two relations: compatible co-inherence (*aviruddhaikārthasamavāya*) and incompatible co-inherence (*viruddhaikārthasamavāya*). These two relations represent in Bhartṛhari's thought the analytic and the antonymic content of words which one can define in the following way: the analytic content of a word is represented by the set of expressions whose meaning is included in the word, and the antonymic content is represented by the set of expressions whose meaning is excluded from the word. The point can be illustrated as follows: the word 'tree' is a complex of several universals which are compatible such as, having a branch, having roots and so on. There are several other universals which are incompatible with the word, these may be, being a creature with horns, being a creatures with hoofs and so on. I shall return to this point later; what I wish to stress now is that the passage represents universals, not as forming a hierarchical pattern, but as forming clusters.


My interpretation of the above assumes that the concept of universals has meaningfulness attaching to it. Since this aspect of universals may not be generally acknowledged, and since it appears to be a widespread belief that when he used the term *jāti* (universal) Bhartṛhari had in mind only phonological features,²¹ I shall now turn my attention to JS3. Here the meaningfulness and the compatibility and incompatibility implicitly attaching to universals are exploited in order to solve a problem connected with ritual sacrifices.

The problem of finding substitutes for materials prescribed in the context of certain rituals must have become acute as the Indo-European

tribes migrated east. The problem was two-fold: to find substitutes and to justify their substitution, ensuring that the Vedic injunction prescribing the ritual is not violated. The latter requirement meant that constraints on the choice of substitutes had to be grounded in actual words of Vedic injunctions. This problem is addressed by Bhartṛhari in JS3-5. My present concerns are confined to the solutions offered to the problem in JS3.

The vocabulary of grammatical analysis had at some time in the early past been modelled very consciously after the vocabulary of ritual practices. Ritual practices consisted in the performance of certain complicated rites laid down by the Vedas. These rituals were conceived of teleologically; they were performed in order to bring about certain ends. Action also was conceived of teleologically as an event to be brought about through a set of well orchestrated Means (*sādhana*) consisting of material objects such as animals, stakes and utensils of various sorts.²² And while the Means, which have the characteristics of finished products, were described as having accomplished natures (*siddhasvabhāva*), action (*kriyā*), an incomplete entity, was described as having a to-be-accomplished nature (*sādhyaśvabhāva*). Grammarians found an analogy between this description of ritual and, within the context of sentences, the roles of nouns and the principal verb. Nouns are the means of bringing about the action signified by the principal verb; nouns have established natures, verbs have a to-be-established nature.²³

The primary constraint on the choice of Means, retaining here the ambiguity between material objects and nominal expressions,²⁴ is exercised by the principal verb in the injunction. Additional constraints are derived from the universal expressed by the nominal expression. Constraints become necessary when the injunction does not lay down specific means or when the means laid down are not available. The injunction may say: "Tie up the beast" or it might say, "Tie up the beast to a post made of *palāśa*" and a post made of *palāśa* may be unavailable. The priest is then forced to consider substitutes. The observation that the verb "to tie" (*bandh*) has semantic expectations (*ākāṅkṣā*) for objects of a certain kind such as tree trunks, pegs and posts, narrows the range of possible substitutes. The range of substitutes is further narrowed by observing that the word *palāśa* signifies a universal treeness, which is also signified by *śimśapā* and *khadira*. The indeterminacy shared by verbs and universals is exploited in order to provide substitutes.²⁵ The indeterminacy presupposes a structure which Bhartṛhari called a regulating principle (*niyama*), which we can diagram:



Bhartr̥hari and Helārāja recall this structure in JS3 in order to provide for substitutes:

According to some, the universal indicates a capacity by way of accompaniment [of the individual]; when [a post made of] *khadira* lacks the capacity [to perform the function enjoined by the injunction] something which has the capacity is substituted. trJS3

Bhartr̥hari, in calling attention in JS3 to the complex content implicit in universals and in using this implicit content in order to solve ritualistic problems, emphasized the semantic component in universals. There does not seem to be, in view of this stanza, any reason for denying that universals belonging in words lack semantic features.

As well as having a semantic component universals for Bhartr̥hari contain a phonological component. This phonological component is identified with the sound pattern associated with the correctly pronounced word. And for Bhartr̥hari a word is correctly pronounced only by the well educated (*śiṣṭa*, cf. VP1.142). The sound pattern associated with women's speech and with dialect is not directly tied to the form (*svarūpa*) of a word, but is indirectly inferred from the form (cf. VP1.141), which remains fixed in the norm.²⁶

The third component which makes up Bhartr̥hari's concept of universals is given by the syntactic features of words. Whether the word is adjectival (*guṇaśabda*) or generic (*jātiśabda*) plays a significant role in the way the word is used in sentences and compounds. I think the features which govern the behaviour of words in sentences are in the VP tied to and displayed in the form of the word. By alluding, in JS1, to the division of words into various syntactic categories, and suggesting the lack of any unanimous view regarding their classification, and then in JS2, by referring to the two categories of universals and individuals as eternal, Bhartr̥hari had meant to subsume the former classification within the latter, more embracing categories. How the programme for the subsumption of these partial categories is to be carried forward is described in Helārāja's commentary under JS2, which I have appended at the end of this chapter.

Bhartr̥hari's conception of universals can be compared to a rope

made up of three strands: a phonological strand, a syntactic strand and a semantic strand. The speaker on the basis of the form of a word has immediate and unerring access to its meaning, its syntactic and phonological features.

I cannot accurately trace the precise historical forebears of Bhartr̥hari's ideas. However, it is possible to suggest that there appears in the guise of *jāti* or *ākṛti* (universal) one more candidate besides *śabda* and *sphoṭa* for the role of "linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning bearer" (the phrase is used by Brough to describe the *sphoṭa*).²⁷ If my guess here is correct, then one part of the later distinction of *sphoṭa* into *jāti* and *vyakti* can properly be traced to the MB. Grounds for tracing the other part of the distinction, namely the one called *vyakti*, can also be found in a rather more preliminary fashion in the MB. In MB on P.1.2.64, universals are described as being eternal (*nitya*), as being unitary and as defining classes of individuals. As defining classes of individuals, I think meaningfulness can be attached to them. That they represent phonological features is also suggested by a quotation cited by Vṛṣabhadeva from the MB (cf. Vṛṣabhadeva on vrVP1.15–23p.52.19–20: *ākṛtigrahaṇāt siddham/ avarṇākṛtir upadiṣṭā sarvaṃ avarṇakulam grahīṣyati*).

Preliminary grounds for attributing the notion of *vyaktisphoṭa* to the MB do exist, but I call these grounds preliminary because the *sphoṭa* was regarded by grammarians as being 'eternal' (*nitya*). The concept of individuals was on the other hand relegated by the MB to the category of non-eternals (*anitya*). A significant point rested on this issue of the perishability of individuals, namely the relation between universals and individuals. Because individuals are non-eternal, Vyāḍi raised an objection, How can universals survive the death of the individuals in which they are located? (vt.49 to MB1.2.64). The answer given in vt.57 is that the universal merely accompanies the individual and does not perish when the individual perishes, just as the vine which clings to the tree does not die when the tree dies.

Even though individuals were relegated to the domain of non-eternals, the concept played a very important part in early grammatical speculation. For it served to generate the notion of gender and number.

Ancient grammarians found unexpected problems arising out of the postulation of universals. Of these problems again I will allow Bhartr̥hari to be our spokesman:²⁸

Just as words for groups of domestic animals have a predetermined gender [assigned to them, even when the individual members have gender distinctions], so also there would be

a fixed gender with respect to [words which express] universals and, because the universal is one, only a singular number would obtain, even when the individuals [referred to] are various.

VS317

The reader will recall VS316, quoted earlier, where universals were regarded as bestowing unitariness on discrete occurrences of words. Because universals are unitary, it was felt that individuals associated with them could justifiably be treated as one. The second part of VS317 above raises a difficulty in that thesis. If the significant aspect of every word consists merely of universals, then there would be no way of distinguishing between singular meaning and plural meaning attaching to words. If *vrkṣāḥ* (many trees) and *vrkṣau* (two trees) signify the same universal, to what do dual and plural sense attach?

The second point raised in VS317 alludes to the complicated demands that the notion of gender made upon the ancient grammarian's grammatical apparatus. It was necessary, from his point of view, to treat words which display different genders in a uniform way. Thus the word for bank is masculine (as in *taṭaḥ*), feminine (as in *taṭī*) and neuter (as is *taṭam*), but from the point of the grammarian's analysis they are not different words; similarly *brāhmaṇa* and *brāhmaṇī* have different genders but do not represent different universals.²⁹ The difficulty with maintaining that these words are to be treated uniformly, because they signify the same universal, is that gender distinctions remain unaccounted for. On the other hand, to treat these words as members of a single class does not resolve the problem either. Because members of a single class are all assigned an arbitrary gender. By P1.2.73 domestic animals which are not young (*ataruṇa*) and which have cleft hoofs uniformly take on the feminine gender, irrespective of their own gender.³⁰ To treat *taṭaḥ* and *taṭī* as members of the same class would thus win them an arbitrary and uniform gender.

These difficulties are resolved by the assumption that every name, besides signifying universals, has reference to an individual; the assignment of gender is with reference to the number and gender of the individual; not the natural gender, mind you, but one derived from the assumption that gender is not fixed, but in a state of constant flux.³¹ Thus the words for bank *taṭaḥ* and *taṭī* signify the same universal³² and represent different gender stages in the same individual. The idea of plurality is also generated with reference to individuals. *Vrkṣaḥ* and *vrkṣau* signify the same universal, but the latter has reference to two individuals, while the former has reference to only one. Grammarians de-

defined plural number by means of a special operation called *ekaśeṣa*, 'Remaindering of One', in the following way:³³

vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca vrkṣaś ca (the tree, the tree, the tree) *vrkṣāḥ* (the trees), by *ekaśeṣa* (Remaindering of One).

Ancient grammarians thus made assumptions regarding individuals in order to establish a proper theory of number and gender. The assumption complemented their assumption with respect to universals. The two postulates were essential tools of grammatical analysis. Behind the appearance of dialect, defects of speech and correct usage lay the reality which consisted, in Bhartrhari's case, of eternal universals and eternal individuals.

ii

The two categories universals and individuals which are called eternal by Bhartrhari in JS2 were, at some early date prior to the third century B.C., considered to be mutually exclusive by their respective champions Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana. The conflict between them is alluded to in the MB, but the author there appears not to have, as far as I can see, chosen sides. A positive attempt at reconciling their respective points of view is made in the JS by Bhartrhari. I intend to follow the thread of his argument as it develops in the JS in the hope of arriving at some fairly general description of Bhartrhari's thought.

Following the traditions of more ancient grammarians, Bhartrhari defined an individual in the following way:³⁴

that which is given as principal (*pradhāna*), as 'this is that', is an individual.

vrVP1.64p.122.5

Vṛṣabhadeva glosses it as follows:³⁵

He has mentioned the definition of an individual which is established in his own doctrine: that is the delimitor of an individual which is itself to be delimited by another cause.

Vṛṣabhadeva on vrVP1.64p.122.15-16

Bhartrhari's definition, and the more complex gloss of Vṛṣabhadeva, are short-hand expressions of a very complicated notion of individuals which I shall attempt to spell out in gradual stages connecting it with the classical theory of names enunciated by Kātyāyana in the third century B.C. The basic idea at work, in Bhartrhari's definition above, is that an individual, referred to in his definition as principal (*pradhāna*), is not

directly nameable, but is named on the basis of a qualifier (*avacchedaka*), which either belongs to it or is in some way connected with it:³⁶

The quality which is adopted for the sake of signifying an individual, of which there is no signification (*avyapadeśa*), is the distinguisher (*bhedaka*). . . . VP3.5.2

The definition succeeds in relativising the notion of an individual: anything is an individual which can be distinguished on the basis of a quality, even so-called qualities:³⁷

When a quality is being distinguished, it becomes principal. . . . VS351A

The definition also renders the notion of qualities quite general: anything is a quality which is the basis for distinguishing an individual.³⁸

Bhartrhari's definition of an individual, as never directly identifiable but as identified on the basis of a quality, was a definition current among grammarians. The definition in fact harks back to the classical theory of names enunciated by Kātyāyana. In an aphorism, Kātyāyana attempted to define the basis for name-giving and produced a technique for articulating the basis of name-giving thus:³⁹

[The occasioning basis for the use of a name is] that quality because of whose presence (*bhāva*), a name is applied to a thing. [The addition to the nominal base of the suffixes] *tva* or *tal* [is taught], in the signification of this quality. vt. 5 on P5.1.119

According to the aphorism, the basis for giving a name to a thing can be identified by the addition of the abstract suffixes *tva* or *tal* to the nominal base; thus the occasioning basis for the use of the proper name *Ḍittha* is *ḍitthatvam*, for the adjectival name *śukla* (the white) *śuklatvam*, for the verbal name *pācaka* (the cook) *pācakatvam* and so on.

These identifying bases for the use of names were interpreted as qualities belonging to the thing.⁴⁰ But Sanskrit furnished abundant examples of individuals which receive their names indirectly, in association with or by derivation from names belonging to other individuals. The language contains examples of wives named after their husbands, the wife of a *praṣṭha* (leader who has set forth) is a *praṣṭhī*; sons after their fathers, the son of Garga is Gārgya; sons named after their mothers, the son of Kuntī is Kaunteya; cloth named after the material in which it is dyed, a cloth dyed in *kaṣāya* (lacquer according to Helārāja)⁴¹ is *kāṣāya*. Sanskrit grammarians treated these as derivative names. Kielhorn summed up this treatment as follows:⁴²

Things subservient to something else, or things which are in company with something else, or things which are in a particular place, may be called by the names of things to which they are subservient, or in the company of which they appear, or of the place where they are. . . . IA XVI p.250

The treatment of these derived names allowed that a name which is given on the basis of a property belonging in an individual could be extended to name another individual, because of a certain relation obtaining between the two individuals. The occasioning basis for the use of derived names, as a consequence, contains reference to the relation (*sambandha*) on the basis of which the secondary name has been earned. Thus the secondary name Gārgya, reflects in the occasioning ground for its use, the progeny-progeny-bearer relation.⁴³ Bhartrhari presented a general view of the matter:⁴⁴

Where (in an *x*) a word applies through another's (say *y*'s) property either as an ascribed identity (lit. 'this is that') or as a relation (between *x* and *y*) (lit. 'this belongs to that'), then that other *x* becomes named (on the basis of *y*). VS349

Several questions raised more than six hundred years later by Bhartrhari shed interesting light on this classical theory of names. What is the ontological status of this quality on the basis of which names are given to things? Is it eternal (*nitya*) or is it non-eternal (*anitya*)? What is the relation between the content of the name, the occasioning ground for its use on the one hand and the content of the individual which is the name-bearer on the other? Does, for instance, the content of the name 'exceed over' the content of the name-bearer? Are names related to other names?

These very complicated issues were implicitly raised by Bhartrhari in the context of Kātyāyana's aphorism. My chief interest in this matter derives from my desire to understand the philosophical issues involved in Bhartrhari's treatment of individuals and his treatment of the quality on the basis of which names are given to things as eternal (*nitya*, cf. JS2 and JS34, SS50–51), when in Kātyāyana they had the status of non-eternals.⁴⁵ I am specifically intrigued by the following:⁴⁶

No meaning of words (*padārtha*) exceeds over (*ati-vrt*) this Being, the metaphorical occasioning ground for the use of all words (*pravṛtthetu*). . . . SS50B–51A

In elevating the basis of name-giving from an actual quality belonging to a spatio-temporal individual to a metaphorical or ideal level, and further, by claiming that it is this Being which is not exceeded over, did

Bhartrhari imply that the occasioning ground for the use of some names does in fact exceed over its actual bearers?

Looking at the ancient aphorism through the framework of this question several intriguing implications emerge. These implications, in turn, provide the background against which later, historically connected, issues can be resolved. The historical questions, revolving around several possible implications that may not all have been part of the assumptions governing Kātyāyana's aphorism, are: the addition of *tva* or *tal* to a nominal base converts the nominal base into the name of a quality or a qualifier, which is an index to the content of the name and the content of the bearer; the content of the name equals the content of its bearer, the qualifier sums up this dual content; the quality is spatio-temporal; the individual which is named is also spatio-temporal; the name and its bearer are thus non-distinct.⁴⁷ Given these assumptions, the historical question posed by Dignāga in his critique of Bhartrhari's theory of names was: is the relation between a name and its spatio-temporal bearer teachable? The implications which I have read into Kātyāyana's aphorism on names played an important role in determining the necessary conditions for the teachability of the relation between a name and its spatio-temporal bearer. Dignāga criticised Bhartrhari's new theory of names on the ground that the terms of the theory provided insufficient grounds for the teaching of a relation between a name and its bearer (see trPS5.2). In framing his own theory, Dignāga maintained that a name did not 'exceed over' its spatio-temporal bearer. Helārāja, seeking to show that Bhartrhari's theory provided adequate grounds for the teaching of a relation between names and its spatio-temporal bearer, slanted his interpretation in favour of a theory which maintained a tight relation between the content of a name and the content of its bearer.⁴⁸ Against this historically later debate, the following two statements of Dignāga and Bhartrhari serve to focus attention on these issues and to highlight the distance between their respective positions:

The word causes its object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati + vrt*) the object; not by means of qualities etc. which belong to words.
PS5.13⁴⁹

No meaning of any words exceeds over (*ati + vrt*) this Being, the metaphorical occasioning ground of all words.

SS50B 51A⁵⁰

What is the evidence for reading the condition, that content of name equals content of bearer, into Kātyāyana's aphorism? The issue is not

directly raised in that context by any of the commentators. And yet there is some evidence suggesting that this condition was an implicit requirement of Kātyāyana's theory. Helārāja, for instance, read a second aphorism of Kātyāyana's in tandem with the one already quoted; according to Helārāja the two aphorisms reflect the two sides of the naming situation – the side of the object or bearer and the side of the name. The second aphorism, translated here in accordance with Patañjali's gloss on vt.6 to P5.1.119 by me, is presented by Helārāja in the following manner:⁵¹

"That quality because of whose presence . . ." (vt.5 to P5.1.119)
in this view the derivation signifies the object – thus the being of a cow is cowness.

"That own-meaning by which all words exist, is their meaning"
(vt.6 tp P5.1.119)

in this view, on the other hand, the derivation signifies the word – thus the being of the word 'cow' is 'cowness'.

Helārāja on VP3.5.1p.194.20–22, p.195.1

In Helārāja's view the content of the name exactly replicates the content of its bearer; 'cowness' reflects cowness exactly. That Helārāja may not be bringing a later sensibility to bear on earlier problems is suggested by Kātyāyana's treatment of compound expressions such as *vīrapuruṣa* (the man is heroic) and *rājapuruṣa*,⁵² where the content of the compound is said to 'exceed over' (*ati + ric*) the content of its individual names.⁵³ Kātyāyana claimed that this additional content emerges only at the sentential level⁵⁴ independently of the content of the individual names of which the compound is composed. This additional content, consists of the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*)⁵⁵; the relation, therefore, does not trace back to the names. While the names are represented as 'the man' and 'the hero', the compound is represented as 'the man is heroic'. This scheme of analysis, according to Kātyāyana, does not violate the rules governing the use of the nominative case, namely that the nominative case merely signifies the meaning of the nominal base, not a relation. The view is summed up by Bhartrhari below, I present it in a version borrowed almost entirely from Cardona:⁵⁶

The qualifier-qualificand relation arises between inflected names; nor is the base meaning thus surpassed.

VS6

Kātyāyana's treatment of compounds then suggests that the occasioning

ground for the use of names (except derived ones) does not signify any relation, that names in the nominative signify their bearers atomically. The condition on names which marked Kātyāyana's analysis is reflected in his aphorisms as interpreted by Helārāja: the content of a name replicates the content of its bearer.

iii

There are two discrepant interpretations of JS6 in the literature, the first is by Brough and the second is by Iyer. My first problem is to decide which one to adopt. JS6 reads as under:

*svā jātiḥ prathamam śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate/
tato' arthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā//*

Brough, contrary to his usual practice of rendering *artha* as 'thing-meant', rendered the term in this context as 'thing', presumably putting it outside the context of language. Iyer, on the other hand, translated *artha* as 'meaning', thus placing it within the parameters of language. Brough's translation reads:⁵⁷

All words first of all express their own class (*jāti*); thereafter they are fictionally superimposed on the form of classes of things.

Iyer's reads:⁵⁸

All words first of all express their universal (*jāti*) which is then thought of as being superimposed on the universals of meaning.

The discrepancy between Iyer's translation and Brough's is fundamental in that it centres around totally different resolutions to the following crucial issues: is the own universal (*svā jāti*) meaningful or is it some sort of uniform sound pattern? Is sound superimposed on meaning? Or is a meaningful universal superimposed upon an external universal? The translation one chooses to adopt must presuppose an answer to these fundamental questions, questions which bear upon Bhartṛhari's philosophical thought as a whole. Brough and Iyer also understand the term *jāti* in very different ways, for Brough a *jāti* is a class; for Iyer it is a universal.

I offer the following translation of the stanza. The translation is based partially on Brough's and Iyer's, but the justification I will present for it has its source in Helārāja's commentary and Bhartṛhari's remarks made elsewhere.

All words first of all express their own universal; thereafter this universal (lit.it) is thought to be superimposed upon the forms of universals of [external] things.

I draw support for rejecting Iyer's proposal that universals are superimposed on universals of meaning from the evidence I have already produced in support of the meaningfulness attaching to Bhartṛhari's idea of universals. I draw additional support from Helārāja who explicated the idea of superimposition in terms of the metaphorical figure of speech *gaur vāhika*. In vrVP1.67p.126.3-5, Bhartṛhari mentioned the same figure of speech to describe how the external object is identified through the superimposition of the word's own form (*svarūpa*). And Helārāja identified the own form of a word with the own universal.⁵⁹

There is no evidence that I can find for rejecting Helārāja's view of this matter. On the contrary, there is sufficient evidence from Bhartṛhari's text to suggest that Bhartṛhari viewed the assignment of names to external bearers in terms of metaphorical figures of speech exactly as Helārāja had conceived it. The 'vāhika ox', for instance, is analysed as a case where the word 'ox', adhering to its own sense, and fixed in its own form (cf.VP.2.255-256), signifies the resident of a region along the Indus (*vāhika*). That the identification of an external object is also a case where a word, remaining fixed in its own form or universal, reaches over the boundaries of its natural substratum (*adhikarana*) in order to become identified with an object belonging in a different substratum (*vyadhi-karana*, cf.trHJS7.8p.19.1-2), is explicitly stated by Bhartṛhari:⁶⁰

The word which expresses a universal applies to things in the same way as the word 'cradles' [in the sentence, 'the cradles are crying'], having remained fixed only in [its primary sense, namely] cradles, truly signifies that which lies in the cradles [i.e. the babies].

VS347


My reason for choosing Iyer's interpretation, of *jāti* as 'universal', over Brough's 'class', has already been stated in Section i. For I have shown in that section that universals were considered to be one (*ekā*) and as defining classes rather than being identical with the classes they define.

We are now in a position to relate in a tentative way Bhartṛhari's definition of an individual given in the previous section, as: "that which is given as principal, (*prādhānya*) as 'this is that' is an individual", with the following:⁶¹

Through the relation [of ascribed identity, expressed as] 'this is that', an individual is metaphorically described as having the property of universals. The distinction which resides in the individual is then assumed to belong to the universal.

VS346

Helārāja describes the relation as one of non-difference (*abheda*, see n.11.63), where the non-difference between the word and the object is achieved through the mechanism of superimposition. Summed up the view expressed in JS6 is fairly simple: a word expresses a universal, and on the basis of that universal, identifies an external object. But whereas the relation between a word and its universal is direct, the relation between a word and its external object is indirect, presupposing as it does the other more immediate relation. The view can be summed up in a diagram:



Helārāja's introductory remarks on JS6 alluded to the structure attributed to universals in solving problems of substitution of materials in the context of rituals (see trHJS6 and trJS3). The possible conflict between that attribution of structure and Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, is the framework in terms of which he saw JS6.

Let me recall the reader's attention to the more ancient theory of names embedded in Kātyāyana's aphorism on names according to which names are given to individuals on the basis of a quality they possess. The aphorism, in addition, described a technique for articulating this quality. The technique consisted in adding the suffixes *tva* and *tal* to the nominal base. The aphorism reads as follows:⁶²

[The occasioning ground for the use of a name is] that quality because of whose presence (*bhāva*) a name is applied to a thing. [The addition to the nominal base of the suffixes] *tva* or *tal* [is taught], in the signification of this quality.

vt.5 on P5.1.119

I have already in section ii of this chapter described the theory of extended or derived names which was an outgrowth of the theory embodied in the aphorism above. The theory of names sketched by Bhartṛhari is JS6 is not completely of a piece with the theory of names sketched above. According to JS6, names are given to things primarily on the basis of universals they express, not primarily on the basis of a quality belonging in a thing. The mechanism according to Bhartṛhari operates in the following manner: a word signifies its own universal (*svā jāti*) "first of all" (*prathamam*), it is then superimposed upon the universal belonging to

things (*arthajāti*). The term *arthajāti* stands duty for the term 'quality' of Kātyāyana's aphorism (I shall justify this statement presently) and suggests a confrontation between Bhartṛhari's theory of names and the theory of names embodied in Kātyāyana's aphorism, according to which individuals are given names because of the properties which belong to them. The confrontation was acknowledged by Helārāja, who introduced JS7–8 with the following preliminary remarks that serve to link JS6, the theory of names embodied in Kātyāyana's aphorism and JS7–8:

How can the universal which inheres in a word designate the universal belonging in things as being non-different,⁶³ when they belong in different substrata? Having suspected this [difficulty], he elucidates the point (lit.it) by means of an illustration:

Just as the essence (*tattva*), which is in the quality red, is designated in lacquer (*kaṣāya*) and, as a result of contact with the conjoint, is grasped even in garments, so also the universal which is fixed in words, as a result of the relation between word and object, brings about the effect of universals (*jātikārya*) when universals belonging in things are designated.

trJS7–8

The stanzas are extremely dense. The density is due to Bhartṛhari's attempt to present his new theory, sketched in JS6, as an extension of the older theory embodied in Kātyāyana's aphorism, rather than as a sharp break away from it. JS7A sets up resonances with Kātyāyana's aphorism but also calls attention to the ontological status of the 'quality' mentioned there. In my original translation (on p.24) of the aphorism I had rendered the phrase *guṇasya bhāva* as "presence of a quality", JS7 presents *bhāva* as *tattva* 'essence' rather than 'presence.' Under this interpretation the aphorism reads as follows:

[The occasioning ground for the use of a name is] that quality because of whose essence a name is applied to a thing.

The more ancient theory is thus described in terms of the view that names are given to individuals on the basis of universals or essences belonging in a quality, rather than on the basis of qualities alone. This interpretation brings Kātyāyana's quality in line with *arthajāti* (thing universal) mentioned in JS6. I can readily see the rationale for this shift in emphasis, although no justification is given in the context, either by Bhartṛhari or Helārāja. The justification is this: if names apply to their objects uniformly, then the ground for the application of names must also be uniform. And Bhartṛhari is acutely conscious that qualities are non-uniform and, for that reason, beyond the scope of language.⁶⁴

JS7A alludes to the older theory of names and JS7B alludes to the

older theory of extended or derived names, according to which a name belonging to an individual is transferred to another on account of a relation the second one bears to the first. JS8 alludes to Bhartṛhari's new theory presented in JS6, hints at the greater explanatory scope of the new theory and suggests that the older paradigm should be replaced by the new one. These various levels of allusions are held together by an illustration the terms of which are not explicitly set forth, not even by Helārāja the commentator.

The illustration draws its basic terms from the practice of dyeing garments in dyes made of *kaṣāya* (lacquer, according to Helārāja: trHJS7–8p.19.9) and naming the garment, *kāṣāya*, a name derived from the name of the dye. The practice, of naming garments after the names of their dyes, is recorded by Pāṇini.⁶⁵

The illustration functions at several levels; the first level is occupied by the older theory of names—a garment dyed in lacquer (*kaṣāya*) derives both its colour as well as its name (*kāṣāya*) from the 'essence' of the colour. An object in the external world similarly receives its designation as well as its colour from the "essence" or "universal" which is fixed in the name. And just as the dye achieves a complicated effect when it is transferred onto the garment, so also a name achieves a complicated effect when it is attached onto an external object. Both effects are due to the essence/universal which, located in one place, is transferred onto another.

I shall presently describe what this effect is. But I must first point out that the stanza contains a two-fold justification of Bhartṛhari's newer theory of names given in JS6: the first consists in observing that the older theory sanctioned a transference of names from one substratum to another, the giving of names to *x*, when they primarily belong to *y*, because *x* and *y* happen to be conjoined in some way. The new theory enunciated in JS6 is not radically different: the universal (read *tattva*, JS7) located in a fixed way (Helārāja reads *samaveta*, trHJS7–8p.20.6), in the word (Helārāja read this as *vyaktisphoṭa*, see trHJS7–8p.20.5–6), primarily names the ideal individual and is then extended to the external individual, with which the word is in contact. The relation of the word universal (*śabdajāti*) to the name is fixed, and is compared to the relation of the universal redness which exists in the colour red. The relation of the word with the external individual is looser, and is compared to the relation between garments and dyes. Thus the query, raised by Helārāja in his introductory remarks to the stanza, is answered by giving an account of the new theory in terms which are drawn out of the earlier one. Just as a name properly belonging to an individual *x* is transferred

to an individual *y* because of a certain relation *x* bears to *y*, so also the universal belonging in a name is transferred onto a universal belonging in a thing because of a certain relation, namely contact (*samyoga*). As a result, the name and its external bearer acquire a common substratum (cf. trHJS7–8p.17.15–17).

However, the second justification of the theory, implied in the phrase "effect of universals", suggests that the real grounds for the acceptance of the new theory lie in its more enhanced explanatory scope. This enhanced scope derives from the richer content to which a name, on the basis of its universal, now has access. To comprehend the explanatory scope of Bhartṛhari's new theory of names will take us far beyond JS6, 7–8. For the phrase harks back to the two relations *viruddhaikārthasamavāya* (incompatible co-inherence) and *aviruddhaikārthasamavāya* (compatible co-inherence), mentioned in Section i, ranges over JS9–14 and culminates in the idea of Possible Existence (*upacārasattā*). Before I present my evidence for Bhartṛhari's conception of "the effect of universals", I would like to state very briefly, by way of summing up JS7–8, what I consider to be the essential features from which this effect derives.

"The effect of universals" derives from the hierarchical structure to which a universal located in a name has access. Participating in this hierarchical structure, a universal has access to the universals located in other names. Thus the name *śiṃṣapā* has access through its universal, *śiṃṣapātvaṃ* to *vrkṣatvaṃ* (treeness) which is located in the name *vrkṣa*. The name, on the basis of its own universal, has negative access to the universal located in the name *palāśa*.


When a name is given to an object in the eternal world, this complex pattern inherent in the name is transferred onto the object; the name dyes the object in a complicated pattern and thus achieves a complex effect, "the effect of universals". This effect cannot be achieved by thing universals (*arthajāti*), because external universals do not, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, inhere in other universals.⁶⁶

Thus "the effect of universals", deriving from word universals (*śabdajāti*) and the relations these universals bear to one another, and logically prior to phenomenal experience, represents a theory of the analytic and antonymic content of names.

By drawing the analytic and antonymic content of names into his theory of names, Bhartṛhari enlarged its scope and its explanatory power. And he used the enlarged scope to deal with a wide ranging set of issues surrounding analysis of negative compounds, rituals and metaphysics.

In order to make the conceptual advances achieved in JS7–8 more

vivid to the reader. I can now make a more detailed version of the diagram drawn on p.30.



In vrVP1.15–23 (quoted on p.18), Bhartṛhari had described compatible co-inherence and incompatible co-inherence in terms of a cluster of universals. In trJS9 this cluster is given shape: two universals do not merely inhere side by side, the higher one inheres in the lower one.⁶⁷ Or, the higher one draws into itself the lower one, through an operation called *ekaśeṣa* (Remaindering of One). In another place Bhartṛhari recognized that this operation is forbidden in the context of universals. Because the universal is one (*ekā*), and because it lacks complexity, the operation in the earlier theory had seemed to be superfluous.⁶⁸ In JS9, Bhartṛhari introduced a complexity into the concept by suggesting that the higher universal is a 'Remaindering of One' of the lower ones. Thus the universal, being a word, represents a 'Remaindering of One' of its lower universals, being a word for trees, and being a word for animals.

In JS10, Bhartṛhari described the higher universal as crossing over (*ati + kram*) its particular word universalness (*śabdajātītva*) in order to lodge elsewhere.

That word universal which is located in [all] words, [but] which is different from the words [in which it is located], resides there having even crossed over [its own] word universalness.

trJS10

I read this stanza in the following manner. A universal has the capacity to cross over both its own substratum as well as the phonetic features associated with it. Thus *vrkṣatva* loses its phonetic marks when it lodges

in *śiṃṣapā*. *Śiṃṣapā* has the sense of *vrkṣa* but not its phonetic features. Universals first give up their singular number when they associate with individuals, because the finished word derives its number and gender in respect of individuals, not universals.⁶⁹ Universals next give up their phonetic features when they associate with the substratum of other universals, because names besides signifying their own universals (*svā jāti*), signify universals belonging to other names. Thus the passage of a universal from its original substrata-less state, first to a substratum which is its own, and later into substrata that are not its own, is characterised as a series of deprivations; the one in order to become the many is forced to renounce aspects of its own unity.⁷⁰

Renouncing their native substrata, universals inhere in other universals to form a hierarchy of higher and lower universals, in the process violating the Vaiśeṣika dogma that universals do not subsist in other universals (cf. HJS7–8p.20.1–3). Renouncing its unity, a higher universal spawns classes of lower universals, which in turn spawn their own offspring in an endless hierarchical array, an array which is analogous to the structure of a family tree (cf. vrVP.1.1.p.13.34–4). The hierarchy reaches all the way up to the Supreme Universal, (*mahāsāmānya*), the Great Plenum in which all words are properly fixed:⁷¹

Divided into cows and so forth through distinctions present in those things which are its relata,
[this] Being is called the [Supreme] Universal; and all words are fixed in this Universal.

JS33


And just as the founding ancestor of a well established family bestows his essence on all subsequent generations so also this Supreme Universal marks all its successors.

Behind the metaphorical vocabulary with its monistic overtones, there lies an abstract approach to meaning relations, an approach which brings together the following ideas:

1. The basically extensional idea that universals define classes which can be further divided into sub-classes.
2. The basically intensional idea that the higher universal is included in the lower universal – the meaning of 'cow' includes the meaning of 'animal'.

The conception prompted Helārāja to borrow Sāṃkhya metaphysics, the idea of Prakṛti as the seed of all Creation (see trJS34). In spite of the metaphysical tones of the vocabulary, the conception of the Great Being has its basis in facts about language; the fact that names have analytic

content and that this content can be represented in hierarchical terms. In order to pin down the exact sense of the two relations compatible co-inherence and incompatible co-inherence, which Bhartṛhari defined in terms of the hierarchy, and in order to set up historical resonances between Bhartṛhari's text and Dignāga's, I mean to diagram the hierarchy and, on the basis of the diagram, define the two relations mentioned above:



Let us define the relation of 'being a sibling' between elements in the hierarchy which share a common parent: by this definition *śiṃśapā* (rosewood) and *palāśa* are siblings because they share a common parent in the form of *vrkṣa* (tree). Similarly *nīlotpala* (blue-lotus) and *raktotpala* (red-lotus) are siblings because they share a common parent in *utpala* (lotus). Compatible co-inherence (see p.18) can, on the basis of this hierarchy, be defined as the relation which obtains between an element and its parent, its grandparents, great grandparents and so on along the immediate ancestral line right up to the Great Universal (*mahāsāmānya*), which is the Great Being. Incompatible co-inherence can be defined as the relation given by siblings. Thus *śiṃśapā* and *palāśa* are rivals or, in Dignāga's image, king's sons quarrelling over their inheritance (cf. vrPS5.28:NC2 p.638)

The content defined by compatible co-inherence is the analytic content of a word; the content defined by incompatible co-inherence is the antonymic content. The former is given by the elements which lie

along its ancestral lines; the latter is given by an element's siblings. Bhartṛhari observed that both the analytic and antonymic content could be regarded as universals (*sāmānya*); the former as the "recurring property" (*anupravṛttidharma*), the latter as the "differentiating property" (*vyāvṛttidharma* cf. JS14).⁷²

As well as defining for Bhartṛhari the antonymic and analytic content of names, the hierarchy introduced Bhartṛhari to a new conception of objects. In the new conception everything which falls within the domain of universals becomes its object. Thus both the *śiṃśapā* and *palāśa* are objects which are defined by the universal treeness (*vrkṣatvam*). The new conception also relativised the notion of objects; *śiṃśapā* is an object vis-à-vis treeness, but a universal vis-à-vis a particular species of *śiṃśapā*. It is all a matter of the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*).⁷³ Thus through the hierarchy there emerged the view that names on the basis of their universals name all their bearers. "Objects of words", Bhartṛhari now claimed "are established as having functional definitions". (cf. *vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthitāḥ*, JS11.)

Everything, with the exception of the Great Being which is the Supreme Universal, can be regarded as an object or individual:⁷⁴

Therefore it is held that everything which is meant is an individual (*dravya*)

JS13

The conception of the individual in JS6 was implicitly modelled after the conception of individuals presupposed by Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, namely that of a singular spatio-temporal bearer, endowed with a quality. In JS6 this quality was transformed into a universal (*arthajāti*) and made secondary to the universal residing in words (*śabdajāti*), but it had a distinct status. Under the new conception the status of the thing universal is ignored. Universals define classes of objects, names on the basis of their universals define classes of bearers. If JS6 had harked back to Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, the new definition of objects, given in JS13, harks back to Kātyāyana's conception that universals define a class of objects. For Bhartṛhari, however, universals define classes of objects, arranged in a hierarchical order.

Bhartṛhari freed himself from JS6 and the shadow of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names in trJS47. In fact JS47 can be looked at as presenting a counterexample to Kātyāyana's theory of names, that individuals are named on the basis of a quality which belongs to them. The counterexample is designed to bring about a confrontation between Kātyāyana's aphorism on names and Kātyāyana's analysis of the qualifier-qualificand

relation. According to Kātyāyana, a group of compounds such as *rāja-puruṣa* (he is the king's man) signify a relation which is in excess of the names out of which the compound is composed: the relation emerges independently of the names at the sentential level. Now the compound can also be treated as a name; the addition of *tva* or *tal* to the compound articulates the occasioning ground for the use of the compound. In the case of compounds the quality expressed by addition of *tva* or *tal*, will express the relation in the compound and so 'exceed over' (*ati+ric*) the quality on the basis of which the individual names which compose the compound are given.⁷⁵ Bhartṛhari claimed that there was nothing in the external world corresponding to this relation:

The distinguishing essence which is located [in such compound expressions as] 'jasmine-scent' 'lotus-scent' is not named in the world by the abstract suffix because of impermanence [of objects in the world]

trJS47

Bhartṛhari may have had in mind Kātyāyana's equation of qualities with impermanence (vt.53 on P1.2.64), as well as his own belief that the qualifier-qualificand relation, signified in compounds such as *utpala-gandha* (this is a lotus scent) is not constructed out of experience (I will go into this doctrine in the next section).

The conception, that names on the basis of their universals have *a priori* access to a hierarchically organized content over which relations can be defined, was extremely liberating for Bhartṛhari; first, as a tool of grammatical analysis, the conception allowed him to treat negative compounds such as *abrāhmaṇa* (non-Brahmana) as *tatpuruṣa-s* (Determinative compounds) instead of as *bahuvrīhi-s* (Dependent compounds); secondly, as a tool for solving problems connected with ritual, the conception justified substitution of materials that were unavailable; thirdly, as a tool of metaphysics, the conception underlined Bhartṛhari's claim that the "nominal base signifies the Great Being" (JS34); fourthly, as a tool for forging his view that grammar was the basic science, the conception laid the ground-work for that idea.

I am unable to delineate the full scope of Bhartṛhari's linguistic achievements that derive specifically through the agency of this hierarchical conception of names. I shall confine my attention to one example, the negative compound *abrāhmaṇa*.

Controversy surrounded the proper analysis of the compound *abrāhmaṇa*. Bhartṛhari and Helārāja treated it as a *tatpuruṣa* (Determinative) compound, and argued against grammarians who would treat

it as a *bahuvrīhi* (Dependent).⁷⁶ The issue dividing grammarians can be pin-pointed in the following terms. Should the demonstrative pronoun in the sentence: 'this is a non-brāhmaṇa' be treated as independent of the elements in the compound or should it be derived through the elements in the compound? The former treatment would identify the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*, for the compound would adjectivally qualify an individual, e.g. a *kṣatriya*, who has been referred to either by the word *kṣatriya* or an independently derived demonstrative pronoun.⁷⁷ The latter treatment would identify the compound as a *tatpuruṣa* because the individual identified through the demonstrative is drawn out of the second element in the compound.

Bhartṛhari denied that the sense of the pronoun in the sentence, 'he is a non-Brāhmaṇa' is independent of the element of the compound. Referring to *abrāhmaṇa*, he said:⁷⁸

The word does not apply to clods of earth.

VS280B

Instead he proposed an analysis that would endow the demonstrative with a sense as well as a reference derived indirectly from *brāhmaṇaḥ*.⁷⁹ This indirect sense is given by the analytic and antonymic content of the word, more precisely the content of its immediate parent. The proper analysis of the compound would be:⁸⁰

This (tawny-haired man or learned man, who could be either a *brāhmaṇa* or a *kṣatriya*), is a *non-brāhmaṇa*.

In this way both negation and the demonstrative pronoun in the compound are fitted out in terms of the hierarchical structures implicit in the analytic content (tawny-haired men or learned men) and the antonymic content (*kṣatriya*) of the name *brāhmaṇa* (cf. *brāhmaṇārtham āśritya naṇo viṣayaprakṛtiḥ*, HVS278p.280.6–7).⁸¹ Under the terms of this analysis the compound *abrāhmaṇa* can be treated as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. The analysis involves an appeal to the hierarchy implicit in names, in other words to what JS8 calls "the effect of universals" (*jāti-kārya*). Helārāja underlined the source of this appeal when he claimed in this context that it is always the object in the understanding (*buddhi*) which is superimposed onto the external world.⁸² The hierarchical structure on which the proper analysis of the name depends cannot be attributed to nature. For the same reasons Bhartṛhari in JS8B attributed "the effect of universals" to word universals, not to universals belonging in phenomena.

The hierarchical conception of universals, and the attendant treatment of objects as interchangeable with universals, permitted Bhartṛhari to use 'words for a universal' (*jātiśabda*) and 'word for an individual' (*bhedaśabda*), as relative terms, not as distinct categories of names. The conception also supported the doctrine that 'the word for a universal', in some important respect, entails all the words for the individual which fall within its range.⁸³ He called the word for an individual a "reiterating word" (*punaḥ śrutiḥ*), because, says Helārāja, "the very same word is implied before by the (word for the) universal (HJS89p.87.22.23)".⁸⁴ 'The word for an individual' entailed by the 'word for a universal', Bhartṛhari further maintained, has a restrictive purpose (*niyamārtha*, cf. VP2.64 and HS89). Bhartṛhari illustrated the matter in the context of ritual in the following way:

"You should sacrifice", from this Vedic injunction one receives the notion that some substance should be sacrificed. This substance in general could include barley, rice or goats. On hearing the additional word 'rice' (*vrihi*), the idea of substance in general is specified, and the other substances suggested through the injunction, are disregarded. Thus the word 'rice' is "the reiterating restrictive word" (*niyamārthā punaḥ śrutiḥ*), in the context of substance. But in another context it need not have this restrictive role. For instance in the context of the injunction, "You should sacrifice rice", the role of the word 'rice' is very different, as a word for a universal, here it entails its own specifying words, words such as 'śreṣṭhavrīhi'.⁸⁵

By noting that Bhartṛhari's analysis of the compound *abrāhmaṇa* and his treatment of words for individuals and words for universals derive from essentially similar structures, given through the analytic and antonymic content of names, I have hinted at the vital role Bhartṛhari's conception of names has in his approach to a variety of problems.

At this point let me pause to note that the hierarchical conception of names, liberating though it was, was purchased at a high price. The renunciation of Kātyāyana's ancient aphorism on names was the price Bhartṛhari had to pay for the new conception of names. Kātyāyana's aphorism had appeared to maintain a very tight connection between two elements: the content of names and the content of their bearers. The new theory repudiated this idea: names name a multiplicity of bearers, their content ranges far beyond the single spatio-temporal owner. The older theory had treated non-derived names in the nominative case as atomic, i.e. unrelated to other names; Bhartṛhari's theory relin-

quishes this idea – names, through their analytic content are automatically related to other names: the name 'cow' is related to the name 'animal'.⁸⁶

However, the renunciation of the older order was more than compensated for by the gain, the discovery of the Upaniṣadic Brahman. The Great Being as the Great Universal (*mahāsāmānya*) is the analytic content of all names. To name an object is, therefore, automatically to stamp it with the stamp of eternity:⁸⁷

Eternity is firmly attached in non-eternals also, through their nature as the named

SS34A

Thus grammar, the science which deals with the proper analysis of names, is the first rung in the ladder which leads to perfection (cf. VP1.16). Depending on one's point of view, the discovery that the Brahman is the analytic content of all names could be either an extraordinary discovery, comparable to the discovery of the philosophers' stone (*cintāmaṇi*), or a terribly ironical one.⁸⁸ I am not at all sure how Bhartṛhari regarded it.

V

Bhartṛhari had located a hierarchically organized content in the purely formal features belonging to names and had, on the basis of the hierarchy, derived structures which had allowed him successfully to interpret *abrāhmaṇa* (non-Brahmana) as a *tatpuruṣa* compound. And yet when it came to the analysis of another group of *tatpuruṣa* compounds, a group which includes *vīrapuruṣa* (the man is heroic), *kr̥ṣṇatila* and *śiṃṣapā-vṛkṣa*, he had not appealed to this semantic source. At first glance *śiṃṣapā-vṛkṣa* appears eminently suited to an analysis based on an appeal to the analytic content: after all, as Patañjali had remarked, *śiṃṣapā* is never a non-tree.⁹⁰ And yet, Bhartṛhari had chosen to ignore the compound altogether and had restricted his analysis to those compounds in the group whose first member has an adjectival form (*guṇaśabda*).

The example *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* crystallizes some crucial historical and philosophical issues. These historical issues include Patañjali's brief and ambiguous remark about it, Bhartṛhari's silence, Kaiyaṭa's interpretation of Patañjali's ambiguous remark and the shadowy contribution of the Buddhist philosopher, Dignāga. My concern in this section is to focus attention on Bhartṛhari's silence and the philosophical problems that laid the foundation of this silence; Kaiyaṭa's apparent resolution of the problem and the philosophical basis of that resolution. And my overall

purpose, which will be carried forward into the next three chapters, is to explain and assess the systematic virtues of the various theoretical solutions adopted by our various protagonists, Bhartṛhari, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, in the context of *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa*.

The framework for the discussion of these issues is fairly complicated, for it is put together out of diverse theoretical considerations, which include the rules governing the uses of the nominative and the genitive case endings. The nominative, according to the tradition of grammarians later than Pāṇini, reflects the meaning of the base (*prātipadikārtha*);⁹¹ the qualifier-qualificand relation being the province of the genitive.⁹² Thus while the name *vṛkṣaḥ* designates a tree, *vṛkṣasya* designates the tree as the locus of a relation. The compounds *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa* and *kṛṣṇatila* are analysed in the following way: *śiṃśapā cāsau vṛkṣaḥ* (the tree is a *śiṃśapā*) and *kṛṣṇaś cāsau tilaḥ* (the sesame is black). The analysis presents two names in the singular as being assigned to the same substratum. However, a hidden premise here, not reflected in the analysis, is that when the names are assigned to the same substratum the first member becomes a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*).⁹³ Thus the names in the analysis *vṛkṣa* (tree) and *tila* (sesame) do not merely designate a tree and a sesame seed, but designate them as the loci of a relation. The meaning of the base is, therefore, declared to have "been surpassed" (*atīrīc*) and rules governing the nominative violated. An objection to the analysis is therefore raised:⁹⁴

There . . . the meaning of the base is surpassed; reasoning thus [we say that] the nominative does not obtain. The genitive would; provisions must be made for its non-occurrence.
Cardona, 1968 p.317

Kātyāyana's reply to the objection is recorded by Cardona:⁹⁵

Vt.2 ad II.3.46 counters this objection by noting that the additional meaning is the meaning of the sentence, not of the *prātipadika* [i.e. the base] in the sentence
Cardona, 1968 p.380

This complicated framework was summed up by Bhartṛhari in a stanza which appeared at the head of his discussion of the class of compounds which signify the qualifier-qualificand relation and include *kṛṣṇatila*:

The relation of *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya* [qualifier-qualificand] arises between *pada*-s nor is the base meaning thus surpassed in them.

VS6:Cardona 1968 p.320

Against this background provided by Kātyāyana's analysis of the qualifier-qualificand relation, Patañjali had raised the following problem: why does one name in the compound alone become a qualifier and the other the qualified, why, for instance, *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa* and not *vṛkṣaśiṃśapā*, why *kṛṣṇatila* and not *tilakṛṣṇa*?⁹⁶ Patañjali's answer to this problem had been both informal and subject to ambiguous interpretation; he had chosen to reply in different stages, the answer to compounds such as *kṛṣṇatila*, whose first member is an adjectival name, had been different from his answer to compounds whose first member is a generic name. The solution he had proposed for *kṛṣṇatila* derived from the observation that adjectival names have expectation (*ākāṅkṣā*) for individuals (*dravya*). Patañjali had not spelled out the nature of this expectation or "necessary requirement" (S.D. Joshi's rendering of *ākāṅkṣā*) whether, for instance, it is semantic or syntactic. Instead, Patañjali had informally illustrated it briefly and startlingly as follows: "When the injunction says, 'Slaughter the white one, slaughter the black one', one's duty is not done by slaughtering an effigy made of flour."⁹⁷ Kaiyaṭa explained the illustration:

When we have the injunction *śvetam chāgam ālabheta*: 'one should immolate a white goat', a black goat can be immolated in the absence of a white one, but immolation of another white substance in the absence of the goat is not allowed.

Joshi, 1971 p.147

Patañjali's remarks here did not in any obvious way carry over into the context of *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa*, where both names are generic. There is, therefore, no question of a syntactic expectation between them. Patañjali restricted his comments on the compound to the following ambiguous remark:⁹⁸

. . . there is no simultaneous application, which is necessary, of these two words. For a *śiṃśapā* is never a non-tree.

MB on vt.1 to P2.1.64

Kaiyaṭa, however, took a general view of the matter and decided to give a general definition of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*), a decision which enabled him to give a unified interpretation of compounds like *kṛṣṇatila* and *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa*. Understanding a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) as anything which distinguishes (*bhedaka*) or restricts the meaning of the qualified (*viśeṣya*), he showed that the name *śiṃśapā* can be regarded as restricting or qualifying the meaning of the name *vṛkṣa*. His reasoning, which consists in interpreting Patañjali's *ākāṅkṣā* semantically, is summed up by Joshi:

In the case of species-genus relation the word covering the wider area of meaning is regarded

as *viśeṣya* [a qualifier] and the word which covers the smaller area as *viśeṣaṇa* [qualifier]. Therefore *vrkṣa* must be *viśeṣya* and *śiṃṣapā viśeṣaṇa*.

Joshi, 1971 p.150 fn.526

Joshi's comments here derive from Kaiyaṭa's:⁹⁹

Because treeness is the pervader, has the larger extension, and is alone perceived first from a distance, it is the qualified. Being a *śiṃṣapā* on the other hand, has a smaller extension, is grasped later (i.e. on coming closer) and functions like the quality white.

Kaiyaṭa on vt.2 to P2.1.57

Kaiyaṭa's exposition is a combination of formal and informal features. Its cutting edge, slurred over by Kaiyaṭa, is the fact that the class of trees includes the class of *śiṃṣapā*. The terms of Kaiyaṭa's exposition, though presented without any preliminaries, derive from Dignāga's extensional analysis of the qualifier-qualificand relation, according to which the qualifier and qualified are related by a pervasion (*vyāpti*).¹⁰⁰ Kaiyaṭa's general notion of a qualifier, as something which restricts the meaning of the qualified, is also connected with Bhartṛhari's notion that the word for an individual in some sense restricts the meaning of the word for the universal. My reason for bringing these allusions into the present context is that despite the conceptional apparatus at his command, Bhartṛhari had chosen to ignore *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa* and had confined his attention to compounds whose first members are adjectival and Dignāga also, with a similarly complicated conceptual apparatus, had defined the *apoha*-operation as a preliminary measure.¹⁰¹ Why? The answer is located, I think, in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* laying down the rules for the nominative and his view that the qualifier-qualificand relation emerges at the sentential level, not at the nominal level. Had Bhartṛhari, in order to analyse *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa*, invoked his relation called compatible co-herence, which describes the analytic content, he would have violated the framework of these rules. And had Dignāga not defined his *apoha*-operation as a prior measure, his view that the qualifier-qualificand relation can be interpreted extensionally as the relation between a class and its sub-class,¹⁰² also would have gone against the terms of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*. The interpretation which Kaiyaṭa puts on Patañjali's remark about *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa* represents a very new way of looking at the matter but ignores the provisos implicit in this novel approach. According to Kātyāyana, the qualifier-qualificand relation emerges at the sentential level between names which are unrelated. Kaiyaṭa, on the other hand, held that the qualifier-qualificand relation emerges at the nominal level between names which are related. Whether one puts a Dignāgian slant

on Kaiyaṭa's interpretation or a Bhartṛharian slant,¹⁰³ the problem will remain. This is because under Kātyāyana's framework of rules there cannot be any appeal to the semantic expectation between names. This I believe is the explanation of Bhartṛhari's silence on the subject of *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa* as well as the specific turn that his analysis of the qualifier-qualificand relation took. It also suggests the *raison d'être* for Dignāga's *apoha* operation.

Bhartṛhari's treatment of the problems that he inherited from Patañjali is presented in VS9–20. In these stanzas he became a spokesman for Patañjali's point of view. However, even as a spokesman for Patañjali, he shaped his treatment to conform to his ultimate view of the matter. His expression can be distinguished from his predecessor's in three important respects: (a) he ignored *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa*; (b) he introduced into a grammatical context issues which were purely epistemological; (c) he enlarged the context of his discussion by bringing in possible solutions not considered by Patañjali. His exposition, unlike Kaiyaṭa's, is more formal, unmarked by any appeal to empirical facts.

Speaking on behalf of the tradition, Bhartṛhari attributed the capacity of names to come together in a compound through a qualifier-qualificand relation to their syntactic form. Thus he interpreted Patañjali's expectation syntactically, not semantically. He held that the name *kṛṣṇa* (the black), by virtue of its syntactic form as an adjectival name (*guṇa-śabda*), has the capacity to combine with generic names (*jātiśabda*).¹⁰⁴ Generic names are similar to names for things (*dravyaśabda*) because they are not used as qualifiers; in Sanskrit there are no expressions such as '*śābaleyaśya gauḥ*' (the cow of spotty); on the other hand, it is perfectly acceptable to say '*paṭasya śuklaḥ*' (the white of cloth).¹⁰⁵ A generic name combines, on the basis of its syntactic form, with an unknown adjectival name. Similarly an adjectival name combines on the basis of its syntactic form with a generic name, also unknown. In a compound these unknown factors are turned aside.

Having taken a syntactic view of the matter, Bhartṛhari was forced to renounce an analysis of *śiṃṣapāvrkṣa*, whose first member is a generic name. Having given a syntactic explanation of *kṛṣṇatila* and implicitly interpreted Patañjali's *ākāṅkṣā* syntactically, Bhartṛhari went on to cast Patañjali's analysis into an epistemological scheme. The reasons for this were to emerge many stanzas later.¹⁰⁶

An individual's nature is separately resorted to as a consequence of distinctions arising out of association with a quality; a second individual is, as it were, grasped as a consequence of distinctions arising out of association with generic features.

The union of these two unrelated states, one representing *kṛṣṇa* and the other representing *tila*, is as it were:¹⁰⁷

A third state of the individual, one in which the two [other stages] mingle.

VS14

Presiding over this artificial division in the same individual is the Understanding (*buddhi*), She (*sā*) who is the Creator (*vidhāyikā*):¹⁰⁸

The Understanding separates the one into the many, and [out of the many] reaches the one. The understanding divides [its own various stages]; for the Understanding is the Creator of objects.

VS15

Something of Patañjali's spirit suffered in Bhartṛhari's translation; Bhartṛhari's restatement has a decidedly idealistic tone. And I do not think that this idealistic tone has any counterpart in Patañjali's discussion; on the contrary, Patañjali, as we saw, in discussing these very issues seemed anxious to defend the cause of those who sacrificed real animals over symbolic ones. Bhartṛhari's shift in tone I do not think is dictated by any concern with sacrifices, rather it derived from his desire to treat the qualifier-qualificand relation as given *a priori*, not constructed out of names or out of phenomenal objects. What does it mean to say that the relation is not constructed but given? For Bhartṛhari it meant that the relation is given by the sentential object prior to experience. It meant that a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the object it qualifies (*viśeṣya*) plus the relation are given prior to experience in language or the understanding, which is the seat of language. This idea has a firm basis in Bhartṛhari's thought, and, after I have presented Bhartṛhari's arguments against the constructionist position, i.e. against the position of those who would build the compound out of its component names or out of objects given in nature, I shall return to substantiate my case.

By way of refuting the constructionist's theory of the qualifier-qualificand relation, Bhartṛhari translated it into an epistemological context. The translation concentrated upon preserving the conditions laid down in Kātyāyana's theory of names, the condition of atomicity and the condition on not being in excess of the bearer. Helārāja summed up these conditions below:¹⁰⁹

The qualifier which has accomplished its purpose, having placed a distinction on the qualified individual, does not cause the qualified individual to be exceeded over (*atīrīc*) by means of its own form, lest there be a determination of two objects.

HVS88p.194.13–15

Translated into an epistemological context, these conditions render acts of name-giving fragmentary and sequential, proceeding in stops and starts: the individual is identified through a qualifier, and before it is identified through the second qualifier, the first has to be withdrawn (*pratisamhāra*, cf. VS88). These fragmentary acts never add up to a unified sentential act, where one name acts as a qualifier and the other becomes the qualified individual. In opposition to the constructionist, Bhartṛhari proposed that the qualifier-qualificand relation be given, not in the external object, but in the understanding:¹¹⁰

In the functioning of the inner instrument [of the understanding] the imagining of an external object is vain; it follows then either that the qualifier-qualificand relation is not a favour granted [to the understanding by the external object] or that the object which is grasped [as external] is not established in that way [i.e. as qualified by a qualifier].

VS91

Presenting his case in the form of a dilemma, Bhartṛhari posed a choice: either one has to abandon the notion that external objects are organized in terms of qualifier and qualificand or one has to abandon the notion that the qualifier-qualificand relation is constructed on the basis of experience of phenomenal objects. The reasoning behind the dilemma presupposes the argument in V88–90. If names name external bearers and conform to Kātyāyana's formula for name-giving, then the qualifier-qualificand relation becomes unavailable. The choice is between renouncing the relation or postulating it as given in the understanding. Bhartṛhari's opinion, that the relation is given in the understanding in terms of an object which is potentially sentential, has a firm standing in his text. In VS92–93, Helārāja's introductory remarks serve to connect the strands of Bhartṛhari's argument: the sentential character of the object, as well as its non-constructed character:¹¹¹

Having demonstrated the impossibility of an opposing view, a view which rests upon discrete cognitions (*bhinnajñāna*), in order to establish the real qualifier-qualificand relation by means of the doctrine resting on a single cognition, which is his own view, he says:

The understanding, woven as it were, out of its intimately associated aspects, applies to the object. Thereafter, grammarians [lit. those who explain] having divided this understanding, speak of it discretely:

In this undivided nature of the understanding, they think there is a division of qualifier and qualified, having resorted to yet another [idea in the] understanding.

HVS92–93p.195.21–22:VS92–93

VS92–93 echo a theme from VP1. I offer a close paraphrase of the passage which I believe illuminates Bhartṛhari's briefly expressed views above: The word and its object are eternally connected (*nityapravīyoga*).

The object (*vastu*), eternally connected with a word, is qualified by all its qualifiers (*sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam*); among these Vṛṣabhadeva includes universals (*jāti*), the individuals (*dravya*), and gender (*liṅga*). This object is described as a "spectrum of intimately associated parts" (*saṃsargiṇī-nām mātrāṇām kalāpam*). It is simultaneously grasped (*yugapadyena*) in a single act of understanding (*ekasyām buddheḥ*). It is divided into parts by other acts of the understanding (*buddhyantaraiḥ pravibhajyate*). Since a unified cognition (*pratibhā*) whose subject is purposive action (*arthakriyā*), i.e. action directed toward the satisfaction of ends, is not forthcoming without a unification of what has already been divided, the understanding again unites (*pratyavamiṣati*) these very associated parts.¹¹² These passages underpin fairly clearly Bhartṛhari's view that ideal objects are given innately in the understanding, which is the creator of objects.

If we, endowed with hindsight, now look back to the stanzas where Bhartṛhari had dealt with the qualifier-qualificand relation in terms of the analysis offered by Patañjali, we can see a rationale behind Bhartṛhari's epistemological treatment of Patañjali's approach. The epistemological context, set by positing an ideal object "qualified by all its qualifiers" as innately given in language, allowed Bhartṛhari to free Patañjali from the burden of having to construct the qualifier-qualificand relation on the basis of the component names.

Concern with a proper analysis of the qualificand-qualifier relation brought Bhartṛhari to the threshold of idealism. To assume that the qualifier-qualificand relation is given in the understanding is to hold, according to Helārāja that:¹¹³

Everywhere, the externally superimposed appearance of the understanding (lit. inner instrument) alone is the object.

HVS91p.195.14–15

The hierarchical view which I have attributed to Bhartṛhari in Section iv of the chapter, when combined with the view that ideal objects are given prior to experience, dictate Bhartṛhari's metaphysics developed through the SS. The metaphysics envisaged access to a world of Possible or Ideal Being (*upacārasattā*) which is the basis of our understanding of the real world. By itself, unreflected in this ideal world, the external is inchoate. The view was underpinned in an analogy between language and crystals, which I will present in the next section.

I started my examination of Bhartṛhari's theory of names with his definition of individual as, 'this is that'. I have traced the link between this definition and Kātyāyana's early aphorism, which claimed that names

were given to things on the basis of a quality. I have stressed the earlier ideal of analysis, that there be a very tight relation between the content of a name and its spatio-temporal bearer. This ideal expressed itself in the concern to ensure that the name did not exceed over (*ati-ric* or *ati-vrt*) their bearers. I have contrasted this concern with Bhartṛhari's statement that:¹¹⁴

No meaning of words (*padārtha*) exceeds over this Being, the metaphorical occasioning ground for the use of all words. . . .

SS50A–51B

In the course of this chapter I have tried to highlight the grounds for Bhartṛhari's shift in emphasis, I have tried to show that Bhartṛhari's metaphysics of ideal objects was underpinned in several critical stages; first by his concern to take account of the analytic and antonymic content to which names have *a priori* access, and then by his concern to ensure a proper analysis of the qualifier-qualificand relation. Each of these critical stages in the metaphysics had been accompanied by its own slightly different view of the object, but an underlying thread had remained the same: the idea that names are given to things on the basis of the universal they express. JS6 had articulated the idea that names, on the basis of the universal they express and through the mechanism called superimposition, identify a single bearer in the external world as the locus of a universal. This view is summed up in the later literature as *tadvatpakṣa* (the view of the individual as the locus of a universal). From JS11 onward Bhartṛhari had propounded the view that universals associated with words define classes of individuals, which can be regarded either as universals or as individuals, and that these classes are hierarchically organized. This view was summed up in Dignāga as the view that: "the word which expresses a universal names all its own individuals" (trvrPS5.2). In VS92–93, Bhartṛhari had postulated the doctrine of ideal objects, which developed into the doctrine of an ideal world and became underpinned through the image of crystals; this analogy was critically examined by Dignāga (trPS5.6).

I shall carry this contrast between Kātyāyana's aphorism on names and Bhartṛhari's reformulation of the theory into the next chapter, where I intend to capture Dignāga's approach in terms of this contrast. I hope to be able to show there that Dignāga championed Kātyāyana's cause without sacrificing the explanatory scope that had been achieved by Bhartṛhari. In order to sharpen the contrast between Dignāga's theory and Bhartṛhari's I shall, in the next section, reproduce the stanzas in

which Bhartṛhari developed his analogy between crystals and language. My intention is to establish resonances between Dignāga's criticism of the crystal analogy and Bhartṛhari's formulation of it in SS40–41. By highlighting Helārāja's rejection of the crystal analogy and his preference for the position sketched by Bhartṛhari in JS6, I hope to be able to show that Dignāga's attack resonates through Helārāja's comments on Bhartṛhari's text. Eventually what I hope to be able to show is that Dignāga's commentator Dharmakīrti emerged as an advocate of Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming that is the basis of the crystal analogy.

vi

Just as such a thing as a crystal, through support of diverse colours, achieves a relationship [with an object] by taking on the same colour [or by an identity], on the basis of links with its own capacity (*svaśakti*), so also, the word, pre-established in this Being, achieves a relationship, through compatible and non-compatible properties.

SS40–41¹¹⁵

Helārāja's comments to this stanza, reproduced below, bear the imprint of Dignāga's critique of the mind/language/crystal analogy and help to restore the historical connections between Dignāga's and Bhartṛhari's text. Dignāga exploited the unresolved confusion in Bhartṛhari's conception of the hierarchically organized content of names and his conception of ideal objects.

At the first stage, the hierarchical conception emerged from considerations based upon the analytic content of names. The hierarchy consisted of universals organized in terms of higher and lower universals (see p.36). Objects under this view had "a functional definition", i.e. whether something was an object or not depended upon the place it occupied in the hierarchy and how the speaker chose to refer to it. Thus a flower is an object if the speaker is referring to 'an earthen substance', but a universal if the speaker is referring to roses. At the second stage the idea of the object underwent a change; here, "the object qualified by all its qualifiers" (among which Vṛṣabhadeva included universals)¹¹⁶ is given *a priori* in language. Universals thus came to be organized according to two patterns, a hierarchical pattern and a pattern which consisted of universals clustering around an ideal individual. As a result of these two patterns the hierarchy became somewhat untidy. However, the conception of the external object remained the same throughout these two theoretical constructions. The external object is that inferred entity

which by 'granting a favour' or 'rendering a service' makes actual the potentiality in language.¹¹⁷ Thus, Helārāja tells us, the name *gaur*, capable of designating nine different sorts of objects, designates one with humps and dewlaps in the presence of that object. Its potentiality is thus narrowed down, when presented with the external object.¹¹⁸ Words, or the universals located in words, and the ideal being to which they have access, are mirrors of reality; language is the mirror in which we discover external objects.¹¹⁹

When objects of words become designated, a different Possible Being comes into existence; it is the reflector of the form of all things in all their states.

SS39

With hindsight we can now look back and trace the mirror image implicit in several passages, for instance, in vrVP1.15–23p.52.8, 53.1–2, the portion which I had italicised (on p. 18) can now be explicated on the basis of the crystal/mirror analogy. I would also suggest that the italicised portions of JS33 (p. 35) can be explicated in terms of this analogy: the external object, which is in conjunction with or proximity (*samyogin*, cf. JS7B) of the mirror of language, shatters its non-reflecting surface: the all-embracing Plenum, capable of reflecting everything placed in front of it, is forced into the narrow shape of the present state of affairs.

Reflecting surfaces appear to have exercised a strong fascination for Bhartṛhari. Images formed on mirrors, diamonds, crystals, Roman glass, Chinese weapons, watery surfaces, oily surfaces all engaged his attention.¹²⁰

When the surface of a mirror is lowered, the reflection of the face is raised, when it is raised the reflection is lowered. In a dagger the reflection is long, in mustard oil it is dark, in Chinese weapons and Roman glass it falls in with the proportions of the reflectors.

vrVP1.99p.165.2–4

The analogy between language and crystals highlights the autonomous character of language. A crystal reflects its objects, not through the agency of light as modern physics would have it, nor through the receipt of colour from the external world, but through "links with its own powers" (*svaśaktiyoga*, SS40). It represents an ideal world in miniature, a possible world which becomes actual in the presence of the external world or the speaker's intention (*prayojana*, cf. SS1). The external object can be known only through the medium of language, its presence is inferred, because everything we know "is shot through with language".¹²¹ Objects are the creation of language and since language is

not an artifact, either human or divine (cf. SS38), objects are not the handiwork of a Creator, but of the Understanding (*buddhi*). It is She who is Creator of objects (*sā hy arthasya vidhāyikā*, VS15).

As well as highlighting the active aspects of language, the crystal analogy illumines its passivity. Language splits up and multiplies what is one, unites what is discrete (cf. VS15), but reflects what is in front of it.

The essential elements of Bhartṛhari's semantics, his theory that universals are logically prior to individuals and are the basis in terms of which individuals, whether internal or external, are identified, his theory that the relation between names and things is itself unnameable,¹²² are summed up in the following:¹²³

Through a relation not signified by words, words which signify universals and which have prior application to universals, also bring forth individuals.

VS345

The theory is underpinned in the crystal/language analogy.

Dignāga's critique of Bhartṛhari's crystal/language analogy concentrated on the untidy state in which Bhartṛhari's two theoretically separate moves had left his conception of the *a priori* content in language: the external object is complex and grants a variety of favours (*upakāra*), the receivers of this favour are untidily organized and fight over the favours to be received; the ensuing cognition is not sentential, but rainbow coloured – well suited to a prismatic view of the world (see trPS5.6).

Helārāja's comments below emphasize the "intervention" (*upadhāna*) of sentential forms, of negation and the qualifier-qualificand relation. The sentential form, it is suggested, gives pattern to the favours being received. Helārāja does not argue the case vigorously, he merely states it as a fact, that sentential forms intervene. I think his defence of Bhartṛhari could have been much more vigorous, given Bhartṛhari's idea of sentential form developed in VP2, but Helārāja was enamoured of the metaphorical model of language and the tentative dualism implicit in that model, and he let the matter rest in the following remarks. In his introductory comments, however, he disassociated himself from the image. I have, in the next section, examined his motives for doing so.

The object of a word is united with Possible Being, because the external object has a determined form [and] because presence and absence are not feasible in common [i.e. at the same time]; for when one says, 'the pot' its [simultaneous] association with forms being conditioned by other expressions such as, 'it is' and 'it is not', would be contradictory. Accordingly this object, which suffers [contrary] specifying forms that are being conditioned by other words, is like a crystal, mica or glass, because it is common to all [individuals whether

present or absent]. It is, therefore, apprehended as regulated through its power to unite with presence and absence in an appropriate way as, "it is" and "it is not". Similarly a thing such as a crystal, when in contact with, for instance blue things, without losing its own form (*svarūpa*), appears as though of that colour, because of its transparency. So also Possible Being, which is comparable to a crystal ornament, without abandoning that form, being related through the intervention (*upadhāna*) of negation and so on, achieves, as it were, an identity i.e. it appears as it were identified with negation. The crystal's own transparency-power is its capacity to accept diverse colours; similarly Possible Being's is its capacity to accept all particulars. Because they have common natures [or, because Possible Being has the nature of universals].

So also, the word means [so also] the object which belongs to the word; since the object is what is being verbalized by the word. Alternately it means: the word, which is fixed as the conveyor of Possible Being (lit. it), becomes related to the properties of what is being signified by other words through its meaning (*arthadvāreṇa*).

The word *contrary* is used to convey the sense of entirety. In this *Being* means in *Being* which has the form of cognition. *Pre*-[established] means that it achieves a relationship in the state of appearance [as opposed to reality] when the cognitive event is the product of [analysis of the sentence into] words. At the time of usage it is in a sentential state. The words *and so on* are meant to show that glass and so on are compatible [illustrations].

Compatible properties are identified with presences. With regard to Possible Being they are compatible properties just as jasmine flowers are in crystal; therefore, they are not grounds for the rejection [of other colours]. That is why, given their proximity, there is recourse to Possible Being through their identity. For compatible external existence obtains as a completed form of Possible Being. Therefore, it is said:

When a separate verb is not heard, the sense depends on [the additions of] "it is" or "it exists".

MB on p2.3.1

and so on. And since the present tense [of the verb *as*] causes a completing favour, he has said: '*bhavantīpara*'.¹²⁴ Alternately Possible Being is common between incompatible properties, therefore, it is Possible Being alone which is completed by appropriate particulars.

Incompatible properties, on the other hand, are identified with absences, they are identified with negation and cause the fading away of the form of Possible Being; just as the [red] hibiscus causes the [transparent] form of the crystal to fade away. Even though there is an absence of conflict [between the supposed incompatible properties], since they both reside in an orderly manner in Possible Being, this is said in reference to the external [where incompatibilities cannot obtain simultaneously].

Since the undivided external blue lotus is the object qualified as, "the lotus is blue", it is on the basis of divisions in Possible Being alone that, "an individual nature is separately resorted to as a consequence of distinctions arising out of association with quality" (VS12) etc., and when the qualifier-qualificand relation obtains [in this way], the formation, which will be spoken of, becomes feasible.

HSS40–41pp.151.14–17, 152.1–19

The doctrine that language inhabits an independent cognitive realm, and the crystal image which illustrates this doctrine, echo through the VP. In this section I shall try to show that Bhartṛhari's view of grammar, as laying the foundation of thought, had also drawn its inspiration from this doctrine. It, therefore, comes as somewhat of a surprise when we discover that Helārāja did not fully endorse this image, suddenly and without any support from Bhartṛhari's text. Introducing the crystal image in SS40–41, he said:¹²⁵

When [our] affairs are satisfied by this Being, then if another Being is imagined through some sort of largely useless motive which has the means etc. of fulfilling purpose, let it flourish; it does not concern us, for it does not enter into our affairs.

HSS40–1p.151.6–8

Helārāja's qualms here do not represent an isolated act; but have the nature of a preoccupation which runs through JS6, JS7–8, JS47 and JS102¹²⁶. The preoccupation has some of the characteristic features of an unresolved problem – it erupts in incomplete sentences, it is disorganized and it becomes an impulse which partially, and not very successfully, shapes his reading of Bhartṛhari's text.

The source of the problem was Dignāga's critique of Bhartṛhari's theory of names and his crystal image. In the fifth chapter of the PS Dignāga examined in great detail the various implications flowing from Bhartṛhari's theory that names are given on the basis of universals located in words. The critique culminated in a condemnation of Bhartṛhari's comparison of language and crystals: to hold that a name is a miniature possible world which reflects the external bearer with which it is in contact (*saṃsarga*), is to be condemned to a rainbow coloured view (*mecakadarśana*) of one who views the world through a prism. Dignāga's main criticism drew its thrust from a requirement that he introduced into the explanatory scope of the theory of names he enunciated: a proper theory of names must demonstrate how a name is correctly given to its singular spatio-temporal bearer.¹²⁷ Under Bhartṛhari's view that a name on the basis of its universal names all the bearers which fall within the range of this universal it is impossible, Dignāga claimed, to show how this could be done, because the number of bearers can be infinite.¹²⁸

For Bhartṛhari whether names correctly name their bearers had been a matter of some indifference. In fact he had conceded (in SS2) that

mistakes were possible when names were given to their bearers. And both Helārāja and Bhartṛhari's earlier commentator Vṛṣabhadeva had implicitly conceded Dignāga's charges, and yet their reactions had been very different. Vṛṣabhadeva's reaction had been to deny that it was possible to completely explain how names were related either to their infinitely many perceptual bearers or to other words, to cite an apt passage from Patañjali's MB as authority, and to link it to a passage in Bhartṛhari:¹²⁹

The meaning [or the object] is not taught. Because of brevity. For who is capable of teaching the meaning [or object] of nominal bases, of suffixes and of indeclinables?

Unlike Vṛṣabhadeva, Helārāja took upon himself the task of showing that, even though the teaching of a proper relation between names and their bearers is impossible under the view that names, through their universals, designate all their bearers, it is possible to teach it under the metaphorical model given in JS6.¹³⁰ Under this model a bearer in the external world is given a name when the universal located in the name is superimposed upon a universal belonging to a singular bearer in the external world. This view had been entertained by Bhartṛhari in JS6 and Helārāja became its advocate, promoting it over the crystal model. Helārāja's advocacy shaped his comments to JS7–8, where he maintained that, because thing universals have an existence apart from word universals, it is possible to determine their relation. In JS47 and JS102 he argued that thing universals did indeed have an ontologically separate status. Helārāja's greatest problems emerged in the context of JS47. The compound *utpalagandha* (lotus-scent) is a counter-example not only to Kātyāyana's aphorism that names are given on the basis of a quality but also to its re-interpretation in JS7A, that names are given on the basis of a universal belonging in things. This is because for Bhartṛhari and Helārāja, the qualifier-qualificand relation, signified by the compound, is not a feature of the external world. Helārāja was, therefore, forced to admit that the relation between the name *utpalagandha* and its bearer is 'too narrow' (*asādhāraṇa*, cf. HJS102, translated under JS47); the name, in such cases, is always 'in excess' of its bearer. What is especially interesting about Helārāja's preoccupations is his assumption that *saṅketa* (the proper teaching of a relation between a name and its bearer in the form, "this is a cow", cf. HJS6p.17.15) requires as its necessary condition that the content of a name not be in excess of its bearer.

A great difficulty with Helārāja's advocacy of the metaphorical model of language over the crystal model is that Helārāja was not pre-

pared to renounce the fruits of that analysis. The doctrine that language is independent of the world, paved the foundations of Bhartṛhari's catholicity. He could make the existence or otherwise of external universals a matter of choice and leave the decision to contentious philosophers. Helārāja's advocacy of thing universals would have committed Bhartṛhari's system to a dualism, however tentative, and comprised the foundations of his catholicity. Helārāja was not prepared to go that far; he wanted the catholicity and he also wanted the possibility of *saṅketa*.

viii

Grammar is the royal road to philosophy. It is a royal road because it steers a neutral course between various assumptions regarding the nature of the real world. Grammar, in Bhartṛhari's view, without making any assumptions about the nature of the real world, can articulate the foundations of our knowledge of it.

This vision of grammar is fulfilled by his theory that language embodies a realm of possible objects, which are implicitly sentential in character. These abstract objects become actualized in the presence of either what is external or through the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā* vrVP1.13p.44.4). The external is described by Bhartṛhari as extremely dense (*atyantasamsṛta*, cf. VP.2.302 and Puṇyarāja's comments) or inchoate (cf. vrVP1.23p.53.1; Vṛṣabhadeva's comments p.53.8–10) or as fulfilling purpose (cf. *arthakriyāviṣayā pratibhā*: vrVP1.24–26p.75.4; VP1.118p.193.5). Its role in our knowledge of the external world is wholly passive. So passive that Bhartṛhari is prepared to do without the external object altogether. It is then a wholly internal object that becomes externalised (cf. *artharūpākāraḥ pratyayātmā bāhyeṣu vastuṣu pratyastah*: vrVP1.13p.46.5). Two basic principles then negotiate the space between words and the so-called external object. Under the idealistic view, the object which is internal to language, which is summoned forth through the speaker's intention, is the cause of the externalized object. The externalized object, on the other hand, summons verbal responses, and is described as the cause of words. Words and objects are bound by causality, a causality which, however, is symmetrical.¹³¹

Under the non-idealistic view which posits an external *x*, capable of actualizing the potentiality of language, the space between actualized language and the so-called external, is bridged by the principle called 'fitness' or 'appropriateness' (*yogyatā*) or 'conformity' (*sārūpya*). This

fitness of language to reflect its object is compared to the fitness of the senses for their objects and the fitness of mirrors to reflect what is placed in front of them.¹³²

Language for Bhartṛhari inhabits an *a priori* realm and has *a priori* access to objects. Having secured the foundations of this theory on the basis of an investigation of the analytic content of names and on the basis of analyses of compounds, Bhartṛhari proceeded to explore several different ways in which the non-linguistic world of nature could be accommodated. The hierarchy implicit in the content of language became the background for these investigations. Bhartṛhari, the reader will recollect, closed one end of the hierarchy by postulating the existence of a highest all-embracing universal (*mahāsattā* or *mahāsāmānya*). He left the other side open-ended, without dogmatically insisting on either the open-endedness or the manner of its closing. "The flower", "the lotus", "the blue lotus", the process can continue as long as one wants; but, Bhartṛhari argues, one tends not to notice those distinctions for which one lacks words (cf. JS100). The hierarchy can, however, be declared closed by positing something which lies at the end.¹³³

Since at the end of everything rests either an inexpressible intrinsic nature or capacity, no usage is possible on its basis.

JS95

This is the terminal point of analysis, the point at which questioning ceases (cf. HJS95.15–16). Bhartṛhari left the choice of the manner of closing the bottom end of the hierarchy open to the different factious schools of thought. And, in order to make their choice both meaningful and vivid, between JS92 and JS99, he laid the foundations of a nominalistic as well as a platonistic approach to universals. As long as it was conceded that conceptual universals held sway in the realm of language and knowledge, the existence or otherwise of universals in the external world was a matter of supreme indifference to Bhartṛhari. This indifference was supported by Bhartṛhari's epistemology which was built entirely out of what is given *a priori* in language. Bhartṛhari's tolerance can then be traced to his belief that the disputes between various schools centered around irrelevancies.

In JS92 Bhartṛhari began implementing his vision of grammar as "the fundamental science" by declaring that either of two notions, similarity (*sādṛśya*) or innate capacity (*śakti*), can be substituted for the idea of universals. In order to account for uniformities in our cognitions, it is not necessary, Bhartṛhari implied, to posit phenomenal universals; the

notion of similarity or the notion that external phenomena impress the understanding in terms of uniformities, is able to do duty for the idea of universals. Two elements lie at the heart of the need to postulate universals: unity (*ekatva*) and the recurrence of this unity. Bhartṛhari analysed similarity as a complex notion which combined these two elements.¹³⁴

[The idea of] Unity (*ekatva*) is achieved in a single act by excluding (*apoha*) distinctions among entities which have distinct natures; [the idea of] similarity is achieved through repeated acts [of exclusion].

JS98

Having explored two different approaches to a nominalistic metaphysics, one which builds its theories on the basis of uniformities found in nature, the other which denies uniformities in nature but attributes uniformities to the understanding and the innate capacity of natural entities to impress the understanding in terms of uniformities, Bhartṛhari explored the principles which might underline a platonistic approach. The latter was meant to define the approach of Vaiśeṣika school, which posits the existence of phenomenal universals. I do not feel I can do justice to Bhartṛhari's advice to the Vaiśeṣikas within the scope of this essay. I will therefore confine myself to reporting the one single principle which Helārāja extraced from the sense of JS93–94, the principle he claimed would justify the postulating of universals. It is the principle that universals in language must have as their cause corresponding universals in nature: cf. trHJS93–94.4.

I would like to end my essay on Bhartṛhari's conception of universals which, located in the understanding through language and connected with the Great Plenum of Being, mirror nature and are the source of objects, with the following passage:¹³⁵

From that [Great *Śabdabrahman*] fixed in the family of universals there comes into being a gamut of individuals, themselves the womb of other transformations, like rain-bearing clouds from the wind.

vrVP1.1p.13.3–3

A very old insight (e.g. in vt.43 to Pl.2.64) lay at the root of Bhartṛhari's Brahman, that universals define a whole class of bearers. The insight mingled with Bhartṛhari's doctrine of the analytic and antonymic content arranged hierarchically into objects and universals. The highest universal defines the whole universe of individuals; the highest universal is also part of the analytic content of every name: it is the womb of

objects, the foundation of the understanding and the presence which confers eternity on things which are non-eternal. An abstract view of meaning relations lies at the heart of Bhartṛhari's view; an abstract view born of the grammarian's need to provide explanations of linguistic phenomenon.

It is in this way that Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita's remark, cited at the beginning of this chapter, that Bhartṛhari discovered the Upaniṣadic Brahman while looking for a mere trifle, is justified. And Iyer's assessment, that while Bhartṛhari arranged the inherited material "in some kind of a sequence" it was not "made into a complete system", stands challenged. On the basis of pursuing just one line of Bhartṛhari's complex thought, I have argued that there is evidence for holding that Bhartṛhari's thought did in fact add up to a whole: he did not merely present the achievements of a past in "some kind of a sequence", but presented them in terms of a rationally reconstructed system.

NOTES

II.1. These views are expressed by Bhartṛhari in VP2.481–490. The sentence in quotes is Brough's rendering of VP2.490 (Brough, 1951 p.402).

II.2. Bhartṛhari described the royal road as straight (*ajimhā*): *mokṣamāṇānām ajimhā rājapaddhatiḥ*, VP1.16.

II.3. Abhyankar and Limaye in their edition of the VP include an Appendix (pp.197–297), listing quotations from the VP as they appear in later texts. But Bhartṛhari's influence cannot be gauged merely in terms of quotations; both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti borrowed a great deal of their conceptual equipment from Bhartṛhari; see Ch.III.iv and V.

II.4. Most Indian philosophical systems maintain a link between philosophy and liberation; though I doubt that the link is of a uniform kind. The link, for instance, between the highest good (*nirhreyas*) and the knowledge of the sixteen categories of elements listed by Gautama in NSI.1.1. appears to be direct; for him knowledge of the philosophical categories would be identical with liberation (*apavarga*, cf. NSI.1.2). Uddyotakara, on the other hand, would see a less direct link between the knowledge of the categories and liberation (cf. his comments on NSI.1.1: ND p.6: *pratyakṣānumānādhiḡgatavastutattvāḥyānam śāstradharmah/ tasya viśayaḥ pratyakṣānumānādhiḡgatavastutattva ādhīyātmikāśaktisāmpādyukto 'ntevāsi*). See also Potter, 1963 pp.36–46.

II.5. Brough cited Keith and S. K. De as examples of scholars who have misunderstood the concept of *sphoṭa*, which he says, "has been subjected by modern writers to a great deal of unnecessary mystification": Brough, 1951 p.405.

II.6. "The *sphoṭa* then is simply the linguistic sign in its aspect of meaning-bearer (Bedeutungsträger)": Brough, 1952 p.406; also p.409: "In fact most linguistic discussions implicitly assume such a *sphoṭa*."

II.7. *varāṭikānveṣaṇāya pravṛttaś cintāmanim labdhavān iti vāsiṣṭharāmāyanoktā-*

bhāṇakanyāyena śabdavicārāya pravṛttaḥ san prasāṅgād advaita aupaniṣade brahmany api vyutpādyatām iti abhiprāyena bhagavān bhartṛhariḥ vivartavādīdikam api prasāṅgād vyutpādyat. Joshi, 1967 p.42 fn.69.

II.8. This appears to be the standard framework within which to discuss Bhartṛhari's metaphysical views; Iyer supported the view that Bhartṛhari was a *vivartavādīn* and argued against Biardeau who held that Bhartṛhari was a *pariṇāmavādīn* (see Iyer, 1969 pp.128–146, where the controversy is elaborated).

II.9. Iyer, 1969 remains the most extensive as well as the most impressive single source of our understanding of this aspect of Bhartṛhari's thought.

II.10. trJS34

II.11. *yathārthajātayaḥ sarvāḥ śabdākṛtinibandhanāḥ/
tathaiva loke vidyānām eṣā vidyā parāyaṇam//*

II.12. The Sanskrit words which are inserted in brackets carry resonances of VS351, PS5.36 and vrPS5.6A. This theory of indirect naming is referred to in VS351B as "speech whose basis is association" according to Helārāja's gloss: *samsarganimittā śrutiḥ śabda-samsargaśrutir ity ucyate/* HVS351p.312.13. VS351B reads: *samsargaśrutir artheṣu sāk-ṣād eva na vartate/* "Speech whose basis is association does not apply directly to objects." Helārāja's comments under the stanza mention the different indirect mechanisms such as 'achievement of non-difference' (*abhedaprāpti*) and superimposition (*adhyāsa*), by which the universal becomes connected with individuals, qualities and universals, presumably he had thing-universals (*arthajāti*) in mind here; cf. trJS6.

II.13. *dvidhā kaiś cit padam bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā/
apoddhṛtyaiva vākyebhyaḥ prakṛtipratyayādivat//*

II.14. cf. *nāsaty eṣām nityarve śāstram vyavatiṣṭhate/* Vṛṣabhadeva on VP1.15–23 p.52.12.

II.15. *ākṛtiḥ sarvaśabdānām yadā vācyā pratīyate/
ekatvād ekaśabdatvam nyāyayā tasyām ca varṇyate//*

II.16. see MB on vt.39 to P1.2.64.

II.17. The illustration that Devadatta cannot be both at Mathura and Srugna is Patañjali's, from his comments on vt.48 to P1.2.64. Indra's ubiquitous presence is given as an illustration by Kātyāyana in vt.40.

II.18. Helārāja's remark is found in trHJS6p.17.9. Helārāja's identification of these terms calls attention to vrVP1.68–69 p.129.4–5: *svam rūpam iti jātir eva kaiś cit pratijñāyate/* "There are some who assert that the own form is a universal alone." The passage in which the remark occurs has two other verses, VP1068–69, which display Bhartṛhari's systematic attempt to coordinate, around the two central concepts of universals and individuals a great deal of previous grammatical discussion. Helārāja's identification of universals with the form of a word in Bhartṛhari would suggest that Bhartṛhari espoused only one of the views delineated in the *vṛtti*. The suggestion, however, should be resisted because he meant, I think, to negotiate a neutral cross between these various views. How he did so is cursorily examined in Chapter II.viii.

II.19. *śuddhasyoccarāṇe svārthaḥ prasiddho yasya gamyate/
sa mukhya iti vijñeyo rūpamātranibandhanah//*

II.20. *ākṛtiprayuktaṁ cedam śāstram, tathā hi'ākṛty upadeśāt siddham (vt. on P1.1.1)
ity āha sā ceyam ākṛtiḥ śabdatvasāmānyaviśeṣād anyā. śabdatvam hi viruddhaikārthasama-
vāyinibhir ākṛtibhiḥ sarvābhīr aviruddhaikārthasamavāyam/ śabdākṛtviśeṣā hi vṛkṣaśabdatvā-
dayaḥ sati vastusampramohe nimittasarūpatām āpannā abhivyaktāḥ śabda ity apadiśyante/*

*yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapṛthivītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyas tathā vṛkṣaśabde'pi
guṇatvaśabdatvavṛkṣaśabdatvādīnām ākṛtviśeṣaṇam aviruddhaḥ samavāyayaḥ/*

II.21. Though I fail to see how Bhartṛhari could be referring to phonological features when he claimed that being a word (*śabdatvam*) inheres compatibility with particular universals, such as, being a tree, in the word 'tree'. However Iyer's translation of JS6 suggests that he treated *svā jātiḥ* (own universal) as a purely phonological category. See Ch.II.iii.

II.22. Helārāja in his comments to JS3 used the terms *sādhana* (the Means) to stand for actual objects such as posts (see p.17.10) and *sādhanaśruti* (word for the Means) to stand for nouns (he referred to them as what is implied by the verb in a sentence); see n.II.23 below.

II.23. In VP2.46–48, Bhartṛhari discussed his view that sentences have an underlying structure which is a regulating principle (*niyama*). The principle fixes the relation between nouns (*nāmapada*) and verbs (*kriyāpada*). Even when the underlying principle or relation (*sambandha*) has no palpable form (cf. *rūpaṁ tasya na vidyate*, VP2.46), it becomes manifest in the mere presence of a variety of nouns and verbs. In a sentence the verb takes precedence over nouns – nouns are the Means (*sādhana*) and verbs are that which is to-be-accomplished by them (*sādhya*). The same idea is developed in the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa*. Stanza 1 defines a Means as something which has the ability (*sāmarthya*) to bring about action (cf. *kriyām abhiniṣpatti*). Stanza 14 states that Means have accomplished natures (*siddhasvabhāva*); Helārāja's gloss on the stanza contrasts the to-be-accomplished nature of action with the accomplished nature of existents (*bhāva*). See also vrVP1.13p.461–4; VP2. 430 and 433.

II.24. Material objects are to be regarded as a bundle of capacities (*śakti*), otherwise all kinds of technical problems arise. For the problems see Cardona, 1974 p.277–278. Cardona defines a *sādhana* as "merely a thing or a thing viewed as an ancillary to action".

II.25. The similarity in this respect between verbs and universals is mentioned in VP2.68: *na ca sāmānyavat sarve kriyāśabdena lakṣitāḥ/* "In the same ways as universals [do not indicate the specific individuals which fall within their scope]". The rationale for substitution is discussed in VP2.64–73. See also Abhyankar, 1977 entry under *jāti*.

II.26. Bhartṛhari traced the view that sound pattern of dialect is derived from sound pattern associated with the norm to the *Samgraha*: vrVP1.139p.229.1. Evidence that Bhartṛhari associated phonological features with the concept of universals is also derived from the following. S. D. Joshi has identified *sphoṭa* in Patañjali's usage with "the constant element of the auditory image of the varied articulated sounds" (see Joshi, 1967 p.15). Bhartṛhari in his *vṛtti* on VP1.93 identified Patañjali's *sphoṭa* with universals (*ākṛti*), see vrVP1.93p.159.5–6.

II.27. See Brough, 1951 p.406. I cannot help thinking Brough's discussion of *jāti* and *vyakti sphoṭa* is unrepresentative of the actual problems, in view of the way the subject is discussed by Helārāja, on the basis of Bhartṛhari's text. First of all, Brough's translation of *jāti* as 'class' distorts issues. In the MB *jāti* defines a class of individuals, but is represented as being one (*ekā*); see p.17. For Bhartṛhari, similarly, the universal is one (see VS316, translated on p.16.) Nor do I think that Brough represented correctly the concept of *vyakti-sphoṭa*. Thus he claimed that "the *jāti*-school considered the *sphoṭa* to be merely a class whose members were not themselves *sphoṭas*". Helārāja, who considered himself and Bhartṛhari as proponents of the *jāti*-school (see JHS13p.26.12–14, for instance), interpreted

the *jāti-sphoṭa* to be fixed in the *vyaktisphoṭa* (see trHJS7-8p.20.3-6). The *vyaktisphoṭa* is eternal and is to be identified with an ideal entity. The distinction between *jāti* and *vyakti-sphoṭa* should have its conceptual origin in a system which postulated ideal objects.

II.28. *āviṣṭalingatā tasyām syād grāmyapaśusaṅghavat/
dravyabhede'pi caikatvāt tatraikavacanam bhavet//*

II.29. HVS318p.298.6: *taṭādayas trilingāḥ/* "taṭa etc. have all three genders". HVS316 p.297.22-23: *brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇītyātau . . . ubhayalingābhidhānam/* "In *brāhmaṇa* and *brāhmaṇī*, etc. both genders are signified", cf. Iyer, 1969 p.362.

II.30. See Charudev Shastri, 1969I p.178.

II.31. An extensive discussion of the grammatical idea of gender is given by Iyer; see Iyer, 1969 pp.359-370.

II.32. That a name in the same case-ending signifies the same universal can be traced to vt.35 to P1.2.64: *ākṛty abhidhānād vāikam vibhaktau vājapyāyamaḥ/* translated under trHJS9p. 21.17.

II.33. Charudev Shastri, 1969, I, p.175-8; also Renou's Dictionary entry under *ekaśeṣa* (Renou, 1957); see also VS348:

jātir utsṛṣṭasamkhyā tu dravyātmany anuśajyate/

"The universal which has abandoned its number adheres to the individual's nature." See also HVS348p.311.10-13 where both number and gender are generated on the basis of a reference to individuals; see note on *ekaśeṣa*, in trJS9.

II.34. *idaṃ tad iti prādhānyenopādīyate tad dravyam/*

II.35. *yat yasya dravyasya vyavacchedakam svataś ca nimittāntareṇāvacchedyam tad dravyam iti svasiddhāntasthitaṃ dravyalakṣaṇam āha/*

II.36. *dravyasyāvypadeśasya ya upādīyate guṇaḥ bhedakah . . .*

Since the whole stanza is irrelevant to my purposes here, I have taken the liberty of rendering word *bhedaka* which is a qualifier of *guṇa* as the predicate expression, and neglected to translate the actual predicate. I do not think that I have in taking this liberty in any way compromised the meaning of the stanza. See also VP3.5.9 where an individual is described as: *arūpam pararūpeṇa dravyam ākhyāyate*. Thus also MB on vt.5 to P5.1.119 refers to *dravyam* as *anumānagamyam*.

II.37. *guṇasya bhedakale tu prādhānyam upajāyate/*

The latter half of the stanza is given under n.II.12.

II.38. The generality of the notion of *guṇa* is underlined by Bhartṛhari in VP3.5.1; see Helārāja's remarks on the stanza on p.192.6-8; see also Iyer's essay on *guṇa* in Iyer, 1969 p.264-273.

II.39. The whole *vārttika* reads: *siddham tu yasya guṇasya bhāvād dravye śabdāniveśas tadabhidhāne tvatalau/* I have omitted *siddham tu* in my translation as irrelevant to my present purposes. Kaiyaṭa glossed the word *bhāvāt* as *vidyamānatvāt* (see *Pradīpa* under vt.5 to 5.1.119p.295).

II.40. That the quality in question must properly belong in the individual which is named, is underlined by the following remark of Kaiyaṭa's: "*yasya bhāvāt* ity etāvaty ucyamāne putrasya bhāvāt pītari pītrśabdapravartanāt pūrtvam iti putre bhāvapratyavah syāt. . . (see *Pradīpa* under vt.5 to P.5.1.119p.295). It is also underlined in the point made by Patañjali, that the quality in question must be in fact cognized and must not merely be a matter of intention or opinion (*abhiprāya*), see MB on vt.5 to P5.1.119.

II.41. trHJS7-8p.19.9.

II.42. Kielhorn was giving an exposition of phrases such as *tādarthyāt tātchabdyam* and *sāhacarāt tātchabdyam*.

II.43. See HVS82p.191.20-21. The following is a quotation cited by Kaiyaṭa under Kātyāyana's aphorism on names (vt.5 to P5.1.119): *samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra rudhyabhinmayogāvyabharitasambandhebhyah*. "A relation is signified in compounds and verbal and nominal derivatives, except in the case of idiomatic names (such as, *gaurakkhara*, which means 'white-hoofed' but refers to a species of wild donkeys, not necessarily white-hoofed), names derived by the suffixation of *-mat* or *-vat* (like *śukla-mat*) and names where the relation is non-deviating (as in the relation between a generic property and the individual)." The aphorism is cited by Helārāja (VP3.1.5.1, p. 194.15) Traced to Bhartṛhari (Hattori, 1968,n.I.28), it appears in Dignāga (PS5.?:NC2p.629). The aphorism has conceptual links with the two counter-examples produced by Bhartṛhari in JS47-48 against the terms of Kātyāyana's theory of names. As trJS47 implicitly shows, the compound *upalagandha*, according to Kātyāyana's own analysis, signifies a relation at the sentential level. Now if the occasioning ground for the use of any word is a spatio-temporal quality, how is such a quality to encompass a sentential property? JS49 cites *narasiṃha* as an example of an expression whose occasioning ground cannot be signified. I think Bhartṛhari solved the former problem by interpreting the quality, which is the occasioning ground for the use of a word, as a property of ideal objects (see SS50B-51A, quoted in n.II.119) and treating the sentential relation as signified by the property of the individual in which the relation resides, but as 'exceeding over' it. The solution is stated in VP3.7.157 which in Cardona's translation reads as follows:

*dvīṣṭho'py asau parārthatvād guṇeṣu vyatiricyate/
tatrābhidhāyamānaḥ san pradhāne'py upabhuḥyate//*

"Though it occurs in both, [the *sambandha*] is directly expressed as the additional meaning of the *guṇa*-s, since they are intended for others. While it is expressed therein, (i.e., in the *guṇa*-s) it is experienced also for the principal i.e., the qualificand." (Cardona 1968, p.319fnl).

Grammarians appeared to have conceived of relations in general as *kāraka* relations, as linked to verbs in sentences. Their complicated theoretical framework is suggested by the following remarks of Helārāja:

"Since individuals, which have established natures lack a mutual relation, it is really brought about by action. For action, like a ladder . . . causes a connection between individuals . . ." *dravyāṇam hi siddhasvabhāvanām . . . parasparasambandhābhāvāt kriyākṛita eva saḥ/ kriyā hi niḥśrayaṇīva dravyāṇy upaśleṣayati . . .* (H. on VP3.7.156 p.355.12-15).

II.44. *asyedam iti vā yatra so'yam ity api vā śrutiḥ/
vartate paradharṃeṇa tad anyad abhidhīyate//*

II.45. The MB under vt.5 to P5.1.119 lists the following as qualities: *śabdarūparasa-gandhā guṇāḥ/* and identifies individuals as given independently of language: *kim punar anyac chabdādibhyo dravyam āhosvid anyat/ guṇasyāyam bhāvād dravye śabdāniveśam kurvan khyāpayaty anyac chabdādibhyo dravyam iti/* Similarly vt.53 and 59 under P1.2-64 treat qualities and individuals as non-eternals. Iyer's discussion of *guṇa* as a universal is heavily influenced by Helārāja and represents a post-Bhartṛhari view as does Kaiyaṭa's. (See Iyer, 1969 p.268-273; see Kaiyaṭa on vt. 5 to P5.1.119; see trJS7-8).

II.46. *pravṛttihetum sarveṣāṃ śabdānām aupacārikīm/
etāṃ sattām padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate//*

II.47. See trPS5.34-36; see trHJS7-8p.19.1.2; trHJS6p.17.15-16.

II.48. This is discussed in Section vii of the present chapter.

II.49. Text given under n.III.5.

II.50. Text given under n.II.46

II.51. "yasya guṇasyabhāvāt" (vt.5 to P.5.1.119).

ity atra pakṣe'rthavācīnī prakṛtiḥ, gorbhāvo gotvam iti/

"yad vā sarve bhāvāḥ svena bhāvena bhavanti sa teṣām bhāvah" (vt.6 to P.5.1.119)

ity atra tu pakṣe śabdavācīnī prakṛtiḥ, gośabdasya bhāvo gotvam iti/

Patañjali glossed the vārttika as: sarve śabdāḥ svenārthena bhavanti sa teṣām artha iti tadabhīdhāne tvatalau bhavata iti vaktavyam/

In his remarks on vt.7 to P.5.1.119, Patañjali stressed that the aspects of the naming situation which accrue to the speaker, his intentions or opinions will not get represented because they are not named (cf. *anabhidhānād abhiprāyādiśūpapattir na bhaviṣyati*). I find these remarks quite significant since they suggest that only those features get represented which are named. Even though I lack the competence to deal with the MB as a whole, a great deal of analysis in the work appears to me to turn around the following idea: one word one bearer; content of word equals content of bearer. The idea all but suffuses the operation of *ekaśeṣa*, 'Remaindering of One', which is underpinned by the following vārttikas: *pratyartham śabdaniveśān naikenānekasyābhidhānam*/ "Because a name is given with reference to each object, one word cannot stand for numerous bearers" (vt. 1 to P.1.2.64); *tatrānekārthābhidhāne'nekaśabdavatvam*// "In that context, where one word signifies numerous bearers, numerous words are used" (vt.2 to P.1.2.64). The idea is served by the *anvaya-yatireka* procedure, described by Cardona as follows: "By *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, then, the grammarians determine constant co-occurrence (*sāhacarya*) of a linguistic item (*śabda*) and a meaning (*artha*). A meaning is not understood unless the item expressing it occurs; if an item occurs a meaning is understood, and when that item is absent the meaning attributed to it is also absent" (Cardona, 1968 p.345). See also n.II.43.

II.52. My account of *karmadhāraya* compounds such as *rājapuruṣa* is paraphrased from Cardona's lucid presentation of Kātyāyana's views, see Cardona, 1968 pp.318–322.

II.53. See Cardona, 1968 p. 318

II.54. See Cardona, 1968 p. 320

II.55. See Cardona, 1968 p.318–319

II.56. Cardona, 1968 p.320, I have taken the liberty of replacing the word 'pada' in his translation with the phrase, 'inflected names', which seems to be the intention in the context. On the uses of the nominative see n.II.91.

II.57. Brough, 1952 p.404 fn.12; see also p. 403 fn.7.

II.58. Iyer, 1971 p. 10.

II.59. *svārūpādhyāropacikīrṣyām bāhyeṣv arthātmasu śabdārthānām svārūpeṇādhiśtānabhūtenārthavattvāt prathamā vidhīyate/ so'yam iti ca samjñinā śakty avacchedalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho niyamyate/ tad yathā gaur vāhikah, sinho māṇavaka iti/* Helārāja's identification of *svārūpa* with *svā jāti* (trJS6p.17.9) has been used in Section i of this chapter to explicate Bhartṛhari's idea of universals.

II.60. *mañcaśabdo yathādheyam mañceṣv eva vyavasthitaḥ/*

tattvenāha tathā jātiśabdo dravyeṣu vartate//

II.61. *so'yam ity abhisambandhāj jātīdharmopacaryate/*

dravyam tadāśrayo bhedo jāteś cābhyupagamyate//

II.62. Text given in n.II.39.

II.63. According to Cardona, 1974 p.249, the relation called *abheda* is "simply the semantic counterpart of co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*). He illustrates this in terms of

vīrapuruṣa and Patañjali's statement "that the locus of heroic-ness (*vīratva*) is the same as the locus of manhood (*puruṣatva*). That is, there is a single referent who is both a man and a hero". The assumption behind Helārāja's query here, that the identification of an object is on the basis of something which belongs in the same substratum is, I think, related to Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, see n.II.40, and discussions on p. 26–27.

II.64. VS102, text given under n.III.34; see VP2.153–156, also VP2.256, where the conception of shifting but uniform designation is underlined.

II.65. Charudev Shastri, 1970II, pp.273–274. Charudev Shastri gives the following derivation: *kaṣāyeṇa raktaṁ vastraṁ kāṣāyam*/ He illustrates it with the following homily: *na kāṣāyair bhaved yatih*/

II.66. see trHJS7–8p.20.1–3; trHJS11p.23.14–16.

II.67. In HJS33p.41.11, *sattā* (Being) is referred to as *mahāsāmānya* (the great universal) while cowness (*gotva*) and horseness (*aśvatva*) are described as lower universals (*aparāsāmānya*).

II.68. This is mentioned by Helārāja, trHJS9p.22.1, who echoed Bhartṛhari in VS332. See also note on *ekaśeṣa* under trJS9.

II.69. cf. VS348B under n.II.33.

II.70. Bhartṛhari used language associated with non-dualistic metaphysics in describing this division of the one into the many. In fact the ultimate Great Universal is described as drawn into divisions by individuals in contact with it (JS33), and while universals are described as real (*satya*, JS32) individuals are called unreal (*asatya*, cf. JS32). The monistic vocabulary, however, is in most cases underpinned in technical considerations. cf. VP2.44; VP2.127.

II.71. *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu/*

jātir ity ucyate tasyām sarve śabdā vyavasthītāḥ//

The translation is basically derived from Brough, 1951 p.422. I do not, however, agree with the interpretation he puts on it. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita was probably justified in identifying Bhartṛhari as a *jātivādin* on the basis of this stanza; a large part of Brough's argument here derives from his rendering of *jāti* as class: a universal defines a class, it is not identical with the class it defines (see Section i).

II.72. The phrase *anupravṛttidharma* is interchangeable for Helārāja with *anuvṛttidharma* (HJS14 p.27.10), *abhinmapratyaya* (identical element, cf. HJS10 p.23.1), *anvaya-pratyaya* (persisting element, cf. HJS11 p.24.2), *anugatākāra* (the included form, HJS93–94 p.94.6). The phrase is contrasted with *vyāvṛttākāra* (the differentiating form, cf. HJS93–94 p.94.6).

II.73. See vrVP1.68.69pp.129.4–5, 130.1–5; *vyāpāralakṣaṇā yasmāt padārthāḥ samavasthītāḥ* (trJS11); cf. HJS11.25.4–5: *yasmāc chabdayāpāreṇa padārthā lakṣyante*/ "Because objects of words are defined by the function of words."

II.74. *dravyam atah sarvo'rtha iṣyate/*

Helārāja's comments under this stanza treat the individual as an ideal or possible individual (*upacaritadravya*, HJS13 p.26.13).

II.75. See Cardona, 1968, pp. 318–322.

II.76. The position of the opponent is given in VS314. According to the opponent's analysis even when the object, which lies outside the scope of the words used in the compound, is grasped (*upagṛhīta*) by the two words which occur in the compound, the object cannot be determined without the use of an entirely separate word (cf. HVS314 p.295.9, *vartipadābhyām upagṛhīto'py ayam artho na śakyate'vadhārayitum padāntaraprayogam*

antareṇa). Helārāja dubs this analysis the outcome of a failure to appreciate the power of words (cf. *śabdaśaktim anavadhārayantah*, HVS.314 p.295.10).

II.77. *te kṣatriyādibhir vācyā vācyā vā sarvanāmabhiḥ/* VS314A.

II.78. *śabdapurvattir na tv asti loṣṭādiṣu . . .*

II.79. Thus the compound is analysed as *uttarapadapradhāna* (one in which the latter word predominates). The defects in the view that the compound is *pūrvapadapradhāna* are given in VS315. It should be noted in this context that both the demonstrative as well as the sense attaching to it are derived from the latter term in the compound, *abrāhmaṇa*. Otherwise the proper ascription of number and gender, accruing to the compound, would not be forthcoming.

II.80. The suggestions that 'tawny hair' (*piṅgalakeśa*) may be a property shared by *brāhmaṇas* and *kṣatriyas* is made by Helārāja (see HVS278 p.280.23–26). Helārāja drew attention to Bhartṛhari's use of the term *saṁśaya* (doubt) and to the Nyāya analysis of *saṁśaya* (NS1.23), which traces doubt to the apprehension of a shared or similar feature (*samānadharma*, the Nyāya term, *sādrśyalakṣaṇa*, Helārāja's term).

II.81. Bhartṛhari's analysis of demonstrative pronouns, implicit in this analysis of negative compounds, is carried into other contexts, such as questions (see VP2.271), where the action connected with the verb is described as being "in the womb" of the question.

II.82. HVS279p.2808: *bauddhaś ca śabdārthaḥ samāropitarūpaḥ sarvatra yuyata eva ityāha/*

II.83. *sarvabhedānugūṇyam tu sāmānyam apare viduḥ/*
also vrVP1.1p.12.3–4, quoted under n.II.135.

II.84. *pūrvam sāmānyenākṣepād ekāiva śrutiḥ punaḥ śrutiḥ ity ucyate/*

II.85. This account is a paraphrase of VP2.64–66. And even though the example *śreṣṭhavrīhi* does not occur in the text, I do not think I have falsified the intention of the original by drawing out the added implication. This implication flows from Bhartṛhari's belief that no word captures the specific features of the individual (cf.VP2.154), therefore, all words in some sense are general and imply less general ones: cf.VP2.158; see also vrVP1.68–69p.130.1–3: *tatra jāter vyaktiḥ samjñā vyakter vā jātiḥ/ . . . tātparyeṇa vivakṣā bhidyate/* also vrVP1.1p.13.3.4, quoted under n.II.135.

II.86. Helārāja's comments on JS11 allow that *sāṅketa* or a proper relation between a name and its external bearer, embodied in sentences, such as, 'this object is a cow' (*gaur ayam arthaḥ*, trHJS6p.17.15) is not possible under this view because a word universal is not superimposed upon a thing universal; see also Vṛṣabhadeva's comments discussed in Section vii, n.II.129; trPS5.34.

II.87. *anitiesv api nityatvam abhidheyātmanā sthitam/*

II.88. Vṛṣabhadeva on VP1.1p.3.20–21: *īdṛṣam hi tad brahmādhyāsitam yenātadrūpam api tathā pratyavabhāṣate . . .* Bhartṛhari's and Vṛṣabhadeva's thesis seems to be the reverse of the standard versions of non-dual Vedānta where the unreal is superimposed upon the real.

II.89. These issues are discussed in Cardona, 1968pp.318–322. I have referred to these matters on separate occasions, in the course of discussing Kātyāyana's aphorism on names in Section ii, in the course of JS47, p.72 and in Ch.III.iii.

II.90. see n.II.98.

II.91. See Cardona, 1968 p.316; "According to Pāṇinīya's beginning with Patañjali, part of this rule [i.e. P2.3.46: *prātipadikārthalingaparimāṇavacanamātre prathamā*] provides for the use of the first (*prathamā*) triplet of endings, the nominative, when the mere (*mātra*) *prātipadikārtha* is to be expressed".

II.92. See Cardona, 1974 pp.247–48.

II.93. See Cardona, 1968 p.320; see MB on vt.2 to P2.1.57: Joshi, 1971 pp.139–151.

II.94. The wording of this paragraph echoes Cardona's; see Cardona 1968, pp.315–322.

II.95. See also Helārāja on VS6.

II.96. MB on vt.2 to P1.2.57. This would be the case if the compound were a *dvandva* or did not signify the qualifier-qualificand relation; see Joshi, 1971 p.141, note 99, also p.143, note 100.

II.97. *tad yathā/ śuklam ālabheta, kṛṣṇam ālabheteti na piṣṭapindīm ālabhya kṛti bhavati/ avaśyam tadgūṇam dravyam ākāṅkṣati/* MB on vt.2 to P2.1.57.

II.98. *naitayor āvaśyakaḥ samāveśaḥ/ na hy avṛkṣaḥ śiṁśapāsti/* The ambiguity of the remark causes Joshi to say the following: "It cannot be the intention of Bhāṣya No. 6 to say that two main words cannot refer to the same object. We have several usages of *dravya-vacana* words standing in apposition like *keśavo brāhmaṇaḥ*: 'the brahmin Keśava'. *Śakuntalā bhāryā*: 'the wife Śakuntalā' . . . Joshi, 1971 p.148.

II.99. *vṛkṣatvasya vyāpakatvāt mahāviśayatvād dūrāt prathamatas tasyaivopalambhād viśeṣyatvam eva/ śiṁśapātvam tu svalpaviśayatvāt paścād grahaṇāc ca śuklādiguṇakalpatvād viśeṣaṇam eva . . .* Joshi, 1971 p.33. The phrase *mahāviśaya* occurs in vrVP1.24–26 p.76.1 and is glossed by Vṛṣabhadeva as: *sarvavyakty anugatatvāj jātir mahāviśayā/ tataś ca sphuṭa-taraparicchedyatayā prathamataḥ pratipadyate/* "A universal has the large[r] scope, because it is included in all the individuals [which fall within its range]. Therefore, as the one which is more clearly distinguished, it is first understood." In spite of the importance of the idea that a universal includes or pervades the individuals which fall within its range, Bhartṛhari, unlike Kaiyaṭa, did not underpin his conception of the qualifier-qualificand relation with this conception. It was Dignāga who did; see trvrPS5.4A: *na hy asatyām vyāptau sāmānādhikaranyam/* Dignāga's solution to Patañjali's problem, why *śiṁśapā-vṛkṣa* and not *vṛkṣaśiṁśapā*, rested on his analysis of the qualifier-qualificand relation in terms of class-inclusion; it is because the extension of *vṛkṣa* includes the extension of *śiṁśapā* that the compound *śiṁśapāvṛkṣa* is well formed and *vṛkṣaśiṁśapā* is not (see Jinendra-buddhi's remarks quoted in n.IV.72); See discussion in Ch.IV.v. Dignāga's influence on Kaiyaṭa, at this point, should be acknowledged in the tighter translation of his text. Joshi's rendering of *mahāviśayatvāt* as 'since its (meaning) area is greater' lacks sharpness. The *vṛkṣa* has the larger scope because it extensionally includes the scope of *śiṁśapā*. On the other hand, *śiṁśapā* intensionally includes, or includes as part of its analytic content, the meaning of *vṛkṣa*, and in that sense has a wider meaning area.

II.100. See Ch.IV.v; trPS5.34–35; also n.II.99.

II.101. See Ch.III.iii; trPS5.14; trPS5.36.

II.102. See Ch.IV.v; trPS5.34–36; trPS5.14.

II.103. By this I mean whether one explains the qualifier-qualificand relation as deriving from relations between word universals (*śabdajāti*) or constructed from experience (see Ch.IV.v).

II.104. *dravye'nirjñātajātīye kṛṣṇaśabdaḥ prayujyate/ anirjñātage caiva tilaśabdaḥ pravartate/* (VS9)

A slightly modified version of Iyer's translation of the stanza: "The word *kṛṣṇa* (black) applies to a thing whose generic features are undetermined; and also the word *tila* (sesame) applies to a thing whose quality is undetermined".

II.105. See VS24–25 also HVS16–18 and 22–23 on p.160. The illustrations are

taken from Kaiyaṭa on MB to vt.2 to P2.1.57, whose remarks bear a striking resemblance to Helārāja's, thus: *jātiḥ tūtpattiprabhṛtyāvināśād dravyeṇāvabhāricaritasambandhā/* (HVS 23p.160.22) and *utpattiprabhṛtyāvināśāj jātir dravyam na jahāti* (Kaiyaṭa on vt.2 to MB on P2.1.57 p.32 in Joshi, 1971).

II.106. *dravyātmā guṇasamsargabhedād āśrīyate prthak/
jātisambandhabhedāc ca dvitīya iva grhyate//*

II.107. *dravyāvasthā tritīyā tu yasyām samsrjyate dvayam/*

II.108. *buddhyaikam bhidyate bhinnam ekatvam copagacchati/
buddhyāvasthā vibhajyante sā hy arthasya vidhāyikā//*

II.109. *viśeṣye hy atīśayam ādhāya kṛtārthaṃ viśeṣaṇam na svarūpeṇa viśeṣyam atirecayati, mā bhūd dvarthāvasāya iti/* VS88 is a very complex stanza with several layers of allusions. The phrase *tadbhāvābhyuccaye sati* glossed by Helārāja as: *tadbhāvasya viśeṣaṇarūpasya abhyuccaye atireke sati/*, seems to me to connect the conditions laid down on the uses of the nominative with the condition on the theory of names given in Kātyāyana's aphorism. VS88 reads as under and I offer a translation based on Iyer's translation and Helārāja's gloss:

*viśeṣaṇād viśeṣye'rthe tadbhāvābhyuccaye sati/
pūṇas ca pratisaṃhāre vrttim eke pracakṣate//*

"Some declare that integration of meaning [at the compound level] takes place when, on the basis of [the cognition of the] qualifier, the qualified is named [and] when it exceeds over its being [bhāva, *viśeṣaṇarūpa*, according to Helārāja], it is again withdrawn." See discussion in section ii, where the question whether the name does or does not exceed over its bearer is discussed. See also Cardona's remarks on *sāmānādhikāraṇya* quoted in n.II.63.

II.110. *antahkaraṇavrttau ca vyarthā bāhyārthakalpanā
tasmād anupakāro vā grāhyam vā na tathā sthitam//*

II.111. *evam paramate bhinnajñānāvalambanapakṣe'nupapattim udbhāvyā svamatenaika
jñānāvalambanavādena vāstavam viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvam avasthāpāyitum āha/
amūyūteva samsrjter arthe buddhiḥ pravartate/
vyākhyātāro vibhajyātha tām bhedenā pracakṣate//
tadātmany avibhakte ca buddhyantaram upāśritāḥ/
vibhāgam iva manyante viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayoh//*

II.112. *na hi śabdasya kramavatī viramya viramya svārthādiṣu vrttiḥ sambhavati/
sākṛd uccāraṇāt/ arthena ca nityapraṇīyogāt/ pratipattikramo hy ayam śrotur abhidhātur
vā na vyavasthitah/ sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam hi vastu samsargiṇīnām mātṛāṇām kalāpam yauga-
padyenaikāsyā buddher viśayatām āpannam uttarakālām icchan buddhyantaraiḥ pravi-
bhajate/ pravibhaktasyāpi cāmusandhānam antarenārthakriyāviśayā pratibhā nopapadyate iti
pūṇaḥ samsargarūpam eva pratyavamarṣati/ vrVP1.24–26 p.74.7,75.1–5; also n.II.116.*

II.113. *sarvatrāntahkaraṇasyaivābhāso bahīrūpatayādhyasto bhavati/*

II.114. Text under n.II.46.

II.115. *sphaṭikādi yathā dravyam bhinnair rūpair upāśrayaiḥ/ svaśaktiyogāt samban-
dham tādrūpeṇopagacchati// tadvac chabdo'pi sattāyām asyām pūrvaṃ vyavasthitah/
dharmair upaiti sambandham avirodhivirodhībhiḥ//*

II.116. vrVP1.24–26 p.75.2–5, text in n.II.112. Vṛṣabhadeva's gloss on *samsargiṇī-
nām mātṛāṇām kalāpam/* "a spectrum of associated units" suggest that the spectrum includes universals: Vṛṣabhadeva p.75.20.

II.117. VP2.440B: *upakārāt saivārthaḥ katham cid anugamyate/* "That very object is somehow inferred, on the basis of a service rendered", vrVP1.94p.160.3–6.

II.118. HJS7–8 p.20.17–19; vrVP1.67p. 126.4–5; VP2.403.

II.119. *vyapadeṣe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī/
sarvāvasthāsu sarveṣām ātmārūpasya darśikā//*

II.120. *nimnesv ādarśatalādiṣu mukhapratibimbam unnataṃ dṛśyate, unnateṣu nimnam,
khaḍge dṛgham, priyaṅgutaile śyāmaṃ cīnaśastrayavanakācādiṣv ādarśapramāṇabhedānu-
pātīti . . .* In the next line Bhartṛhari noted the capacity of reflecting surfaces to split up and multiply objects placed in front of them; cf. VS325 and HVS325 p.301. 8–10; Vṛṣabhadeva on vrVP1.15–23 p.53.15–17; vrVP1.71p.135.3.6.

II.121. VP1.115 is one of the most frequently quoted stanzas of Bhartṛhari's.

II.122. See Herzberger, 1981.

II.123. *jātau pūrvaṃ pravṛttānām śabdānām jātivācīnām/
śabdavācyāt sambandhād vyaktir apy upajāyate//*

II.124. See Mimāṃsaka Vol.3, p.291.

II.125. *evam cānyāiva sattayā pūrte vyavahāre yady arthakriyākaraṇādīnā kṣāṭbusa-
prāyeṇa kecin nibandhanenānyāsattā kalpyate tadvardhatām sā, na tatra cintā/ asmākaṃ
vyavahāre tu tasyā nāsty anupraveśaḥ. . .*

II.126. trHJS6p.17.15–18; trHJS7–8p.20.19–21, 21.1–13; trHJS11p.23.10–11; tr
HJS47 p.56.6–16; HJS102 p.101.7–10 (translated in the context of JS47); also trHJS93–
94 p.95.3–7.

II.127. See trPS5.34–36

II.128. See trPS5.2

II.129. vrVP1.15–23 p.59.1–3: *nityaḥ sambandha ity asyedaṃbhāve sati śabdārthayoh
so'yam iti yaḥ sambandhaḥ so'rthādeśanasya kartum śakyatvād autpattikaḥ svabhāvasid-
dhaḥ na kena cit kartrā kañ cit pratipattāram praty ajñātapūrvah tatprathamam kṛta iti/* The relation is also eternal. What is meant is this: where there is an idea of mutual appurtenance, the relation between word and meaning in the form 'It is this' is, since meaning cannot be assigned (by grammar), eternal, self-existing and not something not known before and made known for the first time by some speaker for the benefit of some listener (Iyer's translation, see Iyer, 1965 p.26–27). Patañjali's passage cited by Vṛṣabhadeva (p.59.26–27) is:

arthānādeśanāt/ tac ca laghvartham/

ko hi samartho dhātuprātipadikapratyayanipātānām arthān ādeṣṭum/

Patañjali's discussion of the matter here suggests that in explaining the meaning of any word, the basis of explanation (whether in terms of other words or things) has to be taken as given, or, as he put it, it is given through their own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*), otherwise there is an infinite regress of explanations (*anavasthā*). Vṛṣabhadeva's gloss is as follows (Iyer suggested that the text might be corrupt): *yato'rthānām āmantyaṇ na pratyakṣato'rthānām
nāpi śabdāntareṇāvasthānāc chakyate kartum/* "[The relation between words and meanings/ objects] cannot be made (*na śakyate kartum*) because the relation is established neither on the basis of perception of objects nor even on the basis of other words, because meanings/ objects are infinite." cf.tr.PS5.2 and trPS5.34–35. The following remarks of Vṛṣabhadeva, are interesting, in view of Helārāja's similar juxtaposition of the crystal model with the metaphorical models of language (see n.II.126 and Section vii): p.59.15–16: *tatra sārūpya-
syobhayagatatve'pi śabde prakāśakasvabhāvāt arthasya rūpasankrāntiḥ, yathā svacchatayā
darpaṇatāle rūpasankrāntiḥ, na darpaṇatalasya rūpe/* "Even though there the conformity [*sārūpya*, between the word and the object] is symmetrical (*ubhayagata*), the coalescence of the object's form is located in the word, because it has the nature of an illuminator; just as coalescence of form takes place on the surface of a mirror due to its clarity, the coalescence

of the surface of the mirror does not take place on the form". p.59.20–22: *kaś tarhi śabda-syārthe vyāpāraḥ/ ayam ucyate, so'rtham abhidhātā iti/ na khalu kaś cit kevalaḥ śabdaḥ svātmany arthākāram ādarsayan samāropaṇākhyena vyāpāreṇa yukta ivābhiddhātā iti ucyate/* "What then is the function of the word with respect to its object? It is said to be this, 'it names its object'. Indeed no isolated word, reflecting within itself the form of the object, equipped as it were with the function called superimposing, is said to name its object." Cf. trHJS7–8 pp.20.19–21, 21.1–2. While Helārāja preferred the metaphorical model, Vṛṣabhadeva preferred the crystal model, and I think Vṛṣabhadeva's preferences are more justifiable in view of Bhartṛhari's implicit rejection of the metaphorical model in JS47. The metaphorical model is merely a first step on the basis of which Bhartṛhari could construct his own theory of names. The first step was necessary because it maintained the spirit of Kātyāyana's theory of names: the content of names continued to reflect and be isomorphic with the content of the bearer.

II.130. See n.II.126

II.131. Vṛṣabhadeva on vrVP1.24–26 p.61.9–15, following the *vṛtti*, makes it clear that the relation of cause-effect obtains between words and external phenomena. Helārāja, on the other hand, claims that the relation is intended for the sake of encompassing the views of those who do not believe in an external world (cf. HSS1 p.122.14–15). The two views are not necessarily contrary; even those who posit the existence of external non-linguistic sensuous phenomena can deny that objects are constructed out of phenomena, and hold that the internal object given in language is superimposed onto sensuous phenomena which are by nature momentary and fragmented: this is basically the point of view adopted by Dharmakīrti (Ch.V.iii) and the point of view that Jinendrabuddhi chose to impress on Dignāga's thought (trPS5.34). I find the widely current interpretation that the cause-effect relation obtains between a word and meaning both obscure and odd. Obscure, because it does not give a good account of Bhartṛhari's fundamental and influential doctrine that the object is internal to language and odd, because it leaves the impression that the item or word in question is not meaning-bearing.

II.132. See vrVP1.23p.60.1–2, 61.1–2; vrVP24–26p.71.7.9; SS29; trHJS7–8 p.20.10–20. My sources for identifying *yogyatā* with *sārūpya* are Vṛṣabhadeva's remarks on vrVP1.23p.59.10–25, p.60.14–25 and p.61.1–2. Here his discussion on *sārūpya* naturally leads into a discussion of *yogyatā* and the Buddhist connection is explicitly made, but not elaborated on for fear of being too prolix (*bahugranthabhayāt*, p.61.1–2). Vṛṣabhadeva's remarks here raise very interesting questions regarding the Buddhist import of Bhartṛhari's idealism.

II.133. *svabhāvo 'vyapadeśyo vā sāmartyam vāyatiṣṭhate/ sarvasyānte yatas tasmād vyavahāro na kalpate//*

II.134. *sakṛtpravṛttāv ekatvam āvṛttau sadṛśātmatām/ bhinnātmikānām vyaktīmām bhedāpohāt prapadyate//*

II.135. *tasmād ākṛtiḥgotrasthād vyaktigrāmā vikāriṇaḥ/ mārutād iva jāyante vṛṣṭimanto balāhakaḥ//*

Vṛṣabhadeva glossed *vikāriṇaḥ* as *vikārantarayonayaḥ*, a gloss which has influenced my translation.

TRANSLATIONS (Chapter Two)

JS2

In the artificial analysis of meanings/objects of words, a universal or an individual have been described as the two really eternal objects/meanings of all words.

For Bhartṛhari a sentence is the real unit of meaning. This meaning can however be subjected to further analysis, which is what the grammarian does when he subdivides a sentence into nouns and verbs. This kind of analysis is artificial, and the entities derived by means of an artificial analysis are artificial entities. It is these entities which he is talking about in the stanza above as *apoddhārapadārtha* (see Iyer, 1969 pp. 220–227). The salient distinction between real entities and artificial ones is that while the former have a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*), the latter are governed by a certain relativity. They depend upon the theoretical bias of individual grammarians: 'By some words are divided in two ways, [by others] in four or even in five ways' (*dvidhā kaiś cit padaṃ bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā*). (JSI).

However, Bhartṛhari preferred the two-fold division of words into individuals (*dravya*) and universals (*jāti*). The ancient roots of these two categories have been discussed in Ch. II.i-ii. These categories have, according to Bhartṛhari, the virtue of being all-embracing categories, therefore, the division of words into universals and individuals can supersede the sub-divisions of nouns, verbs, prefixes and so on. Helārāja explains how this is to be done.

HJS2p.8. 3–10

Since words are examined through [their] object/meaning, there is first a discussion, from different points of view, of the object/meaning of words [obtained] through an artificial analysis. Accordingly: in the view of the universalists, linguistic units which have the form of words, with natures such as names and verbs, have a universal as their object/meaning, not an individual. According to the substantialists, on the other hand, an individual really is the object/meaning. By the second 'or' (*vā*, in the stanza above) yet another object/meaning of words is suggested: an individual qualified by a universal is what is signified.

Thus it is indicated that those two [the individual and the universal] are both, in a composite form, the two object/meanings signified. Otherwise, when the sense of the 'vā' (or) is already understood [as either the individual thing or the universal], this inclusion [of the sense of the dual, *padārthau*] does not obtain.

On the other hand, when a thing which has the universal (lit. it) is signified, the signification of both [the universal and the individual] is also simultaneous, because words don't function in stops and starts. The primary and secondary relationship between a universal and an individual really depends upon the [contextual] sense. Alternately, as the two have distinct scopes in Pāṇini's system, both the universal and the individual are primarily signified by words; it is this point of view which is mentioned here [in the stanza] as: *the two objects*.

HJS2p.8.10-11

Helārāja demonstrates the feasibility of the programme of reducing nouns, verbs, pre-fixes and post-positions to the one uniform category of universals. His concerns here extend to showing how universals signified by these various categories of words combine, in the context of a sentence, to form a complete sentence-meaning. This concern harks back to VP2.1 where a sentence is defined as: *jātiḥ saṃghātvartinī* (a concatenation of universals).

Several additional features characterize Helārāja's analysis below. His treatment of the word *gaur* ('cow') in terms of the universal *gotvam* (cowness) which is modified by the universal of number given by the nominative singular suffix, which is derived by reference to an individual, pin-points the grammatical function of these categories (see Ch.II.i). His suggestion that the name is the *Means* (*sādhana*, see n.II.23) with respect to the range of verbs, echoes Bhartṛhari's analysis of sentences and the regulating principle (*niyama*) which is at their centre (see n.II.21-22). Finally his efforts to locate every aspect of verbs and nouns in individuals is curious, since its rationale is not obvious. My guess is that the grammatical framework, which requires that number and gender of words in sentences reflect the number and gender of the individuals they designate (see Ch.II.i), inspires Helārāja's rather tedious efforts here. Thus the grammatically significant fact that verbal endings match the nominal endings of their agents, and that nominal endings in turn match the endings of their modifying adjectives, is explained by the theory that they all belong 'in the same substratum'.

In this way names such as 'cow' signify a universal such as cowness, which is the Means with respect to the scope of the appropriate action [and] which has acquired modification through the co-inhering universal of number.

HJS2p.8.12-17, p.9.1-9

Because there cannot be universals which have no support [in things], the individual is understood by [an implied] compatibility. In this way, even verbs have the power of direct signification, which power has as its scope universals of action, which are the ground for the cognition of uniform names [and] which inheres in separate action-moments. Universals belonging to the various agents of action (*kāraka*) are secondary here. Universals of action belonging in verbs become connected with universals of the various agents of action, which belong in names, through individuals. Universals which belong in individuals, on the other hand, experience connection with action through powers which reside in the various Means, as a result of the relationship of co-inherence in the same thing. And even universals of number become connected with action through powers belonging in the individual in which they reside, because of co-inherence in the same individual; thus the sentence meaning is produced when a connectedness of all the word meanings becomes feasible. Just as the universal such as, for instance, [of the action] of tossing is manifested through the moments of [the action of] tossing, even though these are not simultaneous, because of repetition, so also universals of action belonging in 'he cooks' are manifested through the action moments of their substratum: this will be considered later. The to-be-accomplished character (*sādhya*) of this action universal (lit. its), which is eternal, becomes feasible through the individual entities [to which the action belongs]. In this system, prefixes and so on, which accompany nouns and verbs, also have universals as their object/meaning, because they specifically illuminate the meaning of nouns and verbs. Post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*) are also located in universals of relations because their specification is determined by means of the qualified place or repose¹ (*viśrānti*, which is a relation). Words for qualities, for instance, 'white', signify quality universals. It will be demonstrated that proper names such as, for instance, 'Dittha' also signify universals. In this way, in accordance with the views of the teacher Vājapyāyana, the establishment in all places of universals as the object/meaning of words becomes feasible.

According to Bhartṛhari, post-positions regulate the nature of relations; see HJS1p.5.1-20.; VP2.204.

HJS2p.9.9.-20, HJS2p.10.1-8

Helārāja proceeds next to the category of individuals. He points to the all-embracing nature of the category by defining a thing as anything which can be pointed out by means of the demonstratives. (cf. Matilal 19/1p. 110-11).

However, in spite of the ubiquity of the category, Helārāja is anxious to point out that the naming of objects depends primarily on universals, even in the context of Vyādi's theory.

On the other hand, according to the view of Vyādi, what is signified by all words is an

1. I have read *viśiṣṭaviśrāntyaiva* instead of *viśiṣṭaviśrāntarayaiva*.

individual, because only an individual is directly connected with action; since by being the constituent part of the sentence-meaning the individual is the subject matter of Vedic injunctions. It has been said:

Because in the context of injunctions, it is the individual (lit.it) which is understood [and not universals]. (vt. 47 to Pl.2.64)

The teaching of the relation between a name and an object (*saṅketa*) arises here due to the connection [of the individual] with a single universal. Even a universal not [directly] mentioned is made an indicator with regard to a verbal object just as a crow is an indicator of the house [on which it sits]. In Vyāḍi's view, the individual which is the substratum of the various *Means* is the primary sense even in the case of verbs. Since the possibility of sharing a direct substratum arises only by way of the individual, [as in the sentence] 'Devadatta cooks'. Action is here really subordinated, the object of a verb is an individual endowed with action; and that is an individual thing here which is capable of being identified by connection with pronouns as, 'this is that'; thus this establishment [of the category of individuals] is all comprehensive. Accordingly he will say:

When an individual is the object/ meaning of a word, all meaning is said to have the property of [being] an individual. (JS13)

That even words such as 'white' have individuals as their meaning, is likewise established. Alternatively, he will really say that Brahman qualified by a number of conditioning features, expressed by words such as 'individual', is the subject matter of all words. Or, since the word expressed by words such as 'individual', is the subject matter of all words is divisible *dravya* and the word *vyakti* are synonymous, the subject matter of all words is divisible as *jāti* and *vyakti*. Thus, on the basis of the phrase, "of all words"² (in JS2 above), the artificial division which is the meaning/objects of words such as action, agent of action, number and so on, is taught by way of the division into universal and individual; the artificial division of words which attaches in an appropriate fashion to such items as base, and suffix, when these [latter] are abstracted from inflected words. Alternately, if both universal and individual are understood through words then both will constitute the meaning [of words]. The difference in view-point will depend upon what is primary and what is secondary.

JS2p.10.4-8

The description of permanence is [found] in the [statement of] the Bhāṣya:

"In which the essence is never destroyed." (MB on Pl.1.1) under the *Vārttika*: "When the relation between word and meaning is permanently fixed."

thus the individual is also permanent, because it is always understood from words as the eternal flow [of the substantial essence].

2. Iyer's text does not identify the phrase with the phrase in JS2.

JS3 casts light on the early speculations surrounding the idea of universals, speculations with which it retained its ties even in the time of Bhartṛhari.

HJS3p.10.6-16

In this way, having said that either a universal or an individual can be, from different points of view, the object/meaning of words, there is, in this chapter here, a [further] discussion which is useful to the science whose subject matter consists of universals. Since an examination of words is the aim of this Book, and, since an examination of words is by way of their object/meaning, and since that discussion is through their use in sentence meanings [the question arises]: in view of those who hold that universals are the object/meaning of words, in what way are universals connected with action expressed by the [principal] verb, [the action] which is the meaning of the sentence? [The question arises] because action becomes connected [with the other meaning bearing elements in the sentence] through the Means. And universals are never Means. Suppose it is suggested that their support might become the Means: in this way also, because universals are directly prescribed by words, when the support of a universal (i.e. the object) is understood as a result of compatibility, the prescription is adhered to thus:

Lest there be an omission of action which is obligatory or of action which is voluntary, when [the thing mentioned in the injunction] is not on hand,¹ a substitution is prescribed. (VP2.70)

Thus having suspected the impossibility of substitutes [and] in order to provide for them, he says:

JS3

According to some the universal indicates a capacity, through the accompaniment [of the individual thing which has the universal]. When [the post made of] *khadira* wood [being unavailable] lacks the capacity [to perform the function assigned to it by the injunction], something which has the capacity is substituted.

HJS3p.10.19-21

Here, *according to some* means according to universalists, *universals are indicators*, i.e. the Means in the conveying of *capacity* because of co-inherence in the same thing; this is the view.

1. Rau, 1977 and Abhyankar, 1965 read *asambhave* in Iyer's text as *asannidhau*. My translation accords with their reading.

Others again claim that through the direct purport (*tārparya*) [of words] the universal alone is conveyed by words; its connection with action is thought sometimes to be direct and sometimes through the individual.

Helārāja is here, I think, contrasting two kinds of sentences: ones in which 'connection with action is direct' (*sāksāt kriyāyoga*) are universal sentences, e.g. "One should not kill a brahmaṇa" (*brāhmaṇam na hanyāt*). In JS28 Helārāja analyses this statement as follows: "whenever the idea of killing arises negation prevails over the whole class of brāhmaṇas" (*yadā yadā hananabuddhir utpadyate tadā tadā pratiśedhaḥ sarvatra brāhmaṇajātau vyāpriyate*). (HJS28p.38.2–3) An instance of a sentence where the 'connection with action is through the individual' (*vyaktidrāveṇa kriyāyoga*) is: 'Fetch a brāhmaṇa' (*brāhmaṇam ālabheta*). The instructions here concern a single individual.

Helārāja is concerned to address two problems, one to the universalists (*jātivādīn*) and the other to the substantialists (*dravyavādīn*). For the universalist the problem is, if Vedic injunctions are couched in terms of universals, how do they apply to individuals? The problem harks back to Vyāḍi's mocking observation (in vt.47 to Pl.2.64) that it is animals which are seized and not universals. Helārāja's reply based on JS3 is that individuals are indicated by universals, as representing capacities (*śakti*, see n.II.24). Notice, however, that JS3, in deference to the tradition of the MB (cf.vt.55.on Pl.2.64), uses the term *sāhacarya* (accompaniment) to designate the relation between individuals which are sacrificed and universals, while Helārāja uses the term *ekārthasamavāya* (co-inherence). I do not know if this is deliberate, or whether Helārāja has unconsciously carried over into JS3 Bhartṛhari's elevation of the individual to the status of an eternal in JS2. The second problem addressed by Helārāja is the problem of substitution, if injunctions are couched in terms of individuals, how is substitution to be justified? His answer, an elaboration of JS3, draws in Bhartṛhari's view of universals presented in VP2.68, that universals and verbs share a common nature, in that all the individuals which fall within their range are never specifically indicated (*na ca sāmānyavat sarve kriyāśabdena lakṣitāḥ viśeṣā na hi sarvesaṃ satāṃ śubdo bhidhāyakaḥ*). Helārāja's interpretation of *śakti* (capacity) undergoes a certain change in these comments of the substantialist's position below. Here *śakti* (capacity) is not presented as directly belonging to individuals like posts made of *palāśa* wood (JS2), but to nominal suffixes. Universals are introduced through the nominal base to which case endings attach.

HJS3p.10.21–24

Alternately, *according to some* means according to some words. According to the substantialists, [even when words directly signify individuals], universals are necessarily given there as a result of being indicated through connection with capacity [given in the inflectional endings], because the nominal inflectional endings, which signify the capacity, are not able to function in isolation. Therefore, since the nominal base inevitably is given, the capacity becomes delimited by means of the universal signified by the nominal base; if it is possible.

Thus the case for substitution is made only by way of universals, even for the substantialist.

HJS3p.11.1–5

In the object's absence, on the other hand, the capacity which accompanies a universal which is similar to it, is grasped, since the prescription is through the purport of words. When the suggestion regarding the mere Means is fixed through the principal action [determined by the principal verb in the injunction], which is the sentence meaning [and] even when the word which signifies the Means is given in order to convey a qualified universal, [and] when that particular universal is impossible [when the individual it picks out, e.g. post made of *palāśa* wood, is unavailable] then, lest, when there is an abandonment of the principal capacity, due to the use [in the injunction] of a universal which is given over to conveying the [specific] capacity of the Means to action, the [enjoined] action becomes impossible [to perform], the capacity belonging to an individual, which falls under a different universal, is grasped, on the basis of the action of the learned. Nor in this way is there an over-extension, because the subject matter of the rule, it is held, only concerns a substitute in the context of the action which is prescribed. And so, in the case of prescriptions such as cow-milking (*godohādī*), no implication concerning buffaloes arises, when cows lack the capacity.

Helārāja here lays down the priorities for the choice of substitutes. The principal verb of the sentence automatically suggests a range of means, choice is further restricted by the use of a more specified universal. When individuals, which fall within the range of the qualified universal are unavailable, one which falls within the range of the principal verb is substituted. The choice, however, may also be in deference to the "action of the learned". But the "action of the learned", Helārāja suggests, never will extend beyond the range of substitutes given through the principal verb in the injunction. I am not sure whether the substitution of buffalo milking is prohibited by "the action of the learned" in these matters or whether the prohibition is read off from the verb, to be interpreted as cow-milking rather than just milking.

HJS3p.11.6-16

A universal does not lay down a specific rule [with regard to the choice of specific individuals, which are the Means], because it merely indicates (*upalakṣaṇatvāt*). Just as in sentence such as, 'protect [the butter] from crows', whose intent is protection against intruders, when something similar is given [i.e. if the butter is protected against a dog], the heard meaning of the original sentence is not abandoned. And, where the object which is enjoined in the prescription is available, there the injunction is fulfilled. Therefore, in sentences such as for instance, 'he fastens to a *khadira* post', 'he fastens to a *palāśa* post', when the capacity of fastening, which exists in the *khadira* post and such, in unavailable, then the acceptance is recommended of Means which have the capacity [and] which are similar to it, such as, for instance, the *kadara* post. Because it is not possible to have a capacity without a support, a universal is given as integral [to a non-specified individual], because the universal does not lay down the rule [as regard the choice of the individual which is to be the specific means]. The universal which indicates a capacity is not really concerned in action; therefore, when its support [which though mentioned in the text] is without capacity, a capacity is grasped which belongs in another individual thing, without the previous support [lit. grasped which belongs in another individual thing, without the previous support [lit. without it]. If, on the other hand, that very kind of thing [mentioned in the text] had the capacity then, because there is no reason to abandon that which is at hand, that very kind of thing is accepted. On the other hand, when that very kind of thing [prescribed in the text] has no capacity, because an indicator is satisfied in what is indicated, [and] because some other thing [beside the one indicated in the injunction] is also [satisfied] in the performance of that function, a capacity indicated by it [i.e. by the one mentioned in the injunction] is enjoined by the *śāstra*; thus the capacity belonging to some other thing is accepted, because nothing hampers [this acceptance]. And because a capacity belonging to another object which is similar is grasped, there is no over-extension.

HJS6p.16.10-12

In this way, in another Book the two views [regarding the primacy of individuals or universals] have been shown to be feasible and, therefore, as the need arises, substitutes considered. Now, when [it is the case that] universals are being signified by words, fearing that the application of words may not have an occasioning ground, because universals do not subsist in other universals, in order to make this feasible, he says:

JS6

All words first of all express their own universal; thereafter the universal (lit. it) is imagined to be superimposed upon the forms of universals of [external] things.

HJS6p.16.15-18

Own (*svā*), i.e. the universal which is unique to itself, for instance, being the word 'cow' not,

on the other hand, the universal which is common to all words, for instance, being a word. Thus the relation of the word does not deviate from its own universal (lit. it), even when the word's relation with the universal of things does deviate, because it has been qualified as being unique; therefore, that the *own universal* alone is what is primarily signified, becomes stated [in the stanza].

Helārāja's comments on *own universal* are based on vrVPI.15-23p.52.4-6 (translated on p. 18). The question whether the notion of universals is a semantic notion or a purely phonological one has been discussed together with Iyer's and Brough's translations of JS6 in Ch.II.iii; the conclusion reached there was that the concept of universals include semantic features. Helārāja's comments about deviance and non-deviance are inspired by SS2: "When the form of the word is grasped there can be no deviance" (*svarūpeṣūpalabdheṣu vyabhicāro na vidyate*).

HJS6p.17.5-9

Accordingly the Vākyakāra says: Alternatively, this is not so, because the understanding of the thing is preceded by the word (vt.2 on P1.1-68). That is why he says that in signifying the thing universal on the basis of the non-deviating universal word form (*svarūpajāti*), the word signifies through an integral relation (lit. integrally), therefore, he says: *first of all*. What is perceived as being identical with something must necessarily be perceptible there: this is the sense of primacy, the primacy is not due to a signification in sequence.

Helārāja's authority for denying a chronological sequence comes from VS353.

Alternately, the firstness is in respect of the time when the relation [between the word and the external object] is learnt. Accordingly when the relation between a word and an object is first being learnt, there is no relation [between the word] and the universal belonging in the thing. If that were the case [that the relation between the word and the thing were prior to its being learnt], the application of the word, as the signifier in that context (*vācakatvena viniyoga*), would be pointless; since the object would already have been known, the object would not be (lit. is not) known through that word. And if, at that time [when the relation between the word and object is learnt], the word were not to express its own universal, then, being meaningless, it would not here become connected with a case-ending; thus he says: "Before the name becomes connected with the named, the name means its own form" (VPI.66).

Viniyoga is a technical word. Iyer, who bases his remarks on vr. to VP2.399 of the Second Book, explains it thus: "when the word has more than one meaning, the speaker mentally chooses one of them and decides

that it should be expressed by the speaker": Iyer, 1977 p.171. To translate *sambandhavyutpattikāla* as "when the conventional meaning of a word is learnt" would be to falsify Helārāja's intention, which is to point out that the sense expressed by a word through the universal is prior to, and the logical basis upon which, external objects are identified. The nominal stem, according to Pāṇini's definition: *arthavad adhātur apratyaya prātipadikam* (P.2.45) is necessarily meaningful.

HJS6p.17.9–19

Helārāja now identifies the concept of *svā jāti* (own universal) with *rūpa* (form) and *svarūpa* (own form) which are used by Bhartṛhari for instance in JS6, VPI.66 and SS2 respectively. The identification of *svaṃ rūpam* with *jāti* is mentioned in vrVPI.68–69p.129.4–5.

'The form' (*rūpa*) is really the 'own form' (*svarūpa*) or 'own universal' (*svā jāti*): thus signified from different point of view. *By all*. By those words which have reference to their own form as well as by those which have reference to their object, because it is the word universal which is, as the own form of the word, involved in usage. In this way, even words which have not become related to objects convey, through an invariant relation, the universal which is fixed as the word's own form.

Going back to the theme already propounded (HJS6p.17.3–4) that the understanding of the word universal and its superimposition upon the universal of things, is not separated in time, Helārāja makes a metaphysical point: universals of things are only seemingly non-linguistic; the whole universe being in some sense an evolute of the language principle (see SS34B)

Even when the object is understood at the very same time as being not different (*abheda*) from the word's as is already explained [sense of] sequence [he says] *thereafter*, i.e. after the own universal is conveyed, its superimposition on the form of the thing universal, such as cowness, is *imagined*; there is no real superimposition, for the object is not essentially different from language, being a transformation of language.

Even though metaphysically the external world is an evolute of the linguistic principle and, therefore, of the same substance, in an account of our knowledge of the external world this aspect of the theory is ignored. For the purposes of epistemology the word universal and the thing universal have to be allowed to be totally distinct (*atyantabhinna*), as belonging to different substrata. In JS7-8 the gap between the thing and the word is bridged by the relation called conjunction (*saṃyoga*), which obtains between independent substance. It is interesting to note that in Dharmakīrti also the relation between the universal (which is a *vāsanā*

and therefore a mental) and the perceptual realm, is negotiated by proximity (*pratyāsatti*): see SVP162, quoted by Helārāja in JS94, translated there. Helārāja explains the idea of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) by means of the idea of metaphor. In this he follows Bhartṛhari, see discussion in Ch.II.iii.

Alternately, at the time when the relation [between a word and the object] is made as, 'this object is a cow', a superimposition through identity is imagined, because the word universal (*śabdajāti*) is totally distinct (*atyantabhinna*) from the universal of things and because, as a result, a common substratum [between them] does not in any way become feasible. The same is the case with the [metaphorical figure] the 'vāhika ox' (*gaur vāhika*). Otherwise [i.e. in the absence of the superimposition] the designation of the object by the word could not even be made.

Helārāja now qualifies his statement that the word universal and the universal of things are absolutely distinct (*atyantabhinna*). Absolute distinction does not entail arbitrariness; a word universal such as cowness cannot be superimposed upon the thing universal, horsehood. The gap between the perceptual and the conceptual realm is bridged by the notion, not directly alluded to here, of fitness (*yogyatā*) or conformity (*sārūpya*): see Ch. II.vi.

Just as the relation between the signified and the signifier is beginningless and not negotiated by men so also the superimposition [is beginningless and not negotiated by men]. Otherwise, the signified-signifier relation itself could not be possible. Just as for the Buddhist the identification between the perceptual and the conceptual object (*drśyavikalpārthaikāra*) is marked by the disregard for the [very real] distinction [between the perceptual and the conceptual] but is not, on the other hand, [subject to men's whims] as is the [metaphorical figure] 'the vāhika ox', so also here the superimposition is not through men's whims.

The last two lines are somewhat dense. The phrase, *drśyavikalpārthaikāra* echoes a phrase of Dharmakīrti's vrSVPV68-70p.39.6–8: *te tu svā-lambanam evārthakriyāyogyam manyamānā drśyavikalpān arthān ekīkṛtya pravartante* "They, believing really that the support [of their cognition] is alone fit to fulfil ends, act, having [first] identified the perceptual and the conceptual [objects]". Helārāja is here calling on the idea of conformity (*sārūpya*) or fitness (*yogyatā*) which makes this superimposition of the conceptual on the perceptual not a matter of whim, but a matter of natural fitness. The idea of conformity is an essential aspect of Dharmakīrti's and Bhartṛhari's epistemology (see Ch. II. vi). Helārāja's sympathetic treatment of Dharmakīrti is obvious in his frequent use of the phrase: *drśyavikalpabhedānādhyavasāya* (disregard of the distinction between the perceptual and conceptual) and its variant, *drśyavikalpābhedādhyavasāya* (proper regard for the non-distinction between the perceptual and

conceptual). Aklujkar has noted numerous uses of the former phrase (Aklujkar, 1970 n.5.54c). The phrases represent a very neat way of summing up the distinction between the grammarian's point of view and the point of view of the Buddhists of Dharmakīrti's persuasion, while retaining their essential area of agreement. For the Buddhist the distinction between the conceptual and perceptual is genuine, for the latter alone is metaphysically real. For the grammarian, on the other hand, that which has its source in language alone is real, there being no reason to postulate, once the link with ritual sacrifices is forgotten, a perceptual realm. In spite of this basic metaphysical difference, both schools agree that for the purposes of daily life (*vyavahāra*) the perceptual and conceptual have to be regarded as unified, a pre-established conformity guaranteeing this gesture.

There is an extremely interesting discussion by Helārāja on this matter in VP3.7.6, a discussion which serves to underline the unsystematic character both of his rejection of the crystal model of language (see Ch. II.vii) and his support of the metaphorical model. The passage also underlines the common area of agreement between the Bhartṛhari/Helārāja school and the Dharmakīrti school, crystallized in the doctrine that objects, given full-blown in language and the understanding, are superimposed upon the non-linguistic phenomenal world. (see Ch. II.v; Ch. V.iii).

Speakers imagine distinct capacities in objects, having [first] superimposed the form which belong in the activity of the understanding. (VP3.7.6)

The activity of the understanding is marked by [the act of] distinguishing [objects]. Its form or shape is what appears in the object. Speakers, having superimposed this shape [lit.it] onto external objects, imagine diverse capacities in them. This is the meaning [of the stanza]. Since the distinction of capacities, which belongs in the understanding, is falsely viewed to belong to the external alone, because of the identification of the perceptual and conceptual, they imagine that a diverse instrumentality [for achieving their ends] exists there [i.e. in the external object]. Since what appears in the understanding cannot be apprehended through its [external] basis, they apprehend the [external] thing itself as possessing diverse capacities, having [first] drawn in distinct acts and the speaker's expectations [with respect to the object]: thus, language is the authority with respect to the external object. Those engaged in using language convey the truth of the sentence on the basis of the absence of incompatibilities (*bādhakābhāva*) between the association of the action and the agents of action and the presence of agreement [between the elements of the sentence]. For the Buddhist the movement toward the external is the result of disregarding the distinction of the conceptual reflection (*vikalpapratibimba*, cf. PV2.163–164) [from its perceptual source]. But the source of authority, which accrues in the speaker's intention alone, still belongs to language, not to the external object, because deviance can be suspected [with reference to the external]:

the external [in the case of the Buddhist], rests in fact merely on the exclusion of what is other. The grammarians' subject matter, on the other hand, consists of excluded objects determined in that way: the authoritativeness rests there alone [and does not extend into the external world]; such is the difference in views [between the grammarians and the Buddhists].

There is no possibility of confusion because usage (*vyavahāra*) is regulated by the proper limiting features (*upādhi*). And the powers which render service (*upakāra*) are, in each case, distinguished on the basis of the limiting features and are incapable of being described in terms of essence (*tattva*) and otherness (*anyatva*), because their being is inchoate; therefore, there is no possibility of what is not a limiting feature rendering a service. (Helārāja on VP3.7.6p.237.10–21)

In this text Helārāja appears quite reconciled to the idea that usage is regulated by services rendered (*upakāra*) by the 'conditioning feature'. He does not demand a full-fledged thing universal, separately ascertained, upon which the word universal is superimposed (see HJS7-8p.21.5–13). Helārāja's sympathetic attitude to Dharmakīrti is apparent in his remarks above. As Helārāja sees it, the difference between his own stand-point and Dharmakīrti's consists in the fact that the latter is interested in the external world as fulfilling purpose. The broad area of agreement consists, on the other hand, in their view that the source of authority in both their cases depends on language and that, for the purposes of every day usage, the distinction between the perceptual and the conceptual is ignored. That Helārāja is not distorting the beliefs Dharmakīrti held and that for Dharmakīrti language is the primary source of truth and falsity of almost all sentences, singular as well as universal, is discussed in Chapter V.

HJS6p.17.19,18.1–11

How is the universal, which is unique and which is not revealed in each [separate] syllable, revealed through syllables which exist at different times, when in the practice of the world, the non-distinction between the word and object is always maintained? If this is an objection, we reply: it is revealed in the same way as [universals of] actions, say of tossing, are revealed. Accordingly even when the revelation of [universals of] action belongs to each moment [during which the action is performed], the first moment of tossing, not having its specific features [clearly] determined, because of its similarity with the moments which constitute the twirling [action and], because it occupies the space of a mere atom (and) has the form of mere extension (lit. advance, in space), is not capable of revealing its proper universal by itself, therefore is dependent on other moments [for the proper revelation of the universal]. It is not that there isn't any distinction between the action of tossing [lit.it] and the action of twirling, since at the very beginning it [the action of throwing] is generated by efforts such as [is expressed by], 'I am throwing'. Even when the effort involved in [articulating the

sentence] 'gośabdam uccārayāmi ('I say the word 'cow'') is different from the effort which goes into producing [the words] *gāna*, *gagana* ('song', 'sky'), and the *ga* sounds [in each case] are also really distinct, due to the differences in their causes, still it is difficult accurately to perceive [this distinctiveness] because of similarity. Therefore, the initial sound, even though it reveals the universal, reveals it indistinctly (*asphuṭam*); thus even when it is repeated, it is not the cause of a clearer revelation of the universal. When the composition of parts is not the cause of a clearer revelation of the universal, which consist of word universals and conditionally grasped, then worldly practices, which consist of word universals and conditioning features, becomes fixed. For at that time, due to accompaniment, the word universal and conditioning features acquire a distinct appearance, due to a mutual delimitation.

I understand the compound *śabdajātivīśeṣopādhiyukta-* as: *śabdajāti-vīśeṣopādhibhyām yukto vyavahārah*. The phrase is obscure largely because of the phrase *vīśeṣopādhi*. I would like with some reservation to suggest that the phrase *vīśeṣopādhi* is a substitute for *arthajāti* mentioned in Bhartṛhari's text above. A *jāti* (universal) and an *upādhi* (limiting feature) do belong to separate ontological categories, the latter is transient (see HDSp.108.2–3) but the former is not. And yet Bhartṛhari is known to downgrade the role of the *arthajāti* in pursuit of metaphysically neutral theory: see discussion on JS47 and Ch.II.viii. The idea then that the practices of the world are a combination of the word universal and perceptual information, is a reasonable interpretation of the meaning of the phrase.

HJS6p.18.11–18

Just as a *śloka* which upon a single reading is not clearly understood, but on repeated study appears clear, so also the essence of the *sphoṭa* shines clearly in the final awareness (caramacetas) in the same way as the essence of a jewel [shines clearly in the awareness of an experienced jeweller]. The initial syllable merely generates the appearance of a universal, the series of each unfolding syllable which is subsequent to it, posits a progressively clearer delimitation [of the *sphoṭa*]. This specific form of revelation, which proceeds from the accumulation (lit. generation) of particular memory traces, is seen in cases such as [the jeweller's ability to recognize] the real nature of jewels. Because [expressions such as:] 'we understand the object on the basis of that word' are part of usage, and because it is not possible for syllables to be the agents through which sense is determined and since [the subsequent] breakdown of meaningful discourse has already been explained in the First Book, it becomes necessary to accept a verbal essence which has no parts, which conveys meaning and which has the essential nature of the *sphoṭa*, distinguished as universal and individual. Moreover, [in sentences such as:] 'this object is a cow', since the signified thing is understood as [being] non-different from the signifier, the object which is to be a part of usage, has its form overlaid with the superimposition of the word (lit.it). It has already been concluded there in the First Book that the (word's) own-form is significant, in this Book also (lit.here) the same thing will be concluded in the *sambandhasamuddeśa*.

JS6 is discussed in Ch.II.III. Issues raised by Helārāja in the context of the metaphorical figure *gaur vāhika* are discussed in Ch.III.vii.

HJS7-8p.19.1–2

In the context of the interpretation offered in the previous stanza (lit.there) this might be raised [as an objection]: How can the universal which inheres in a word designate the universal belonging in things (*arthajāti*) as non-different when they belong to different substrata? Having suspected this [objection] he elucidates the point by means of an example:

JS7–8

Just as the essence, which is in the quality red, is designated in lacquer and, as a result of contact with what is conjoined (*samyogisannikarṣa*), is grasped even in garments; so also the universal, which is fixed in a word as a result of the relation between word and object, brings about the function of universals (*jātikārya*), when universals belonging in things are designated.

HJS7–8p.19.7–10

Helārāja does not comment on the fact that the quality on the basis of which names are given to objects has been raised to a universal (see Ch.II.iii and iv). There are several interesting features about Helārāja's comments, among them the following: he interprets *śabdārthasambandha* as the relation of inherence between *vyaktisphoṭa* and *jātisphoṭa*. He therefore treats the word universal as inhering in the ideal object; his source for this interpretation may be vrVP1.23p.52.1–3 where *śabdārthasambandha* is understood as *ākṛtyarthasambandha* and both *ākṛti* and *artha* are designated as eternal. Thus *śabda* is no longer a *guṇa*, but an independent *dravya*: cf.SS40–41. This challenges the conception of names given by Kātyāyana and as interpreted by Patañjali.

The essence which is in the quality red: the essence, which belongs to that red quality is redness, it is said to be the universal redness which inheres in the individual quality. As a result of inhering in what has inhered there, it is being designated in the individual (*dravya*) which is the substratum of the red colour: being designated in the sense of bringing about designation [of the individual]. For it is that individual lacquer which has that redness as its qualifier (reading *tadvīśeṣaṇabhūtam* as *tad raktatvaṃ vīśeṣaṇabhūtam yasya tat kaṣāyadravyam*) which becomes named as: 'red lacquer'.

According to Helārāja the *essence of the quality* (*guṇasya bhāva*) is a universal which resides in an individual which is a quality, through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). It names lacquer through inhering in what has inhered (*samavetasamavāya*) i.e. through the quality which inheres in lacquer.

HJS7-8p.19.10-12

The essence of a quality (*guṇasya bhāva*) is described as extending beyond the objects in which it inheres and, therefore, can name. This extension is negotiated through the relation of conjunction (*saṃyoga*). The object to which it is thus extended is called *saṃyogin* (the conjoined object). The phrase *saṃyogisannikarṣa* is explained by Helārāja:

Garments etc. are in contact with the essence of redness (lit.it). The contact (*sannikarṣa*) of these two conjoined entities, namely of lacquer and garments, is their intermingling (*saṃbheda*); as a result of that occasioning ground redness is grasped even in the cloth (lit. there). The meaning is: due to inherence in what has inhered in what is conjoint (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*), in the case of garments also the designation has redness as its occasioning ground [for instance, in] 'the red garments'.

In the phrase *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya* (inherence in what has inhered in what is conjoint) the conjoint (*saṃyukta*) stands for the garment which is conjoint with the lacquer (*kaṣāya*), the *samaveta* (what has inhered) stands for the quality, the redness which has inhered in lacquer. Thus the essence or universal redness is described as residing in the quality red which in turn inheres in lacquer, which is conjoint with a garment.

HJS7-8p.19.12-15

So as a result of the relation between word and object, a word universal names [its object] strictly by means of a relation (*sambandhād eva*) which takes the place of the relation between the quality redness and the individual, [namely], lacquer, which is fixed as [the relation of] co-inhering in the same thing, which is natural (innate ?) and is known only at the time of its learning and which, only because it cannot arise in any other way, is imagined to be superimposed. Here, the object is the universal belonging in things, because it is that which initiates designability.

The idea that the relation (*sambandha*) between word and object (*śabdārthasambandha*) is all encompassing, is what Helārāja has in mind here. This basic relation becomes modified, stands in (*sthānīya*), or does

duty for, various other relations such as the one mentioned here: the relation between a quality and its substratum. This notion of relations implies that there are no relations in the external world; relations being features of one basic relation which belongs to language and, therefore, to mind. In SS8-11, Bhartṛhari attributes such an all encompassing character to inherence; see vVP1.67p.126.3-5 (under n.II.59). The view that external objects are responsible for bringing universals into reflective focus is discussed in Ch.II.vii.

HJS7-8p.19.15-17.p.20.1-4

When designating: the word brings about designation by means of a non-distinction with its own form; brings about the function of universals: the universal, situated in the word 'universal' etc., and applying to universals as designator, not only brings about designation but also brings about the function of universals. Alternately the meaning is that where there is designation, the word universal (lit.it) brings about the function of universals. Universals do not belong in other universals, therefore, given that thing universals themselves lack [further] universals, the universal which has inhered in a word [and] that has acquired a superimposed identity with the thing on the basis of a relation [expressed as] 'this is that', while producing that function whose character is to repeatedly recur in verbal cognitions, receives, it is metaphorically said, an identity with the thing.

The last line expresses the view that the nature of this all embracing relation becomes circumscribed in the context of the object. "The function of universals" is a hierarchical structuring of universals as a result of which a relation of entailment obtains between various words, e.g. between the word, 'cow' and the word, 'animal'. For details see discussion on Ch.II.iv.

HJS7-8p.20.4-9

Helārāja now turns his attention to JS8A, bringing into the context of the discussion the idea of *sphoṭa* (the unified word symbol) which is divided into universal (*jāti*) and individual thing (*vyakti*): see discussion of these terms in Ch.II.ii.

The universal inheres in the word in its form as an individual thing, not on the contrary, in syllables: therefore, the word *fixed* is proper [in the phrase *śabde jātir avasthitā*]. Because syllables lack simultaneity they are not signifiers, and so, how can the word universal inhere in them? Since there are two views regarding the *sphoṭa* alone, which is distinguished as universal and individual, universals inhere in the *sphoṭa* individual. Universals, which are the cause of the idea of uniform names, should necessarily be assumed, for they belong to words which are eternal and which are distinct due to distinctions present in objects. That is precisely why only the individual, delineated on the basis of a universal, is the

signifier. Since the [idea of the] universal resorted to here is that of an indicator [of the object], the objection: how can a non-recurring (*ananuyāyin*) thing (*vyakti*) be a signifier? should not be urged.

The term *ananuyāyinī* which qualifies *vyakti* (thing) contrasts with a *jāti* which is frequently described by Helārāja as *anvitākāra* or *anuvṛt-tipratyaya*: see n.II.72.

HJS7-8p.20.10-18

And here [i.e. in this system] the relation between words and things is intended to be marked by fitness. All words used as names become connected with their objects everywhere through a relation marked by fitness. The function of the giver of names consists merely in de-limiting a capacity [which pre-exists in names], not in establishing a new relation between words and things: because the relation [of words] with objects is non-human. And so it is not the case that in applying the word *vṛddhi* to *ādaic* (i.e. to ā, ai, au) there is really no prior relation between the word *vṛddhi* (which can also mean growth or increase) and *ādaic*; therefore, because all words have a variety of meaning or, because of a variety of speakers there is a diversity, it is necessary to postulate a universal which is the cause of the uniform cognition. Just as [the universal] skyness is defined as a property of the sky, when its distinctions, based upon the distinctions of the entities which are conjoint [with it], are imagined to be numerous.

According to Helārāja both words and things acquire modifications when an object is named. Meaningful words have their meaning contextualized by the speaker who uses them, for a word can and usually does have a variety of senses. A word is never arbitrarily attached to an object. For the grammarian there are no proper names, in the strict sense of that word. The word *saṅketa* like the word *saṁbandhavyutpattikāla* (HJS6p.17-15) cannot in this context mean a 'conventional relation between word and meaning', the normal manner of translating it; see trPS5.34. The notion of 'fitness' (*yogyatā*) is discussed in Ch.II.vi.

It does not follow from this that any meaning can be understood from any word, for understanding of meaning is subject to what is well established; [and only] some thing is well established in some place. Moreover, it has already been mentioned that meaning in context (or intention and context) and such are the reasons for the distinctions of well established meanings. So, in spite of nine senses being presented through the word 'cow', there is, on the basis, for instance, of context and so on, determination of the relevant sense.

HJS7-8p.20.18-20,p.21.1-2

In this way, first of all, through the word universal, (*śabdajāti*) the word individual (*śabda-*

vyakti), which is the signifier, is named through (their) non-difference; thereafter, the universal belonging in things, after that the [external] individual which belongs to it (i.e. to the universal of things): this is the real sequence. In the understanding there, however, is really no sequence.

The *śabdavyakti* here stands for the *vyaktisphoṭa* or the ideal and permanent individual (JS2) postulated by Bhartṛhari. Thus the point of Bhartṛhari's analogy in JS7-8: the universal belonging in individual *x* transferred to individual *y*, on account of contact. The move represents a dramatic shift, away from the more traditional position that a word is a quality (*guṇa*) located in space (*ākāśa*), to the position that the word comprises a universal located in an ideal individual; that the word itself is an individual. This gives substance to Dignāga's criticism in trvrPS5.36: *arthāntaram upādāya svabhedeṣu śabdo na vartate*. I draw the reader's attention to Helārāja's condemnation of the crystal image below (see Ch.II.vii).

Even when the object in [the external world] is not delineated on the basis of the word, its form does not disappear. Just as the form which belongs to a pot does not disappear when it is not illuminated by light, in the same way the [external] object is tinged with the form which belongs to the word [which designates it, but has an independent form also]. For it is seen that both language and light illumine their objects in just this way, through the superimposition of their own forms. And just as is the case in [the metaphorical figure] 'the *vāhika* ox'; what is apprehended here is not merely the form of an oxness, rather [what is apprehended] is a *vāhika* on whom the form of an ox has been superimposed; so also here [it is not merely the form of the word which is apprehended, but an object on which the word's form is superimposed].¹ What is intended here is not, on the contrary, the complete union of the word universal in the [external] thing as is the case with the crystal, because what is to be conveyed is really the external object (lit.it), just as it is the *vāhika* [who is to be described by 'vāhika ox', not the ox].

HJS7-8p.21.3-5

Since the relation of non-difference of words [and objects] is the natural means to convey an object, the man who is to have an object conveyed to him through a name, understands it in just that way [through non-difference based on superimposition]. This is not subject to human agency. Since, in the universe which is beginningless, the relation between the word and the [external] thing is learnt only in this way [through the superimposition of a meaning-bearing word], who can then be imagined here as the fixed [i.e., first] superimposer?

1. I read *ityantra* as *ity atra* (p. 21.1).

HJS7-8p.21.5-12

Helārāja now makes a plea for the acceptance of thing universals (*artha-jāti*) as independent of word universals (*śabdajāti*). This is of a piece with his rejection of the crystal as a model for language and his partiality for the models described by *gaur vāhika*: see HJS7-8p.20.19-21, p.21.1-2, translated above, under the crystal model, the ontological status of the thing universal is left uncertain: see HJS47p.56.6-17; JS104 and HJS103 p.102, not translated; see JS92 and JS93-94 plus Helārāja's comments on these stanzas for the uncertain status attributed to thing universals. See also the discussions in Ch.II.vii, Ch.III.iv for Dignāga's critique of the crystal model and Helārāja's response.

Since uniform cognitions (*abbhinna pratyaya*) arise in a man who has not learnt the relation between a word and the [external] object, universals belonging in things also exist; it should not be said that the word universal alone is allowed as superimposer. Since verbal cognitions are of this sort they have, therefore, been explained by means of visual illustrations, such as, the cognition of red. Even in the absence of a proximity with [spatio-temporal] things, this beginningless superimposition of word universals is established. And since, in the affairs of the world, the non-difference relation [between words and things] is constantly being re-assessed (lit. determined), and since the object appears [separately in the manner of the vāhika] in vāhika-ox, this cognition [of the object through the word] is not mistaken. Universals belonging in things appear as distinct [from word universals] prior to the time of the awareness of the relation [between the word and the external object]. A child who has not yet learnt the relation [between a word and an external object] has distinct cognitions when he is placed in front of a thing which has dewlaps and such; then, since the signifying word (*vācaka*) is not at hand, the thing universal, which is the cause of uniform cognitions, is ascertained. That is why objections of the following sort would not be urged: how can the word universal be superimposed upon the things universal, which has not been separately ascertained?

JS9

He now explains the meaning of what he has already said [namely] "brings about the function of universals."

It [i.e. the higher word universal] is held to be the universal of [lower, more specific] universals when [the operation] Remaindering of One is performed for words which signify universals as: "[these are] word universals here"; the higher word universal [lit.it] is located in word universals.

The operation of *ekaśeṣa* (Remaindering of One) is restricted to the context of words which signify individuals. It has no provenance in the context of universals, because universals are already one (*ekā*) there is no need for

any further reduction. This was maintained by Patañjali: cf. MB on vt.53 to Pl.2.64, *yadi hi kadācid ākṛtir ekatvena vivakṣitā bhavati kadācid dvitvena kadācid bahutvenaikākṛtir iti pratijñā hīyate yac cāsyā pakṣasyo-pādāne prayojanam uktam ekaśeṣo na vaktavya iti sa cedānīm vaktavyo bhavati*/ Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali, also declared elsewhere that the operation had no justification in the context of universals (see VS332). In the context of words which designate individuals the operation is justified by the dictums: each bearer has its own word and where numerous bearers are designated numerous words are used (see vt.1 and 2 to Pl.2.64, translated under n.II.51; cf. also Abhyankar, 1977 entry under *ekaśeṣa*). The operation is invoked to explain the observed fact that one word can stand for numerous bearers, for instance the word *ṛkṣau* (two trees) stands for two objects. This is explained away by maintaining that the word represents the residual form of two occurrences of words which have the same form (*sarūpa*) (see Charudev Shastri, 1969 I.p.175-176).

In an unorthodox gesture Bhartṛhari in JS9 above extends the operation to the context of universals; the extension underlines the novel and more complex notion of universals he sought to introduce into the system.

HJS9pp.21.17,22.1-10

"Alternately, because a universal is signified [the word] in the nominal ending, is one" according to Vājapyāyana. (vt.52 to Pl.2.64)

Since the operation, Remaindering of One, is forbidden in the view of the universalists, in the case of Remaindering of One here, the result of the operation [namely] the use of a single word, is signified. Remaindering of One indicates an intention to speak jointly. Alternately, "in the event of Remaindering of One of words which signify universals", this should be added [as the sense of the stanza]. It refers to word universals. The universal, which belongs in words which signify universals, and which is being fixed as belonging in an identical way with thing universals, creates the function of universals, which is the use of a single word. Just as a single word usage, such as 'cows', 'trees', which has as its basis a uniform universal [and] in which a specific number is located through co-inherence, is feasible. So also [the designation] "these are universals", which depends upon the superimposition of the universal belonging to the signifying expression (*vācakajāti*), is feasible, because universals [belonging in things] are not located in other universals. Universals belonging in words are said metaphorically to perform the function of universals, for no one [i.e. no grammarian] makes a rule with regard to thing universals alone. When it is the case that

1. Following Kielhorn (MB), I read *vaikavibhaktau* as *vaikam vibhaktau*.

universals belonging in words are also to be conveyed, then, in their case also only that which belongs in the signifying expression (*abhidhānagatam*) brings about the function of universals; therefore he says: "[these are] word universals here".

Helārāja points out that, at the heart of the new operation, is the intention of taking about several entities jointly (*sahavivakṣā*). This can occur at several levels: at the level of language, when on the basis of one word there is an intention to talk about other words; on the level of reality, when on the basis of a word there is the intention of talking about many things. In the former case one can talk about all the universals located in specific words as, "these are word universals". In the latter case one can talk about the universals located in phenomenal things as "these are universals", or "these are trees". In both cases the word universal is the basis of such usage. At one point Helārāja's reasoning becomes quite dense, this is when he invokes the Vaiśeṣika dictum that universals do not inhere in other universals. The point of bringing in the reference is not stated. The dictum presupposes the following argument. The locution "these are trees" draws into its fold the content of lesser universals such as rosewood-ness. This cannot be accounted for unless one assumes that universals belonging in things inhere in other universals. Since this cannot happen, the function is performed by universals located in words.

HJS9p.22.9-11

That universal is the word universal, it is the universal which belongs in words. In a single word location, "these are word universals", that universal which belongs to the word for word universals is the ground when in a single word usage [more specific] word universals such as being the word 'cow', suitably located in [spatial] entities, are to be conveyed in a single word usage: this is the meaning.

HJS10p.22.12-13

What are the effects of extending the operation of *ekaśeṣa* (Remaindering of One) to the realm of universals? Helārāja suspects the extension would lead to an infinite regress; JS10 is meant to preclude such a possibility. What is the basis for Helārāja's suspicion? I think the following. The operation is justified on the basis of the ideal that each bearer has its own word (see vt.1-2 on Pl.2.64, translated in n.II.51), an ideal which is served by the *anyavyatireka* procedure: "a meaning is not understood

unless the item expressing it occurs" (see n.II.51). Now under the aegis of this analysis, if a word signifies a hierarchy of universals and each element in the hierarchy needs a separate designating item, then the process of encompassing the content of a single name would be endless. Bhartṛhari's stanza forestalls such a possibility by attributing to the higher universal the capacity to "cross over" (*ati+kram*) aspects of its own universal. I interpret this as the capacity of the higher universal, of its semantic content, to cross over the phonetic features immediately connected with it and to lodge in the phonetically defined contours of other words. Thus the universal associated with the word 'animal', i.e. animality, has the capacity to cross over its own phonetic features and lodge within the word 'cow'. So also the universal, being a word, lodges in all particular words such as 'cow' and 'horse'.

If the word universal is of this sort, there is then the possibility of an infinite regress, since universals which belong to a word have another signifying universal [and] they [in turn] have another; having suspected this problem, he says:

JS10

The word universal which resides in words, [but] whose character is different from the words [in which it resides], exists [in these words] having also crossed over its own word-universality.

JS10p.23.1-4

That universal which is the cause of uniform cognitions with regard to words used for word universals, diverse on account of a variety of speakers, different in nature from words which have become its support, is not entitled to a separate designation, falling [as it does] within the class of words such as, for instance, 'cow'. This in our view is the meaning: the possibility of an infinite regress does not exist, even the word used for word universals, has universals in the same way as the word 'cow', therefore, through a single word usage it also is conveyed.

HJS11p.23.5-7

According to Helārāja JS11 dispenses with the mechanism of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) of JS6 and presents an entirely different view of the relation between objects and universals, the view that objects have "functional definitions" or, as Helārāja puts it, "objects of words are defined by the functions of words" (*śabdavyāpāreṇa padārthā lakṣyante/*

HJS11p.25.4–5). Helārāja tells us that this new view violates the Vaiśeṣika dogma that universals do not subsist in other universals. I interpret this statement to mean that Bhartṛhari's new conception of individuals emerges from the hierarchical view of universals (see diagram on p.36). As I see it, the new conception of objects is the following. A universal defines all the individuals which fall under it, but these individuals can, in turn, be regarded as universals. The following consequences flow from this conception. The idea of universals and individuals is reversible (cf.vrVP1.69pp.129.5,130.1: *keṣāṃ cit tu viparyayena vyapadeśaḥ| tatra jāter vyaktiḥ saṃjñā, vyakter vā jātiḥ*). Anything can be an individual (cf.JS13: *dravyadharmā padārthe tu dravye sarvo'rtha ucyate*), with the exception of the highest Universal (*mahāsāmānya*). A universal can be represented as residing in another universal as the recurring element (*anupravṛttidharma*, cf.JS14), this is the analytic content. A universal can also be represented as the differentiating element residing in an individual (*vyāvṛttidharma*, cf.JS14), this is the antonymic content.

Helārāja explicitly states that under this new view a proper *saṅketa* (learning of a relation between a word and a thing) is not possible, that proper *saṅketa* presupposes superimposition. I interpret this to mean that the model of language given under JS6 gives way to a different model in JS11, while the former is underpinned by the view that language about the external world is like the figure *gaur vāhika*, the model developed in JS11 is underpinned by the idea that language is like a crystal (see SS40–41 in Ch.II.vi and vii).

He has demonstrated in this way, through the support of the point of view of superimposition [an idea] established in his own system, that the object/meaning of a word is everywhere fixed in terms of a universal. For universals, which are the word's own form, are the first to be conveyed, due to their being integral to words, being uniquely theirs and being indispensable. Even without the support of [the idea of] superimposition, in order by means of a mature exposition, to bring about the all-pervasiveness of universals as object/meaning of words, he says:

JS11

Because, even in the signification of thing universals, all words signify [word] universals, it is established that objects of words have functional definitions.

HJS11p.23.10–14

Here Helārāja points out the limitation of this view in the context of

saṅketa. It was precisely this limitation which was pointed out by Dignāga in his critique of Bhartṛhari's theories, see trPS5.2–8.

Here the relation [between word universals and things] is different. To wit, let us concede that word universals cause the function of thing universals, however, [in such a case] the learning of the relation between a word and its [external] bearer is not explained. For the universal is superimposed wherever the relation between words and objects is learnt. This learning of the relation between words and objects does not arise apart from [existence of] yet another universal, since there is a wide variety of thing universals; therefore, he says: *Even in the signification of thing universals* and so on. Even when the view resorted to is that all words signify pure thing universals, still all [words] signify universals, i.e. the word 'universal' and so on really signify universals.

HJS11p.23.14–16, p.24.1–6

Helārāja now confronts the Vaiśeṣika objection, that universals do not subsist in others.

Since there is a doctrine that universals do not have other universals in them, how can words such as 'universal' signify the universal whose support is a universal? In reply he says: *have functional definitions. A function is an effect, it is that which is intended. That alone is a definer [of a function] by which it [i.e. the function] is defined. [The phrase vyāpāralakṣaṇāḥ is to be understood as an appositional compound:] Those objects conveyed by words have functions as their definition or cause (hetu) i.e. have their nature regulated in that way [by words]. This is the meaning: let the Vaiśeṣikas have their doctrine that universals do not belong in other universals. [For them] this is so because universals (lit. they) are to be determined [as subsisting] in objects on the basis of a recurring idea and, because they lack the appearance of thisness which belongs to independent entities, they cannot be conditioned by other universals. For the grammarian, however, let it be assumed that the linguistic object is the object, [then] the subsistence of universals even in universals remains non-contradicted, because verbal cognition arises through the delimitation of a recurring form. Since it is this [recurring idea] which is really the ground in the assumption regarding the subsistence of universals in individual things, what is the harm in making a similar assumption here also [i.e. in the context of word universals]?*

HJS11p.24.6–9

Helārāja finally takes refuge in the view that the grammarian acknowledges no other authority other than language.

'Even perceptual objects remain performing their own function, such as, [conveying of] knowledge' this is [part of accepted] usage, how then can one deny that objects of words also have their own functions? Therefore, on the basis of the utterance of universals, even individuals etc., through the expressibility belonging to language alone, are indicated. For those whose authority stems from language that is real which is signified by language. In this way, even the quality which is being designated through its recurring form, is really a universal.

Since the rest of the commentary is not relevant to the issues I have discussed in this essay, I have not translated it.

JS34

He now shows that the Great Being [lit. it] is really meant by all words:

They signify the Great Being [lit. it] for the sake of nominal stems as well as verbal stems. It is eternal, the Great Ātman; the *tva* and *tal* [suffixes which are attached to the nominal base of a word in order to articulate the quality (*guṇa*) which represents the occasioning ground for the use of that word] signify it.

HJS34p.41.19–21.p.42.1–5

The universal, in the form of Being, is included in all existents. All nominal stems without exception signify Being, for even absence (*abhāva*) is not disassociated from this Great Being, being ascertained by the forms of the understanding. It has been said: 'Being is the meaning of the nominal base'. Being, which has inhered in individual entities of action, whose becoming actual is subject to the various Means; Being which has become manifold due to appropriate conditioning features (*upādhi*), is signified also by the verbal stem. Being is the subject matter of all words, since it is Being which is applied [when a word is used to designate a thing], through its two-fold nature, the accomplished and the to-be-accomplished, (i.e. nouns and verbs), since there is no other category [besides these two, to which words belong]. Even the affix parts [of words] here really signify Being, qualified by appropriate conditioning features such as, number and the various agents of action (*kāraka*). And Being is *eternal*, since it is devoid of coming into and going out of existence, because the idea of Being always persists.

I would like to draw attention to the parallels between Helārāja's description of Being as 'always persisting' (*sarvadāmuṣṛtti*) with Bhartṛhari's description of the *Śabdabrahman* as the primitive stuff which persists through diverse forms in vrVP1.1pp.6.1,7.1 and refer the reader to the discussion on pp. 40–41). In the next passage Helārāja alludes to JS35 and VP1.3, stanzas in which Bhartṛhari has described the Great Being or *Śabdabrahman* as transforming itself into the six temporal states: "It comes into existence, it exists, it changes, it grows, it wanes, it is destroyed". Borrowing his vocabulary from the Sāṃkhyas, Helārāja next proceeds to give a cosmological interpretation to this idea of persistence which has its origin in observed features of language, that, for instance, the content of the word *śimśapā* contains the content of the word *vrkṣa*, 'tree'.

These are the six specific modifications of *mahat*¹ which is the self, the entirety of Being. That which is beyond these specific modifications, is the essence of *mahat*, the entire suprasensuous self (*liṅgamātram*)²; these [modifications] having remained fixed in the Great Self, in the entirety of Being, experience the direction of growth. And being born again [yet] having remained fixed in that same Great Self, in the entirety of Being, they return to it [at the end]; in this way, in the Sāṃkhya system, the essence of the understanding, signified by the word *mahat*, which is neither being nor non-being, neither existent nor non-existent, which is unmanifest and not a sign of anything (*aliṅgam*), is shown to be the first cause of the manifest universe; thus the form of Being belonging to the rest of the immediately succeeding gamut of transformations, is not incompatible, because this form (of Being) goes through transformations as their cause; thus the whole of the manifest universe is said to have the form of Being; thus the doctrine of non-dual Being is also comprehended through the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas.

HJS34p.42.10–14

Following Bhartṛhari, Helārāja implicitly identifies the 'quality' (*guṇa*) which is the basis on which a word is applied to a thing, with the universal expressed by words. For, under the hierarchical scheme presented in JS33, the Great Being is also the all comprehending universal (*mahā-sāmānya*, cf. HJS33p.41.11) and is, therefore, signified by all words (*ibid.* lines 13–15). Helārāja had, in the course of explicating JS7A, regarded this 'quality' as a thing universal (cf. HJS7-8p.19.7–8). However, there is no discrepancy, for, in the latter context, he was merely explicating an earlier view of the matter.

And in this way, Being, which is signified by all words has become the occasioning ground for the use of all words, therefore, Being is really signified through its different appropriate conditioning features by the abstract suffix.

[A possible objection to the above interpretation might be:] In this way the nominal stem and the suffix, say in *gotvam* (cowness) would have the same meaning. This is not so. Because Being is distinguished through distinctions of its conditioning features. Being 'whose support is a cow' is signified by the nominal base (of the word: *gotvam*), on the other hand, the suffix signifies the universal abstracted from its substratum; therefore, the exposition is without fault. Distinctions in the abstract suffix are caused by the meaning of nominal stems; therefore, there is not any intermixture.

1. See Pande, 1967 pp.163–174

2. *Ibid.*

JS47p.55.13–16

JS47 contains the first of two counterexamples to Kātyāyana's aphorism (the second is given in JS48) according to which names are given to things on the basis of a quality (*guṇa*). These qualities, according to Patañjali's gloss, belong in the sphere of the object of the senses (cf. *śabdarūpara-sagandhā guṇāḥ*: MB on vt.5 to P5.1.119) and are presumably impermanent. According to Kātyāyana's own admission the qualifier-qualificand relation signified in compounds such as *utpalagandha* (lotus-scent) is sentential (see Ch. II.v). Can a sentential entity be an impermanent quality? For Bhartṛhari the qualifier-qualificand relation resides exclusively in the understanding (see Ch. II.v). In JS47 he implies that the occasioning ground for use of compounds such as *utpalagandha* has no external counterpart.

Helārāja's comments on the stanza are extremely convoluted. These convolutions stem primarily from his fear that the stanza jeopardizes the status of phenomenal universals. Helārāja is keen to preserve the status of phenomenal universals because of his contention that a proper *saṅketa* (relation between name and its bearer) is possible only through superimposition of the word universal (*śabdajāti*) upon the thing universal (*arthajāti*: HJS6p.17.15–17; HJS7–8p.21.1–13). He fears that Bhartṛhari's stanza describing the world as impermanent, by denying the existence of permanent entities in the world, forecloses the possibility of a proper relation between words and things. His strategy is to interpret Kātyāyana's aphorism in the framework of Bhartṛhari's conception of names according to which universals residing in words designate classes of hierarchically organized bearers.

This is being discussed there. He has said: "The *tva* and *tal* [suffixes] signify it [the Great Being]" (JS34); [now] wondering whether the abstract suffix, in such cases as 'jasmine-scentness', 'lotus scentness', 'mallikā-scentness' signifies the higher universal or whether it signifies the lower universal, subsisting in the scent belonging in specific substrata, he says:

JS47

The distinguishing essence (*bhedatattvam*) which is located in [expressions] such as: 'jasmine-scent', 'lotus-scent' is not named in the world by the abstract suffix (*bhāva-pratyaya*), because of impermanence [of objects in the world].

HJS47p.55.19–22

Here, in verbal usage which is worldly, [and] subject to the speaker's intention, when the

abstract suffix *tva* or *tal* is added to compounds such as 'jasmine-scent' then, since the compatibility relation [between the elements of the compound] is the reason for the compounding, that compatibility relation [lit. it] is really the occasioning ground [for the application of the word], therefore, the abstract suffix really signifies it. "In compounds and in verbal and nominal derivatives a relation is signified". From this sentence it follows that the relation of locus and located is signified by the locative compound or the relation which precedes [and], which is not signified by any of the other six cases (lit. the remainder), is signified by the genitive compound; this should be stated.

The aphorism quoted by Helārāja is attributed to Bhartṛhari by later writers – see n.II.43 for a fuller exposition. Helārāja's comments here draw on P2.1.1., where it is stated that a compatibility relation is presupposed between elements in a compound.

HJS47p.56.2–5

Helārāja now considers an alternative manner of interpreting the occasioning ground associated with compounds. The mention of the relation is eliminated by forming the occasioning ground prior to the compounding, through the elements of the compound. The point of the alternative argument, I think, is to render *anitya* (impermanent) as having the connotation *deviant*. The alternative argument fails, but not before Helārāja has made several moves to save the status of phenomenal universals, whose status is threatened by the thrust of Bhartṛhari's stanza.

If one wishes, on the other hand, to hold that the abstract suffix is added to the word *gandha* ('scent') earlier, and the compound is formed later, then that real essence (*pāramāṛthikam tattvam*) which belongs in qualified scents located in individuals, such as jasmines and lotuses, is the object; the lower universal (*aparāsāmānya*) resorted to [here] is the agent (*kartṛbhūta*) [and] is not signified by the abstract suffix, because it is impermanent, i.e. not present on all occasions.

The passage is extremely obscure largely because of the contrasting phrases *karmabhūtam* and *kartṛbhūtam* which qualify *pāramāṛthikam tattvam* (the real essence) and *aparāsāmānyam* (the lower universal) respectively. I would like tentatively to interpret these phrases in the following way. The phrase *kartṛbhūtam aparāsāmānyam* stands for phenomenal or thing universals (*arthajāti*) which reside in actual substrata; the phrase *karmabhūtam pāramāṛthikam tattvam*, on the other hand, stands for word universals. The latter are superimposed on the former and acquire the status of objects (*karma*), the former are agents which elicit the superimposition or regulate it (see vrVP1.15–23pp. 52.7, 53.1; also trHJS7–8p.19.15).

HJS47p.56.4–16

Helārāja now examines the phrase *bhedatattvam yadāsritam*.

The qualified universal is the essence of the qualified scent or of the individual object (*bheda*) (*bhedatattvam* is therefore a Determinative compound in the genitive case). That qualified scent which is located in i.e. has inhered in the co-referential word. This is the meaning: Since that qualified universal which inheres in lotus-scent is not present in individuals such as sandalwood-scent, being deviant, it is impermanent; universals cannot be impermanent. And since the word 'scent' applies to all scents in an unqualified way, it must necessarily be on the basis of an occasioning ground which pervades all scents signified by the abstract suffix. And since the qualified universal which has inhered in the lotus-scent does not pervade all scents, it cannot be the uniform occasioning ground for the application of the word 'scent'.

The universal scentness becomes [qualified as] lotus-scentness through connection with its specific substratum; therefore, a qualified determination is established [such as awareness of lotus-scentness] in the qualifier through the [relation] inherence in the inherent.

In order to show that the word '*anitya*' cannot possibly rule out the existence of thing universals (*arthajāti*), Helārāja argues that their existence is rendered feasible on the basis of sound principles.

It does not in this way follow that the qualified universal does not exist, because the connection with lower universal is possible [and] because individual scents are rendered distinct through distinctions present in their substrata; it arises in connection with lower universals in the same way as [the idea of] the spotted cow [arises when one sees one]. Therefore he says *the distinguishing essence which is located*. He will say that distinctions in qualities are the result of distinctions of their substrata. Since a recurring idea (*anvayī pratyaya*), which is excluded from other things [such as sandalwood], does belong in lotus scents, the possibility of there being a universal, which is its ground, cannot be denied. That is really why the phrase, "the world" (*loka*) is used. In the affairs of the world lower universals are not signified. But those who are learned, and know about mixing perfumes, indeed perceive qualified universals [of scent].

Extremely relevant to this context is the following admission of Helārāja made in the context of HJS10p.101.7–10: *yatra yatra ca saty apy avāntaraviśeṣe bhinnah pratyayo'sti tatra tatra pramāṇasiddhānām sāmānyaviśeṣānām aṅgikaraṇam ānantye'pi na doṣāya | asādhāraṇasaṅketābhava'pi ca jātyutpalādigandhānām iva sattvam asty eva* / "Wherever there are uniform cognitions, in spite of other differences, the acceptance of authoritatively established qualified universals is without fault, even when there are an infinity of them. And even though a too narrow *saṅketa* [i.e. the proper learning of a relation between words and things] is impossible, fragrances belonging as it were in jasmines and lotuses etc. in-

deed do exist." Helārāja's defence of the existence of qualified universals concedes the impossibility of *saṅketa* in the case of compounds. This should be contrasted with his remarks in JS6, 7–8 insisting that *saṅketa* is possible if thing universals are granted a separate status. In the next two lines he gives a totally different reason for re-interpreting the word *anitya*. Here the *bhāvapratyaya* is derived from the whole compound. The defence is laconic and I think alludes to Bhartṛhari's view that the relation between universals and individuals is beyond the reach of language (see VS345).

And even when the abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*) is derived from the compound [as a whole], because compounds signify the relation between universals and individuals which cannot be signified by words, it is impermanent and is therefore not signified.

HJS92p.93.10–12; JS92; HJS92p.93.18–22

Having secured through argument the status of word universals (in JS6, 7, 8 and 9), Bhartṛhari, beginning with JS92, sets in motion the process of re-negotiating the status of the thing universal (*arthajāti*, JS6). Its diminished role was implicitly acknowledged in JS8, when implicational relations present in language were explained in terms of a hierarchical structure ascribed to word universals (*śabdajāti*, JS8B and JS9). In JS47, the failure of the external world (*loka*) to properly account for the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*), presupposed by such compound expressions as 'lotus-scent' (*utpalagandha*), is deemed sufficient ground for further downgrading the role filled by thing universals; the role becomes minor and can be played even by impermanent entities such as conditioning features (*upādhi*) of objects. Bhartṛhari actively pursued the shifting roles of the entity which plays opposite the word universal, exploring the suitability of each role in the context of various Schools. In the context of the Buddhists, who were nominalists, this role is assigned to similarities (*sādhya*, JS92) or to the ability of phenomena to impress the mind uniformly. It is assigned to conditioning features in the case of Vyādi's system (see VP3.2.3), but restored to the status of permanence for the Vaiśeṣikas. Needless to say the ideas developed by Bhartṛhari here were extraordinarily influential. The crucial fact in Bhartṛhari's catholicity is his commitment to universals of language. Linguistic universals,

which become the basis on which external objects are identified and their relations established, effect the reconciliation of the Schools under the tutelage of grammar.

HJS92p.93.10–12

Thus having first examined the universal which is meant by the nominal stem, having said that what is meant by the nominal suffix is also a universal of number, having discussed the point which arises with regard to intention and non-intention [of number assigned to the word by the case-ending] now, in order to discuss what remains over and above (this), with reference to that very same universal, he says:

JS92

The form of uniformity which is similarity or a power (*śakti*) identical with the nature of things; these are described as having the same meaning as the word 'universal'.

HJS92p.93.15–18

This is the problem here: a universal is proclaimed as something whose existence is derived from knowledge of recurrence. And it does not display itself to us as distinct from the individual. Let it be conceded that these individuals alone are causes, on account of similarity, of generating uniform knowledge, because they, by nature, have the capacity to produce a single unified cognition (*ekapratyavamarśa*), or because there is a superimposition [on them of words]; what remains to be accomplished by [the supposition of] additional universals? He assumes this point of view.

The view that individuals, which are neither similar to each other nor have universals, present themselves as uniformities to the understanding (*buddhi*), can be traced into Dharmakīrti's PV (see trPS5.34, also SVPV162 quoted by Helārāja in HJS93–94p.94.15–16, translated below).

HJS92p.93.18.22

That similarity which is the non-separated *form of uniformity* belonging to individuals or that capacity (*sāmarthya*) defined as the power to produce unified single cognitions, which is separated from individuals [existing only in the effect produced in the understanding], is also designated as universals. For this is a dictum common to all schools: a universal can also be designated as universals. Therefore, is some such form belonging in individuals which generates uniform cognitions. Therefore, let universals be designated by different terms, similarity and even capacity, nothing is lost [lit. nothing is thereby rendered unfeasible]. The view is: whether universals are distinct [from individuals] is an issue for debaters.

The two great Buddhist philosophers each adopted variations of the two

positions stated here: that similarity or a capacity to impress the understanding in terms of uniformity, can be substituted for the notion of thing universals. Dignāga did not directly adopt the idea of similarity, but he adopted the idea of abstraction (*apoha*) in terms of which notions of similarity were explicated by Bhartṛhari (see JS98; discussion Ch.II.viii and Ch.III.iii and trPS5.34). Dharmakīrti adopted the idea that phenomena, though fragmentary, impress the understanding in terms of uniformities. Helārāja noticed this and quotes Dharmakīrti's SVPV162 in his comments on trJS93–94; see also his comments on VP3.7.6 translated under trJS6;trPS5.34.

JS93–94p.94.1–5

In order to prove a different thesis regarding universals, through the support of the *Vaiśeṣika* view, he says here:

Even though [the ideal of] a staff is understood through desire for a staff, "he is a staff-bearer" is not known from that capacity [which belongs in the desire]. The knowledge that a man has desires does not proceed on the basis of desires; so when there is capacity [our] understanding has the support of a different thing.

Language is a pure potentiality for Bhartṛhari; it has the capacity to reflect anything put in front of it. But this potentiality or capacity needs something to bring it into focus. Without such an element the potentiality would remain unactualized. Helārāja, in conformity with his own belief in the reality of thing universals (*arthajāti*), interprets these stanzas as articulating the following principle: the causal elements which make the potentiality actual have to conform to their effects. Thus only thing universals can evoke universals in the understanding. Thus:

HJS93–94p.94.6–13

The meaning is this: It is impossible that individuals, which have distinct forms, would be causally efficient with regard to cognitions which have a tallying form (*anugatākāra*); that is why universals are postulated. On the other hand, similarity and capacity are not distinct from individuals [in which they belong]. It is necessary, [therefore], to assume a separate universal which recurs in [different] individuals. *Objection*: And would it not follow the individual in a deviant way? And so lead to an unfortunate confusion between, say, cows and horses. *Answer*: This is not the case, because universals subsist in their proper substrata. If the question is raised: "what is the basis [for such a claim?]" [The answer is]: "because individuals are connected with special configurations." Since the unity of parts is really different in case of cows than it is in case of horses, a regulating principle with respect to the substrata of cow universals and horse universals becomes established. Only then, on

the basis of a special configuration, which is additionally synonymous with similarity, let the existence of a tallying form be granted, by means of a proper regulating principle.

HJS93-94p.94.13-15

The opponent, deriving his arguments from Dharmakīrti's SVPV162, argues on the basis of the principle of economy. When the unity of parts (*avayavasanniveśa*) is sufficient to evoke tallying forms in the understanding, there is no need to postulate separate entities which have such forms. Dharmakīrti in the context of SVPV161-162 lays down the following as a principle for the generation of uniformities: there is no basis (*nimitta*) in the external world for the generation of these ideas, these uniformities belong in the mind and are superimposed (*āropita*, cf. vrSVPV161p.82.19) onto the phenomenal in the same way as dream objects or objects falsely perceived on account of eye defects, are superimposed onto the external world.

Just as the unity of parts, in spite of being different in each individual, is the basis on which the support of uniform universals is delimited, so also it can become the basis for cognition of tallying form; let us then do away with universals, a useless intermediary. It has been said:

Let that alone be the ground for verbal knowledge, by whose proximity, sometimes and not elsewhere, [and only] when individuals are similar, [knowledge of] universals proceed. (SVPV162)¹

HJS93-94p.94.15-21

In reply to Dharmakīrti, Helārāja interprets Bhartṛhari's stanza as being one of the earliest expressions of the thesis that all ideas require a corresponding intensional object.

The reply is: In this system (lit. here), because an effect is to be produced by means of a duly determined cause, it is not possible to make all generating causes operate with reference to all effects. Thus in the idea, 'the man who has a staff', the occasioning basis consists of [the man's] relation with a staff. To the [additional] question: why does it not [then follow] that the [man's] relation to the staff is not everywhere [the man is]? the answer is, the desire for obtaining the staff is the reason [for the man's relation with the staff].

The opponent, granting that desire is the basis for the relation a man

bears to the stick, requires that the desire for the stick do duty both for the relation that the man bears to the staff as well as for the desire.

Opponent: It is not possible to say this here. Since the desire for acquiring the staff alone is the regulating basis with reference to a relation [the man bears] with the staff, let us allow the idea, 'he has the staff'; what is the purpose then to be fulfilled by positing an additional basis for the relation [of the man] with the staff? The desire for obtaining the staff is the basis for [the man's] relation with the staff. To the query: "What again is basis of that?" the answer should be: "The [particular] capacity of the staff that is seen in those cases where the staff is used, should be declared to be the basis for holding the staff." In this way, let the idea, 'he has desire for holding the staff' follow on the basis of desire, why declare [further] the inherence of desire in the self to be the basis [for the idea, 'he has the staff']?

Helārāja feels that Bhartṛhari's argument conceals an additional premise, that the cause which makes the potentiality actual must, in some sense, conform to the response it elicits. Otherwise a plea might be entered like Dharmakīrti's in SVPV162 quoted above, or the one registered in JS92, which posits some sort of 'tallying form' (*anugatākāra*) or conceptual universals based on proximity with their objects, but stops short of positing actual thing universals. This point is made explicitly by Helārāja in the concluding remarks.

HJS93-94p.95.3-7

It is not possible to say this. Since an effect is to be generated by a suitably conforming cause, the knowledge which is the result of [a man's] relation with desire is, 'the man has desire' not, 'the man has a staff'. Even so, though common features such as similarities have the capacity to regulate the subject matter, it is not right, merely on the basis of that capacity to claim that they have the capacity to generate cognitions of tallying forms, just as they have the capacity to generate the cognition, 'this is similar'.² It is absolutely necessary, therefore, to posit a separate universal which is the cause of tallying form: this is established.

1. Following Gnoli, 1960 (SVPV), I read *yathā jātiḥ* in the text as *yayā jātiḥ*.

2. I read *ityādijñānad* as *ityādijñānavad* (p.95.6).

CHAPTER THREE

DIGNĀGA AGAINST BHARTṚHARI

I am concerned in this chapter to establish links between Bhartṛhari's ideas, briefly sketched in the previous chapter, and Dignāga's, which will be more fully explicated in the next chapter. Dignāga wrote against the assumed background of Bhartṛhari's thought, and without an awareness of this background Dignāga's laconic statements remain obscure and odd. In order to achieve a less obscure view of Dignāga's thought it is important to shade in the background through Bhartṛhari's. But, since Dignāga was also an independent thinker, it is equally important to establish how his thought shaded away from Bhartṛhari's. I am concerned also that Dignāga's theories of language and logic be viewed from the longer and more orthodox perspective of those grammatical theories which constituted the common inheritance of all Indian intellectuals of the period and of which Bhartṛhari had, in the 5th century, become chief spokesman. For I do not believe that Dignāga's theories of language were addressed in the narrow sectarian interests of Buddhism alone, especially not in the way some modern historians interpret these interests. I believe that Dignāga's theories were addressed in the more universal context of those theories which constituted the common subject matter of Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The coordinating lines of this longer perspective are given in the ancient debate between Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi: what is primarily signified by words, universals or individuals? The debate, which dots the pages of the MB, had continued into the fifth and sixth centuries with Bhartṛhari and Dignāga playing the new protagonists.¹ Nor do I believe that in seeking this perspective in which to interpret Dignāga's views on language, I have in any way compromised his allegiance to Buddhist dogmas on language. A religion like Buddhism must admit some ambivalence to language: there is the language of the unenlightened, language which is drenched with memories of pleasure and pain; there is the language of the Buddhas, the enlightened ones, who speak from a ground emptied of memory and desire. Dignāga had consistently and vitally been interested in languages of the latter sort, languages which do not distort their ground.² This interest of Dignāga's found concrete expression

and a universal audience in the defence of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names. A defence of the view that names do not exceed over (*ati + vrt*) what is given by the quality of their object, became for Dignāga a way of simultaneously restituting the language of the Buddhas and the claims of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names.

The following is an outline of my argument in this chapter:

Section i: I will briefly sketch the influential views of Masaaki Hattori, the modern exponent of Dignāga's thought; I will then propose my own somewhat different view of Dignāga's thought, and explicate the framework of this view in terms of the ancient debate between Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi: what is primarily signified by words, universals or individuals? I will suggest that Bhartṛhari and Dignāga had, in the fifth and sixth centuries, revived this ancient debate using new techniques of analysis and a new vocabulary. The debate between them centred around the claims of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names: names are given to things on the basis of a quality which properly belongs to them, and, an implication of this aphorism, that the content of names does not 'exceed over' the content of its bearer. I will next try to argue that the terms of my framework do not conflict with Dignāga's Buddhist commitments. My argument will draw its emphasis from the *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*, a text which has been attributed to Dignāga since its translation into the Chinese in the seventh century by I-Ching. My argument will show how a defence of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names can simultaneously be a means of restituting that fragment of language which does not distort its ground, the language surely in which the Buddha spoke.

Section ii: I contrast Bhartṛhari's view, that language is eternal because objects are integral to language with Dignāga's, that language is not eternal, nor is it an independent source of truth, but that it is a construct which shares structures with inference (*anumāna*). In an effort to uncover what Dignāga meant when he said that names convey their objects in the same way as the Logical Reason conveys its conclusion, I will ascribe a pair of basic sentences to his system: a singular affirmative sentence, "this has H" (where H is a name), and a singular negative sentence "this has nonnonH". I will find evidence in Dignāga's text for the former and trace its forebears in Bhartṛhari's VP, texts which I think influenced Dignāga. I will next propose that, within the context of the affirmative sentence, demonstratives designate their single spatio-temporal bearers directly, while names designate a plurality of bearers indirectly, on the basis of the universals they signify. This, I claim, would suggest why the *apoha*-operation is confined to names and does not

apply to demonstratives. The proposals also substantiate what Dignāga meant by the *svārtha* (own object) of names.

Section iii: Having in a previous section argued that the *apoha* operation is restricted to names which, on the basis of their universals, define classes of bearers, I will suggest that it is a three-fold operation which functions on a three-fold content. I will, following Bhartṛhari's analysis of names, suggest dividing the content of a name into its connotative content (by which I mean the content which consists of the universal alone, thus Hness) and the denotative content (by which I mean the individual bearers defined by the universal, thus H-bearers). I will then argue that the *apoha*-operation, when applied to the connotative content, suspends its property commitments and, applied to the denotative content, deletes it. I will suggest that the latter operation mimics *matublopa* (elision of the possessive suffix) familiar to grammarians. The operation, by deleting reference to individuals, also deletes the relational content of names. At the third stage, I will argue that, within the context of the basis sentence, the *apoha* operation abstracts away the unshared features of its spatio-temporal bearer, designated by the demonstrative, and leaves a residual content which replicates the name's connotative content. Thus the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names are fulfilled: the name denotes its bearer without exceeding its content. Freed of demonstrative, the name is freed of its specific spatio-temporal location. Freed of its reference to classes of bearers, by the deletion of its denotative content, the name is also freed of its relational features. Kept within bounds only by the limitations imposed by its meaning, the name has earned the right to combine with other names in compounds. Thus the complicated implications of Kātyāyana's aphorism are also met.

Section iv: In this section I will sharpen my portrait of Dignāga by reproducing in outline Dignāga's critique of Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming. I will uncover three basic arguments by which Dignāga sought to overthrow Bhartṛhari's theory: the argument that under the terms of the theory the relation between names and their spatio-temporal bearers cannot be taught, the argument that the metaphorical model of language does not fulfil the terms of metaphorical speech, the argument against a pre-established fitness or conformity (*sādrśya*) between language and nature. All these arguments have as their target the view that names denote their spatio-temporal bearers indirectly on the basis of universals signified by names.

i

The dominant view of Dignāga's theories of language derive from the writings of Masaaki Hattori and are advocated in his book, *Dignāga on Perception* and in an article entitled "Apoha and Pratibhā". Hattori draws his views of Dignāga's text from Dignāga's statements of his *apoha* theories and from Dignāga's views on perception and inference. He interprets the evidence of this text under the very general assumption that language lacks the capacity to directly denote, as he says, "anything real":

The function of the word consists *solely* in differentiating the directly perceived object from other things. (emphasis mine)

Hattori:1980 p.62

and,

... a word indicates an object *merely* through the exclusion of other objects (*anyāpoha-vyāvṛtti*). For example, the word 'cow' simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word *cannot denote anything real*, whether it be an individual (*vyakti*), a universal (*jāti*), or any other thing (emphasis throughout is mine).

Hattori:1968 p.12

There is a certain tension in Hattori's presentation of Dignāga's theories, a tension apparent in his choice of verbs: 'indicate' and 'differentiate' instead of 'denote'. The choice would appear to be governed by the belief, attributed to Dignāga, that language generally distorts what is real, but by reconstructing language in a negative fashion what is falsely imputed to reality by language is minimized, or even nullified. Unfortunately, the programme of translating this very general view of Dignāga's theories of language into the details of Dignāga's texts has remained unfulfilled so far. Neither Hattori nor the scholars who share views similar to Hattori's have undertaken to read the details of Dignāga's text, particularly those texts which deal with his idea that language is not different from inference, under the aegis of their overall view.³

Having presented Hattori's views, let me admit that I do not mean to follow his interpretation of Dignāga's views on language. I mean to do things in a different way, chiefly by concentrating my analysis on Dignāga's attempted reduction of language to the structures of logic. My conclusion, deriving from that analysis and supported by Dignāga's text, will be that Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine was meant to ensure that names apply directly to their perceptual objects (*sākṣād vytti*, cf. trPS5.36:NC2p. 729), and are not in excess of their perceptual objects; these paradigms were drawn out of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names.

I will not be concerned in this essay to demonstrate that an attempted reconstruction of Dignāga's text along the lines suggested by Hattori is impossible. My concern will be to show that a view rather different from Hattori's can indeed be attributed to Dignāga and that a coherent organization of Dignāga's *apoha* text is feasible along these different lines. I shall test my views in the translations I have provided at the end of this chapter and the next.

I want to seek a wider and newer perspective against which to examine Dignāga's views on language, to view his work against the historical background of the revolutionary theories of language advocated by Bhartṛhari. I want to try to show how profoundly Bhartṛhari's theories influenced Dignāga's thought, but how, despite this profound influence, Dignāga's thought retained its separate character. I want to try to draw into this historical perspective the ancient debate between Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana, the debate which centred around the question: what is primarily signified in language, universals or individuals? Against Vājapyāyana, who had, in order to ensure their universal application, argued that Vedic injunctions should be interpreted as having reference to universals, Vyāḍi had mockingly observed that cows, not cow universals, are milked and goats, not goat universals, are sacrificed.⁴

The debate between Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana had continued into the pages of the MB and neither Kātyāyana nor Patañjali appear to have chosen sides. Bhartṛhari, on the other hand, had attempted a reconciliation, and his attempts at reconciliation had been underpinned in two critical states: the first stage had consisted in the discovery that Kātyāyana's ancient theory of names, which attributes primacy to qualities, could not give an adequate account of the relations between names; the second stage had consisted in the failure to account for the qualifier-qualificand relation solely on the basis of the formal properties of names. Correlated with these stages had been two theoretical moves, the first favoured Vājapyāyana's point of view, the second Vyāḍi's. Bhartṛhari's first theoretical move had consisted in elevating Kātyāyana's quality to the status of a universal, bifurcating this universal in two – a word universal (*śabdajāti*) and a thing universal (*arthajāti*). He had then attributed logical primacy to word universals by maintaining that external objects are named on the basis of word universals and that word universals, inhering compatibly and incompatibly in names, are responsible for analytic and antonymic content (cf. JS6–14). The second theoretical move had consisted in the postulation of *a priori* sentential objects. The move had allowed Bhartṛhari to hold that the qualifier-qualificand

relation is not constructed but given in the ideal object “qualified by all its qualifiers”, and innate in language.

Even though the second of Bhartṛhari's theoretical moves established that universals and individuals have the same eternal status, it seemed to go against Vyāḍi's spirit; Vyāḍi might still have mockingly observed that it is not ideal cows which are milked and ideal goats which are slaughtered, but real ones.

It is necessary to note that in expanding the explanatory scope of his theory of names, Bhartṛhari had also violated the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, that names are given on the basis of spatio-temporal qualities and that the content of a name does not exceed over the content of the object which is named. Having violated the terms of Kātyāyana's theory, Bhartṛhari had tried to appease the form if not the spirit of his aphorism by maintaining that the meaning of words does not exceed over (*ati + vrt*) the ideal or Possible Being which provides the ground for the application of words to things (cf. SS50–51).

Championing Vyāḍi's cause and the spirit behind Kātyāyana's aphorism, Dignāga declared:⁵

Even though what is named (*abhidheya*) is multifarious, it cannot be known entirely on the basis of words, for, in accordance with its own relations, the word conveys the object through exclusion.

Even though a word has multifarious properties, it causes the object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati + vrt*) the object; not by means of qualities etc. which belong to words.

PS5.12–13:NC2p.630

Dignāga's statement in PS5.12 above that:

Even though what is named is multifarious, it cannot be known entirely on the basis of words.

is in opposition to Bhartṛhari's doctrine that the object, “qualified by all its qualifiers” (*sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam vastu*) is simultaneously given (*yugapat*) on a single utterance (*śakṛd uccāraṇa*) of a word.⁶ Dignāga's reasons for opposing a view like Bhartṛhari's:

for in accordance with its own relations, the word conveys the object, through exclusion.

although obscure, reflect, I believe, Dignāga's intention of coming to terms with problems which surrounded Kātyāyana's aphorism, namely, the condition that names are unrelated before they enter *karmadhāraya* compounds. The reader will recall that Bhartṛhari's inability, within the traditional framework, to come to terms in a systematic fashion with

a series of compounds which include *kṛṣṇatila* and *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* had been one of the motivating forces behind this postulation of ideal objects. Dignāga's statement above implies that the step is not necessary, for the fact that names are related (as qualifier and qualified), can be properly accounted for without the postulation of ideal objects. That the problem of relations can be taken care of without sacrificing the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism, is implied in PS5.13 which contrasts two views. The views that a name conveys its object on the basis of qualities which belong to words (*śabdaguṇa*), is contrasted with the view that a name conveys its object on the basis of "that quality" (notice the singular) which does not "exceed over" its object. The former position, which draws attention to the theory developed by Bhartṛhari in JS6-8, is rejected in favour of the latter, which draws attention to the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism, that names are given on the basis of a property which properly belongs to the individual which is named.

My efforts in the ensuing two chapters will be directed toward showing that the implications I have read into the above stanzas, namely, that Dignāga's theory of names was aimed at restituting the claims of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names without denying the legitimacy of the grounds on which Bhartṛhari had sought to re-interpret the aphorism, are justified in terms of Dignāga's additional text. This means that I will be obliged to show that Dignāga drew into his theory the following paradigms taken from Kātyāyana's aphorism and Bhartṛhari's speculations:

- (a) names are given to spatio-temporal individuals on the basis of a spatio-temporal quality;
- (b) the content of a name does not 'exceed over' the content of the quality belonging to the individual which is named;
- (c) uniform application of names presupposes a uniform ground of application;
- (d) names have analytic and antonymic content and are, therefore, at some level, related to other names;
- (e) the qualifier-qualificand relation can be accounted for without postulating ideal objects.

I will be obliged to show how Dignāga managed to embody in his theory these seemingly unreconcilable ideals.

PS5.12-13 are not the only source for my perspective on Dignāga's theories. I have drawn my perspective on the basis of claims that Dignāga made in PS34,35 and 36, stanzas in which he summed up the achievements of his theory and the shortcomings of Bhartṛhari's. I refer the

reader to these texts which have been explicated at the end of this chapter.

In order to convey more vividly what Dignāga had meant to achieve in his theory, and in order to achieve a more vivid contrast with Bhartṛhari's theory, I would like the reader to consider the following example.⁷ If the sentence, 'All cows are animals' is necessarily true because language says so, then the sentence, 'All whales are fish' should, by the same token, be necessarily true; but it is false *in fact*. It would then appear that nature has a role in the determination of meaning. It was this role that Dignāga, in contrast to Bhartṛhari, had attempted to define. The phenomenal world is totally irrelevant in determining meaning of names; this was Bhartṛhari's uncompromising stand. The phenomenal world directly contributes to the meaning of some names; this was Dignāga's stand, no less uncompromisingly held.

At this point my reader might wonder if I have not, in presenting Dignāga in this unorthodox light, violated the terms of Dignāga's Buddhist commitments. Is not *nirvāṇa* beyond name and form (*nāma-rūpa*)? And do not words always fall short of reality, on the one hand, and distort reality, on the other? Should not language for Dignāga, as it is for all good Buddhists, be the product of "a beginningless *vāsanā*" (the phrase is Dharmakīrti's)? In order to persuade the reader that Dignāga's concern to preserve direct links between language and the phenomenal world known through the senses, is not anti-Buddhist, I would like to draw into my perspective a little-known text of Dignāga's called *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*, which was translated into the Chinese by I-Ching and which has been rendered into English by the late Hidenori Kitagawa.

Dignāga was here concerned with the status of constructed entities which have a certain continuity in space and time, entities such as the human personality, and the human body. The Buddha's sermons had assumed as their point of departure the existence of these entities. Dignāga in this work posed questions with regard to the ontological status of these entities. In the course of his argument he denied granting them the status of absolute reals, a status enjoyed only by the purely unconstructed elements of sensuous experience, elements of the auditory, the visual, the tactile and so on.⁸ At the same time, Dignāga argued against relegating these entities to the status of pure illusions. He felt that relegating them to the status of pure illusions would nullify essential aspects of the doctrines preached by the Buddha:

If you do not admit of the existence of the body, [the following will be concluded: Buddha] the holder of the right view, should have preached [for example, the four methods of contemplation] in vain: moreover, there should be no person accused of holding nihilistic

views of the universe and there should be no distinction in our deeds [with regard to their religious merits].

Stanza 9: Kitagawa, 1969 p.434

In order to preserve the truth behind Buddha's sermons, Dignāga proposed granting spatio-temporal continuants such as human bodies a status in between the illusory and the unconstructed, a status he described as "constructed in dependence on realities", i.e., "in dependence on" the purely empirical. Dignāga's argument in support of these constructs ended with the view that empirical elements alone have "essential natures" (*svabhāva*) and, therefore, questions of "identity and non-identity" (and by extension questions of truth and falsity) have to be settled in terms of them.⁹

Preoccupation with language characterizes even Dignāga's purely religious composition, the *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha*. Here the relation between mystical knowledge and language of religious texts is expressed in terms of a complicated grammarian's vocabulary:¹⁰

*prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayaṃ sā tathāgataḥ |
sādhyā tādarthayogena tācchabdyam granthamārgayoh ||*

Piṇḍārtha 1: Frauwallner, 1959 p.140

In Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, with its stress on the empirical content of names and its concern with achieving a tight fit between the content of names and the content of its bearer, Dignāga discovered the right context and the right vocabulary to develop his views. His views, as I interpret them, are as follows: There are entities which are constructed "in dependence of realities" (to use the vocabulary of the *Upādāya-prajñaptiprakaraṇa*), i.e., "in dependence on" the elements given in sense experience. And, because they are so constructed as not to exceed over what is given, the enlightened ones can talk about their experience without having to falsify it.

The framework that I have tried to build, and in terms of which I would like to interpret Dignāga's theories of language is, as I have already said, not of a piece with Hattori's framework. His framework is built upon his view that language for Dignāga inhabits the conceptual realm of pure universals (*sāmānya*) and that perception belongs to an entirely separate realm composed of non-uniform unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). Names cannot bridge the gap between the perceptual and the conceptual because, as Hattori puts it:

The former is real, while the latter lacks reality. As each is incompatible with the other,

there cannot be anything which possesses both *sva-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* at the same time.

Hattori, 1968 n.1.14

My framework for interpreting Dignāga conflicts with Hattori's framework. For I assume that the same object possesses both *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa*, and I seek the support of Dignāga's text in securing my point of view. I believe that the universal (*sāmānya*) on the basis of which names are given to individuals is completely resident in its bearer (cf. *pratyekaparisamāpti*, trvrPS5.36) and is not cut off from its support (cf. trvrPS5.36; also n.III.35). It is not exclusively a property of names (cf. PS5.13), nor is it the product of a beginningless habit-energy (*vāsanā*), as Dharmakīrti would have it (trPS5.34; n.V.43,45).

In accordance with our different hypotheses, Hattori and I read the following fragment of Dignāga's in our own way:¹¹

*pratyakṣam anumānam ca pramāṇe
... yasmād
lakṣaṇadvayaṃ /
prameyam
na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti | svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyak-
ṣam sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ |*

Hattori reads it as under:¹²

the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely.] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

They are only two, because

the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.

Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, and we shall prove that perception has *only* the particular for its object and inference *only* the universal (emphasis mine).

I prefer to read the same as under:

the means of cognition are [immediate and mediate, namely.] perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*).

There are only two, because

the object to be cognized has [only] two aspects.

Apart from the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) there is no other object to be cognized, *for* we shall prove that perception has the particular for its object and inference the universal.

Hattori and I thus interpret identical series of fragments in accordance with our own separate framework. While he takes *hi* (in *svalakṣaṇaviśayaṃ hi pratyakṣam sāmānyalakṣaṇaviśayam anumānam iti pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ*) as 'only', I take it as 'for' or 'because'. Extending my

own framework, I understand Dignāga's statement, *lakṣaṇadvayam prameyam* literally as "the object to be cognized has two aspects", Hattori must necessarily understand it as "the object to be cognized has two aspects [but not at the same time]" (see his n.1.14, quoted above, see also trPS5.34).

My concern, as I have already stated, is not to show that Hattori's position is untenable, but rather that there is a different way of looking at Dignāga's material, and that my way of looking at it need not be ruled out on the basis of Hattori's interpretation of the series of fragments I have just quoted; my interpretation of this text is no less literal than his. I have also argued on the basis of a text that had been attributed to Dignāga since its translation into Chinese by I-Ching, the *Upādāya-prajñaptiprakaraṇa*, that there is nothing intrinsically anti-Buddhist about the interpretation I have sought to introduce into my reading of Dignāga's texts on language.

To return to my immediate task then, I see Dignāga as reversing the various steps that had led Bhartṛhari away from the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names:

1. In JS6–8 Bhartṛhari had tentatively elevated to the status of universals Kātyāyana's quality on the basis of which names are given to individuals. I have suggested that the grounds for this move were the following. A uniform application of names demands a uniform ground of application and, because spatio-temporal qualities are non-uniform, they are for Bhartṛhari beyond the reach of words (see n.11.64); a mere quality cannot be the basis of name-giving.
2. In JS6–8 he had bifurcated universals into two ontological realms: the realm of phenomena and the realm of language (*arthajāti* and *śabdajāti* respectively).
3. In JS6 he had attributed logical primacy to word universals over thing universals, the former constituted the primary basis on which names are given to things in the external world.
4. In JS7–8 he had undermined further the role of phenomenal universals by assigning what he called "the effect of universals" (*jātikārya*), i.e. an effect achieved by a hierarchical arrangement of the analytic content of names, to word universals.
5. In JS47 he had cut the ground from under phenomenal universals by arguing that the qualifier-qualificand relation has no counterpart in the external world and, therefore, the occasioning ground for the use of such compounds as *utpalagandha* (lotus-scent) could not be identified with an external quality.

6. In VS90–94 he had argued that an ideal object comprising all its qualifiers is given in language.

Attempting to reverse the steps taken by Bhartṛhari Dignāga took the following path:

1. In PS5.12 he rejected Bhartṛhari's view that the full-blown ideal object, comprising all its qualifiers, is given on the basis of language.
2. In PS5.34–36 he constructed a hierarchy on the basis of experience of concomitances in nature. The hierarchy corresponded to Bhartṛhari's, but unlike Bhartṛhari, who had taken it as given by the universals located in language, Dignāga built it out of experience. Thus the analytic content of names was for him not given in language, but constructed out of experience; all *śiṃśapā* are trees, not because language says so, but because it is so in fact and because language is a record of facts. Similarly the antonymic content of words is also a record of the way the world is.
3. Granted a temporary status to universals (*sāmānya*), but regarded them as abstracted out of sense experience, not as universals given from beginningless time in language.
4. Suggested that the residue left after the application of *apoha* is a uniform quality which is not 'in excess' of the spatio-temporal object.

The distinction between the main thrust of Dignāga's theory and Bhartṛhari's can once again be summed up in terms of the following two passages:

... a name directly applies and is non-distinct [from its own object].

A name does not apply to its own object, having first presented it with another object.

trvrPS5.36

... Speech whose basis is association does not apply directly to objects.

VS351B¹³

ii

In characteristically laconic fashion Dignāga stated his views on language in the opening stanza of the fifth chapter of the PS:

Knowledge derived from words is not a separate means to truth from inference; for a name (lit. it) signifies its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding what is other (*anyāpoha*) in the same way as [the Reason] 'being an artifact' [establishes what is to be proved].

trPS5.1:NC2p.608

Dignāga's conclusions were stated in deliberate opposition to

Bhartrhari's. Bhartrhari had held that the relation between names and their bearers is unanalysable. This very unanalysability had constituted partial grounds for declaring language to be unconstructed (*akṛta*): since objects are integral to language there is no way language can be constructed out of objects. Thus Bhartrhari had held:¹⁴

Whether the object is eternal or non-eternal, it is not possible for man [either human or divine] to make a relation [of objects] with words, in the absence of a relation already made.

SS38

I read Dignāga's stanza above as an elliptically worded statement of a complex purpose: the reduction of this so-called unanalysable structure to the structures given in logic, more specifically to the structure of class inclusion.

Apoha (exclusion) is the pivot around which Dignāga's solutions were co-ordinated; it is both a doctrine, which includes a definite analysis of names and demonstratives, as well as a peculiar kind of negation operator. My concern in this section is to expose the structure on which the negation operator functions. I believe that this structure was adapted by Dignāga from Bhartrhari's analysis of names and demonstratives. My attempt will be, therefore, to identify this structure, find evidence for attributing it to Dignāga and trace the structure to its source in Bhartrhari's text.

Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine at its base consists of a pair of singular sentences:

this has H
this has nonnonH.

The sentences are composed of the following elements: a demonstrative of space/time, a name, a doubly negated version of the same name, a relation between the demonstrative and the name signified by the genitive.

My attention in this section will be confined to a proper analysis of the singular affirmative sentence. I will present evidence for attributing the affirmative sentence to Dignāga, reproduce Dignāga's analysis of demonstratives and names and trace the sources of Dignāga's analysis to Bhartrhari's text, hoping thereby to illuminate Dignāga's text.

A *prima facie* reason for attributing the affirmative sentence to Dignāga comes from PS5.1 quoted above, where Dignāga states his view that names signify their "own object" in the same way as "[the Reason] 'being an artifact' [establishes what is to be proved]". Now the Logical Reason conveys its conclusion on the basis of a pair of premises, an

affirmative one and a negative one. In fact Dignāga relegated to a category fallacies he defined as "too narrow" any argument which attempted to force its conclusion on the basis of a negative premise alone.¹⁵ There are, therefore, no real *prima facie* grounds for holding, as Hattori does, that:

a word indicates an object *merely* through the exclusion of other objects (*anyāpoha*, -*vyāvṛtti*).

Hattori, 1968 p.12

More direct evidence for the affirmative sentence is given in the following passage from PS:¹⁶

"This has this genus [word]," or "this has this substance [word]" thus having necessarily grasped two elements (*arthadvayam*), a relation (*sambandha*) is imagined [between them]. Thereafter, it is grasped either by the elision of the possessive suffix -*mat* or by an ascribed identity. And since the qualifier (*viśeṣa*) becomes established through memory, its existence is possible only in knowledge belonging to mind [rather than the senses].

vrPS1.21:Vai.S.p.170.11-12

The passage occurs in the context of an argument against the Vaiśeṣikas, who claimed, according to a *sūtra* quoted by Dignāga, that even knowledge which is purely perceptual contains reference to the genus of the perceived object, to its quality (*guṇa*) and the action it possesses (*kriyā*). Denying this, Dignāga held that purely perceptual knowledge is not qualified in this way; it is a "mere presentation of the object" (Hattori, 1968 p.43k.lab). In the passage above Dignāga treated some of the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*) as subsumable under the single description "qualifier" (*viśeṣa*) and, in another passage, which I will quote below, he reduced these categories to names of different types. The passage in context purports to describe four stages in the transformation of knowledge which has its origins in perception:

1. A perceptual state where the object is an undifferentiated presentation.
2. A verbal state where the undifferentiated object is differentiated into two elements (*arthadvayam*), one represented by a demonstrative of immediate space/time (*asya*) and another, which is given in association with names and has reference to non-immediate objects of memory and mind. This state is sententially described as: "this has (the genus name) 'cow'", "this has (the substance name) 'staff-bearer'". Thus, 'This has H', where H is a name.¹⁷
3. A later state where the demonstrative, which is in the possessive case, is dropped and the truncated sentences now read: 'cow' 'staff-bearer'. Thus, H.¹⁸

sis I can explain Dignāga's notion of own object (*svārtha*, PS5.1), a term long neglected by historians who attribute to Dignāga the view that names do not denote "anything real". I can also show how structures associated with inference (*anumāna*), viz. the idea of class membership, is introduced into the fabric of name-giving by Dignāga.

In claiming that names, on the basis of their universals, designate a plurality of individuals, I have drawn Dignāga's theory of names into the scope of Bhartṛhari's. I do not mean thereby to impute to Dignāga's universals the same ontological status as Bhartṛhari's. Dignāga's universals are not given in language through beginningless time. And though they do not have the same ontological status as Bhartṛhari's universals, they share the same functional features as Bhartṛhari's. They have unity (*ekatva*, cf. tr.PS5.36), they define classes of bearer but completely reside in each (*pratyekaparisaṃpatti*, cf. tr.PS5.36). They have access to a hierarchical structure over which the equivalent of Bhartṛhari's relations, incompatible co-inherence and compatible co-inherence, can be defined (cf. PS5.34–35). They are also eternal (*nitya*, cf. PS5.36).

I cannot immediately justify the views that I have attributed to Dignāga, but will do so gradually over the rest of this section and over the next chapter. This gradual approach is dictated by the complex structure presupposed by Dignāga's treatment of these matters and by his complex relationship to Bhartṛhari.

The intimate relationship between Dignāga's thought and Bhartṛhari's is illustrated in the view that I have just attributed to him, the view that the functions of designating singular bearers is to be distinguished from the function of designating classes of bearers, because the latter function depends on universals. The following passage from Bhartṛhari, with its striking similarity to Dignāga's passage already cited (vrPS1.21 on p.119), seems to me to be a precursor of Dignāga's distinction:²⁴

There are others who say: even though the [perceptual] object is not differentiated, the verbal object (*śabdārtha*) is indeed differentiated. For a word applies when capacity (*śakti*), even when it belongs to the scope of a single [perceptual] object, is grasped in a distinguished way, for instance as, "this is a staff". [Here] the demonstrative names the very same object as is grasped through the perceptual form, [and yet] it does not grasp it by way of a relation with the staff-universal which is also being grasped [through the word 'staff' in the sentence]; [this is so] because the demonstrative lacks the capacity to name [its bearer] through the staff universal.

vrVP1.69pp.131.4–6, 132.1

Bhartṛhari's passage prefigures the following aspect of Dignāga's vrPS1.21: an undifferentiated perceptual object is differentiated into a

sentence which has a demonstrative and a name, one of the elements in the sentence is singled out as functioning in an entirely different manner from the other. In Dignāga's treatment (vrPS5.1.21) the name or qualifier is said to have, unlike the demonstrative, a reference to memory. In Bhartṛhari's the demonstrative, unlike the name, has no access to universals. In both passages it is implied that demonstratives are unlike names.²⁵

Bhartṛhari pursued this distinction between names and demonstratives in VS340–342. Here he contrasted two views: in the first view, recorded in VS340, names which designate merely their universals (*jātimātrābhīdhāyin*, HVS340p.308.2) and names which designate an individual qualified by a universal (*jātivīśiṣṭadravyābhīdhāyin*) have the same form (*tulyarūpa*). In the second view the functions of signifying universals is separated from the function of designating individuals; they belong in different types of words (cf. *bhinnaśabdapravṛtti*, HVS341p.308.7–8). Because demonstratives designate their bearers "prior to becoming connected with universals" (*prāk ca jāty abhisambandhāt*, VS342), the function of designating existents (*sattva*) is assigned to them.²⁸

I think what Dignāga essentially did between PS5.2 and PS5.11 was to argue against the first of these views portrayed by Bhartṛhari above, namely, that "the universal and its bearers both are to be designated by the same word" (*jātitadvantau dvāv ekaśabdavācyau*, HVS341p.308.6) and to adopt, by implication, the second, that the function of designating singular individuals is a separate function from that of signifying universals and defining classes of individuals.

As an immediate achievement of my hypothesis I would like to claim that I can now substantiate an aspect of Dignāga's statement:

... a name signifies its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding what is other.

trPS5.1

I can claim that the own object of a name is the object in space/time directly designated by a demonstrative. Dignāga's sixth century Jain opponents had already posed several interesting problems in this context, among them were: What is the *svārtha* of a word? And why is it not subject to the *apoha*-operation?²⁷

According to my hypothesis above, the *svārtha* of a name is the singular object designated by a demonstrative; it is exempt from the *apoha* operation because it does not designate its object on the basis of a universal but directly. The *apoha*-operation is restricted to that part of the name-giving sentence which designates its object indirectly through

by Bhartṛhari. The relation of possession, which characterizes the relation between universals and individuals in which they reside, is signified, according to this analysis, on the basis of the quality belonging in the individual and as 'exceeding over' the quality.²⁹ The two compartments then can be represented as:

1. $H = (\text{Hness-bearers}) + (\text{Hness})$, where H is a name.

Let us then define an operation which elides the content of the first compartment and negates the content of the second, and let us label the operation single *apoha*-negation, thus:

1.1 $\text{nonH} = (0) + (\text{nonHness})$

Let us perform the operation twice and call it double *apoha*-negation.

1.2 $\text{nonnonH} = (\text{nonnonHness})$



The double negation is meant to suspend the name's existential commitments: the property commitment which forms part of the connotative content and the commitment to objects which is part of the denotative content (see diagram below). The elision technique mimics the *matublopa* procedure familiar to Sanskrit grammarians, which means that at least part of the procedure described above can be translated into more familiar vocabulary.³⁰

śuklavat (x has white) by *matublopa*
śukla- (white)

Notice that with the elision of the suffix of possession (*matublopa*) both the reference to the individual as well as the relation, signified by the possessive suffix *-vat*, disappear.

If the structure of Bhartṛhari's analysis of names is captured by 1, the structure of Dignāga's is captured by 1.2. For Bhartṛhari, names on the basis of their universals define classes of actual and possible objects, for Dignāga names, on the basis of their universals define possibly empty classes.

Dignāga's basic *apoha*-sentences can, on the basis of this analysis, be diagrammatically described as under:



The notation is explained on p.171. Comparing diagram 1 with 2 and 3, it becomes apparent that property commitments are not inherited under *apoha* negation: names subjected to the operation no longer commit the speaker to the existence of universals associated with them. Dignāga could, on this basis, defend the position of a school which did not posit the existence of eternal entities (see n.IV.51); the property 'being eternal' does not belong to either actual or ideal entities. This is in sharp contrast with Bhartṛhari's stand on negative names (see p.38–39). The *apoha* operation also allowed Dignāga to fulfil the first of the following requirements which flow from Kātyāyana:

1. Names are atomic; not related to other names.
2. Names are given to things on the basis of a quality (*guṇa*) they possess.
3. Names do not exceed over their bearers' quality.

The reader will recall that the first of these requirements is associated with a critical stage in Bhartṛhari's thought. Bhartṛhari, who had attributed analytic and antonymic content to names, had been prevented from appealing to this content in the context of his analysis of compounds such as *kṛṣṇatila* and *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*. Kātyāyana's conditions on the compounds of this type, that names prior to compounding are unrelated and that the qualifier-qualificand relation emerges at the sentential level independently of the names, had effectively blocked off any approach which appealed to the analytic content of names. To have analysed *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* in terms of the analytic content implicit in *śiṃṣapā* and

vrkṣa would have meant establishing a relation between them. As a consequence of these conditions, Bhartṛhari had restricted his analysis to the syntactic features of names and had been able to analyse only those compounds whose first member is adjectival (*guṇaśabda*). Dignāga's elision procedure alleviated this problem; by deleting the denotative content of names reference to relations also became deleted.

In an elliptical reference to Bhartṛhari's dilemma, he compared his own position to Bhartṛhari's:³¹

Here, some maintain that what is signified [by names] is a thing qualified by a relation. On the other hand, some others hold that what is signified is a thing qualified by words which are devoid of [any reference to] objects.

vrPS1.3:NC1tp.102:Hattori,1968,n.1.29.

The unspoken premise from which Dignāga's contrast draws its emphasis is, I assume, the following. Under Bhartṛhari's analysis a relation of possession, which is essentially the relation between universals and their bearers (*jātimat*), is signified as an additional feature of the property (*guṇa*) of their bearers; the deletion of reference to individuals from the content of the name, automatically empties the name of its relational content. The point that the name is freed of its reference to individuals is repeatedly underlined by Dignāga:

A name does not apply to its object, having first presented [it with] another object.

trvrPS5.36

It would, I think, be useful at this point to retrace the steps in my argument so far. I have claimed that Dignāga invested singular designation exclusively in demonstratives. He allowed that names designate plural classes of bearers, but he deleted, through the *apoha* operation, reference to these individuals. The deletion procedure in emptying reference to individuals, I have argued, also emptied the relational content of names. As a result of the operation, names designate individuals only in tandem with demonstratives, in the context of a basic sentence. Demonstratives are the anchor which tie names down to their spatio-temporal context. Freed of demonstratives, names are, to use Dignāga's image, like so many crows hovering around willing to alight simultaneously on a single pole.³² Unrelated, unattached, they fulfil Kātyāyana's requirement that underived names in the nominative do not signify relations. How the names become related as qualifier and qualified I will

explore in the next chapter.

I have in this section presented Dignāga's theory as emerging from Bhartṛhari's, as an additional step to be taken, not primarily for the sake

of its religious advantages, but for the sake of the right analysis of compounds such as *kṛṣṇatila*. In this matter I have followed the outline of Dignāga's presentation of his own case. From PS5.2 to PS5.11 Dignāga minutely criticised the various implications which flow from Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming; in PS5.12–13 he swiftly sketched his view that names convey their objects on the basis of that which does not 'exceed' over its bearer, mentioned *apoha*, and then launched into a solution of the compound *nīlotpala*.

In order now to show that Dignāga's theory fulfilled the other two requirements of Kātyāyana's aphorism that, in Dignāga's words:

a word causes its object to be conveyed by means of that [property] which does not exceed the object.

trPS5.13:NCp.630

I have to make a digression.

The reader will recall that in drawing attention to the important role of universals in his theory of names, Bhartṛhari had distinguished the use of the word in regard to various levels of reality: as an entity given in language (JS6), in the understanding (JS104) and in phenomenal reality (as *arthajāti*, in JS6 and JS102). Holding the first two levels to be co-extensive, Bhartṛhari had argued that entities given in language and mind are the means whereby objects in the external world were established (cf. JS102: *tāś cārthasya sādḥikāḥ*) that they are, therefore, logically prior to phenomenal universals (cf. JS6). On the other hand, while tentatively conceding the existence of phenomenal universals (*arthajāti*), he had made their status rather more negotiable, holding that the phenomenal reality underpinning a uniform use of names could be accounted for in various ways: by postulating thing universals (*arthajāti*, JS93–94 as read by Helārāja), or by replacing this entified universal by either of two hypotheses: that fragmentary phenomena strike the understanding (*buddhi*) in terms of uniformities, because this is an aspect of the potentialities belonging to phenomena (cf. *ātmabhūtāḥ śaktayaḥ*, JS92) or, uniformities belong to phenomena in the form of similarities (*sādrśya*, cf. *abhedarūpaṃ sādrśyam*, JS92). These two conceptions can do duty for thing universals because they, in their own different ways, give an accounting of the uniformity which underlies verbal usage. Bhartṛhari had then proceeded to analyse the notion of similarity (*sādrśya*) in terms of repeated act of *apoha*.³³

[The idea of] Unity (*ekatva*) is achieved in a single act by excluding (*apoha*) distinctions among

entities which have distinct natures; [the idea of] similarity is achieved through repeated acts [of exclusion].

For Bhartṛhari *apoha* is an act of abstraction; a single act of abstraction achieves notions of unity (*ekatva*), repeated acts produce the notions of similarity.

Apoha as the act which achieves a non-differentiated unity (*abhedai-
katva*, cf. VS100) as a result of abandoning differences (*bhedānām pari-
tyāga*; cf. VS102), is illustrated by Bhartṛhari primarily in terms of the
sensuous world, but the structure of *apoha* and, therefore, its application
are not restricted to the sensuous worlds. Evidence for this comes from
the context of speculation on the nature of number, from VS100–103.
Here he illustrated a view of number as undifferentiated unity, whose
proper application is achieved by abandoning differences:³⁴

Just as the bearer of colour is conceptually known through a form whose particular aspects
are not grasped – indeed the distinguishing features of white etc. cannot be grasped [con-
ceptually] – so also, as a result of the operation of only a part of the universal [of number
brought about] by the exclusion of the distinct, the idea of number applies. Or, it is of that
sort through the abandonment of the distinct.

VS102–103

The structure of *apoha*, as described by Bhartṛhari in JS98 and again in
VS100–103, corresponds rather well with Dignāga's *apoha*. These
texts were, I think, a primary influence on Dignāga's doctrines. As is
the case with Bhartṛhari, the *apoha* operation functioned on several
levels: on the level of names and the level of the sensuous world. I have
already exposed the structure as it operates on the level of names:

H = (Hbearers, relation) + (Hness), by *apoha* negation
H = (O) + (nonHness), by *apoha* negation
H = (O) + (nonnonHness = Hness)

My evidence for holding that the *apoha* operation functions on the
level of a sensuous reality, that even though in sensuous experience we
are given particular shades of white or green, never white as such or, to
use Hattori's words, "white in general", still through abstraction (*apoha*)
or exclusion of particular shades of white, it is possible to be aware of
an underling unity which pervades all white things, is drawn from several
sources. Chief evidence for extending the scope of Dignāga's *apoha* to
include the sensuous world is Dignāga's claim that in his system alone
are:³⁵

...properties of universals, features such as unitariness (*ekatva*), permanence (*nityatva*)

and complete residence in each individual (*pratyekaparīsamāpti*) properly established.

trvrPS5.36:NC2p.630

My hypothesis that the *apoha*-operation achieves a unity and that this
unity is identical in the sensuous world with a quality stripped of all its
particular features, enables me to give substance to Dignāga's claim
above. Dignāga, following Bhartṛhari, also claimed that names could
not draw on the distinguishing features of sensuous objects: that the
particular aspects were beyond the reach of names (*avyapadeśya*, cf.
vrPS1.2:Hattori, 1968 p.24, and compare with VS103). Dignāga could
also, following Bhartṛhari, claim that, if naming is abstracting, then
repeated acts of naming produce notions of similarity (cf. JS98):

where a cognition of similarity obtains there a sequential signification is observed, as it is
[in the following cases]: "the whiteness of jasmine, waterlily and mother of pearl."

trvrPS5.5A

Dignāga, on my hypothesis, could without duplicity hold that this unity
is an eternal (*nitya*, cf. vrPS5.36) and not absolutely real (*adṛavya*, cf.
vrPS5.36) because the unity achieved through abstraction of distinctions,
does not contain anything over and above what is given in the sensuous
world, it is eternal; because nothing in the sensual world exactly cor-
responds to this abstraction, it is not absolutely real (*adṛavya*). The
universal, to use the vocabulary associated with *Upādāyaprajñapti-
prakarana*, is constructed "in dependence on" reality.

My hypotheses that Dignāga's *apoha* operation extends into the
spatio-temporal world also allows me to substantiate Dignāga's state-
ment which was the point of departure for the digression, namely, that:³⁶

a word causes its object to be conveyed by means of that [property] alone which does not
exceed the object.

trPS5.13

I have interpreted this statement as displaying Dignāga's support of
Kātyāyana's aphorism on names. By reducing Bhartṛhari's conception
of names from:

H = (H-bearers) + (Hness)

to:

H = (O) + (Hness)

and by extending the operation of *apoha* to the sensuous world, an opera-
tion which achieves a spatio-temporal unity, the content of certain names
corresponds to the spatio-temporal unity and is not 'in excess' of the

object named through the demonstrative: both parts of the *apoha* sentence, the connotative content and the demonstrative, name the same object directly.

... [the name] directly applies [to its bearer] and is not distinct [from its own object].
trPS5.36

The following untraced fragment sums up Dignāga's theories:³⁷

The word 'tree', excluding from its own object non-tree words, causes its object to be conveyed as tree-featured (*vrkṣalakṣaṇa*): this is claimed [by us]. In this way, the object of a word is an object (*vastu*) qualified by an exclusion; not merely an exclusion.
untraced quotation ascribed to Dignāga by Mallavādin

I have thus interpreted *apoha* as an operation which operates on a three-fold content of names in a three-fold manner:

1. It excludes the objects which fall within the range of the name by deleting them.
2. It excludes the objects which fall within the name's complementary range, by properly negating them.
3. It excludes the unshared or intrinsic features of the object and achieves a residual unity (*ekatva*).

The advantages of extending the *apoha* operation into the spatio-temporal world and identifying the unity achieved by the operation with Dignāga's universals (*jāti*, PS5.36), are the following. It allows us to show how Dignāga met Bhartṛhari's implicit objections to Kātyāyana's theory, that a uniform application of names requires a uniform ground of application. It allows us to show this without allowing Dignāga to fall victim to his own charges levelled against the Vaiśeṣika conception of universals. Dignāga's universals being abstractions given in nature do not flit from location to location, but are completely given in each of their locations (*pratyekaparisaṃāpti*, cf. vrPS5.36).³⁸

I have in the preceding pages of this chapter argued that Dignāga took his explanatory paradigms from Kātyāyana's aphorism on names; he held that names are given to things on the basis of a quality and that names so given are not in excess of their objects. I have explicated Dignāga's concept of the own-object (*svārtha*) of a name as the target of a demonstrative of immediate space/time that designates its object directly and without the aid of a universal. I have shown that the *apoha*-operation is a three-fold operation aimed at deleting everything in names which is in excess of the own object, traced the forebears of the operation in Bhartṛhari's text and stressed the continuity between Bhartṛhari's

usage and Dignāga's in this respect. What I have not done, and will postpone doing till the next chapter, is to show how Dignāga accounted for a name's antonymic and analytic content and the qualifier-qualificand relation without violating the spirit behind Kātyāyana's aphorism.

In the remainder of this chapter I shall confine my attention to sharpening the portrait of Dignāga that I have drawn by discussing the defects attributed by Dignāga to a theory of indirect names such as Bhartṛhari's.

iv

The historical importance of Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari cannot be overestimated. We are here presented with a readymade appraisal of Bhartṛhari's complex thought. And even when the appraisal is polemical and, therefore, unappreciative of Bhartṛhari's historical achievements, its treatment of Bhartṛhari is both systematic and thorough. We are thus, with the aid of Dignāga's criticism, able to reconstruct the basic principles which underlie Bhartṛhari's complex metaphysics. The criticism is instructive also because of the light it sheds on Dignāga's achievements; for Dignāga was not a sophisticated polemicist: the explanatory deficiencies he pointed out in his opponents' thesis were invariably absent from his own. Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari is methodologically rather similar to Bhartṛhari's implicit criticism of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names: Bhartṛhari had enlarged the explanatory scope of the theory by demanding that the theory explain antonymic and analytic content of names. The failure of Kātyāyana's theory to account for this content had provided Bhartṛhari's justification for transferring the 'occasioning ground for the use of a word' (*pravṛttinimitta*) from the spatio-temporal realm to the linguistic realm. In a similar fashion, Dignāga turned around and proposed his *apoha* doctrine on the basis of explanatory lacunae of Bhartṛhari's theories. And just as the starting point of Bhartṛhari's theories had been given by Kātyāyana's aphorism so also Dignāga's starting point is given by Bhartṛhari's theories. Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari tells us a great deal about the explanatory scope of Dignāga's *apoha*-doctrines.

Dignāga's critique of Bhartṛhari also sheds light on an unexpected quarter – Dharmakīrti's notion of *sādhśya* (coordination, according to Stcherbatsky's rendering). When Dharmakīrti adopted Bhartṛhari's views on names, he took care to avoid some of the problems attaching to

Bhartṛhari's theories, problems which had in fact been pointed out by Dignāga.³⁹

There are several defects which Dignāga pointed out in Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming. These difficulties arise from the failure of the *new theory to square with the old paradigms*. A major difficulty of the theory is, according to Dignāga, the failure to give a proper account of how names are given to singular individuals in external space, in sentences of the form, 'this is a cow'. An additional difficulty derives from the dual requirements which were traditionally laid down for the analysis of *karmadhāraya* compounds: names, prior to compounding, are unrelated to each other, but within the matrix of the compound become related as qualifier and qualificand. The cornerstone of Dignāga's attack on Bhartṛhari consisted in his insistence on condemning all theories of indirect naming; theories which name their external objects on the basis of proximity (*saṃsarga*) as false (cf. trPS5.5B; n.II.12). Bhartṛhari's view of language as the prior ground of all knowledge had been underpinned through the image of language as a reflecting surface which takes on the shape of whatever is placed in front of it, without directly interacting with it. Dignāga, in his critique, twisted the image out of shape arguing that to accept Bhartṛhari's views is to be condemned to the rainbow coloured visions of a man who looks at the world perpetually through a prism. His doctrines on language are aimed at discovering a less prismatic approach to the sensuous world.

Historical resonances of Dignāga's critique can be found in Helārāja's comments on the Third Book of the VP, in his inexplicable rejection of the crystal model, in his advocacy of thing universals and in his insistence that sentences of the form, 'this is a cow' can be properly accounted for on the basis of Bhartṛhari's thought. I have attempted in my presentation of Helārāja to look beneath the surface of his remarks in order to reveal his very different reactions to the thought of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.⁴⁰

I distinguish the following very different arguments by which Dignāga sought to undermine Bhartṛhari's theories on naming:

1. The argument that the relation between a name and its singular spatio-temporal bearer cannot be made (*anabhidhānadōṣa*, cf. vrPS5.36: NC2p.729; PS5.2: NC2p.608). The charge is directed against the views developed by Bhartṛhari in JS11-14 and substantiated in JS47. The view can be summed up as:

H = (Hness-bearers) + (Hness); where H stands for a name and Hness for the universal it expresses (*śabdajāti*).

Dignāga pointed out that the bearers of a name could be infinite in number and, under the circumstances, it would be impossible to verify whether a name *did in fact belong to all its infinitely many bearers*. Moreover, according to the terms of this doctrine, the name, prior to naming its external bearer, is already encumbered by a class of possible bearers. Given this baggage, the name cannot simultaneously name the singular bearer. The name which is dependent (cf. *pārantantrya* trvrPS5.36) is not free to name the totally different external individual.

Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and the deleting procedure which it incorporates (see Ch.III.3) meets the second of these difficulties; the name is stripped of its baggage before it is given to an external individual. Helārāja, reacting to this criticism in his comments, was at pains to secure the status of thing universals (*arthajāti*) as the element which is both uniform and properly corresponds to the content of the word as signified by its word universal (*śabdajāti*), thus providing the adequate verificatory grounds for singular sentences.

Dignāga's theory of names is shaped so that singular sentences of the form, 'this is a cow' are confined through the following type of argument:

This is a cow/ox (*gaur*)
because of a hump and dewlap
All things with humps and dewlaps are cows/oxen e.g. Śābaleya
All things which are not cows/oxen do not have humps and dewlaps.

Admitting that the number of entities designated in his exposition were also infinite, Dignāga denied that this presented insuperable problems for verification. The negative cast of his universal premise, he claimed, allowed access to the class which registers the existence of counter-examples to the generalization. The non-observation of such exceptions or deviant examples is sufficient ground, he claimed, for the acceptance of the universal premise.⁴¹

The *apoha* operation, moreover, allows the content of names to exactly correspond with the content of the object.

2. The argument that the qualifier-qualificand relation is not properly accounted for. This is called the "defect which consists in the

separated word", (*prthakśrutidoṣa*, cf. vrPS5.36:NC2p.727; PS5.2:NC2p.608). Dignāga claimed that the objection applied to two versions of Bhartṛhari's theories:

- (i) H = Hness
- (ii) H = (Relation of Hness with its bearer)

The defect arises in the context of co-referential names, such as *śiṃśapā* and *vrkṣa* (tree), which combine as qualifier and qualified, in compounds such as *śiṃśapāvṛkṣa*. Bhartṛhari's theory summed up as in (i) above, does not, according to Dignāga, account for such implicational relations between two names because it does not posit any relations. The second version of the theory (ii) though it purports to name a relation, cannot really do so, given the terms of Bhartṛhari's theories. This is because relations, according to Bhartṛhari's analysis, are denoted only as properties of their relata.⁴² This analysis cannot be extended to the relation between a name and its bearer, for fear of an infinite regress (see Herzberger, 1981). Dignāga claimed to solve the problem by constructing relations between names through the *anvayavyatireka* procedure (see trPS5.34–35) which involves incorporating the structures of inference into analyses of language. Thus the class of individuals designated by *vrkṣa* pervades or includes the class designated by *śiṃśapā*. And because the name with the larger extension implies all its bearers, it can stand in a co-referential relation, as qualified by a qualifier, with a name for its sub-class.⁴³

3. The argument against metaphor (*bhāktadoṣa*, cf. vrPS5.36:NC2p.729; PS5.4:NCp.607). This argument has as its target Bhartṛhari's view in JS6.

H = Hness and, through metaphor, Hness-bearer.

Dignāga observed that metaphorical figures are underpinned by a certain similarity; the name 'ox' is given to a Vāhika on account of a shared similarity, namely stupidity. No such similarity, he claimed, properly underpins Bhartṛhari's notion that language about external reality is metaphorical. Notions of similarity he argued, basing his analysis on Bhartṛhari's JS98, are the product of sequential acts of name-giving, of repeated acts of abstraction, but according to Bhartṛhari's own admission, the act of signifying universals and metaphorically designating its external bearer, are simultaneous (VS353; trHJS6p.17.3–4).

Dignāga rejected the idea of a pre-established similarity (*sādrśya*).

negotiated through the device Bhartṛhari termed "conferring a favour" (*upakāra*). Bhartṛhari had held that the possible world of bearers designated by a name through its universal could be made actual, in the presence of a phenomenal object, through a process which transcends naming; whereas naming, according to the classical theory enunciated by Kātyāyana, presupposes a division of quality (*guṇa*) and thing (*dravya*), favours can be conferred in terms of signification of meaning without this division. Thus relations (*saṃbandha*) which are purely verbal entities are signified even when they are not individuals and have no properties.⁴⁴ And whereas, according to Kātyāyana's theories, the content of names corresponds to the content of the object which is named, no such correspondence is required by the mechanism Bhartṛhari called "conferring favours". A bare object can confer a favour and awake sentential responses implicit in the understanding.

Dignāga rejected the idea of "conferring favours" parodying it mercilessly: the receivers of favour (*grahīṭṛ*), i.e., the universals which are given in the sentential object, are many, as are the conferrers of favour (the phenomenal object being complex). The receivers of favour would quarrel over the favours to be received and never settle down to a sentential statement. Who would, for instance, receive the favours conferred by blueness, the universal associated with the name 'blue' or the universal connected with 'colour' or with 'lotus'?

Bhartṛhari's whole scheme, Dignāga suggested, reduced our knowledge of the external world to the rainbow coloured vision of a man looking at nature through a prism.

NOTES (Chapter Three)

III.1. Helārāja considered Bhartṛhari to be an exponent of the universalist's point of view (*jātivādin*): HJS13p.26.8–9, 12–14. Bhartṛhari's view that universals are prior in the identification of individuals, developed through the JS, supports Helārāja's contention. Bhattoji Dīkṣita, as quoted by Brough (n.11.71) also considered Bhartṛhari to be a member of the *jāti*-school. Kaiyaṭa cited Dignāga at least twice, both times in the context of views upheld by Vyādi. Under a *vārttika* voicing Vyādi's objection to universals, Kaiyaṭa quoted the following from Dignāga's attack on the Vaiśeṣika concept of universals (Randle Fragment Q):

*nāyāti na ca tatrāsīd asti paścān na cāṃśavat/
jahāti pūrvam nādhāram aho vyasanasantatiḥ//*

(whiteness, blackness) and things possessed of the quality, as opposed to adjectives such as *vapāvān* 'fatty' (*vapā* 'fat'), which denote only things possessed of a quality. In a foot-note Cardona quotes Kaiyata's on the difference between *vapāvān* (fatty) which is not *guṇavacana* and to which *matublopa* device does not apply and *śukla* which is *guṇavacana*: Cf. Kaiyata (Pr., II.590): *vapāvaccchabdas tu guṇavacano na bhavati/ yo hi guṇam uktvā dravyam abhidhatte yathā śuklaḥ paṭa iti śuklaśabdah sa guṇavacanah vapāvaccchabdas tu sarvadā vapāsambandhaviśiṣṭam dravyam āha/* "But the item *vapāvāt-* is not *guṇavacana*. For, an item is *guṇavacana* which, having expressed a quality, denotes an object, like the item *śukla-* in *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*. The item *vapāvāt-*, however, always denotes an object qualified by its connection with *vapā*."

The reader will notice that in my translation of Dignāga's passage I have interposed in brackets what I consider to be implicit, e.g. "This has this genus [word]" and "This has this substance [word]". My interpretive insertion is sanctioned by vrPS1.3 (see n.III.20, where the text of the passage is given), and by the fact that the deletion of the possessive suffix (*matublopa*), recommended at the second stage, applies to verbal suffixes, not to genus by itself. But Dignāga is in apparent violation of the *vārttika*, explained above by Kaiyata, that the deletion of the *matup* suffix is allowed only for those which are *guṇavacana*, unless he meant that all nominals (proper names, action names such as *pācaka*, genus names, such as *gaur*) are *guṇavacana*, i.e. (in Cardona's words) "which having expressed a quality denote an object". Such a sweeping treatment of nominals characterized Bhartṛhari's approach; he had seen all nominals as expressing universals (*jāti*, cf. JS6). Is Dignāga's position here a reversal of that, an equally sweeping attempt to show that names are qualifiers because they denote qualities? Helārāja's comment under VS349 suggests that the *matublopa* procedure has no bearing on words which signify universals (*jātiśabda*) because universals are never seen separately from their support: *jātiśabdānām tu vyatirekasya kadācid apy adarśanām matublopena nārtho 'bhedopacārād eva tadvati vṛttih/* (HVS349p.311. 16–17). Dignāga's deliberate choice of the *matublopa* procedure to me suggests his intention of treating all nominals as *guṇavacana* in the spirit of Kātyāyana's aphorism according to which names are given to things on the basis of a quality (*guṇa*), not a violation of Kātyāyana's *vārttika* explained by Kaiyata above; this is also evidenced by his use of the term *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) to describe names; cf. trSL.V.5.4.36. Notice that the *matup* suffix is composed of two elements: a *guṇa* and a relation between the *guṇa* and *guṇin* (i.e. the quality and the bearer of the quality). This dual aspect is captured by the demonstrative in the genitive (*asya*) in Dignāga's sentence, '*asyedaṃ sāmānyam*' and is represented thus in my reconstruction:

(This has) (H).

Notice also that the deletion of the *matup* results in both elements, the bearer and its relation to the quality, becoming deleted, thus:

(This has) (H), by deletion of *matup*
(0) (H).

This is an extremely significant result in view of Dignāga's comment: *anye tv arthaśūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo'rtha ucyata iti/* (vrPS1.3:Hattori, 1968 p.25). The implications in the context of Dignāga's *apoha*-operation are discussed in section iii; see also n.III.30.

III.19. I have interpreted Dignāga's phrase *abhedopacārād grhyate* as restoration of reference for the following complicated reasons. The device, which literally means an

ascribed or metaphorical identity, is associated very generally with extended usage of words. Bhartṛhari described it thus:

Where (in an x) a word applies through another's (say y's) property either as an ascribed identity (lit. 'this is that') or as a relation between (x and y) (lit. 'this belongs to that'), then that other x becomes named (through the property of y) VS349, text given in n.II.44.

The *abhedopacāra* device is invoked in the context of the relation between a *guṇa* (quality) and the *guṇin* (bearer of the quality), between a universal (*jāti*) and the thing which possesses it (*tadvat*) (see Cardona, 1968 p.330fn.1). The device plays a significant role in Bhartṛhari's efforts to shift the emphasis of Kātyāyana's theory of names. In Chapter II I have reconstructed Bhartṛhari's theory, according to which names designate their bearer on the basis of the universal they express (JS6). The proposal here is underpinned by the device of *adhyāropa* (superimposition), which is interpreted by Helārāja in terms of *abhedādhyāropa* (superimposition through identity; HJS6p.17.15–16). That Bhartṛhari's scheme is an extension of the *abhedopacāra* device to the context of naming is confirmed by VS345–347: see discussion in Ch.II.iii. The locution *so'yaṃ* (this is that) represents the relation of identity. It does not follow from this that this ascribed identity is as a general rule sententially expressed. It can be expressed without the aid of demonstratives, for instance, under Bhartṛhari's view that the same word signifies a universal and designates an individual, without change of form (see VS340–341, given under n.III.26). The interpretation fulfils the general purpose of the device, namely, the extension of a name from its own context (in Dignāga's case the perceptual context) to another (either perceptual or non-perceptual). I have interpreted the *matublopa* device and the *abhedopacāra* device as operating in separate epistemic stages, when Dignāga in fact used merely a fairly standard phrase: *tato matublopād abhedopacārād grhyate/* This is because the direct application of the *abhedopacāra* device to the sentence: *asyedaṃ sāmānyam*, to me, makes no sense (since it is already referential), while its use in a later context as interchangeable with a restoration of the possessive suffix *matup* (see Cardona, 1968 p.330; also n.III.18), makes abundant sense.

III.20. *nāmajātyādiyojanā/ yadrechāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo'rtha ucyate dīttā iti/ jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti/ guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti/ kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti/ dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍi viśāṇīti/*

III.21. See n.III.18. Notice that Kumārila also interprets Dignāga's names as qualifiers see trSL.V.5.4.36.

III.22. See trPS2.8-11; trPS2.34A; trU; trK.

III.23. *jātitadvantau dvāv ekaśabdavācyau/*

III.24. *apara āha-yady api vastu na bhinnam śabdārthas tu bhinnah/ śabda hy ekavastu-viśayānām api śaktinām avacchedenopagrahe vartate/ tadyathā ayam daṇḍa iti [] pratyakṣarūpatayā tad eva vastu sarvanāmnābhidhīyate, nopalabhyamānenāpi daṇḍajātyiyogena daṇḍajātyiyogābhidhāne hi tasyāsamarthyam sarvanāmnah/*

III.25. It should be noted that the idea of demonstratives recorded here is entirely different from the one recorded by Bhartṛhari in the context of his analysis of the compound *abrāhmaṇa*. There the demonstrative draws out its universal from the context, from the latter member of the compound, see pp.38–39; see also trvrPS2.34A.

III.26. *ekatve tulyarūpatvāc chabdanām pratipādana/ nimittāt tadvato'rthasya viśiṣṭagrahaṇe sati/ so'yaṃ ity abhisambandhād āśrayair ākrīṭeh saha/ pravṛtttau bhinnāśabdāyām lingasaṃkhye prasiddhyatah/*

VS340–341

III.42. See n.11.43; trPS5.3.

III.43. See Ch.IV.v., trPS5.34–35.

III.44. The idea of *upakāra* (service rendered or favour granted) is intimately bound up with Bhartṛhari's theories of language. Anything which does not follow the pattern imposed by the more traditional theory of names – i.e. not an individual possessing a quality – is, in the strict sense, *avācya* (non-designatable). Its presence is then conveyed by an *upakāra*. The relation between words and things falls within this range of entities whose presence is conveyed by means of an *upakāra*; its presence is somehow then inferred, cf. SS5; HSS5p.129.1–5. In the context of the theory that the external world is inchoate, having no aspects which can be regarded in terms of continua, its presence is reflected in language through a service: see Helārāja on VP3.7.6p.237.19–20, translated under HJS6; SS40–41p.152.13, translated in Ch. II.vi. It follows from this theory that the expressive capacity of language is wider than its denotative capacity.

TRANSLATIONS (Chapter Three)

The following is a partial translation of the fifth chapter of Dignāga's PS as reconstructed into Sanskrit from the original Tibetan by Muni Jambuvijaya in his edition of the *Dvādaśāraṇayacakra* (NC2).

PS5.1;vrPS5.1:NC2p.607

Two means to truth have been declared. There are some who believe that knowledge derived from language is yet another means to truth. In that respect, we hold:

Knowledge derived from words is not a separate means to truth from inference; for the name signifies its own object (*svārtha*) by excluding what is other, in the same way as (the Reason) 'being an artifact' [establishes what is to be proved].

A word, which is applied to an object, illumines that aspect [of it] with which it is invariably connected, by excluding other objects, even as (the Reason) 'being an artifact' [signifies the property 'being impermanent']. Therefore, language [as a means to truth] is not separate from inference.

This passage should be read in conjunction with trPS5.34 and 35, fragments where Dignāga suggests how his programme of reducing the structures of language to those of logic, is to be implemented. The programme consists in demonstrating the empirical origins of the relations between such names as *śiṃṣapā* and *vrkṣa*, i.e. between a name and another which represents its analytic content. According to Dignāga's analysis there, the so-called analytic content of names is not indigenous to language, but derived from nature. And just as invariances which govern inferential arguments are underpinned by observation, so also the invariance which is presupposed in the analytic content is governed by observation.

The key phrases in the stanza: *svārtha* (own object) and *anyāpoha* (exclusion of what is other) have been explicated in section ii and iii of Chapter III and section ii of Chapter IV. I shall briefly recapitulate the conclusions I reach there. Naming a singular individual is jointly achieved in a pair of sentences, by a demonstrative of space/time, a name and its doubly negated counterpart: 'this has H' and 'this has nonnonH'. Demonstratives designate singular spatio-temporal objects directly, without the intervention of any universal. Names, on the other hand, designate

classes of individuals on the basis of the universal they signify. Names have the following structure, which can be described as the denotative and the connotative content respectively: (Hness-bearers) and (Hness).

On the basis of the above clarification the *svārtha* can be described as the object directly designated by the demonstrative. The *anya* (what is other) can be described as composed of two classes, the class of bearers designated by the name and the class of bearers designated by the complement of the name, thus: (nonHness-bearers) and (Hness-bearers). The *apoha*-operation excludes both these classes from the sphere of the object designated by the demonstrative, but not in the same way. The operation is a two-fold operation over the two-fold content of names. The operation, used once, deletes the denotative content and negates the connotative content. Used twice, it partially restores the connotative content but keeps the denotative content deleted thus, (Hness) + (Hness-bearers) - (Hness) + (O). What is achieved by this complicated maneuver? The content of names is freed of its existential commitments. As a result the singular individual, which is the target of the demonstrative, alone is named.

Dignāga claimed wide ranging achievements from this theory. They included the following positive achievements: the ability to give a proper account of how a correct relation between a name and singular as well as classes of bearers can be taught; the ability to give a more precise definition of the relation between the elements given in the hierarchical content of names; the ability to give a proper account of the qualifier-qualificand relation displayed by compound expressions such as *śiṃṣapā-vṛkṣa*. On the negative side the theory does not fall prey to the kinds of problems which, Dignāga claimed, flowed from Bhartṛhari's theories.

Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari's theory of names is given in trPS5.2-8; a brief account of his own theory is given in trPS5.12-13; the achievements in the context of the compounds such as *nīlotpala* are given in trPS5.14; the method of correctly teaching the relation between words and things is described in trPS5.34 and a tightening up of the relations between the elements in the hierarchy introduced by Bhartṛhari, is described in trPS5.35; the achievements of his own theory are contrasted with the defects of Bhartṛhari's in trPS5.36.

trPS5.2; PS5.2: NC2p.607

On the other hand, there are some who say: "the word which signifies a universal (*jāti-śabda*) designates all the individuals which belong to it. The word which signifies an in-

dividual (*bhedaśabda*) is for the sake of restriction [of the scope of the universal] to the context of what is said."

In that context, we say:

The word which signifies a universal cannot designate individuals, because of the infiniteness [of individuals] and because of deviation. Nor [can it designate] a relation [of the universal with the individual], nor a universal, because the word is not separated from the meaning of the [word for the] individual. (PS.5.2)

The author will say: *The word which signifies a universal cannot designate individuals.* First, a word which signifies a universal, for instance, [the word] 'existent' etc. (*sat*) cannot designate individuals, because of the *infiniteness* [of individuals it sometimes designates]. Given the infiniteness [of the individuals it designates], it becomes impossible to establish a relation of words with things. And in the absence of an established relation, it is inappropriate for words to name things: for [in the absence of such a well established relation] only the own-form of the word is apprehended [and not its relationship with the bearers].

Moreover, [for the word which signifies a universal also to signify individuals, is inappropriate] *because of deviation*. Because the word 'existent' [according to the terms of the theory] applies, for instance, to such things as substance in the same way as it does to qualities, there would, due to deviance [in usage], be doubt rather than [proper] naming.

I understand the phrase *apṛthakśrutīḥ* as *apṛthagbhūtā śrutīḥ* and the phrase *jātiśabdah* as *jātivācī śabdah*.

Dignāga does not name Bhartṛhari as the target of his attack in these critical stanzas, nor does he put into his opponent's mouth actual stanzas from Bhartṛhari's VP. Rather he creates an opponent who reflects various facets of Bhartṛhari's central thesis, that names are given to individuals on the basis of universals belonging in words. He puts into his opponent's mouth stanzas which he himself in all probability had constructed. And he allows the opponent to speak in an order best suited for critical comment. In spite of this, the criticism is not sophistical, for the criticism flows from ideals that are systematically embodied in his own theories. True, the criticism may be considered unfair in view of the fact that Bhartṛhari, as a grammarian, had explicitly stated that the correct teaching of the relation between a word and its external bearer is not of any concern to him (cf. SS2).

The attack begins with an opponent advocating the view that universals designate all the objects which fall within their range and that the word for an individual (*bhedaśabda*) which falls within its range, merely restricts the scope of the universal: *ukteṣu nīyamārthaṃ bhedaśabdah*. This phrase is interpreted by the authors of the NC (on p.606) under the rubric of the phrase *nīyamārthā pumāḥ śrutīḥ*, which occurs at least twice in Bhartṛhari's VP (in JS89 and VP2.64). Helārāja's interpretation of the phrase (given under HJS89pp.87.22-23, 88.2-5) advocates the same views as those attributed by Dignāga to the opponent.

The authors of the NC interpret the individuals designated by a universal in the following hierarchical order: Being (*sattā*)—substance (*dravya*)—earth (*prithivī*)—clay (*mṛd*)—pot (*ghaṭa*)—bowl (*kuṇḍa*)—small bowl (*kuṇḍikā*). (See NS2p.605.)

Dignāga's criticism of the position is two-fold: under the view advocated here, the word's own form plus all the individuals which bear the name are apprehended; an account of the correct naming of a singular individual object is not given, and cannot be given, because these are infinite in number.

The second stage of Dignāga's argument has as its target the position outlined in the second line of the opponent's objection: that the word for the individual (*bhedaśabda*) merely restricts the meaning of the word for the universal (*jātiśabda*). Dignāga argues that this would lead to deviant usage: a word cannot apply in the same way to the various individuals which fall within its range, the word 'existent' (*sat*) does not apply to substance in the same way as it applies to a quality: its relations with various elements in the hierarchy are different, some elements in the hierarchy can be related to it as its immediate offspring, others are related as offspring of offspring. Dignāga, who had defined additional relations over the hierarchy, pointed out the lacunae in Bhartṛhari's conception of the hierarchy. His refinements of the hierarchy are described in trPS.35 and in Ch.IV.v.

vrPS5.3; PS5.3:NC2p.607

There are also some who hold that: "[The word which expresses a universal] designates merely a universal or its relation [with the individual], for then the relation is readily made [and] there is no deviance." This is not feasible. Nor [can it designate] a relation, nor a universal, because the word is not separated from the meaning of the [word for the] individual. In this way, "the existent substance, the existent quality, the existent action", there would not be such co-reference [of the word for the universal, for example, the word 'existent'] with the meaning of [the word for] the individual, for instance, with the word 'substance', with the meaning of [the word for] the individual, for instance, with the word 'existent', and this [co-referential usage] is seen. For it is not the case that existence is either the relation [between the individual and the universal] or a substance or a quality, rather it is related to substance or quality. It has been said: "For items denoting a quality and a quality-bearer a distinction in nominal endings is prescribed by rule; for those items which denote individuals the same nominal ending is established" (VS8, cf. Cardona, 1968p.331).

Here, a relation is also designated, signified by the property of [one of] the relatum; thus it is signified by a nominal base to which the suffixes *iva* or *tal* have been added [and] even that abstract quality (*bhāva*) is attached to something else. (PS5.3)

A relation is brought about by means of a relating. It is attached to something else in the same way as [a quality], for instance, colour [is attached in an individual]. Because a re-

lation is designated through the property of the relatum, and, since there is no word which signifies a relation on the basis of a property which belongs to it, therefore, its designability, on the basis of a word which signifies a universal, is not feasible.

Continuing his examination of Bhartṛhari's view that individuals are identified or named on the basis of universals expressed by names, Dignāga examines two variations of the theme. The first of these, that names merely signify universals on the ground that the relation with a singular individual then is easily established, is rejected on the ground that certain conditions laid down by grammarians for assigning two terms to the same substratum are not met by the theory. Citing a stanza from Bhartṛhari's own work, Dignāga states the two conditions under which terms can be assigned to the same substratum: Where a quality is ascribed to a bearer the term for the bearer is put in the genitive, while the term for the quality is in the nominative. In the sentence *paṭasya suklaḥ* (the whiteness of cloth) the term *paṭasya*, which is in the genitive, signifies the existence of a relation (see Cardona, 1968 p.318–320). The view that names signify universals, does not provide for the relations which would justify assigning two names to the same substratum.

In the second case where two terms are assigned to the same substratum in a compound, grammatical tradition requires that the two terms be names in the strict sense, that they each denote an individual (cf. *dravyaśabda*). This requirement is not met by the theory that names denote merely universals.

Dignāga next examines a new variation of Bhartṛhari's theory: the universal residing in a name designates a relation with the individual. Dignāga rejects the view. The argument he uses to reject the view is not original to him, but is derived wholly from Bhartṛhari's speculations. Bhartṛhari had drawn a sharp distinction between relations which can be designated and those which cannot. Relations which are not signified by the six nominal endings are reserved for the genitive. These, however, cannot be directly designated, nor can they all be designated. Those that are designated are designated through a quality which belongs in their bearers, thus, the relation between a servant and king signified by the compound *rājapuruṣa* (the king's man), is signified through the quality *rājapuruṣatvam* (being a king's man) located in the *puruṣa* (man) (cf. VP3.7.157 given under n.II.43; Helārāja on VP3.5.1p.194.6–7; Cardona, 1969 p.318–320). The method of signifying relations in the genitive does not work in the case of the relation between a name and its bearer (cf. SS3–4) or, what is essentially the same relation, between a universal and the individual it designates (VS345), because in the case of this relation

the procedure leads to an infinite regress (*anavasthā*, cf. SS28; Herzberger, 1981). Dignāga merely repeats Bhartṛhari's conclusion that a relation between a universal and individual cannot be designated on the basis of a property belonging to it (*svadharmaṇa*, cf. SS4 also Helārāja on SS4).

Another view is examined below, one which resembles the views advocated by Bhartṛhari in JS6 (see Ch.II.iii). Here the problem of designating relations is set aside, because it is held that universals or names designate their bearers as possessing, or being the locus of, a relation (*jātimat*). Dignāga objects to the doctrine, particularly to its implication that talk about the external world is essentially metaphorical (see Ch.II.iii.). Dignāga presents two arguments against the view: when the name signifies a universal, and, on the basis of that universal, an individual which has the universal, then the name cannot at the same time imply a relation with other names. And such relations are implicit in such compounds as *nīlotpala* and *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*. Dignāga, at this point, interjects his own solution to the problem that co-referentiality between two names presupposes the class and sub-class relation, which has to be tested by the empirical *anvayavyatireka* method (see Ch.IV.v).

Dignāga's second argument is as follows: the meaning of a word does not remain the same when it is used metaphorically. Thus some account of the shift in meaning that a word undergoes, when it designates an external object while signifying its own form or its own universal, is called for. Moreover, it is necessary to explicate in this context a suitable counterpart for the similarity which underpins normal metaphorical usage. Thus, for instance, in the metaphorical figure 'Vāhika ox', stupidity (*jadatva*), presumed to be shared between the Vāhika and an ox, underpin the metaphor (see Punyarāja's remarks in VP2.273, Iyer, 1977), not a hump or a bushy tail. In the next stanza Dignāga gives arguments to show that the doctrine, a name which signifies a universal metaphorically designates an individual, is ill-conceived, because it lacks a proper notion of similarity.

vrPS5.4A:NC2p.607

On the other hand, there are those who say: "what is intended is to signify merely the individual as possessing the universal (*jātimat*): since [on this view] there is co-reference [between the word for the universal and the word for the individual], a relation [between the word and the individual it designates] is readily made and there is non-deviation [between the word and the individual bearer]." In that context, we say:

Through subordination [of meaning or] through metaphor there is no designation of the individual as the possessor of the universal [lit. of that], because of impossibility [of the proper requirements necessary for subordination or metaphorical usage].

(PS5.4A)

Through subordination [of meaning] there is no designation of the individual as the possessor of the universal [lit. of that]. And so, the word 'existent' indirectly designates an individual in which there is a subordinating of the receptacle of the own form of the universal. Thus because the word 'existent' does not [according to the terms of this theory] imply [the classes of] individuals which fall under it, such as pots, there cannot be, in the absence of such [sub-class] relations of individuals, any co-referential usage [based on the qualifier-qualificand relation]. For, in the absence of pervasion, there cannot be co-reference [of two words as qualifier and qualificand]. Just as the word 'white', because it designates an individual qualified only by a quality, which belongs to its own named bearer (*svābhidheya*), does not imply the sweet taste etc., even though it applies to the individual [say sugar, which has the sweet taste]. Consequently, in this way, not being an individual [i.e. sub-class] which [properly] belongs to it [i.e. to the scope of the universal] would also be entailed here [in the absence of a proper inclusion or pervasion relation].

vrPS5.4A:PS5.4B:NC2p.607

Moreover, *through metaphor*. Because the word 'existent' in its non-metaphorical sense signifies either a universal or its own form. Signifying that [own form or universal], it is transferred to the thing which has the universal. It is never the case that a word used in a metaphorical sense to designate a thing applies in a non-metaphorical sense to that very thing. Because similarity is also *impossible*. And in the individual which has the universal, the similarity of quality is not the product of a coalescing of cognitive acts nor is it the product of a service rendered by a quality. If you ask why it cannot be a product of a coalescing of cognitive acts, the reply is: in the case of metaphor.

Since the nature of the idea is different; just as it is the case when [the word] 'king' is used metaphorically to refer to a servant. (PS5.4B)

For instance, when the word 'king' is used for a servant as [in the sentence] "the one who is the servant is the king", the idea is not the same with regard to the servant as it is with regard to the king.

Here Dignāga is suggesting that the discontinuity between normal and metaphorical usage is glossed over by Bhartṛhari when he suggested that talk about the external world is always metaphorical. He next takes up for examination the kind of similarity that would underline metaphorical usage.

PS5.5A:vrPS5.5:NC2p.608

The word which signifies a universal applies metaphorically to the individual which has the universal [this is not true],

then all knowledge with respect to the world would be fiction (*mithyā* cf. PS5.6A). This for Dignāga is a clear condemnation of the theory. For Dharmakīrti, that his own theory is fiction in this peculiar sense, is not a condemnation, and I find this a very curious feature of Dharmakīrti's thought. He sought extremely stringent criteria for the truth of universal sentences, insisting that the non-observation of deviant examples was no guarantee of truth (see Ch.V.i.). In his search for necessary truths he turned to Bhartṛhari's insights adopting Bhartṛhari's theories of indirect naming and ideal objects given in *a priori* language (see Ch.V.iii) but had no hesitation in declaring this whole machinery a fiction (*mithyā*, n.V.43). This difference in attitude, more than any other single factor, for me, defines the difference between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's thought.

Dignāga argues that theories of indirect naming not only render all knowledge of the external world fictive, they make it confused. And here he turns to criticise Bhartṛhari's theory of ideal objects given *a priori* in language. If the name embodies an ideal object which is a cluster of universals (cf. *samsargīnām mātṛāṇaṃ kalāpam*, vrVP1.24–26p.75.2–3, quoted under n.II.112), then the favours granted by the external object, not coordinated with the receivers of favour, would be fought over. The subsequent cognition would not be sentential. To hold that the favours being granted are many, does not solve the problem either. It leads, on the contrary, to a prismatic or rainbow coloured vision of reality. Dharmakīrti, who adopted Bhartṛhari's indirect view of names, the view that the understanding is a reflection of the phenomenal (*pratibimba*, cf. PV2.163–165) sought very hard to skirt around these problems raised by Dignāga.

PS.6–11 repeat variations of the earlier argument. I have, therefore, not translated them. However, two interesting points are worth noting: that universals have multiple loci (cf. *anekavṛtti hi sāmānyam* vrPS5.?: that universals have multiple loci (cf. *anekavṛtti hi sāmānyam* vrPS5.?: that it is necessary to assume that thing universals (*arthasāmānyā*) inhere in things, but that the assumption is false, because there are no such entities (cf. *tasmād arthe'vaśyam arthasāmānyam abhyupagantavyam/ tac cārthe nāsti/* vrPS5.?: NC2p.629). Both these observations are conceptually connected with the two properties of universals which, Dignāga claims (in PS5.36 and vrPS5.36), are properly delineated in his own system. These properties are: complete residence in each locus (*pratyekaparīsamāpti*) and non-substantiality (*adravyatva*). I have explicated these claims in Ch.III.iii as deriving from Dignāga's view that

universals are abstractions from intrinsic features, obtained by excluding (*apoha*) unshared features. They thus have multiple occurrence, are not entified, and do not 'exceed over' their bearer.

Having criticised Bhartṛhari's theory in detail, Dignāga states his own.

PS5.12–13: NC2p.630

Even though what is named (*abhidheya*) is multifarious, it cannot be known entirely on the basis of words, for, in accordance with its own relations, the word conveys the object through exclusion. (PS5.12)

Even though a word has multifarious properties, it causes the object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati : yj*) the object; not by means of qualities etc. which belong to words. (PS5.13)

PS12 states that the designated individual is multifarious, but is not known entirely on the basis of words. I draw two implications from the statement: that the designated object is not given *a priori* through language (cf. Ch.II.v and Ch.V.iii for Bhartṛhari's and Dharmakīrti's assumptions regarding ideal objects given *a priori*); that the word captures only general features of the individual it names, this latter position is continuous with Bhartṛhari's (see n.II.64 for references in Bhartṛhari's text).

PS5.12B introduces relational content into the structure of names, it also introduces the idea of exclusion or *apoha*.

PS5.13A states that words have multifarious content, while PS5.13B implies this multifarious character is transcended and that the word conveys its objects on the basis of that quality alone which does not exceed over its object, not on the basis of qualities belonging in words. Bhartṛhari's whole thesis in the VP was based on the doctrine that words convey their objects on the basis of universals belonging in words, not things. In Ch.III.ii, I have interpreted these stanzas as posing a direct challenge to Bhartṛhari's thesis. I have explicated the role of *apoha* in Ch.III.iii in terms of an operation which functions of the two-fold content attributed to names by Bhartṛhari; the *apoha* operation is meant to delete the denotative content and negate the connotative content. Used twice it restores the connotative content without restoring the denotative content. The operation mimics the *matublopa* operation. By annulling reference to individuals, I have argued, the operation simultaneously annuls the relational content of names. Stripped of their relational content, names fulfil Kātyāyana's condition on names which enter the

that names are non-distinct (cf. trPS5.36) from their bearers.

The deletion procedure frees names of their existential content, that range of actual and possible individuals which, according to Bhartṛhari, is automatically defined by universals belonging in names. When names are freed of their existential content their relational content becomes suspended, and it is possible for names to combine with other names without violating Kātyāyana's conditions on the qualifier-qualificand relation (see Ch.II.v and III.iii). Freed of both their relational and their existential content it is possible for names to combine with other names in order to designate a third object (see trvrPS5.14); it is also possible to establish relations between names by defining relations such as, *virodha*, *saṃāśaya* and *nīścaya*, between elements which are exemplified in space and time (see Ch.IV.v).

The negation procedure defines the name's complementary class, its *vipakṣa*, and opens the door to verification procedures. The procedure, underpinned in the doctrine that the non-observation of deviant examples is sufficient to guarantee a universal concomitance, is the basis of Dignāga's contention that the relation between names and their spatio-temporal bearers can be taught.

The proper teaching of the relation between names and their visible bearers imposes requirements at two separate levels. At the level of the singular bearer, the relation with its name is successfully taught if it can be shown that the name does not 'exceed over' the content of its bearer. At the level of the whole class of bearers, a class which can have an infinite number of members, the relation between the name and its class of bearers is successfully taught when no examples of the following sort are observed: an example where the ground of name-giving obtains but the name is withheld. The relation between a name and its singular bearer is explained through direct inspection, the relation between a name and its plural bearers is explained indirectly, by the non-observation of deviant examples.

As a way of summing up Dignāga's attitude to the teaching of the relation between names and their visible bearers, and as a way of contrasting this attitude to Dharmakīrti's, I will quote the following remark of Jinendrabuddhi's. The remark is important and helped me to crystallize my disagreement with Hattori. The reader who is interested in pursuing the matter should compare this remark of Jinendrabuddhi's with Dignāga's and its interpretation by Hattori (in Hattori, 1968, n.I.14); the issue is discussed in Ch.III.i. of the present essay.

In the process of learning an object's name by having the object pointed out while its name is being uttered, we simultaneously grasp its particular aspect and its general aspect. When that name is used later, only the general aspects are communicated.

Hayes, 1980 p.69 fn.57

The remark suggests that the apprehension of general or shared features and the unshared or particular features are not separated by a gulf of separate time-moments. I take the remark in the following way: even though shared or general features do not exist in the phenomenal world apart from unshared features, (they are not *dravyasat*, according to Buddhist vocabulary used by Dignāga, cf. trvrPS5.36) they are constructed "in dependence on" what is given in the perceptual world.

Dharmakīrti, reverting to Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect names, denied two essential aspects of Dignāga's thought: he denied that shared or general features are constructed "in dependence on" what is given perceptually (see n.III.35) and he denied that the purely empirical Method of Agreement and Difference can be a guarantee of universal truths. In contrast to Dignāga, he separated the unshared features from shared or general features by an ontological gulf. While shared or general features belong in the understanding alone, unshared features belong in the perceptual world. General features represent a cognitive reflection of the perceptual moment, separated in time from the perceptual moment. The gap between the conceptual and perceptual is real, their identification (cf. vrSVP70p.39) is artificial maintained for the sake of daily life. They are constructs, if one describes construction as being altogether in excess of its building blocks.

Dharmakīrti's general features have two anchors: one in a beginningless propensity or habit energy (*anādivāsanā*), the other in the point instants which make up phenomenal nature. Point instants which constitute the nature of phenomena, have the inherent capacity to generate uniform shapes (*abhinnākāra*, cf. vrSVP68-70p.39.14.15). It is the effect (*kārya*) they have on the understanding. That there are these two anchors is secured in the following way:

There is indeed nothing like [real] universals. The understanding, dependent on language (*śabdāśrayā buddhiḥ*), through the capacity belonging to a beginningless propensity (*anādivāsanā*), arises even creating [in its wake] uncreated properties. On the basis of the appearance which belongs to the understanding, universals and co-reference are established. Also unreal objects. (*na vai kimcit sāmānyam nāmāsti/ śabdāśrayā buddhir anādivāsanāśamarthyād asaṃsrjān api dharmān saṃsrjanti jāyate/ tasyāḥ pratibhāsaśena sāmānyam sāmānādhikaranyam ca vyavasthāpyate/ asadārtho'pi*: vrVSP64pp.34.25-27, 35.1-2).

The second anchor, in real perceptual phenomena, is secured in the following way:

It is desirable that universals be regarded as the capacity of entities to generate single effects. (*sāmānyam vyaktīnām ekakāryajananaśaktir eṣṭavyā*: vrSVPV98p.50.13-14).

The contrast, between Dignāga's conception of the qualifier-qualificand relation as constructed on the basis of pervasion (see Ch.IV.v) and Dharmakīrti's conception that the relation is given in the understanding, stands out in the first of the two passages quoted above. Dharmakīrti's stance is identical with Bhartṛhari's (see Ch.II.v).

Dharmakīrti expressing total dissatisfaction with Dignāga's empirical Method of Agreement and Difference (see Ch.V.i), recommended that the procedure be regulated by universal principles, derived from essential nature (*svabhāva*) of objects given *a priori* in language. The qualifier-qualificand relation belongs in the essential nature of these objects.

This *a priori* structure is presupposed by all *saṃketa* (see PV2.142, translated and discussed under Ch.V.iii). It provides the means (*upāya*) for teaching the relation between words and things. Observation cannot guarantee the invariance between concomitances, for there is no remainderless observation of classes which have infinite members.

Convinced by Dharmakīrti's doctrine of essential natures, Jinendrabuddhi interpolated the cause-effect relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), which is I think alluded to by Dharmakīrti in the second passage above, at a crucial juncture in Dignāga's text. Jinendrabuddhi interpreted Dignāga claims that mere non-observation of deviant instances is sufficient to guarantee universal concomitances, in the following way.

When the cause-effect relation between words and things is already established in the absence of the causal object there will be an absence of the word which is its effect, by merely this [knowledge] the non-observation is cognized (i.e. confirmed) (*śabdārthayoh kārya- kāraṇabhāvasiddhau kāraṇārthābhāve tatkāryaśabdābhāvo bhaviṣyatyī etanmātreṇādarsa- nam pratīyate*: NC2p.651).

The interpretation makes the cause-effect relation logically prior to the non-observation of deviant instances. It is in tune with Dharmakīrti's call for stronger regulating principles on the empirical procedure (SVP31, quoted under n.IV.77). It is also in tune with Dharmakīrti's interpretation of selected fragments of Dignāga's (see p.230-233). By introducing the cause-effect relation as a way of securing the relation between words and things, Jinendrabuddhi introduces the idea of *svabhāva* given by

ideal objects that are, according to Dharmakīrti, inherent in language (see Ch.V.iii). The move secures an innate status for the qualifier-qualificand relation (see Dharmakīrti's first passage quoted above). The move, however, nullifies Dignāga's stance against Bhartṛhari, his efforts to read the qualifier-qualificand relation as constructed out of experience. It also nullifies Dignāga's efforts to re-interpret Bhartṛhari's hierarchically organized analytic content (see Ch.IV.v). To treat these relations given *a priori*, as part of the structure of language is to treat them as postulates, a move which Dignāga did not endorse. See also n.III.35 for another similar interpolation on Jinendrabuddhi's part. PS5.34 and 35 are also discussed in Ch.IV.v.

How is it that the previous faults do not arise when a word denotes its object by excluding other objects?

Because it is not seen as applying to objects denoted by other words, [and] is also seen as applying to an aspect of its own object, the relation of a word [with its object] is easily made, and there is no deviation. (PS5.34)

Agreement in presence and absence alone are the means in the denoting of objects by names. And agreement in presence and absence consists in residence and non-residence in the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* [respectively]. There, residence in the entire *sapakṣa* is not explainable, for sometime when there is an infinity of objects it is impossible to explain [the relation with respect to] all of them. In the case of the *vipakṣa*, on the other hand, in spite of the infinite number, merely on the basis of the non-perception [of deviance], knowledge of exclusion is possible. That is really why, on the basis of non-perception anywhere else, the inference of the exclusion of that is called "Naming For Oneself". If inference were through agreement in presence then from the word 'tree' applied to an object, there would not be a *śiṃṣapā*-manifesting doubt. And paralleling that doubt there would also be earth-ness or substance-ness manifesting doubt. Because the word 'tree' is not seen in the absence of earth substances, therefore, inference is on the basis of agreement in presence. It is said:

PS5.35; vrPS5.35: NC2p.650

Being a tree, an earth substance, existent and knowable, because of being against the grain, are the ground of a four-fold, a three-fold, a two-fold, and a single doubt; conversely they are the ground of a four-fold, three-fold, two-fold, single certainty. (PS5.35)

Apart from the relation [of inextricable connectedness between a name and its bearer] neither a word nor a sign (*līnga*) have the capacity to convey the object; even when the word (lit.it) has a multiplicity of properties there is no possibility [according to the exposition given above] of the knowledge of the entire object [through language]. Nor is there [the possibility of the word's] deviating from its own object, since the individual objects [i.e. sub-classes] are not designated. In this way then the previous faults [belonging to other systems] are absent.

PS5.36:NC2p.728

In this fragment Dignāga sums up the achievements of his theory of names. The fragment is extremely dense and this is mainly because Dignāga packs into the fragment explanatory paradigms derived from two separate historical sources and, instead of laying out the context of his theories, merely alludes, in typically short-hand style, to the historical background. We, who have lost touch with the historical context, and have to supply the context as best we can, are in the position of those who are obliged on the basis of one half of a dialogue to re-create the other half.

The fragment can be unravelled if we view it in the historical light of Kātyāyana's aphorisms on names and its reinterpretation by Bhartṛhari. Seen through this perspective, one is impressed by Dignāga's concern to preserve the form of Kātyāyana's aphorism, one is also impressed by Dignāga's ambivalence to the solutions offered by Bhartṛhari: Dignāga acknowledges the grounds on which Bhartṛhari's dissatisfaction with Kātyāyana's aphorism rested, but repudiates the reinterpretation of the aphorism offered by Bhartṛhari. Dignāga accepts Bhartṛhari's observation that the uniform application of names requires a uniform ground of application, but rejects Bhartṛhari's elevation of Kātyāyana's quality, on the basis of which names are given to things to the status of a universal (*arthajāti*, cf. p.154). He accepts Bhartṛhari's observation that names are related to each other, but resists Bhartṛhari's account according to which these relations are established through universals residing in words (*śabdajāti*, cf. JS7--8,9,10). He accepts Bhartṛhari's suggestion that the qualifier-qualificand relation could be constructed out of names in a systematic fashion, but rejects implications of Bhartṛhari's eventual claim that the relation should be treated as given in an ideal sentential object. What he does not question is the necessity to preserve the form of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names.

Kātyāyana's aphorism on names and Bhartṛhari's criticism of that aphorism, establish the explanatory paradigms of Dignāga's theories. These paradigms can be summed up as the requirement that there should be a correlation between names and the grounds for name-giving: names properly belong to singular individuals, the ground for name-giving must also properly belong to singular individuals; names belong to classes of individuals, the ground for name giving must also belong to classes of individuals. Permeating this is the belief Dignāga shared with Kātyāyana that names do not 'exceed over' their actual bearers.

Where the concomitance excludes others, there is non-separation [of the word for the universal] from the meaning of its individuals [i.e. with its sub-classes]. Because [the name] directly applies [to its bearer] and is not distinct [from it], the characteristics of universals are properly established. (PS5.36)

vrPS5.36:NS2pp.728-9

The rest [of the defects] are also absent. How so? *Where the pervasion excludes others, there is non-separation [of the word for the universal] from the meaning of its individuals* (i.e. sub-classes). The function of excluding other objects, which belongs to words for universals is effected without implying their [i.e. the names'] own individuals [i.e. the sub-classes], that is how co-reference with words for individuals becomes feasible. It follows from this that "the fault of the separated word" does not arise. That object, which is the object designated by both words, is where, in an [entirely] different object, co-reference occurs. In this way, there is non-deviance with its own object, because only the isolated word occurs elsewhere [in the context of other bearers].

The latter defect also does not arise. How so? *Because [the name] directly applies and is not distinct [from its object]*. A name does not apply to its own object having first presented it with another object. Therefore, the two defects which arise through dependence, namely, "the non-implication of own bearer defect" and "[illegitimate use of] metaphor defect" do not exist.

Nor do the two defects "not naming [the bearer]" and "not being a [proper] universal", which spring from the inexhaustibility of individuals and not pervading them respectively, exist: because [the name which contains] exclusion of other objects alone is non-distinct [from its bearer] and non-substantial. Only on this basis is it not necessary to go in pursuit of yet another relation which binds the universal and the particular; because the word directly rejects other objects.

In this way the proper meaning of words is one which excludes others, because it lacks the defects mentioned earlier. From this it follows that *the characteristic of universals are [properly] established*. In this system alone (*atraiva*) are the properties of universals, features such as unitariness (*ekatva*), permanence (*nityatva*) [and] complete residence in each, properly established. This is because [the universal] is non-distinct [from the individual bearer], is not cut off from its support and is cognized [as present] in the entire object. In this way, because of the absence of defects and enhancing presence of virtues, a name really designates objects qualified by the exclusion of others.

These various faults which Dignāga traces to his opponent have been dealt with in Ch.III.iv. Dignāga's conception of universals is discussed in Chs.III.iii and IV.i.

CHAPTER FOUR DIGNĀGA

In the beginning of this essay I proposed that Dignāga's logic was part of a metaphysical scheme, that his logical techniques were grist to a metaphysical mill. In the third chapter, in the course of contrasting his views with those of Bhartṛhari's, I suggested what this metaphysical purposes may have been. I argued that in restituting the claims of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, Dignāga was simultaneously concerned to show that the fragment of language used by enlightened men to talk about the world was not in excess of what is given: this fragment of language is in fact constructed "in dependence" on what is real, the elements of the audible and visual.

My concern in this chapter is to show how Dignāga's logic reflected these metaphysical concerns. I would like to explain away the non-formal aspects of his logic in terms of the metaphysical design they serve. I would like to show that his argument embodies two ideals: a reductive ideal, which expresses itself as the need to translate every element in the argument back to its perceptual source; a constructive ideal, which expresses itself in the need to show how a hierarchical arrangement of the content of names can be constructed out of perceptual phenomena, to show how the qualifier-qualificand related can be derived from this construction and to show how the relation between words and things is correctly taught and learnt.

My conclusions will be presented in the following outline:

Section i: I will state Dignāga's definition of perception as being without construction, and his definition of the constructed as being connected with language. I will describe how the private world of the perceiving mind is made public through the mechanism of shared features (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), and the objects defined by them. I will contrast Dignāga's conception of shared features, or universals, with Bhartṛhari's and Dharmakīrti's and recapture some of the conclusions regarding names and demonstratives reached in Chapter III.

Section ii: I shall suggest that the *raison d'être* for the *apoha*-operation is the unwanted entification which is a by-product of naming. I will

contrast names with their doubly negated counterparts, and note that the latter lack some features of the former.

Section iii: I will examine the kind of relations that underpin Dignāga's universal sentence, then distinguish several different types of sentences which enter into his argument: the universal affirmative sentence, its contraposed counterpart, the particular sentence, the singular affirmative sentence, its double negated counterpart. I will then lay down their truth conditions, and suggest that some of the charges of redundancy against Dignāga's argument are the result of misrepresenting his contraposed sentence.

Section iv: I will briefly sketch the origins of the form adopted by Dignāga for his argument. I will show how Dignāga adapted the original debating purpose of the argument to suit his metaphysical intentions. I will argue that Dignāga built into the argument provisions for the verification of universal sentences and took measures to ensure that no entity that could not be translated back into a spatio-temporal world was admitted into it. In this respect Dignāga's argument embodied a reductive aspect.

Section v: I will describe how Dignāga used the same form of argument to reconstruct Bhartṛhari's hierarchical arrangement of universals, and how he defined the qualifier-qualificand relation and three other relations in terms of this newly constructed hierarchy.

Section vi: Having shown how logic could have had its beginnings in Dignāga's school, I shall conclude my argument by drawing attention to the statements of earlier scholars such as de La Vallée Poussin, Keith and Randle, who argued that the argument had no right to exist in Dignāga's school.

i

Radiant with all shapes, without division of first and last, without conception,
As the sky, its darkness rent by the thousand pellucid rays,
In its own wholly residual form he sees the mind itself that has no beginning.

Yogāvatāra 4.5.41

The above is from one of the very early works of Dignāga. Here Dignāga viewed reality as an unstructured realm of pure experience. It is a vision that Dignāga was to carry over into his last work, the PS. That purely

perceptual realm in which no element is conceptual, is the only reality posited by the PS. There perception is defined as "that which is without construction" (*kalpanā'poḍham*).² The word 'construction' stands for association with "[proper] names, generic names and the like" (*nāma-jatyādiyojanā*).³ The realm of pure perception includes presentations of the senses and also the mystical experience of enlightenment.⁴

Any analogy that Dignāga might have felt existed between a theory of enlightenment and his theory of the external world remained unexplored in the PS; in the PS he confined himself to working out a theory of the external world.⁵

What is significant is that for Dignāga sense experience stood midway between the external world and the world of introspection. It was not a realm of objects, either internal or external. It was a world of coloured shapes and sounds stretched out in phenomenal space.⁶ And because this idea of reality as presentation is not divided into subject and object, it suited Dignāga's idea of the mystical.⁷ Moreover, it enabled him to build a secular epistemology that was neutral between the existence and the non-existence of the external world. It became a means therefore of reconciling factions within schools of Buddhism.⁸

The realm of pure sensory experience, however 'radiant', is still a private world, a world in which language has not yet found a foothold. In order that there be communication so that the nature of the world could be expressed in language, Dignāga reached back to the *Ālaṃbana-parīkṣā*, where he had adopted two conditions for the support (*ālambana*) of a cognition by an object.

1. the object causes the cognition,
2. the object conveys to cognition its shape or feature.⁹

Atoms cannot support cognition because they violate condition 2.¹⁰ In fact condition 2 is sufficient to reject as support of cognition any object which is unknowable. However, that condition does not reject sensory presentations as supports of cognition.

The above conditions underwent a subtle transformation in the PS, under the direct influence of a stanza of Bhartṛhari's.¹¹ According to that stanza, cognitions are named on the basis of the objects reflected in them. Modified by Dignāga, objects are named on the basis of universals or shared features (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), never on the basis of their intrinsic features (*svalakṣaṇa*).¹²

Shared features are products of abstraction, "the result of constructing a non-difference among things which are different" (*bhedeṣy-*

abhedakalpanāt).¹³ For Dignāga they are universals abstracted from the presentations of the senses. These universals or shared features, in spite of being abstractions, have all the features normally associated with universals: they have uniformity (*ekatva*, cf. trvrPS36), eternity (*nityatva*, cf. trvrPS36) and they are completely resident in each locus (*pratyekaparisamāpti*, trvrPS5.36). Being abstractions construed out of what is given, they do not suffer the series of difficulties which, according to Dignāga, afflict the Vaiśeṣika conception of entified universals. They do not flit from location to location, unlike the Vaiśeṣika entity, which "is not connected with that wherein it resides, and yet pervades that which occupies that place".¹⁴ A doctrine of names, construed on the basis of this view of shared features, does not fall victim to the defects which plague an indirect theory of names such as Bhartṛhari's; the defect which consists in an illicit use of metaphor (*bhāktadoṣa*, cf. trvrPS5.36; trvrPS5.4) or the defect of not naming its proper individual (cf. trvrPS36), Dignāga claimed, had no place in his theory. Finally, Dharmakīrti's conception of universals represents a sharp break from Dignāga's. For Dharmakīrti universals are the product of a "beginningless propensity or habit energy" (*anādivāsana*, cf. SVPV64p.34.26) and necessarily impermanent. For Dignāga they are eternal (*nitya*, cf. trvrPS5.36). And whereas Dignāga's view, that the relation between words and things could be correctly taught, was supported by his doctrine of universals as shared features, Dharmakīrti's view did not have this support.¹⁵

Universals for Dignāga can also be unexemplified, for instance, the universal 'being permanent' was thought to be empty by a school of Buddhists, whose interests Dignāga was keen to defend, as was the shared feature *ātmatvam* (being a self).¹⁶ The theory that shared features are the basis for naming objects was shaped by reinterpretation of the earlier dictum that "the activity of naming does not obtain without a *nimitta*" (*nānimittā hi śabdasya pravṛtṭih*) – in fact, Dignāga in Muni Jambuvijaya's reconstruction, invokes a variation of that dictum.¹⁷ Shared features, as delineated by Dignāga, inherit many of the characteristics of Bhartṛhari's universals. They cut across the categories of nouns, verbs, proper names, quality names and secondary derivations.¹⁸

The techniques developed by Bhartṛhari in the context of universals and subsumed in Dignāga's theory of shared features (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), can be summed up as follows:

1. Shared features are the basis on which objects are named. This parallels Bhartṛhari's requirements that objects are named on the basis of universals.

2. Shared features, in the manner of Bhartṛhari's universals, make incomplete expression like verbs denotable.¹⁹
3. Reference to individuals is through demonstratives.

Shared features reside in a multiplicity of objects (*anekavṛtti hi sāmānyam*)²⁰ and names formed on their basis have multiple denotation. Dignāga's system had no provisions for names that denote single objects. Confronted with proper names Dignāga argued that if an intrinsic feature were to become the basis of a name no object could be named without deviation (*vyabhicāra*); for each individual on each occasion would require a new name since no two individuals are exactly alike.²¹

All reference to an individual is, therefore, through demonstratives: 'this' or 'here'. Dignāga's theory of the demonstrative was heavily influenced by Bhartṛhari's but partially opposed to it. For Bhartṛhari a demonstrative could refer to imaginary space, for his universe was a universe of ideal objects.²² Dignāga's demonstrative, on the other hand, had reference only to physical space (*deśamātra*). Bhartṛhari had developed two views regarding demonstratives: according to the first view a demonstrative refers to its objects on the basis of a universal borrowed from the context of the sentence. According to the second view a demonstrative does not have this capacity to borrow from the context. Dignāga adapted the latter view. Dignāga's demonstrative referred to mere place, directly without the intervention of any universal.²³

In summary:

1. Names denote objects on the basis of shared features.
2. What is denoted by a name on the basis of a shared feature is neither an intrinsic feature (*svalakṣaṇa*) nor a shared feature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), but objects which are members of a class.
3. Names have multiple denotation.
4. Demonstratives are the only mode of singular denotation.
5. Two or more names can denote the same objects.²⁴

The private world of the perceiving mind is made public through the mechanism of language; specifically through the mechanism of shared features or universals which allow classes of individuals to be denoted. However, names carry existential commitments to individuals denoted on the basis of shared features: from blueness to a class of individuals which are blue, from cowness to various kinds of cows. Thus the private world in becoming public is compromised, its ontological content 'exceeded over'. To get rid of this excess is the *raison d'être* of the *apoha*

operation. To get rid of the excess is to meet the requirement of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, it is also to fulfil the vision of the *Upādāya-prajñaptiprakaraṇa*.

ii

In order to cope with this unwanted entification of relations and abstract individuals, Dignāga formulated a new theory of negation called *apoha*. The new theory had the same intent as the negation Nāgārjuna had described in the VV, a negation which carried with it a freedom to deny without becoming entangled in ontological commitments.²⁵ Bhartṛhari had found no basis in language for this type of negation.²⁶ All negation, according to Bhartṛhari, required commitment to a world of possible objects, because a sentence and its negation carry the same commitment to ideal entities.

Dignāga's *apoha* negation operated on names. His theory can be reconstructed by a set of rules governing names (H) and their *apoha* negations (nonH):

1. H denotes some related class of objects.
2. There is a shared feature (*sāmānya*) Hness.
3. The class of objects denoted by H is non-empty.²⁷
4. The denotation of the name nonH is the complement of the denotation of H.
5. nonH does not share the existential or relational commitment of H.
6. nonH can be an empty name.²⁸

Bhartṛhari's doctrine, that a name designates a class of individuals related in terms of compatible and incompatible co-inherence, had broken with the atomicity condition on non-derived names (see n.III.31). Dignāga's *apoha* negation, which I have interpreted as combining a negating function with a deleting one in Chapter III.iii, restores the terms of the original conception. According to this theory any doubly negated name, nonnonH, connotes the same property as H without being committed to the existential features, to a class of ideal and actual Hbearers. The doubly negated name suspends all the existential features associated with the name. Because relations are signified as properties of their bearers, the operation also dispenses with them.

Demonstratives do not have any such commitments. Each denotes

its object directly.²⁹ The technique of *apoha* thus allows Dignāga freedom of communication without commitment to what he considered to be non-entities. The private world of the perceiving mind can allow language a foothold without metaphysical compromise.

On the basis of this analysis of *apoha*-negation, Dignāga's statement that language is not different from inference, that, "it expresses its own object by excluding what is other" (trPS5.1: *svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate*), is given additional content and some of the problems posed in the context of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine by his opponents, are solved.

Two problems have been posed in connection with Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine:

1. In the sentence *svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* ("it expresses its own object by excluding what is other") what does the phrase "own object" refer to? In Mallavādin's words "What is this own object (*kaḥ svārthah*)?"
2. Why should the *apoha*-negation apply to everything but not to "its own object". Or, in Simhasūri's words: *anyasyāpoha na svasyārthasya*.³¹

The *svārtha* is the object denoted by the demonstrative, the object in space. And it is immune to *apoha* negation because the demonstrative does not denote its object through a shared property, but does so directly. Not being committed to the existence of any abstract property, it is not subjected to any operation. The demonstrative is a unique device in that it can denote without resorting to any conceptual ground. I am tempted here to quote the judicious remark made by Mallavādin's commentator: "the mere phrase, 'the exclusion of objects (denoted) by other words' (*śabdāntarāpohamātrokti*), [without the additional phrase, '*svārtha*' (its own objects)] is a fault 'apprehending the unreal' (*doṣo 'sattvaprapṛtiḥ*)".³²

iii

Having described Dignāga's theory of names and his techniques for de-entifying names, I shall now explicate the logical form of the sentences that enter into his system. Some aspects of Dignāga's analysis of singular sentences with demonstrative subjects have already been described in the preceding section. A few preliminary remarks concerning universal sentences would, therefore, be in order.

A universal sentence, according to the PS, expresses a relationship between two classes. This follows from Dignāga's theory of names. All names have an associated property and denote a class of objects. The sentence, 'Whatever is the result of effort is impermanent' asserts a relationship between two classes of individuals, defined by two properties, 'being the result of effort' and 'being impermanent'.

The kind of relation which underpins a universal sentence was a matter of minute concern for Dignāga. The Vaiśeṣikas had proposed a variety of relations that hold between entities in a universal sentence. Inherence had been listed among the proposed relations. Bhartṛhari had proposed that inherence relations be posited as innate features of the understanding.³³ Dignāga rejected these relations as unsuited to his nominalism and to his reductive aspirations. In a detailed examination he undermined the Vaiśeṣika relations and inference based on them.³⁴


If one were to distinguish necessary truths from contingent ones, and grade relations according to their degree of strength and degree of participation by mind as: those based on necessary connections (*tādātmya*), those based on causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) and those based on nothing more than an absence of counterexamples, then Dignāga's universal sentences would be underpinned by the last and weakest of these relations. His universal sentences were contingent statements which posited invariant relationships in space and time between entities.³⁵

Dignāga held that the relation he had defined was the necessary condition of inference and that it was, unlike so many of the Vaiśeṣika relations, asymmetrical.³⁶ These claims cannot be explicated unless the underlying character of the relations between names as conceived by Dignāga is described. For the purposes of the exposition I shall adapt a system of diagrammatic representation whose function will be to display the truth conditions of the various forms of sentences. These truth conditions combine requirements introduced through Dignāga's theory of names with requirements resulting from relations between names. On the basis of the division of Dignāga's language into names and demonstratives (see Section ii), a circle will represent the objects denoted by a name, a circle with a cross will represent an object denoted by a non-empty name, a square placed around the letter will indicate the property commitment of a name, a shaded dot will indicate a demonstrative. The notation is adapted from D.P. Henry's *Medieval Logic and Metaphysics*, Hutchinson and Co., London, 1972.

The following kinds of sentences, based on the relations between names, empty names and demonstratives, were recognized by Dignāga:


An *A* sentence (All Hs are Ss) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is a name and the grammatical predicate is also a name and in which the denotation of the grammatical subject is to be included within the denotation of the grammatical predicate.

The truth conditions for A sentences can be presented diagrammatically:




An *I* sentence (Some Hs are Ss) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is a name and the grammatical predicate is also a name and in which the denotation of the grammatical subject is to overlap with the denotation of grammatical predicate.

The truth conditions for I sentences can be represented diagrammatically:




A *D* sentence (this is an H) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is a demonstrative and the grammatical predicate is a name and the denotation of the demonstrative is to be included in the denotation of the grammatical predicate.

The truth conditions for such a statement can be represented diagrammatically:




An *E* sentence (All Hs are non Ss) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject and predicate are a name, the denotation of the grammatical subject is to be excluded from the denotation of the grammatical predicate.

The truth conditions for such a statement can be represented diagrammatically:




A *contraposed A* sentence (All nonSs are nonHs) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is the negation of the grammatical predicate of an A sentence and the grammatical predicate is the negation of the grammatical subject of an A sentence: the sentence has the same logical requirements as an A sentence, without its existential features.

The truth conditions for such a sentence can be represented diagrammatically as follows:




A *negated D* sentence (this is a nonH) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is a demonstrative and the grammatical predicate is a name. The denotation of the demonstrative is to be excluded from the denotation of the name.

The truth requirements for such a statement can be represented diagrammatically as:



A doubly negated *D* (this is a nonnonH) is a sentence in which the grammatical subject is a demonstrative and the grammatical predicate is a name. The denotation of the subject is to be included within the denotation of the predicate.

The truth conditions for such a statement can be represented diagrammatically as:



These diagrams make very clear the consequences of Dignāga's theory of negation. Since existential commitments are not inherited under contraposition, a contraposed A-sentence is only partially equivalent to its non-contraposed counterpart. From the truth-conditions it follows that 'All Hs are Ss' implies 'All nonSs are nonHs', but that 'All nonSs are nonHs' does not imply that 'All Hs are Ss'. This reconstruction of Dignāga's theory of contraposition accords very well with Dignāga's contention: "... even if the opponent does not admit the existence [of the negative Reason such as the] ether, as a real substance, still the heterogeneous example is sufficient to show that, were the *probandum* absent, the absence of the reason would be necessarily proved". And also, "... if the two properties of sound (viz. its non-eternity and its quality of being a product), are equally admitted (by either disputant), then it is not necessary to formulate both examples; and also (the same thing happens), when by the mere internal evidence of the argument itself (*arthāpatti*) one single example is sufficient to declare both".³⁷ Conversely, given the contraposed universal statement its non-contraposed version is not automatically forthcoming. In fact, Dignāga defined a fallacy to correspond to the violation of this condition.³⁸

iv

Dignāga had formulated his argument from a stock pattern that had its origins in the traditions of debate. It was a pattern of argument shared by various schools; debate among philosophers in 5th and 6th century

India was still a flourishing institution. Dignāga's attachment to the pattern of the earlier argument can perhaps be attributed to a need to preserve, for the sake of debate, a shared vocabulary.

The following pair of stock arguments can be traced to Vātsyāyana, a not-too-distant predecessor of Dignāga's.

Sound is impermanent,
because it is a product
Whatever is a product is impermanent
like a plate

and

Sound is impermanent,
because it is a product.
Whatever is not a product is not impermanent
like the sky.

It is not clear if Vātsyāyana meant the arguments to be taken separately; Uddyotakara pointed out that the two were merely different applications of the same reason.³⁹ Among debaters the first step: 'Sound is impermanent', was a statement of intention, of what it was that the debater intended to prove. The second step set forth the Reason (*hetu*) which supported the claim. The third step elaborated the claim on the basis of experience. The success or failure of an argument depended on the ability of the opponent to produce counterexamples to the universal statement⁴⁰

Dignāga re-interpreted the elements which comprise the argument by stipulating stricter rules for adjudicating the acceptability of the argument. He also took the argument outside the context of debate and read into it a wider, more metaphysical, significance. As the link between the argument and debate grew more tenuous, the stock-in-trade of debaters, the tricks, futile rejoinders and diversionary tactics, which were part of the heritage of the older Nyāya system, found no echo in his thought. It is under his influence that the usually combative Uddyotakara wrote⁴¹

A complete knowledge of debate and such like, which has a basis in passion and pride, can have no connection with the highest good, according to some.

Acceptability for Dignāga, as for his forebears, was not a purely formal consideration:⁴²

When the Nyāya method of assessing inference in practice is carefully studied it becomes quite apparent that the assessment of "validity" is a matter, not of comparing the inference

with abstract models to see if it instantiates one of "the valid forms of inferences", but rather of trying to detect subtle errors in the adducing of evidence for the constituent judgments.

Complex factors enter into Dignāga's conception of error. He was concerned with the material as well as the formal conditions of truth. He was also wary of the ontological commitments that might result as a by-product of his use in the argument of universal sentences. And given his conception of ultimate reality as the non-conceptual presentations of the senses, the positing of abstract entities was regarded by him as subtle forms of error. His rules for adjudicating arguments show his awareness that the measures required to eliminate error from singular sentences are different from those required for universal sentences. He was also the first to realize that the validity of an argument depended on rules and, therefore, on entirely different considerations. Accordingly he specified the forms of sentence allowed into arguments in the following way:

1. The statement of the object of proof is a D-sentence. (This is a P): 'This is impermanent'.
2. The statement of the reason (*hetu*) in support of the intention is also a D-sentence. (This is H): 'This is a product'.
3. The universal statement is an A-sentence. (All Hs are Ss): 'Whatever is a product is impermanent'.
4. The second universal statement is a properly contraposed A-sentence. (All nonSs are nonHs): 'Whatever is not impermanent is not a product'.⁴³


Dignāga then defined a *similar instance class* (*sapakṣa* or *tattulya*) as the domain consisting of those individuals that have S. The *dissimilar instance class* (*vipakṣa*) was defined as the complement of that class, nonS. Between them the S and the nonS exhaust the universe of discourse.⁴⁴ The reason (*hetu*) consists of those individuals that have H.

On the basis of the above, the example which instantiates the universal sentences (the *udāharaṇa* or *drṣṭānta*) was, for the first time, separated from the classes of which they were members. A similar instance separated from the classes of which they were members. A similar instance (*sādharmya drṣṭānta*) is an individual which instantiates the A-sentence and a dissimilar instance (*vaidharmya drṣṭānta*) is one which instantiates the contraposed A. The former is drawn from the intersection of H and S, and the latter is drawn from the intersection of nonS and nonH. Finally, the *pakṣa* (or alternately the *anumeya*) is the grammatical subject of what is to be proved.


Dignāga then formulated three rules, the *Trairūpya*, for adjudicating the validity of an argument. They were distribution rules for the *hetu*, and were formulated as:

- I. Presence in the *Pakṣa* (*anumeye sadbhāvaḥ*)
- II. Presence in the *Sapakṣa* (*tattulye sadbhāvaḥ*)
- III. Absence in the *Vipakṣa* (*nāstitā'sati*).⁴⁵


On the basis of the notation that has been introduced so far the rules of the *Trairūpya* can be described as:



Rule I. Presence (of H) 'here'
[atra] *anumeye sadbhāvaḥ*




Rule II. Presence (of H) in S
tattulye sadbhāvaḥ




Rule III. Absence (of H) from
nonS *nāstitā'sati*

Rule III has been interpreted as free from existential commitment.⁴⁶ The reader can verify that the diagram given for Rule III is exactly equivalent to the truth conditions for a contraposed A-sentence (All nonSs are nonHs).

These diagrams make it clear that Rules II and III together have the following combined effect:



Uddyotakara criticized the *Trairūpya* for being ambiguous,⁴⁷ especially in the formulation of Dignāga's relations *sadbhāva*; but this criticism seems to have been based on a misunderstanding. It is true that there are two different subcases under Rule II:



Dignāga recognized these as distinct subcases, and based on them two different patterns of argument, but this does not show that his rules were ambiguous. Given the two possible ways in which the reason (H) can be distributed in the *sapakṣa* (S), two patterns of argument are adjudicated by the *Trairūpya*.⁴⁸ An argument of the first pattern, concerning sound, is:

This is impermanent,
because it is a product.
Everything which is a product is impermanent,
like a pot.
Everything which is not impermanent is not a product,
like sky (this exemplification is optional).⁴⁹

This pattern corresponds to I, II.1 and III in the diagram. An argument of the second pattern, concerning sound, is:

This is impermanent,
because it is the result of effort.
Everything which is the result of effort is impermanent,
like a pot and lightning.
Everything which is not impermanent is not the result of effort,
like sky (this can be omitted).

This pattern corresponds to I, II.2 and III in the diagram. These arguments illustrate the forms:⁵⁰

This is an H,
because it is an S.
Every H is an S, like a pot
Every nonS is a nonH. . .

This is an H,
because it is an S.
Every H is an S, like pot and lightning.
Every nonS is a nonH. . .

The three rules, as I have interpreted them, have the effect of suspending all existential commitments. The commitments associated with *H* and *S* become suspended through contraposition. Since the demonstrative has no associated universal, the argument goes through without any existential commitments.

In the second pattern of argument the two examples, pot and lightning, indicate that the denotation of the *sapakṣa* and the denotation of the *hetu* are not identical. Lightning is an instance of something which is impermanent but is not the product of effort. Lightning is, therefore, an indication that the denotation of the *sapakṣa* is wider than the denotation of the *hetu*. My description of the relation between the *hetu* and the *sapakṣa* through diagram II.2 reflects this relation. The first argument, which is instantiated by the single instance pot, indicates that the denotation of the *hetu* and the *sapakṣa* coincide. This is reflected in diagram II.1.

The instantiation requirement had wider implications for Dignāga's system besides showing the manner in which the *sapakṣa* relates to the *hetu*. The procedure plays a role in the verifiability of universal sentences, and in determining the relative extension of classes.

In the first chapter of this essay I described the complex intentions behind the formulation of Dignāga's logic. His argument was formulated so that formal aspects of truth as well as material aspects of truth were preserved. Dignāga's concern with material truth involved his argument in questions of verification. The truth or falsity of any singular sentence is immediately verifiable when the subject is a demonstrative of immediate space/time, the verification of universal sentences is a much more complicated affair.

A universal affirmative statement (what I have defined as an A statement in Section ii) and a contraposed A both figure in Dignāga's argument.

Dignāga formulated a procedure for establishing the verifiability of universal sentences. As a condition on the acceptability of an argument Dignāga laid down two conditions: Rule III stipulates that the intersection of the *vipakṣa* (nonS) and the *hetu* be empty. This condition ensures the truth of the invariance posited by the A-sentence (the non-existence of counterexamples),⁵¹ unless the names participating in the invariance turn out to be empty. The rule does not disallow sentences of the following kind: 'rabbits' horns are dull', to which there are no counterexamples. Dignāga therefore laid down another condition in Rule II.

Rule II stipulates that the intersection of the *sapakṣa* (S) with the *hetu* (H) be instantiated by an object drawn from a universe of discourse acceptable to both parties in the debate. This condition has wide-ranging consequences: it rules out of court those arguments where the *hetu* does not have plural denotation, and guarantees only those arguments where the *hetu* and the *sādhyadharma* are spatio-temporal.

Corresponding with violations of the instantiation condition for the *sapakṣa*, Dignāga defined a fallacy which he called 'too narrow' (*asādhārana*).⁵² An unfortunate aspect of the requirement that the *sapakṣa* be instantiated is that it rules out any *hetu* whose denotation coincides with the denotation of the *pakṣa*, even where the *hetu* and the *pakṣa* happen to be spatio-temporal entities. The following is a case in point:

This (the moon) is impermanent,
because it is earth's natural satellite.
Everything which is earth's natural satellite
is impermanent.
like . . .
everything which is not impermanent
is not earth's natural satellite,
like sky.

Dignāga was prepared to sacrifice a whole class of perfectly acceptable arguments. This may have been because he had seen the awkward consequences that the requirement would have on the Vaiśeṣika system. Criticising the definition of the Vaiśeṣika fallacy called 'doubtful' (*sandigdha*) on the ground that the definition was too narrow, Dignāga recommended that the definition be enlarged to include audibility (*śravanatva*) as a sign of sound.⁵³

The recommendation is a trap set up for the Vaiśeṣikas, for a great deal of early Vaiśeṣika metaphysics depends on the violation of just such a condition. It is the relation of inherence, for instance, together

with fact that the property of sound belongs uniquely in ether that secure the unseen substance ether in the early metaphysics. Given that sound is a quality (*guṇa*), it must reside in some substance: it cannot reside in an internal substance because it is perceived through an external sense. After eliminating the other eight substances, it is decided that sound is a property of ether whose existence is then postulated.⁵⁴ To have accepted Dignāga's condition on the *sapakṣa* would automatically have ruled this argument out, for the force of the argument depends upon sound being a unique property of ether.

Apart from any polemical satisfaction garnered from this requirement, it suited Dignāga's metaphysical purposes, for it enabled him to restrict the universe of discourse to entities exemplified in space and time. Once the universe of discourse is restricted to entities exemplified in space and time, the reductive intent behind the formulation of the argument is brought into prominence. Every name and every shared feature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) which forms the ground (*nimitta*) of the name is demonstrated, in the argument, to have a spatio-temporal exemplification. Arguments with empty names are automatically rejected for lack of exemplification. All other commitments are suspended under the *apoha* operation drawn into the *Trairūpya*.⁵⁶ Demonstratives, the only elements immune to *apoha* negation, carry no property commitments. Their direct target is a point in space/time.

Dignāga's argument, which to Randle appeared as a dense and "untidy" organism, appears under the present reconstruction as a complicated and functional organism. In it older, primitive aspects like the mechanism of instantiating (*udāharana*) are transformed to accommodate verification requirements for universal sentences. The seemingly redundant dual premises (the contraposed A and its non-contraposed version) represent a reductive function, the suspension of undesirable entification. In the system, the truth conditions for demonstrative sentences are set apart from the truth conditions for universal sentences and also from the conditions for acceptability of arguments.

Dignāga was the first philosopher in India to validate arguments on the basis of a denotational analysis of names. True, the patterns of argument that Dignāga discussed were far fewer than possible, given the relations between names that he had identified. The entire range of arguments explored in the Aristotelian syllogistic is potentially available on the basis of Dignāga's relations even though he drew out only one general pattern of argument (the DAD) on this basis (see Chi, 1969). I am not aware of any of Dignāga's opponents having drawn out the full conse-

quences of his relations. Uddyotakara, his most able opponent, confined himself to tailoring these requirements to suit the native genius of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

V

Having in a previous section given an exposition of the reductionist ideal embodied in Dignāga's argument, my concern in this section is to uncover the constructionist uses to which Dignāga put the same argument.

Bhartrhari had focused attention on a whole field of conceptual implications which he had held were *a priori* in language. In pointing out the following facts, and in recommending the following theoretical moves, in order to account for the facts he had pointed out, Bhartrhari had reshaped earlier grammatical theory. First, Bhartrhari had pointed out that names are not atomic but related to other names on the basis of their analytic and antonymic content. He had recommended that the occasioning ground for the use of names be relocated in universals belonging in names (*śabdajāti*).⁵⁷ He had conceived of these universals in terms of a hierarchical pattern over which family relations could be defined.⁵⁸ He had then suggested that the antonymic and analytic content of names be defined over this hierarchy in terms of compatible co-inherence and incompatible co-inherence. He had pointed out that the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*), signified in such compounds as *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* and *kṛṣṇatila*, is a sentential affair that cannot be encompassed by a mere quality (*guṇa*). He had then recommended that a full-blown sentential object "qualified by all its qualifiers" be given *a priori* in language.⁵⁹ Bhartrhari's hierarchy, as a result of these two separate theoretical moves, had emerged somewhat disorganized. The family lines, defined over universals organized hierarchically, had become crossed when the *a priori* object, the centre of a cluster of universals, had been introduced.

I have already in Chapter III described Dignāga's critique of this conception.⁶⁰ My concern is now to contrast Bhartrhari's conception with Dignāga's. Whereas Bhartrhari's hierarchy had been an *a priori* structure composed of universals, Dignāga's constructed hierarchy was an empirical structure of classes of individuals. And whereas Bhartrhari's hierarchy had become confused as a result of introducing the *a priori* object, Dignāga's kept its clear lines by renouncing the *a priori* object. And whereas Bhartrhari could only define two relations over the hier-

archy: compatible and incompatible co-inherence, Dignāga defined three and managed to give an analysis of the *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa*, an analysis which I have implied, influenced Kaiyaṭa's gloss on the MB.⁶¹

In this way Dignāga tried to reverse the steps Bhartrhari had taken away from Kātyāyana's theory of names by showing that an alternative manner of accounting for the same facts that had dictated Bhartrhari's theoretical moves was indeed available. This alternative account kept the terms of Kātyāyana's earlier theory and maintained that names are given to individuals on the basis of a spatio-temporal quality (*guṇa*), but gave a uniform interpretation to the quality. It accounted for the relation between names by constructing a hierarchy on the basis of concomitances in nature, but defined an operation to delete the name's relational content. It thus adhered to the conditions governing the use of the nominative.⁶² In this way Dignāga fulfilled the seemingly unreconcilable ideals drawn from sources in Kātyāyana and Bhartrhari: names are given on the basis of a quality, a uniform application of names requires a uniform basis of application; names, prior to compounding, are unrelated; an account of the qualifier-qualificand relation can be given on the basis of relations obtaining between names.

My sources for the above is a fragment in which Dignāga described *Naming For One's Self*.⁶³ It purports to show how the relation between names and their spatio-temporal bearers can be taught. The fragment does not describe a primitive first act of naming that might be performed by primaeval man or God. It describes a process whereby various types of relations between spatio-temporal properties and their names can be established. The reasoning has the following form:

This is a cow/ox (*gaur*)

because of a hump and dewlap

All things with humps and dewlaps are cows/oxen, e.g. Śābaleya

All things which are not cows/oxen do not have humps and dewlaps.


Dignāga argued that the basis of the argument is the exemplification condition on the *sapakṣa* and the absence of deviance or counter-examples in the *vipakṣa*. He went on to admit that an argument based solely upon an examination of the *sapakṣa* (i.e. the class of individuals which exemplify the *sādhyadharma*) would fall short of a guaranteed proof, because the class can have an infinite number of objects, well beyond the reach of experience. However, Dignāga held that the absence of counterexamples (or of anything which had the *sādhyadharma* but lacked the *hetu*) in the *vipakṣa*, was sufficient to guarantee the argument.⁶⁴

Dignāga felt that a series of arguments of this type could be generated in the same way. For instance,

This is an earth substance,
Because it is a tree.
Everything which is a tree is an earth substance, e.g. a palāśa.
Everything which is not an earth substance is not a tree.

On the basis of arguments of this sort Dignāga sought to reconstruct the hierarchy that Bhartṛhari had maintained was given *a priori* in language. His insistence on exploring the denotation of the *hetu* vis-à-vis the denotation of the *sapakṣa* (see diagram II.1 and II.2) probably had something to do with this concern to establish a hierarchical ordering of class inclusion. He felt that the existence or otherwise of counterexamples was sufficient to decide whether two classes of individuals were congruent with each other, whether one was included in the other, and whether they had a common denominator.

In terms of his constructed hierarchy Dignāga defined three relations: *nīścaya*, *saṁśaya* and *virodha*. These relations can be illustrated with reference to a diagram:



Knowable objects have the largest denotation; the class of knowable objects contains everything. This class divides into two subclasses, the class of existing objects and the class of non-existent objects. These, in turn, divide into other classes until finally the individual comprising

the sum of its qualities (*sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭo dharmin*) is reached. Within this hierarchy the three relations of certainty (*nīścaya*), exclusion (*virodha*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*) can be identified. The upward direction in the hierarchy represents class-inclusion (*nīścaya*): any class is a subclass of each class which dominates it as in the illustration:

lotus is included in flower
flower is included in earth substance.

This supports universal statements (*vyāpti*). Given that 'all lotuses are flowers' and given that 'this is a lotus' it follows that 'this is a flower', and so forth.

The horizontal direction represents class-exclusion (*virodha*): any two classes immediately dominated by some class, have no members in common. This can be illustrated on the basis of the diagram:

earth substance excludes wind substance
lotus excludes china rose
red lotus excludes blue lotus, etc.

This supports a second pattern of inference: given that an object is a red lotus it follows that it is not a blue lotus, etc.

The downward direction in the hierarchy represents doubt (*saṁśaya*): any class in the hierarchy overlaps or may overlap each of the classes it dominates. On the basis of the illustration:

earth substance overlaps or may overlap red lotuses.
lotuses overlap or may overlap blue lotuses, etc.

The downward direction supports a form of doubt rather than inference. Given that an object is a lotus there is doubt as to whether it is a red lotus or a blue lotus. When the subclasses can be enumerated, they can support an inference by alternation. Given that an object is an earth substance it follows that it is a tree or a flower; given that it is a lotus it follows that it is a blue lotus or a red lotus, and so forth.

Dignāga also offered an account of the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) in terms of his empirically established hierarchy of classes. According to him two words combine together in a qualifier-qualificand relation if the doubts of one are resolved by the doubts of the other.⁶⁵ The word 'red' has doubts with regard to various sub-classes of objects, while the word lotus has doubts with regard to others. Because they remove each other's doubt they can combine in a sentence or compound (*nīlotpala*, this is a blue lotus or *raktotpala*, this is a red lotus). Even

where the relation is not of mutual doubt, but doubt on the part of one and certainty on the part of the other, as is the case between names such as *śiṃśapā* and *vrkṣa* or Keśava and *brāhmaṇa*, they can still become related in a sentence as qualifier and qualificand; whereas names cannot in general be combined which cut across lines of doubt and certainty. Thus words which denote exactly the same objects (*vrkṣa* and *taru*) cannot combine nor words which are not related through pervasion (*surabhi* and *madhura* or *utpala* and *vrkṣa*).⁶⁶

In order to ensure that the rules governing the use of the nominative are not violated so that the compound *śiṃśapāvrkṣa* is capable of being analysed as *śiṃśapā cāsau vrkṣaḥ*, Dignāga proposed that names be subjected to the *apoha* operation.⁶⁷ Without the operation the qualifier-qualificand relation would emerge at the level of names and thus violate the condition that names in the nominative signify the base, not a relation. The two names *vrkṣa* (tree) and *śiṃśapā* (rosewood), each of which designate classes of individuals, are emptied of their denotational content and in the process of their relational content, by means of the deletion procedure which is an aspect of the *apoha*-operation. The names retain the possibility of designating the individuals on the basis of their connotational content, but no longer actually designate them. Thus the condition on the use of the nominative is preserved. Names regain their atomicity, they are alone (*kevala*), free like untethered crows to alight upon a range of objects, in tandem with demonstratives. In a compound two names designate the same object, again in tandem with a demonstrative.⁶⁸

On the basis of the above analysis, Dignāga proposed a solution to *śiṃśapāvrkṣa*, the compound that had not been mentioned by Bhartṛhari in the context of his analysis of compounds that signify the qualifier-qualificand relation. These compounds are composed of names which designate individuals (see Ch.II.iv). Dignāga's solution is meant to address the query raised by Patañjali: why *śiṃśapāvrkṣa* and not *vrkṣa-śiṃśapā* (see Ch.II.v)?

Dignāga proposed the following solution. In those cases where the extension of a name is included in the extension of another, (in Dignāga's extension of a name is included in the extension of another, (in Dignāga's vocabulary, has certainty rather than doubt), then the name with the wider extension becomes the qualified and the one with the narrower extension is the qualifier. Thus *vrkṣa*, being the wider class which includes *śiṃśapā*, will continue to occupy the position of the qualified and remain the latter member of the compound. This solution was adopted by Kaiyata in his remarks in the MB explicating *śiṃśapāvrkṣa* (see Ch.II.v).

The solution proposed by Dignāga does not carry over systematically into *nīlotpala* where the name *nīla* (blue) can include (or have doubts) with respect to *utpala* (lotus) and the *utpala* can also have doubts with respect to *nīla* (blue). Dignāga admitted that in these cases there is no hard and fast distinction between what is the qualifier and what is the qualified; one could just as well say 'the blue of the lotus' as 'the lotus-ness of the blue' (cf.n.IV.74).⁶⁹

That Dignāga's conception of the qualifier-qualificand relation is extremely fluid, is evident in his analysis of the basic name-giving sentence, 'this has H', where H is a name (see Ch.III.ii). Here the object of the demonstrative is a member of the class designated by the name H, the latter has a wider extension and yet it is called a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*, see Ch.III.ii also trK).

Dignāga argued against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition which considered the categories of substance and quality to be fixed. In a surviving fragment from a lost work he described the qualifier-qualificand relationship as having been imposed by the mind (*buddhyāruḍha*) and therefore as being neither 'real' or 'unreal' in the external world (*na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate*).⁷⁰ The relation, according to this account, is not fixed because whatever can be regarded as a property can be regarded as a substance, and vice versa. The sentence, 'sound is permanent' (*anītyaḥ śabdaḥ*) can be expressed as, 'the impermanence of sound' (*śabdasyānītyatvam*) as well as 'the soundness of the impermanent' (*anītyasya śabdatvam*).⁷¹ Between the extremes of regarding the qualifier-qualificand relationship as part of an innate structure of the mind and as part of the given nature of the world, Dignāga trod the middle part. He attempted to build it on the foundation of an empirically determined hierarchy of classes.

vi

I have thus addressed myself to the question which has puzzled scholars from the very early stages of research on Dignāga: how logic could have had its beginning in an idealistic system. In 1903, to de La Vallée Poussin, it seemed:⁷²

c'est une chose étrange que la logique de Dignāga, et de Dharmakīrti ait été élaborée par des idéalistes extrêmes.

In 1926 Randle quoted an opinion of Keith's as to the origins of the theory of *avinābhāva* and went on to state his and the Naiyāyika's position:⁷³

A priori, therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that Praśastapāda owes the Principle (indissoluble connection) "to a school in which it had a natural right to exist". The fact is that the Naiyāyika, so far from admitting that the principle has a natural right to exist in an idealistic system emphatically denies that such a system has any right to such an idea. And I think that there is no evidence that Dignāga himself bases his doctrine of indissoluble connection on his idealism.

The assumption behind de La Vallée Poussin's puzzle and Keith's *a priori* assertion, that a so-called idealistic system cannot have a theory of indissoluble connection (*avinābhāva*), has been explored by me through a more detailed exposition of Dignāga's so-called idealism, and through conjectures regarding the metaphysical purpose that such a logic might serve. Grounds for the puzzle exist; for logic in 5th and 6th century India was indeed a hand-maiden for the metaphysics. It is because I share the very same assumptions that I tried to pin down the relation between the *Trairūpya* and the metaphysics. I have tried to show that the *Trairūpya* has both a constructive as well as a reductive aspect. The constructive aspect of the *Trairūpya* provided Dignāga with a framework for constructing discursive knowledge out of the presentations of the senses, the reductive aspect annulled the entification of abstractions, a by-product of the constructive activity. The logic allowed Dignāga to confront Bhartṛhari's claim that only linguistic realities could account for our knowledge of the external world. This manner of interpreting the *Trairūpya* becomes available only if the reductive and constructive intentions underlining Dignāga's argument are uncovered. The fragment of language and thought sanctioned by the *Trairūpya* is that oasis of thought and language where the enlightened can tread without becoming committed to non-entities. Keith had felt that the origin of the relation of indissoluble connection should be traced to a school in which it has "a natural right to exist". I have tried to argue that the relation is only part of a complex empiricist purpose and has every "natural right to exist" in Dignāga's school.

As a prelude to the following chapter, I will end this one with a contrast.

Consider the following two passages:⁷⁴

"How does the negative reason determine its conclusion [lit. object]?" [Of the questioner it is in turn asked]: "The positive reason is accepted [by you] as determining its object. How does it do it?"

"The positive reason causes its conclusion to be conveyed through the agency of some positive connectedness." Then why should 'being the object of a means of knowledge' not be a reason? Since it is this [positive character] which distinguishes a positive reason [for you]?

Is it that it is not a reason because of the existence of counterexamples (*vyabhicāra*)? Then it is not the positive concomitance which is a conveyor [of the conclusion] but rather the absence of counter-examples."

The principle of invariable relatedness (*avinābhāvaniyama*) is regulated by causality or identity; never by perception or the absence of perception.

The first is an endorsement of Dignāga's empiricist basis for the concomitance (*vyāpti*); the latter invokes a higher principle of construction. The first is contingent; the second is necessary (*avaśyam*). The first is a quotation from Uddyotakara, Dignāga's opponent; the second is from Dharmakīrti, his commentator.

NOTES (Chapter Four)

IV.1. Frauwallner, 1959, p. 145.

*sarvākārāvirājitaṃ ādyantavibhāgarahitaṃ avikalpam /
nirmalasahasradhītinirbhinnatamisragaganam iva //*
svākāramātrāśeṣaṃ paśyati cittaṃ svam ādyanutpannam //

IV.2. NCIt. 101.14; Hattori, 1968 p.25C.

IV.3. NCIt. 101.15.101.1; Hattori, 1968 p.25C.

IV.4. NCIt. 105.5; Hattori, 1968 p.27.DC.

IV.5. See Ch. III. i.

IV.6. I take Dignāga's statement: *tatrānekārthajanyatvāt svārthe sāmānyagocaram* NCIt. 104; Hattori, 1968 n.1.40 and Dignāga's comment to the above: *anekadravyotpādyatvāt tat svāyatane sāmānyagocaram ity ucyate, na tu bhīnneṣv abhedakalpanāt* NCIt. 104.11; Hattori, 1968, n.1.41, as evidence of the idea of sensory presentations spread out in phenomenal space.

IV.7. For Dignāga the mystical is identified with the absence of objects; *Pinḍārtha* 26, Frauwallner, 1959 p.142: *sarvo jñeyatayārūḍha ākāraḥ kalpito matau. Yogāvatāra* 3A, Frauwallner, 1959 p.145: *jñeyam vilokya sakalam māyāgandharvanagaranirbhāsam*.

IV.8. Whether the external world exists or not had been a divisive issue for the Buddhists of the period. The desire to construct a neutral epistemology seems to have been a feature of Dignāga's as well as Dharmakīrti's thought. According to Professor Kitagawa Dignāga's *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*, for instance, is a synthesis of the philosophies of the Madhyamaka, the Yogācāra and the Vaibhāsika, which were divided on this issue (Kitagawa, 1965 p.436); See Malvania, 1955, p.xx-xxi.

IV.9. See Hattori, 1968, n.2.17. Though Dignāga might have held the view that there is *sārūpya* (coordination) between the cognition and the object in the *Alambanaparīkṣā*, by the time of the PS he had abandoned the notion in favour of the notion of direct denotation of the object on the basis of a shared feature (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*): *sāksād vṛttiḥ* cf. vP. 55.36; P. 55.6.

IV.10. Hattori, 1968 n.2. An anti-atomistic theme runs through Dignāga's works, from the early *Hastavālaprakaraṇa* (Frauwallner, 1959 p.128) *Alambanaparīkṣā* (Frauwallner, 1959 p.158.26-29); *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa* (Kitagawa, 1965 p.432); PS (NCIt. 116.2-8, 117.1-5; Hattori, 1968 pp.33.35).

accompaniment with the *sādhyā*, glossing *anugama* as *sarvatra gamanam* 'constant accompaniment': see PS4.2 and vrPS4.2 in NCItp.133–134 (quoted under n.V.7).

IV.36. See trvrPS2.31A, where *saṃyoga* (conjunction) is rejected on the ground of being asymmetrical.

IV.37. NMP.37 and NMP.41: see also n.IV.46.

IV.38. See n.IV.52 also n.IV.55.

IV.39. NB1.1.34 and 1.1.35. Uddyotakara's remark in NV.1.1.35 (NDp.538) may be taken as a criticism of Vātsyāyana: *anutpattidharmakam nityam dṛṣṭam ātmādaya iti bhāṣyam etat tu na samāñjasam iti paśyāmaḥ, prayogamātrabhedāt/* cf. Potter, 1977 p.245.

IV.40. See *Tarkaśāstram* (Tucci:1929), the text consists of a series of propositions offered, defended and/or shot down.

IV.41. NV1.1.1: *madamānādinimittatvād vādādiparijñānaṣya nābhisambandho nihśreyaseneti kecit/* (NDp.21).


IV.42. Potter, 1977 p.183.

IV.43. There is some textual support to show that Dignāga had given a correct theory of contraposition. In NM.p.37 he raises an objection against an earlier view of contraposition: 'Why did you first say that the reason is followed by the probandum, and then, in the second place, that whenever the probandum is absent, the reason also is absent? Why did you not say [on the contrary] that whenever the reason is absent there is no probandum?' See also NM.p.18: NCItp.134.2: *vaidharmyeṇa nityam aprayatanāntarīyakam dṛṣṭam [yathā] ākāśam iti/*


IV.44. Kitagawa, 1960: "*Sapakṣa*. That which is similar to the *pakṣa* in that it possesses the *sādhyā*. For example, when Indian logicians argue 'Sound is non-eternal, because of [its] nature of being a product', every entity that possesses the dharma non-eternality is of [its] nature of being a product', every entity that possesses the dharma non-eternality is the '*sapakṣa*'. " "*Vipakṣa*. That which is dissimilar to the *pakṣa* in that it does not possess the *sādhyā*. In the above example, every entity that does not possess the dharma non-eternality is the *vipakṣa*. " NM.p.18: "in fact every object can be an instance", every object is either a *sapakṣa* or a *vipakṣa*. See Chi, 1969 p.31.

IV.45. Randle Fragment E: *anumeye'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstītā'sati*. The *Trairūpya* is discussed by Chi, 1969 pp.30–40; by Potter, 1977 p.192.

IV.46. The third rule of the *Trairūpya* adjudicates arguments in which the *vipakṣa* is empty as well as arguments in which the *vipakṣa* is exemplified by something which exists within the *vipakṣa* (the nonS) and the negated *hetu* (nonH).



For Dignāga they were just variations on the same argument. What the rule rejects is:



Uddyotakara distinguished the two arguments. He stated the rule in which the *vipakṣa* is empty as: *avidyamāna vipakṣa*. When the *vipakṣa* is non-empty the rule was stated as: *vipakṣavyāvṛtti*. Uddyotakara's illustrations of the different kinds of arguments adjudicated by various distribution rules are given in NV.1.2.4.

IV.47. NV.1.1.5. Uddyotakara's criticism of the *Trairūpya* is analysed by Chi, 1968 p.31–35.

IV.48. Randle Fragment J.

"That which is present in the similar instance class in two ways and is absent in the dissimilar instance class is the [valid] *hetu*." (*tatra yāḥ san sajātīye dvedhā cāsaṃ tadatyaye sa hetuḥ. . .*)

IV.49. This follows from my analysis of Dignāga's negative names: they can be empty or non-empty. See Chapter III.iii. See also quotation from NM in n.IV.51; and n.III.31.

IV.50. NMP.27: "Sound is eternal, because a product (valid)". The argument is marked I (3). NMP.27: "Sound is eternal, because a product of some exertion (valid)". The argument is numbered II (7). See NV.1.2.4, where the first argument is described as: *sādhyataj-jātiyavyūpakṣo vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*. Uddyotakara distinguishes Dignāga's two cases (illustrated by II.1 and II.2), as *vyāpaka* (total pervasion) and *ekadeśāvṛtti* (partial presence). Dignāga did not give separate names to the two cases; see n.IV.49.

IV.51. See trvrPS2.31B–32A. In the following passage consequences of the *vipakṣa* being empty are explored: "*tadā sandeha eva nāsti tadabhāvāt tatrāvṛtteḥ/* (In that case there is no doubt. Since there is no dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*), a reason does not exist there; therefore. . .". Katsura, 1975, Fragment 12. The translation of the Fragment is Katsura's. He explains it thus, "For example, when someone argues with those who do not admit any eternal substance, it is impossible to prove that something is non-eternal because there is no valid Reason which possesses the third characteristic (i.e., absence from all dissimilar instances). To this Dignāga replies that such a doubt does not arise in this case, for since there is no dissimilar reason, the Reason (i.e. *kṛtakatva*) cannot be present in any dissimilar instance. Therefore we can prove that something is non-eternal following those who do not admit any eternal substance" (p.76). See also trPS5.34.

IV.52. Katsura, 1975, Fragment 9 also his fn.24 on p.77; see NM.pp.32–34; NC2p.663.fn.1.

IV.53. Vai.S.pp.199.13–17, 200.1, p.201.1.

IV.54. Vai.S.II.1.25: *paratra samavāyāt pratyakṣatvāc ca nātmaguṇo na manogunaḥ/* The aphorism eliminates an internal substratum for sound.

Vai.S.II.1.24: *kāranaguṇapūrvah kārye guṇo dṛṣṭaḥ, kāryāntarāprādurbhāvāc ca śabdah sparśavatām agunaḥ/* The aphorism eliminates those substances which are tangible from being the substrata of sound.

Vai.S.II.1.26 establishes ether as the substrata of sound.

IV.55. My conjecture is that Praśastapāda fell into the trap set up by Dignāga. He adopted the same rules as the *Trairūpya*, and defined a fallacy corresponding to Dignāga's fallacy *asādhāraṇa* (too narrow). Praśastapāda called his own *anadhyavasita* (PDp.593). He then would appear to have brought into jeopardy the status of all those Vaiśeṣika arguments which depended on the uniqueness condition. Under these circumstances Uddyotakara's argument in NV.1.1.35 takes on an added historical significance.

IV.56. See Ch.III.iii, where I explicate Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine in terms of deletion.

IV.57. See JS6.7–8 and Ch.II.iii.

IV.58. See Ch.II.iv.

IV.59. See Ch.II.v.

- IV.60. See Ch.III.iv.
 IV.61. See Ch.II.v. and n.II.99.
 IV.62. See Ch.II.v on the uses of the nominative, also n.II.91.
 IV.63. trPS5.34-35.
 IV.64. See Ch.V.i for Dharmakīrti's dissatisfaction with this argument.
 IV.65. See trPS5.14 and trvrPS5.14.
 IV.66. That synonymous pairs of words do not exclude each other is stated in vrPS5.25 and mentioned in the context of trPS5.34-36; see also trPS5.14.
 IV.67. On violating the rules governing the uses of the Nominative see Ch.II.v; n.II.91.
 IV.68. See trPS5.14; Ch.III.iii.
 IV.69. Even when the universal is multifarious, it is conveyed by the non-deviating individual; the qualifier-qualificandness of the two [names associated with the *śiṃṣapāvṛkṣa* type of *karmadhāraya* compound] are not the same (i.e. the relation is not symmetrical).
 Jinendrabuddhi's gloss: *vrkṣaḥ* has expectations for a deviating exclusion with respect to *śiṃṣapā*, and so on, therefore there is a qualifier-qualificand relation [with *vrkṣaḥ* as the locus of the relation]; *śiṃṣapā*, on the other hand, lacks a deviating expectation with respect to the universal of trees; therefore there is no qualifier-qualificand relation [located in *śiṃṣapā*]. Of two qualifiers, such as *nīlaḥ* (the blue) and *utpalah* (the lotus), which have deviating expectations the qualifier-qualificand relation is the same [i.e. either can be the qualifier or the qualificand].
*anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicārīṇā /
 upāttaṃ na tayos tulyā viśeṣanaviśeṣyatā ||* (PS5.27:NC2p.638)
 Jinendrabuddhi's gloss: *vrkṣaḥ śiṃṣapā*diivyabhicāravyavacchedam *apekṣata ity asti viśeṣa-
 ṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ śiṃṣapā tu vrkṣasāmānyāvyabhicāraṃ nāpekṣata iti nāsti/vyabhicārīṇor
 viśeṣanayos tu viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāvas tulyo yathā nīlotpalayoh ||* (NC2p.639)
 IV.70. Randle: Fragment II; vrSVPVlpp.2-3 also fn.1 on p.3. On Dharmakīrti's con-
 ception of the qualifier-qualificand relation see n.V.69; see also trK for Kumārila's criticism.
 IV.71. PS2.62:Vai.S.p.197.13-15:
*anityatvasya śabdaḥ, śabdasyānityatvaṃ, śabdo'nityaḥ' ity ete samudāyārthā vyava-
 vacchedaphalatvāt /*
 "The impermanence's sound, the sound's impermanence, sound is impermanent"
 these objects are designated by an aggregate (*samudāyārtha*), because they are the
 result of exclusion.
 IV.72. de La Vallée Poussin, 1903p.381 fn.2
 IV.73. Randle, 1926 p.54.
 IV.74. NV.1.1.35: *katham punar ayam avīto'rthaparicchedaka iti? atha yo' abhyamujñāto
 vīto'rthaparicchedakaḥ sa katham? vīto'nyayād iti cet? vīto hetur anvayena pratipādayati. atha
 prameyatvaṃ kasmān na hetuḥ, yady anvayasyaitat sāmānyam? vyabhicārāt prameyatvaṃ
 na hetuḥ? na tarhy anvayaḥ pratipādayati. My translation of *avyabhicāra*
 as absence of counterexamples is guided by my concern to sharply distinguish the relations
 which underpin a *vyāpti*.
*kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt /
 avinābhāvanīyamo'darśanān na na darśanāt ||* (SVPV31)*

TRANSLATIONS (Chapter Four)

The following translations from Dignāga's PS, Uddyotakara's NV, and Kumārila's SL.V form a set. They constitute the partial evidence for my hypothesis that the *dharmīn* (property bearer) in Dignāga's *anumeya* (object of inference), which is defined in the PS as '*dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeyaḥ*' (Hattori: Fragment 4), is a position in place (*deśa*) and the target of a demonstrative. The passages drawn from the works of Dignāga's major opponents, Kumārila and Uddyotakara, indicate their unanimous view that for Dignāga the grammatical subject of the conclusion and, therefore, of the *pakṣadharmā* (minor premise), is a demonstrative of place. The second point that I would like to stress is that for Dignāga the two sentences 'this is a lotus' and 'the lotus is blue' represent different levels of construction. The separate words in the first sentence denote their objects directly. The demonstrative denotes a singular object, while the grammatical predicate (lotus) denotes a plurality of objects. The qualifier-qualificand relation is built out of this basic sentence, it is not given.

Four stanzas* from Dignāga's PS preserved in Vācaspati's NVTT under NS 1.1.5 form the nucleus of the translation. The passage from Uddyotakara's NV translated next is, according to Vācaspati (NVTT, 1.1.5, NDP.320), an attack on these verses of Dignāga's. The translations from Kumārila's SL.V recall the debate between Dignāga and Uddyotakara. Kumārila's sympathies are with Uddyotakara. Uddyotakara and Kumārila attack Dignāga for his conception of the property bearer (*dharmīn*) as a point in space, and for holding that the subject and predicate which constitute the conclusion are related through a qualifier-qualificand relationship which is constructed, not given (see Ch.IV.v). For Kumārila and Uddyotakara reality is conceived of as a plurality of substances, and for them the qualifier-qualificand relationship is part of the given.

* The verses are translated by Randle (1926) and by H. Kitagawa in his notes, to which I had access.

trPS2.8-11

There are those who think that what is to be inferred is a property, because of the non-deviation of the sign [from it]. There are others who want it to be a relation [between them] on the ground that the property possessor as well as the property have already been established.

If the sign has already been established to be in the property what else remains to be inferred through the sign (lit., it)?

If it is the presence of the property in the property-bearer, then why not concede that this is the very thing which is the object to be inferred?

For in the relation the two (*relata*) are not [invariably] present, [if it were the relation which were the objects of inference] then that which has the relation (lit. it) would be expressed in the genitive [as: of this the relation of fire]. Being non-denotable and being grasped over [and over] again [with completely different relata] the relation cannot be connected [only] with the sign.

The last stanza is preceded by a remark of Vācaspati's:

The sign is not cognized as a property of its relata, rather as connected with place (*deśasaṃgatam*).

The non-deviation of the sign with its property which is seen elsewhere, Will in that place (*tatra*) cause the apprehension of the well-established property bearer as having a property.

*kecid dharmāntaram meyam lingasyāvyabhicārataḥ /
saṃbandhaṃ kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharmaṇoḥ* // (PS2.8)

*lingaṃ dharme prasiddhaṃ cet kim anyat tena mīyate /
atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva kīmarthaṃ nānumeyatā* // (PS2.9)

*saṃbandhe 'pi dvayaṃ nāsti śaṣṭhi śrūyeta tadvatī /
avācya 'nugrhitatvān na cāsau lingasaṃgataḥ* // (PS2.10)

na hi saṃbandhadharmatayā lingam pratīyate, api tu deśasaṃgatam ity arthaḥ /

*lingasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmenānyatra drśyate /
tatra prasiddhaṃ tadyuktaṃ dharmiṇaṃ gamayīṣyati* // (PS2.11)

The view expressed in verse PS2.10, that a relation is non-denotable (*avācya*), incomplete and that it does not have fixed relata (cf. *saṃbandhe dvayaṃ nāsti*) and that, because it is grasped over again (*anugrhitatvāt*) its meaning is contextual, can be traced to Bhartṛhari's description of its relations in VP III.3.8-11. I consider the phrase *prasiddho dharmin* (the relations in VP III.3.8-11. I consider the phrase *prasiddho dharmin* (the well-established property bearer) in trPS2.11 to be significant. In view of the fact that for Dignāga the *dharmin* (property bearer) is normally a construct, (see PS1.5) and in view of the fact that the word *prasiddha* is used in VP II. 26-268 to denote that object which is known immediately, in contrast to that knowledge which is *aprasiddha* mediated, requiring

effort, the phrase *prasiddho dharmin* I think signifies an object which is the direct target of the demonstrative (see pp.205-206), i.e. a point in space.

In trPS2.8 and trPS2.9 Dignāga combats earlier views: that the object of proof is a property and that it is a relation between the property and its bearer. Dignāga's *anumeya* is a sentence which has the form of a property bearer qualified by a property (*dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmy anumeyah*). In the second line of trPS5.11 the same conclusion is underlined. In trPS10 Dignāga states his objections to including a relation as part of the object of proof. He has the qualifier-qualificand relation in mind; his opponents interpret this statement to mean that the qualifier-qualificand relation is dispensable.

According to Vācaspati (ND p.320) the stanzas of Dignāga just quoted are attacked by Uddyotakara in the following:

trU

Others describe it in another manner as: by that very smoke that very fire is conveyed. What is this which is conveyed by smoke? Is it fire, or place, or existence or the place which has fire? [Among the alternatives] there [with regard to the first]: it is not fire which is being conveyed, because then the relation between a property and its bearer would not be forthcoming. Fire is not a property of smoke, nor is smoke a property of fire. And because fire is already known, fire (lit. it) is not what is to be inferred. This argument explains [why] existence and place [cannot be the objects of what is conveyed by fire], because the existence of fire and the place have already been cognized. Could what is to be proved be the place as having fire? No, because smoke is not its property. Perhaps this might be the case: the place which has fire is inferred on the basis of smoke? This is absolutely not so. Why? Because it is not its property. Smoke is not the property of the place which has fire. [An alternative suggestion, parodying the double negative style of Dignāga's]: It is not the case that the relation of fire merely with place is not cognized. 'This has fire', if this is what is meant [by the suggestion]? it is rejected because it is not seen. [Another suggestion]: A particular aspect of place is inferred by means of that [object] which has fire, not mere place. No, for him nothing is seen. He does not see a particular aspect of place. He merely mouths empty names [when he says] 'this place has fire'.

(anye punar anyathā varṇayanti / yathā tenaiva dhūmena tam evāgnim pratipadyate iti? / kim punar ayam dhūmena pratipadyate? kim agnim, uta deśam, uta sattām, utāgnimantaṃ deśam? tatra na tāvad agnim pratipadyate, dharmadharmaḥ bhāvānupapattē / nāgnir dhūmasya dharmah, na vāgnidharmo dhūmah / pratītatvāc cāgner nānumeyatvam asti / etena' sattā deśaś ca vyākhyātaḥ, agnisattāyāḥ pratītatvād deśasya ceti / agnimān deśa iti cet - na, dhūma-syātaddharmatvāt / athāpīdaṃ syāt agnimān deśo dhūmenānumīyate? tac ca naivam / kasmāt? ataddharmatvāt / na hi dhūmo 'gnimato deśasya dharmah / na cāgner deśamātrasaṃbandho na pratītaḥ / ayam agnimān iti cet - na tasyādrśyatvāt / deśaviśeṣo 'gnimattayānumīyate, na deśamātram / na, tasyādrśyatvāt / na hy ayam deśaviśeṣaṃ paśyati / kevalaṃ śūnyam abhi-dhānam uccārayati ayam deśo agnimān iti /) (NVI.1.5)

Uddyotakara's abrasive tone here betrays a substantial difference between himself and Dignāga. At issue here is whether a demonstrative denotes place directly, or indirectly through a description. Uddyotakara is of the opinion that a demonstrative can mark out a place only in the context of a description. In a previous section Uddyotakara had argued against an opponent who had claimed that a pointed finger could determine a point in space. (*eke tu dik pratyakṣatve'numānam brūvate-pratyakṣā dik, angulyādivyapadeśāt candravat itī/ tacca na arūpatvāt/ arūpā dik katham bāhyakaraṇapratyakṣā bhaviṣyati? katham tarhi. . . . ? digdeśasambandhiṣu vṛkṣādiṣu digvyapadeśāt?*) (NVI.1.5, ND.p.298.8–11).

Denying that a demonstrative could directly denote an object, Uddyotakara tries in the trU to turn the tables on Dignāga by charging that his theory of language lacks a mechanism for denoting singular objects. This was a repetition of the charge directed by Dignāga against the Vaiśeṣika theories of language (see trPS2.34A). In the NV Uddyotakara developed a theory according to which reference to individual objects is restricted to words for substantives, e.g. 'mountain' and 'lotus'. Words for qualities have multiple denotation and denote the individual indirectly. The resulting language is quite artificial for, in the context of inference 'fire' and 'smoke', which would normally be considered substantive expressions, become adjectival (*guṇabhūta*), unless they appear as the grammatical subject of the conclusion (*sādhya* or *anumeya*) or of the minor premise (*pakṣadharma*) (see NV.1.1.5; NV.1.1.10). This position seems to have been entirely adopted by Kumārila in the SL.V. What is significant is the manner and extent to which the paradigms introduced by Dignāga became absorbed into rival systems.

The following verses are from Kumārila's (SL.V.5.4.34–47).

trSL.V.5.4.34–47

These two, whose qualifier-qualificand-ness is [already] achieved, should be the object of proof.
There are some who want alternatively this relation to be of the principal and the subordinate.

[For them] the property of the bearer is always understood through a property.
Between what is qualified and what is a qualifier no distinction is realized.

To this there are others who reply; if the bearer were to be a qualifier,
Its relation with the property, which is the sign, would not be clear, because it would not be principal.

Only as a result of being principal would a relation with its property exist, through a sentence.

Because this relationship does not arise there, it is later imagined together with the property bearer [which is also imagined].

Or, 'of sound' should always be expressed, on the occasion of the seeing of the concomitance.

The adjectival rendering of a property which has been given through an individual is not a fault.

Fire as qualified by place, is not a proper definition of the object of proof.

For the qualification of fire by place would be of the following kind:

That fire which has been observed in some uncertain place exists in some uncertain place,

Or, the fire, which has previously been experienced, is connected with mere place,

Or, that which is fire is connected with this, or, that fire which has been seen is connected with this.

Or, that which is this is connected with mere place, as it was previously.

Or, that which is connected previously with mere place is this.

Or, this which is qualified by this place is the same as this fire.

In the first two cases the object of proof would be circular, in the latter it would be contradictory.

The pervasion by this place of all fires is not feasible.

Nor of the previous one, nor is this fire qualified by

Every place, nor is there a qualification by a previous place of this.

"This is qualified by this place", how can this ever be meaningful?

When it is ascertained that this fire is not independent of place,

Then the place is certainly ascertained here before fire.

That place which is known at the moment of that cognition is not a qualifier,

Having grasped place in the form of mountain without fire

Then to know it again as qualified by fire, is not a fault.

Therefore the object of proof would consist of a property bearer qualified by a property.

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣytvam āpannau dvāv imāv atah/

gamyāv aṅgāṅgibhāvas tu kaiścid iṣṭo vikalpataḥ/

sarvathā dharmiṇo dharmo dharmeṇa tv āvagamyate/

viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatve na viśeṣo 'vadhāryate/

tatrottaram vadanty anye yadi dharmī viśeṣaṇam/

hetudharmeṇa sambandhas tatrāprādhānyato 'sphuṭaḥ/

pradhāntvād dhi dharmeṇa sambandho vākyaḥ bhavet/

tatrāsambhavataḥ paścāt kalpyo 'sau dharmiṇā saha/

dhvaner ity athavā vācyam anwayasya tu darśane/

bhedopāttasya dharmasya guṇabhāvo na duṣyati/

agner deśaviśiṣṭatve na caitat pakṣalakṣaṇam/

viśiṣṭatāsya deśena bhaved evaṃprakārikā/

yo 'gniḥ so 'sti kvacid deśe yo dṛṣṭo yatra tatra vā/

agnih pūrvānubhūto vā deśamātreṇa saṅgataḥ/

yo'gnih so'nena yukto vā yo dr̥ṣṭo'nena so'thavā /
 yo'yam sa deśamātreṇa yuktaḥ pūrveṇa vāpy ayam /
 etad deśaviśiṣṭo vā yo'yam agnir itīha tu /
 pūrvayoh siddhasādhyatvam puresu syād viruddhatā /
 vyāptir etena deśena sarvāgninām na yujyate /
 nāpi pūrvasya nāpy eṣa vahnih sarvair viśiṣyate /
 deśaiḥ pūrveṇa vāpy asya na deśena viśeṣyatā /
 etad deśaviśiṣṭo'yam ity etad kathyate katham /
 yadā deśānapekṣo'gnir nāyam ity avadhāryate /
 agneḥ pūrvataram cātra deśa evāvadhāryate /
 taj jñānakālabuddhaś ca na deśaḥ syād viśeṣanam /
 deśasya parvatādes tu svarūpe pāvakād ṛte /
 gṛhīte'gniviśiṣṭasya punar jñānam na duṣyati /
 tasmād dharmaviśiṣṭasya dharmiṇaḥ syāt prameyatā /

Kumārila is here reporting the conflicting views of Dignāga and Uddyotakara on the nature of the *dharmin* (property bearer). Putting his weight behind Uddyotakara, Kumārila argues more fully for the primacy of the qualifier-qualificand relation. In Uddyotakara's attack this was alluded to, but not highlighted. The untraced fragment of Dignāga's; *sarva evāyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyāruḍhena dharmadharmaḥ bhedeneti*. (Frauwallner, 1959p.164) plays a significant role as the target of Kumārila's attack. Kumārila's conclusion is the same as Dignāga's, that the object of the inference (*anumeya*) is expressed in a sentence of the form *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmin* (a property bearer qualified by a property) but with the very definite difference. The *dharmin* (property bearer) is not a place (*deśa*), but rather an entity represented by a name like 'sound' or 'lotus'. The *dharmin* is attached to its quality (*dharmā*) through a relationship which is real and not a construct. Notice that Kumārila interprets Dignāga's *dharmin* (property bearer) as a *qualifier* (*viśeṣaṇa*, SL. V.5.4.36). Notice that this is admitted by Dignāga (see Ch.II.ii). Notice that Kumārila adopts Uddyotakara's version of language according to which nominal expressions are primarily given as denoting singulars, but have the capacity to become adjectival (*gunabhūta*) and thus secure multiple designability.

An Examination of the Vaiśeṣika View-Point from the second chapter, 'Inference for One's Own Self', of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* together with its commentary.*

vrPS2.30,PS2.30B: Vai.S.p.184.16-19

The following is an aphorism of the Vaiśeṣikas: "Of that [this is the cause, the effect, the possessor of a relatum, the co-inherent, the contrary-such is sign-bearing knowledge" (Vai.S.IX.18). In the aphorism [lit. therein] the first [of the relations], *cause and effect*, have been refuted previously. On the occasion of refuting the Naiyāyikas' theory of inference, [as] "that which has a prior, that which has a posterior", it was stated that cause and effect are not grounds of inference.

The Nyāya aphorism referred to here is NS.I.1.5: *tatpūrvakam trividham pūrvavat, śeṣavat, sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* "(inference is preceded by that and three-fold: that which has a prior, a posterior and is seen in general)."

Dignāga's major objections to the Nyāya definition are two: One, that it does not constitute the necessary ground of inference and two, that even when all the causal factors are present, countervailing forces can prevent the effect from coming into being. The second is an older, somewhat stock argument, against inference already registered as a Nyāya aphorism (NS.II.1.38). The first argument is given as follows:

If that were the case then one could not have inference, even if one grasped an invariant connectedness, but did not also grasp a causal relatedness. But in fact inference in such cases [lit. this] is seen [to arise]. Thus, the inference of impermanence on the basis of being a product, etc., would be deemed impossible.

(*tathā sati kāryatvāgrahaṇe'vinābhāvitvasaṃbandhagrahaṇād anumānam na syāt. tac ca dr̥ṣṭam/ evam yat kṛtakādibhir anityādy anumānam tadapi na syāt*). (Vai.S.p.216).

Clearly Dharmakīrti, who adopts the relation of *tadutpatti* [the relationship between an effect and its cause] as one of the regulating principles (*niyāmaka*) of his *vyāpti*, departs from Dignāga's view that causality is not a necessary ground of inference. Uddyotakara, on the other hand, recasts the idea of causality to fit the idea of *avinābhāva* (invariant relatedness) enunciated by Dignāga. For him *avinābhāva* is the regulating principle of causality while for Dharmakīrti the necessity imposed by the relation of effect to cause sanctions the idea of invariance (see Ch.V.i).

* From the Sanskrit reconstruction of Dignāga's PS by Muni Jambuvijaya published in *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, G.O.S. no.136, Baroda, 1961, pp. 184-188. The above translation has benefited from some very concrete suggestions made by Professor Daniel Ingalls.

vr.PS.2.31A: Vai.S.pp.184. 9-10, 185.1-3

The possessor of a relation is of two sorts: that which is conjoint and that which is inherent, for instance, smoke with fire and horns on a cow [respectively]. There, with regard to the first, it is not conjunction, because even without knowledge of it, inference is established, because, merely on the basis of the memory of an invariant relatedness, the inferential knowledge of fire is seen to occur, without a recognition of conjunction. A non-apprehended relation cannot serve to convey what is to be inferred, since it becomes a clue only as a result of causing a cognition (*jñānakāraṇatvena*).

A non-perceived relation cannot produce a cognition, because only a cognizable has the capacity to produce another cognition. A non-perceived relation cannot, therefore, produce any cognitive effect.

vrPS2.31A: Vai.S.p.185.3-6

Moreover, if conjunction were a cause of inference even fire would become the cause of the knowledge of smoke because conjunction resides, in two objects. Because conjunction resides in two objects the result [of adopting it as a ground of inference] is that the capacity to convey [the cognition of one of the relata] would reside in both places. And fire is seen to exist without smoke, in the state of embers, in a ball of iron, etc.

Dviniṣṭha means 'seated on both sides'. Thus conjunction can be described as a relation which is seated on both sides ('sides' in this case signifying the relata). Now if conjunction is located in both relata it follows that 'A is conjoined to B' implies 'B is conjoined to A' and vice versa. Thus in effect conjunction is said to be a symmetrical relation. This could justify reading *dviniṣṭha* as symmetrical. *dviniṣṭha* is glossed as *dviṣṭha* and *dvigata* (NC2p.678.16-18).

PS2.31B,32A: Vai.S.p.185.7-11

[A possible defence] on the basis of exceptions [made by Vai.S.III.1.11] one of the relata is not the inferential sign: "The false and the doubtful are not inferential signs", is a rule for marking exceptions. Thereupon fire is not the cause [of the inference of smoke]. For fire is not necessarily conjoined with smoke whereas smoke is necessarily conjoined with fire. [The reply] Even that is not feasible, because of being non-distinct. Conjunction is non-distinct, it resides in one place in the same way as it does in another, therefore, it is not proper that in one place there is no causal capacity.

The last line is translated on the basis of the reading given by V-nobhayam, (*api tu*) *avaśyam ekam eva*. Jinendrabuddhi explains the phrase *abhedataḥ*, (Vai.S.p.190.28): *saṃyogo hi prāptiḥ, tasyāṃ ca bhedo nāsti, tataś ca yathaikasya prāptis tathā dvitīyasyāpīty ekasminn agnāv akāraṇam na*

yujyate / "Conjunction is a coming together and in it there is no distinction. Therefore, the one is reached in the same way as the other, therefore the non-causality of one, i.e., fire cannot be justified." The argument is: conjunction is a symmetrical relation and justifies an inference of smoke on the basis of fire; the correct relation has to be asymmetrical.

Nor does a relation become a cause of inference by being frequently observed in such fashion that it could be tested for agreement and difference. On the other hand, those whose relation is invariable relatedness can feasibly maintain that not both [relata] but only one is necessarily the cause [of the inference].

PS2.31B,32A: Vai.S.p.185.12-15

The form of the Vaiśeṣika argument did not have a verification procedure built into it until Praśastapāda's *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. This can be determined from Candrānanda on Vai.S.IX.18, who cites a surviving fragment of the pre-Praśastapāda Vṛttikāra. The fragment is an attempt to fuse the requirements of the aphorism Vai.S.IX.18 with Vai.S.III.1.9, but shows no signs of having borrowed the Nyāya concept of *udāharaṇa* (exemplification). Dignāga's definition of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* owed something to the Nyāya procedure of 'exemplification' but is a much more enlarged conception, since it is in these slots that the existence or otherwise of counter-examples (*vyabhicāritvamavyabhicāritvam*) becomes registered, and the truth and falsity of a universal premise established. Dignāga, in the above passage, says that repeated observation does not guarantee the truth of a universal proposition, rather it is the non-existence of counter-examples which guarantees it (see Ch.III.iv, pp.48-49). The quotation from the Vṛttikāra: *evaṃvidhaprāsiddhasaṃbandhasyārthaikadeśam asaṃdigdham paśyataḥ śeṣānuvyavasāyo yaḥ sa līngadarśanāt san jāyamāno laṅgikam* (Vai.S.p.69; also Introduction by Anantalal Thakur, (NDp.17).

There is no part through which fire is not conjoined [with smoke] nor smoke [with fire]. On the basis of this it follows that all parts [of fire] could be conveyed through smoke.

Given the relation of conjunction [as the basis of inference], unique aspects such as [the precise degree of] illuminativeness and heat which belong to fire would become conveyed through smoke: because of being conjoined [with smoke] with its entire self. In this way the apprehension of the mere substantiveness etc. of smoke would become also, on the basis of that nature alone, (*tenaivātmanā*) a conveyor of fire. For it is not non-conjoint through its nature of substantiveness.

Dignāga points out the incoherence between the Vaiśeṣika notion of conjunction and its theories of inference. Conjunction relates whole

individual substances which are a nexus of action, qualities and shared universals. If there were invariance between individuals related through conjunction then any property of smoke, say its universal, 'existence' (*sattā*) would suffice to convey the idea of fire, not merely fire in general but a specific form of fire. Dignāga's own theory of the nature of universals is fashioned to preclude just such problems. (See trPS5.34; Ch.III.iii.)

vrPS2.32B; PS2.33; Vai.S.pp.185.16-17, 186.1-3

The fault with regard to conjunction *belongs to inherence, etc.* There also in the case of a cow and [its] horns there is not an absence of the relation of inherence between either the particular spottedness etc. [of the cow] nor between the common substantiveness etc. [of the horns]. *Because even in the case of [inference between] contraries there is the possibility [of the unique features as well as the deviant shared features becoming illegitimate marks of the unique and deviant shared features of the to be inferred object].* Where the relation of being an inferential sign and its bearer obtains between what was and what was not [or a presence and an absence], there also the mutual inferability [between various deviant features] should be mentioned. [For] in this way, the relation of inferential sign and bearer would obtain between specific and shared features, since there is not any part in respect of which they [the pair] are non-contraries. It is [therefore] said:

The sign possesses shared features with other objects [than those which it can legitimately convey], to the sign bearer also there belong features which are specific. These cannot be related as illuminator and illuminated, the consequences elsewhere [for the Vaiśeṣikas] are everywhere the same.

Dignāga is here pointing out several problems which stem basically from the observation that the elements in the *vyāpti* (pervasion) must be recurring qualities (*dharma*), not full-fledged completely determined individuals. For full-fledged individuals do not recur in a uniformly determined way. In early Vaiśeṣika doctrine not much thought is given to this side of the problem, which is in any case a post-Bhārṭṛhari insight, indirectly deriving from Bhārṭṛhari's concern with the uniform application of names (see JS7-8), their ability to designate classes of bearers. Dignāga's point here is that if contraries are individuals such as wind, rain and sky, then the mutual incompatibilities which obtain between them cannot be in terms of their specific features nor can it be in terms of all their general features, but only between their properly tested concomitant features.

If conjunction were the cause of inference then there would be the consequence of the apprehension of the whole conjoined relatum; otherwise the inferential sign would lack the power to convey knowledge of the bearer. This should be mentioned in the case of inherence also.

Jinendrabuddhi glosses *samyogimātrapratītiprasaṅga* as: *samyogyāk-āreṇānumeyagrahaṇam*/ "the apprehending of the object of inference in the shape of the conjoined entity". (Vai.S.p.191.22-33).

The charges made in trPS2.31B-32A are pressed home. The object to be inferred cannot be delineated as to its specific features lest the inference become deviant. However, the sign has the power to convey only that with which it has been experienced to be conjoined in the past. Since in experience objects do not occur except in a fully determinate form, consequences for the Vaiśeṣika theories of inference are bad. The object would have to have the very features that had previously obtained, otherwise "the sign" would have no power to convey the knowledge of the bearer of the "sign". But if the inferential object is determined as regard its specific features then the inference would become deviant.

For Dignāga the *anumeya* or *sādhyā* is *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmin* or a property bearer modified by a property (see Hattori: Fragment 4). Before Dignāga proceeds to characterize his notion of the inferable object he attacks the Vaiśeṣika idea. For the Vaiśeṣikas the object of proof is merely the conjoint entity. And the notion of the mere existence of the conjoint entity is not what is to be proved by an argument. For:

vrPS2.34A: Vai.S.p.186.9.12

And there it is not the existence of fire that is being proved on the basis of smoke, since the existence of fire is already known. What is being proved is: "that place in which smoke is adjacent, that has fire", otherwise the locution 'here' would be meaningless. "In smoke is fire, in fire heat". Such expressions would make the statement of the reason identical with part of what is to be proved. Therefore conjunction is not the necessary relation between a mark and its bearer, rather it is the relation of invariance.

Here the form of the sentence in which a property bearer is modified by a property (*dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmin*) is elaborated. The *dharmin* or property bearer is a place, the object of the demonstrative 'here'. The phrase '*yatra deśe dhūmaḥ samīpaḥ*' is significant for the conclusion as *dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmin* is identified with *dharmaviśiṣṭo deśa*, i.e., a place modified by a property. The place is the object of a demonstrative. According to Jinendrabuddhi, the demonstrative *atra* denotes the substantive (*viśeṣya*) directly. An objector asks, "the support (*āśraya*) is a universal and is established by the word 'here', then from where does the notion of the particular come from there?" (*nanv āśrayaḥ śāmānyam 'atra' iti vacanena sādhyate, tatas tatra viśeṣapratītiḥ kuta ity āha*).

The answer reflects aspects of the conception of the demonstrative developed by Bhartṛhari in the VP. "Otherwise, etc. By that [statement] he shows the impossibility of the demonstrative's (lit. it's) having any other meaning than that of a particular (*viśeṣād arthāntaratvāsam-bhavaṃ dyotayati*). Where the word 'here' has not the possibility of having any other meaning then it is intended as the substratum (*āśraya*) of the function [of the sentence], it is the same [sense of the demonstrative] in the sentence, 'this is a well' [that obtains] also in 'here is fire' (*atrāgniḥ*)". (*anyathetyādi etena viśeṣād arthāntaratvāsam-bhavaṃ dyotayati/ yatra 'atra' ity asya padasyārthāntarāsam-bhavas tatra pravṛttyāśrayo vivakṣyate, yathāyam kūpa iti vākye, 'atrāgniḥ' ity atrāpi. . .*) Vai.S., p.192.8-10). Bhartṛhari's idea of the demonstrative is scattered throughout the VP (see notes III.25, II.21, IV.22). Vṛṣabhadeva's remark illuminates Dignāga's ideas: (*sattvaṃ dravyaṃ tal lakṣyata ebhir iti. . . ata eva viśaya-mātram viśeṣasyāpratipādanena*) (VP.1.12,p.45.27). "They indicate an existing thing . . . that is why they indicate the mere object without conveying [its] specific aspect."

This theory is taken over by Dignāga, with certain modifications. For Dignāga the *dharmin* indicates a position in space. This is the thrust of his verses quoted by Vācaspati. Opponents like Uddyotakara, Kumā-rila and Mallavādin all agree on this point. As Randle put it in 1926, "That is Dignāga criticises first the view that what we infer from smoke is another quality, viz. fire and secondly the view that we infer the relation between fire and place; and he accepts the view that we infer the place qualified by fire" (Randle: Fragment H).

Jinendrabuddhi explains the circularity charge against the Vaiśeṣikas as the reply to an objection: *namu viśeṣaṇāsiddhiḥ dhūmasyāiva 'atra' ity anena vivakṣitatvād* (p.192.11-12).

Dignāga's answer is that the form of the conclusion in that case would be, 'the existence of fire in smoke (*dhūme'gniḥ*)', would beg the question, because the reason is stated as, 'wherever smoke there is fire'.

vrPS2.34A:VaiS.p.186.13-16

With reference to space and time: 'that invariance alone which has reference to space'; in all those places in which smoke has been previously grasped as invariant with fire; 'which has reference to time'; through the whole [period of] time, in which smoke is previously grasped as invariant with fire, for instance, in states like the churning of the fire-stick. Therefore the conjunction between fire and smoke is not the ground of inference.

This is one of the most influential doctrines regarding inference (*anumāna*) enunciated by Dignāga; the idea that the purport of the

vyāpti is to express uniformities in space and time. The previous section, establishes the nature of the conclusion, the nature of the entities which participate in the conclusion, and the form of the sentence which expresses the conclusion. The sections trPS2.34A and trvrPS2.34A are governed by an extreme empiricism. This extreme empiricism became a paradigm adopted by such diverse systems as the *Nyāyavārttika*, the *Yuktidīpikā*, the *Ślokavārttika* and the *Padārthadharmasamgraha*. Of these the most ingenious adaptation is Uddyotakara's (NV.1.1.5, 1.1.10, 1.1.34-35), who had a fine sense of the native genius of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

vrPS2.34B:Vai.S.p.186.17-19

Nor is the inherence between [for instance] a cow and [its] horns the cause of inference; because of being non-perceived. Even if the relation should exist, it is not the cause because of being non-cognized. A non-cognized relation is not desirable as a manifestor [of the conclusion]. And since an apprehension [of the inferential conclusion] is seen on the basis of an invariant relatedness, even in the case of one who has not cognized the relation of inherence, invariant relatedness alone is the cause of inference.

vrPS2.34B:Vai.S.pp.186.19-22,187.1-7

That which has the relation of being inherent in the same object is two-fold: the effect is the sign of another effect and the cause is the sign of another cause, as colour is of touch and the legs of arms. Here also the same [charge] should be mentioned - even if there were such a relation, it is not the cause [of inference] because of being non-cognized. For the co-inherence [of two] in a single object is not perceived by anyone. Even without a knowledge of the inherence in a single object, [merely] on the basis of the apprehension of invariable relatedness cognition [of the inferential conclusion] is seen. Here also *because the relation is non-different* [in respect of either relatum] just as colour would manifest (i.e., help us infer) the tactile quality so would the tactile quality let us infer colour. The relation of co-inherence in the single object is non-different [in respect of either relatum]. And in the event of counter-examples the consequences would be that the relation would no longer be the cause [of inference]. For what has been said with regard to co-inherence in the same object being two-fold, that also is not so (i.e. two-fold), *because of other possibilities*. What is the effect of another effect can be seen to be cognized from the cause of another cause, as has been said, "Our understanding of an effect as 'it was' may arise from what no longer is". (Vais.S.X).

Therefore, the enumeration of co-inherence in the single object as [only] two-fold is not feasible.

vrPS.2.35A:Vai.S.p.187.8-11

The contrary is four-fold - e.g., What was not (is a mark) of what was and so on. With regard to all these *what is contrary is not the sign*. There is contrariness between the action of rain

blished is not a sign' (Vai.S.III.1.10), is uttered. [The reply] If a mere relation were to be the cause of inference *causality etc. would be undefined in the aphorism*. Those signs which in the system are expressed as signs of eternity and impermanence, for instance, 'what is real and does not have a cause is eternal' (Vai.S.III.1.9), 'because of being an effect, because of being the transformation of a cause (it is impermanent)' (Vai.S.IV.1.1.), would remain undefined [as signs of eternity etc].

Here the Vaiśeṣika opponent gives up aphorism Vai.S.IX.18, and decides to explicate the form of the argument in terms of Vai.S.III.1.9 and Vai.S.IV.1.1. The former provides the universal premise (*vyāpti*) while the latter indirectly provides the singular premise (*pakṣadharmā*) by ruling out those relata which are not perceptually cognized as being connected with the sign. Dignāga rejects this manoeuvre because it would result in the ruling out of the relations listed in Vai.S.IX.18, contrariness, causality, etc. The suggestion is clear that these relations cannot be defined in terms of Vai.S.III.1.9. Dignāga underlines the crucial role given to the relation of causality in early Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

vrPS2.36B:Vai.S.p.188.7-10

[If it is contended that the notion of causality together with the other relations are somehow to be defined through the locution 'of that this' 'asyedam' Vai.S.IX.18]. One or other of these relations such as being a cause etc. would not be possible. How does their impossibility arise? Suppose the relationship of being a suggestor and being what is suggested, which has the nature of the cause-effect relationship, were to obtain here, then that which is a suggestor alone is intended to be the cause [of inference], *the rest would not be suggestors*. The rest, which are in conjunction etc., which are the cause [of inference], would be non-suggestors, being different from the cause [of inference].

Here Dignāga rules out a strategy through which the relations in Vai.S.3.19 could be defined through a common aspect that runs through all the relations, e.g., the one between a suggestor and what is suggested. The initial locution 'of this that' (*asyedam*) would re-capitulate this element. The strategy will not work because there is no such common element, the rest of the relations simply are much more than mere suggestors.

vrPS2.36B:Vai.S.p.188.10-13

Moreover, any other way of understanding it is vain. Having reached the objective through another relation and having by means of a [fanciful] mind, imagined, 'this is the suggestor of this', then is useless as the cause of inference. Thus the faulty definition of the Vaiśeṣikas has been mentioned.

CHAPTER FIVE

DHARMAKĪRTI

No one rides before, no one comes behind
And the path bears no fresh prints.
How now, am I alone? Ah yes, I see:
The path which the ancients opened up is by now overgrown
And the other, that broad and easy road, I've surely left behind.

The above stanza is attributed to Dharmakīrti by a later anthologist.¹ The stanza suggests that Dharmakīrti had taken upon himself the lonely task of reviving a dead tradition. We are not told either how old this tradition was nor how long it had been dead. Could the tradition Dharmakīrti was referring to be the one that had been initiated by Dignāga, and that was dying when Dharmakīrti wrote? The evidence that we have from the travels of the Chinese pilgrim Hiuan-Tsang indicates to the contrary that Dignāga's work had continued to occupy a prominent place in the curriculum of the University of Nālandā even after Dharmakīrti appeared on the historical scene.² The stanza, therefore, presents an enigma: was Dharmakīrti denying his debt to Dignāga or was he, even in the beginning of the seventh century, asserting his claim to a correct interpretation of a tradition of thought that he considered was in decline because it had been improperly interpreted? The traditional account of the relationship between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti supports the latter view. The picture of the relationship presented by Bu-Ston is quite simple: Dignāga made mistakes, Dharmakīrti corrected them.³

Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the PS tacitly acknowledges the correctness of this tradition reported by Bu-Ston, for it includes at critical junctures refinements introduced by Dharmakīrti; Jinendrabuddhi read Dignāga as an incomplete Dharmakīrti.⁴ The modern scholars Stcherbatsky and Hattori have similarly maintained that Dignāga's work attained its final purpose in Dharmakīrti's.

These accounts of the PS are, I think, basically incomplete. For they have not assessed the philosophical effects of reading into the PS concepts drawn from the PV. A historian may want to know what these mistakes were, and a historian of philosophy might instinctively feel

that mistakes in philosophy, unlike typographical errors or errors in calculation, are not easily conceded and less easily corrected. For systems in philosophy are complicated mechanisms whose parts are usually inter-related to form a design. Tampering with a part could interfere with the pattern of the whole; the subsequent loss can be both historical and aesthetic.

Bearing in mind this status of mistakes in philosophy, the proper questions to be addressed in the context of Dignāga-Dharmakīrti relationship are the following:

1. Why did Dharmakīrti change the PS? Or, what are the mistakes he thought that Dignāga had made?
2. How did Dharmakīrti correct these mistakes?
3. What are the effects, if any, of introducing into the PS modifications introduced by the PV?
4. Should one read the PS according to the refinements introduced by the PV? This last question is not independent of the first three in that it assumes answers to them. Presumably Jinendrabuddhi knew the answers to the first three questions and had decided that modifications to the PS could be purchased without paying too high a price. But we, who are modern historians, have to ask these questions again and to reassess, for our own time, whether the price of reading Dignāga according to the pattern introduced by Dharmakīrti is too high or not.

My concern in this chapter is to address the questions I just posed above: to identify the source of Dignāga's 'mistake' and investigate the measures taken by Dharmakīrti to correct it. I will suggest that these corrections have their origin in Bhartṛhari's thought, thought which was rejected by Dignāga. I will argue my case on several fronts.

The following is an outline of my argument:

Section i: I will attempt to uncover the sources of Dharmakīrti's dissatisfaction with Dignāga, suggesting that the dissatisfaction sprang from Dharmakīrti's lack of confidence in Dignāga's weak criterion for the truth of universal sentences. I will show that Dharmakīrti sought stronger conditions for the truth of universal sentences and found these conditions in an *a priori* sphere; I can then argue that the *a priori* sphere, which had been defined by Bhartṛhari's doctrine of ideal objects, is the source of Dharmakīrti's doctrine of essential nature (*svabhāva*). I shall then very rapidly sketch how readily Bhartṛhari's framework translates into a Buddhist vocabulary.

Section ii: My view that Dharmakīrti's doctrines should be examined in an *a priori* framework, is neither original nor unchallenged. I shall present the views of Stecherbatsky, who in 1930 proposed an *a priori* interpretation of Dharmakīrti's doctrines. I shall then defend Stecherbatsky's interpretation against Steinkellner, who challenges the existence of the *a priori* in Dharmakīrti's thought.

Section iii: I will try to trace the grammatical origins of Dharmakīrti's concept of ideal objects and their essential natures. I shall show how in Dharmakīrti's system, as in Bhartṛhari's, objects are internal and projected onto an external sphere. I shall try to identify the arguments by which Dharmakīrti introduced ideal objects. I will be especially concerned to investigate his remark that those who do not accept internal objects cannot properly account for the statement: "The essential nature of sky is skyness". My attempt will be to define Dharmakīrti's stronger relations, *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*, on the basis of the essential nature doctrine.

Section iv: There are hints that not all the Buddhists of the time looked kindly on Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's text. I will examine these hints and look at two fragments of Dignāga's and discuss Dharmakīrti's manner of interpreting them. I will suggest that there are systematic distortions here which can be summed up as: an effort to read more stringent conditions of truth into Dignāga's text combined with an effort to introduce into it a doctrine of essential natures. I argue that these attempts are not justified in the context of the original.

ii

The roots of Dharmakīrti's dissatisfaction with the PS can be traced to problems surrounding verification of sentences. If we once again distinguish truths based on necessary relations (*avaśyambhāva*) from those based on looser even accidental connections (*ākasmika*) and then grade them according to their degree of strength as those based on identity (*tādātmya*), those based on causal necessity (*tadutpatti*) and those based on nothing stronger than an invariance in space and time (*deśakāla-viśiṣṭam avinābhāvam*),⁵ then the universal sentence which stood at the head of Dignāga's argument displayed the loosest of these relations. This is evident from his rejection of relations such as inherence, conjunction and causality, which were proposed by the Vaiśeṣika school and the Nyāya school to stand as the basis of their universal sentence.⁶

Dignāga's statement to the Vaiśeṣikas that an invariance in space

and time is sufficient to guarantee the truth of universal sentences and arguments based on them, was systematic. For the idea of a universal sentence, underpinned by a very loose connection, was carried into various parts of his text, where the invariance in space and time is understood as the non-observation (*adarśana*) of deviance (*vyabhicāra*). A clear example of this loose condition on the truth of universal sentences comes from his comments on PS.5.34. Here Dignāga addresses the difficulties of applying a name to a class of objects whose members are infinite. Given the infinite number of individuals, the problem of verifying whether a name does indeed apply to all of them is declared to be insuperable. However, Dignāga proposes a solution to the problem; the solution consists in noting the absence of counterexamples of "non-observation of deviance". Thus the universal sentence 'all Hs are S' is true for Dignāga if experience does not present us with an object which has an H but not an S. The point of view is retained in Dignāga's definition of the conditions on the *Examples* (*drṣtānta*):⁷

Where the constant accompaniment of the *sādhya* with the *hetu* and the absence of the *hetu* when the *sādhya* is absent is known, that is Example; it is of two sorts: the similar and the dissimilar.

The above gives a consistent picture of a philosopher interested in securing the truth of sentences which express uniformities in space and time. Dignāga's attitude to the verification of singular sentences such as, 'this is not white' is of a piece with his empiricist views. The sentence is true, if the object is observed to be white or false, if it is observed not to be so. Thus:⁸

The appearance of the object is the authoritative means of cognition, [because] it is authoritatively known on that basis.

PS1.9B:NC1p.108

This is glossed by Dignāga as:⁹

On the other hand, when an external object is the object of cognition, then the appearance of the object is the authority for its cognition. Then even though the cognition has self-cognizability, having disregarded the own-form [of the cognition], the authority for the establishment of the object is the appearance of the object. The object which is cognized conforms to whatever the shape the object has, for instance, white or non-white, when it enters cognition.

vrPS1.9:NC1p.108-109

Unlike Dharmakīrti, Dignāga does not seem to have held that the truth of singular existential sentences presupposes the truth of a universal

sentence.¹⁰ Thus for Dignāga, sentences like: 'this is white', 'this is not white', 'this is a cow', 'this is not a cow' are immediately verifiable. As the above passage suggests, the conditions for the truth of singular sentences rests in "the appearance" of the external object, not in an *a priori* source.

When one combines Dignāga's ideas on the verifiability of singular and universal sentences with his rejection of causality, conjunction and inherence on the ground that some of them are not verifiable, the emerging portrait is that of an empiricist. The portrait sits well with Dignāga's Buddhist commitments, for Buddhists in general prized the unconstructed (*asaṃskṛta*) over the constructed (*saṃskṛta*); the presentations of the senses fall more readily within the latter category.

Dharmakīrti shared the Buddhist preference for perception over construction, for he declared that the only perceptual truth is absolute truth (*paramārthasat*). It alone has the capacity to satisfy purpose or have an effect (*arthakriyāsamārtha*; cf. PV2.1-3). Be that as it may, Dharmakīrti disagreed with Dignāga on the criterion for the verifiability of universal sentences. He denied that either an invariance in space and time or the non-observation of deviance, were in themselves sufficient grounds for the truth of universal sentences.¹¹

The principle of invariable relatedness (*avinābhāvaniyama*) is regulated by causality or identity; never by perception or the absence of perception.

SVPV31

Dharmakīrti rejected Dignāga's claim that an inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*) is realized merely on the basis on a concomitance (*sahabhāva*) in space and time and a non-perception of deviant instances. This rejection expressed a dissatisfaction with the *anvayavyatireka* (Method of Agreement and Difference) procedure formulated in the PS. The *anvayavyatireka* procedure, Dharmakīrti claimed, "is dependent on a remainderless observation and non-observation" (*anvayavyatirekayor niḥśeṣadarśanādarśanāyattatvāt*:vrSVPV38p.24.5)¹², and classes in nature, even according to Dignāga, could be infinite and preclude such remainderless observation.¹³

Moreover, Dharmakīrti argued that non-observation by itself is altogether a very weak form of proof. It can at best give information regarding the non-existence of an object at a particular place and time. A proof of non-existence as such is beyond its competence. For there is no guarantee that the object presumed to be non-existent might not turn up.¹⁴

Non-perception [of deviance] is not thus an authoritative ground [for the assertion of non-existence] because of the possibility of deviance.

vrSVPV19p.14.11

Dharmakīrti underscored the weakness of non-observation of deviant instances as a form of proof by arguing that sentences which claim an invariance between an imperceptible entity, or a non-existent entity and a something else, could not be falsified, or, by the very nature of the case, nothing could present itself as a counterexample. Thus, for instance, the statement, 'Sons of barren women are handsome' cannot be falsified, for nothing in experience is both unhandsome and the son of a barren woman. This method of proof sanctions Uddyotakara's argument, the conclusion of which is: 'Everything which has vital breath has *ātman*.'¹⁵ For there is nothing observable as the absence of *ātman*. To be strictly fair, Dignāga's condition on the *sapakṣa* and Uddyotakara's condition that only certain kinds of entities are allowed as terms in his negative argument, precluded just such possibilities as envisaged by Dharmakīrti.¹⁶

Dharmakīrti's aim was then to strengthen the argument enunciated by Dignāga, by introducing more stringent requirements on the universal sentence which could be allowed as its premise. This more stringent criterion amounted to the acceptance of only those universal sentences to which exceptions could not be envisaged. This is possible, according to Dharmakīrti, only if the truth in question is underpinned by a principle of identity (*tādātmya*) or causal necessity (*tadutpatti*):¹⁷

Otherwise one could have doubt regarding the deviance of the *sādhya* from the *hetu*, since there is no principle which says: given the existence of a property, the other must exist.

vrSVPV2Ap.17.23–24

Dharmakīrti's acceptance of stronger criteria for the truth of universal sentences allowed into an argument paved his way to the acceptance of two relations which he called *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*, which can be loosely rendered as identity and causality respectively. These relations, which Dharmakīrti referred to as regulating principles, (*niyama*: SVPV31) guarantee the truth of universal sentences. Whereas, under the procedures recommended by Dignāga, there is no guarantee that concomitances would hold in the future, under the guarantees provided by these relations Dharmakīrti felt certain that all objects, even unexamined ones, would fall necessarily in line.

Tādātmya is a compound expression which can be expanded as *tasya ātmano bhāvaḥ* (its own nature). *Tadutpatti* is a compound expres-

sion of the same type, expandable in the same way, *tasya utpattiḥ* (its production).

My intention in this chapter is to argue that the genitive demonstratives *tasya* (its) in the above compounds refer primarily to things such as fire, smoke, cows and lotuses viewed, under the aegis of language, as ideal sentential objects given prior to experience. I will argue that the *svabhāva* (essential nature) of these entities is not given in sense experience and learnt through accumulated time, rather that it is given full-blown in language, at birth. I will also argue that the two relations of identity and causality plus a third, incompatibility (*virodha*), are defined on the basis of essential natures (*svabhāva*) of ideal objects. Finally, I will argue that universal sentences based on these three relations become connected with spatio-temporal phenomena through two other relations: a pre-established fitness (*yogyatā*) or conformity (*sārūpya*) and the relation of producer and produced (*janyajanakabhāva*).

The reader is already familiar with a large part of this machinery. I have traced the origins of the notion of ideal sentential objects in the VP. I have also mentioned the two relations 'incompatible co-inherence' (*aviruddhaikārtasamavāya*) and 'compatible co-inherence' (*viruddhaikārtasamavāya*) through which Bhartṛhari described a word's antonymic and analytic content. My main contention is that Dharmakīrti, in his desire to secure a firmer basis for the *anvayavyatireka* procedure, turned to these specific insights of Bhartṛhari's, re-adapted these insights to suit his own purposes, imposed them onto Dignāga's vocabulary and read them into selected fragments of Dignāga's text.

Dharmakīrti brought a new ambience to Bhartṛhari's thought certainly. Bhartṛhari, as a grammarian, had never been concerned with the truth of sentences; Dharmakīrti introduced these concerns with respect to the truth of sentences on the basis of lessons learnt from Dignāga. And this was probably his most original contribution. His major insights such as the existence of a *priori* truth, for which he is so celebrated, were in the main derived from the writings of Bhartṛhari. In the next few paragraphs I will rather swiftly sketch the ease with which Bhartṛhari's ideas were translated by Dharmakīrti to suit a Buddhist ambience.

Bhartṛhari had held that language provides the basis of our understanding of the external world; language is, therefore, prior to experience and eternal. Dignāga maintained that language is constructed out of experience and, therefore, non-eternal. Dharmakīrti trod the middle path between Bhartṛhari's position and Dignāga's. He held that language is

both beginningless (*anādi*, cf. SVPV205) and non-eternal, because it is a beginningless habit energy or propensity (*vāsanā*). The nomenclature is itself rather odd, a *vāsanā* generally connotes traces left by experience; but coupled with *anādi* (beginningless) the *vāsanā* is not the memory of anything experienced. It is more like cosmic ignorance, springing unbeknownst in beginningless time, surviving the passages of many births, covering over the vivid, momentary, fragmented character of perceptual experience and imposing a more stable and recognizable pattern which is its very own. Dharmakīrti thus incorporated *a priori* structures identified by Bhartṛhari without compromising his Buddhist commitments.

For Dharmakīrti the world of the understanding and language are separated from the phenomenal world by an ontological gulf: the former is a fiction (*mithyā*), the latter is real (*paramārthasat*). But fictions are not without their uses; some fictions even mirror reality and become guides to truth and the satisfaction of desire; through no such direct action as name giving, but through a pre-established similarity which guarantees a certain coordination between the fictional object and phenomenal reality. And even though phenomenal reality alone can satisfy purpose or have an effect (*arthakriyākārin*), the fictional object is the source of all our understanding. For the ideal or fictional object is a complex, given through clusters of universals, which properly belong to it and separate it from other ideal objects. The cluster of universals which properly belong to it constitute its essential nature (*svabhāva*); the cluster of universals which are automatically excluded, on the basis of the universals belonging to the *svabhāva*, are its other nature (*parabhāva*). Dharmakīrti's conception of essential nature and other nature represent transformations of Bhartṛhari's analytic content and antonymic content; Dharmakīrti's relations *tādātmya* and *virodha* represent relations which Bhartṛhari called 'compatible co-inherence' (*aviruddhaikārthasamavāya*) and 'in-compatible co-inherence' (*viruddhaikārthasamavāya*); *tadutpatti* is a variation of *tādātmya*.

Absorbing Bhartṛhari's ideal sentential objects given *a priori* in language, Dharmakīrti took as one premise of his argument an analytic sentence, and proclaimed the doctrine of necessary or inevitable truth. In the process he violated the empiricist spirit of Dignāga's thought, how deeply we shall see later.

The portrait I have drawn above is neither totally novel, nor universally acknowledged. Stcherbatsky had already propounded an *a priori* framework in which to interpret Dharmakīrti's thought. It is to this work, and its defence, that I now turn.

In 1932, on the basis of limited texts, and perhaps due to the post-Kantian influences, Stcherbatsky interpreted the debates between Indian philosophers of the fifth, sixth and seventh centuries according to the pattern, introduced by Kant, of dividing knowledge into *a priori* and *a posteriori*.

In Indian phrasing the question is asked, whether right cognition in general and inference in particular represent a pure light, comparable to the light of a lamp, which is in no way necessarily connected with the objects upon which it accidentally happens to shed its light; or whether cognition, and the logical reason in particular, are necessarily connected with the cognized object. In the latter case the understanding must consist of some definite principles, which are not accidental as all sensible experience is; they must precede that experience and make it possible. Our knowledge will in that case have a double origin. Its framework will be due to the understanding and will consist of a definite set of principles; its content will be due to all the accidents of sensible experience.

The Indian systems of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina and Sāṃkhya share in the realist view that the understanding represents initially a *tabula rasa*, comparable to the pure light of lamp, that it contains no images and that there are no principles in the intellect before accidental experience comes to fill it up with more or less accidental facts and rules.

The Buddhists, on the other hand, maintain that there is a set of necessary principles which are not revealed by the lamp of experience, but represent, so to say, the lamp itself. The Law of Contradiction, the Law of Identity and the Law of Causality are the three weapons with which our understanding is armed before it starts on the business of collecting experience.

BLIpp.261,262

Stcherbatsky's insight, to the exposition of which he devoted two volumes, has on the whole stood the test of time. His portrait of Dharmakīrti is amazingly accurate. Despite the fairly meagre material at his disposal, he was able to present a clear and self-consistent portrait and to locate it in the context of Dharmakīrti's opponents and his forebears. In spite of my admiration for Stcherbatsky's treatment of Dharmakīrti, I do not share his views on Dignāga. Stcherbatsky treated Dignāga as a lesser Dharmakīrti and his subsequent division of the Buddhists from the non-Buddhists is, I think, not entirely accurate. In any case, my concern in the present section will be to defend Stcherbatsky's portrait of Dharmakīrti against its latter day critics chief among whom is Eric Steinkellner. An *a priori* framework within which to interpret Dharmakīrti's thought is, according to Steinkellner:¹⁸

not only not useful but even wrong and rather an impediment to any clearer understanding of Dharmakīrti's ideas.

Steinkellner makes three assumptions, which he claims are a necessary part of Stcherbatsky's interpretation of Dharmakīrti. The first of these

assumptions is that a proposition in order to be necessary must be analytic.¹⁹

Analytic propositions are therefore propositions which unfold something that is already given with the subject.

In support of this contention Steinkellner quotes Kant:²⁰

According to Kant the term "analytic" thus characterizes those propositions "that add nothing to the concept of the subject through the predicate, but merely break it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it".

The second assumption, which is not explicitly attributed to Stecherbatsky but which plays a very important role in his rejection of the *a priori* element in Dharmakīrti, is the belief that what is *a priori* cannot be ascertained by means of a method which is *a posteriori*. Pointing out that Dharmakīrti recommends an empirical procedure for the determining the truth of the sentence, 'This is a tree, because it is a *śiṃśapā*', Steinkellner asks the question:²¹

But why does Dharmakīrti have to prescribe such a procedure rather than understand a proposition which relates terms that are *svabhāva* like "*śiṃśapā*ness" and "treeness" as analytic? Why does he have to refer to experience?

A third assumption which he attributes to Stecherbatsky is that Dharmakīrti's notion of *svabhāva* (essential nature) is given *a priori*. Steinkellner then argues that the *svabhāva* which is "a particular, necessary characteristic of a real thing without which that thing could not exist",²²

cannot possibly as such "contain" or "entail" any characteristics that would define themselves as referring to things which belong to a certain genus and are certain individuals.

This is because the *svabhāva* of a thing is established through *apoha* "exclusion" or "differentiation".

Stecherbatsky's major insight, that the idea of *svabhāva* in Dharmakīrti is given *a priori*, can be defended against Steinkellner's attack, whose main outline has been just described. If we understand the relation of identity as the relation of concepts which are "contained" in other concepts, then it can be argued on the basis of the SVPV that the relation is formulated by Dharmakīrti on the basis of the idea of *svabhāva* given independently of experience, therefore, *a priori*. The defence of Stecherbatsky would be a defence of the idea that the Dharmakīrti's argument: 'This is a tree, because it is a *śiṃśapā*' presupposes that the concept of 'treeness' is contained in the concept of *śiṃśapā*ness: to be a *śiṃśapā* is to

be a tree, it is its essential nature (*svabhāva*) without which it could not be a *śiṃśapā*.

In view of the discussion in the first section, Stecherbatsky could easily be defended on the following lines. The *svabhāva* (essential nature) of something, we all agree, is an inseparable property (*avyatirikto dharmah*) of something, we also agree with Steinkellner that Dharmakīrti proposed an "additional proof (*pramāṇa*)", for the discovery of a *svabhāva* of something, a proof we agree, "shows that the reasons do not occur, where the contrary of the property to be inferred occurs". But we disagree with Steinkellner when he says further:²³

This latter proof is purely empirical, taking recourse to perception directly, or indirectly via additional inferences, and is the only means of establishing the necessity of the inferential reason.

For we must remind Steinkellner that:²⁴

Perception is not the conclusive proof of anything.

vrSVPV57p.31.21

and that:²⁵

Non-deviance [of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*dharmā] is not merely on the basis of non-observation [of what has the *hetu* but not the *sādhya*dharmā] in the *vipakṣa*.

SVPV13A

and that the idea of *svabhāva* and the relations based on *svabhāva* precede the empirical procedure. One cannot, only on the basis of empirical observation, claim that anything is the "necessary characteristic" of "a real thing", as Steinkellner would have it; not in Dharmakīrti's PV:²⁶

For only when an invariance is given on the basis of *svabhāva* (essential nature) that some object does not deviate from some other object. For that invariance (lit. it) is based on identity.

vrSVPV1p.2.19-20

Steinkellner's arguments against Stecherbatsky is vulnerable on other counts. An implication of his argument, one which Steinkellner himself draws, that essential natures belong only to real entities, is not something to which Dharmakīrti would have assented. Dharmakīrti argued, on the contrary, that if fictitious entities such as sky-flowers (*vyomakusuma*) are denied essential natures neither denial nor assertion with respect to them would be forthcoming:²⁷

Those who hold that essential natures do not really belong to fictitious entities cannot

explain how words, whose sphere consists in distinctions pertaining to essential natures, apply to them. Words must necessarily apply to them. Because that which is not established in any way cannot become connected with assertion or negation.

vrSVPV18p.91.1-4

Dharmakīrti maintained moreover that unless ideal objects integral to language are posited, the following sentence could not be justified: "the essential nature of sky is skyness" (*khasya svabhāvaḥ khatvaṃ* SVPV67). The statement, we shall see, highlights the tension between Dignāga's purely empirical methods of establishing correlations in nature, the absence in his system of the idea that objects have essential natures, and Dharmakīrti's non-empirical procedures and his idea of essential natures. In Dharmakīrti's system essential natures supply the regulating principles (*niyama*) which guarantee the results of the purely empirical *anvayavyatireka* procedure. In Dignāga's system the empirical method is sufficient to guarantee the truth of universal sentences; no appeal to essential natures is required. Dharmakīrti was in fact fairly cavalier about the need for the empirical method; in this treatment of the Reason based on Non-Apprehension he completely ignored the need for Examples and asserted several times that the learned (*vidvān*) have really no need for Examples.²⁸

These various aspects of Dharmakīrti's thought go against Steinkellner's belief that essential natures belong to real entities, that only on the basis of an empirical procedure do they get established and that essential natures are 'empty' because they are established through differentiation. In contrast to Steinkellner, I think the position espoused by Dharmakīrti can be characterized in the following manner. Essential natures belong to abstract or ideal sentential objects; they are shared by real as well as fictional entities. What is fictional and what is not fictional, however, can be decided only on empirical grounds, on the basis of observation. Hence the empirical method. The description of the empirical method, in terms of various differentiations, on which Steinkellner pins so much of his argument, is not intended merely to convey the fact that concepts are empty, but to ensure that cognitions will be sentential. The reader will recall that Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming had appealed to *a priori* structures implicit in language. Bhartṛhari, however, had not sufficiently clarified these structures: they had consisted of universals organized hierarchically and of universals clustering around ideal objects. Dignāga had criticised the structure on the ground that the favours granted by the external object would, under these circumstances, not be sententially interpreted—the granters of favour would be too many, the

receivers of favour would also be too many – the subsequent strife would not result in a sentential state but in a prismatic rainbow-vision (see trPS5.6). My guess is that Dharmakīrti, in adopting Bhartṛhari's doctrine of ideal objects and indirect naming, became heir to the problems pointed out by Dignāga. He then adopted Dignāga's technique of *apoha* to solve Bhartṛhari's problems, which were now his. I do not have the space to explore this aspect of Dharmakīrti's solution in any detail, nor is this matter directly relevant to my defence of Stcherbatsky's position that Dharmakīrti's doctrine of essential nature is based on appeal to *a priori* structures. My concern in the next section will be to try to show that Stcherbatsky's conclusions can be substantiated by highlighting Dharmakīrti's debt to Bhartṛhari.

iii

Very early in the *vṛtti* to the SVPV Dharmakīrti made a distinction between individuals (*bheda*) and reals (*artha*), suggesting that the former are independent (*svatantra*) of the latter and not co-extensive with them. While reals are known through the senses, individuals have their seat in the understanding (*buddhi*).²⁹ And individuals do not acquire this seat in the understanding gradually, through the thrust of repeated experience, but have been in the understanding since beginningless time, across the passage of endless births. The mind of a new born baby is not a *tabula rasa*, awaiting the hand of experience to inscribe it with objects. Rather, objects lie latent in the child's mind – the mother's breast being the first object to be recognized in the form of an identifying cognition, "this is that".³⁰

Śaṅkarasvāmin, according to Hiuan-tsang a "personal pupil" of Dignāga's, whose work "closely followed the teaching of his master [Dignāga]"³¹ had, in contrast with Dharmakīrti, described the faculties of a very small child as being slow (*manda*) to interpret verbally his perceptual experience.³² Manorathanandin remarked that such views were held by other followers of the Ācārya.³³ Dharmakīrti argued against this idea on the ground that to deny an innate conceptual framework of *a priori* objects is, in effect, to forever deny the capacity to make the relation between words and things.³⁴

Since the means of making a relation with objects have not arisen, the relation with an object would not be there even later.

That objects are integral to language and the understanding is an idea that has its origin in the writings of Bhartṛhari.³⁵ In the fifth section of the chapter on Bhartṛhari I have traced the conceptual struggle which preceded the birth of the idea. The conceptual struggle, I have suggested, was intimately linked to Kātyāyana's aphorism on names: while Kātyāyana's theory of names had been built around the framework of spatio-temporal individuals in possession of qualities, Bhartṛhari's conception was built around the framework of internal objects given *a priori* in language. I have interpreted Dignāga's theories of logic and language as an attempt to reinstate the terms of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names. I would like to interpret Dharmakīrti's theories as principally allied to Bhartṛhari's. Dharmakīrti's objects are given *a priori* in language: his arguments for the existence of internal objects closely resemble Bhartṛhari's, except one, which is original and has as its target Dignāga's views.

If objects presented by language were merely perceptual, then words, which refer to non-perceptual objects, would be meaningless; one could talk neither about past objects nor future ones, nor account for mistakes with respect to what is perceptual. If there were no internal objects, one could not account for number which qualifies names: the word for wife *dārā* is always plural, one's wife is not. How could this discrepancy be accounted for without the assumption that there are internal objects? These arguments are not substantially different from Bhartṛhari's. The following argument is, however, original to Dharmakīrti. It is the argument that those who deny the existence of internal objects cannot account for the assertion: "the essential nature of sky is skyness".³⁶ It is explicated rather cryptically as follows:³⁷

How is it that in this case, in the absence of any special distinction (*atiśaya*), you say: "the essential nature of sky is skyness" and not merely "sky". One says this [i.e. one says "the essential nature of sky is skyness"] when there is a desire to know the form of the occasioning ground for the use of the word 'sky', not by means of an identifying cognition of the features which it shares with other objects, [but in accordance with its unshared features].
vrSVPV67p.37.20-22

The argument focuses attention on the tensions in Dignāga's theory of names. It brings to mind Dignāga's dictum on names – a thing is named on the basis of its shared features,³⁸ – and raises a problem. The dictum effectively rules out intrinsic features (*svalakṣaṇā*) as the basis on which names are given, but does it rule out those features which, though non-perceptual, are unshared? Does the condition, for example, rule out the features which earn the moon the name *śaśadhara* (that which has the

marks of a rabbit)? Dignāga did not think so. He included proper names within the compass of his dictum even observing:³⁹

... we find that designation is generally by means of a specific [cause]; for example, [we use expressions like] "the sound of drum" or "sprout of barley", [to indicate a certain sound or a certain sprout ...]
vrPS1. 4:Hattori, 1968 p.26

Dignāga did not hold that names could not be given to members of unit classes such as *Dittha*.

How well does this view sit with his doctrine that names are given to things on the basis of the Method of Agreement and Difference (*anvayavyatireka*) and the Second Rule of the *Trairūpya*? The Second Rule of the *Trairūpya* demands that the Reason (or *hetu*) have at least two members, a demand which cannot be met in the case of unit classes such as sky, moon and *Dittha*.⁴⁰ Dharmakīrti's example focuses on these difficulties in Dignāga's theory, while presenting an argument against the view that essential natures of unit classes can be established on the basis of the Method Agreement and Difference. Finally, Dharmakīrti argues that essential natures, as belonging in ideal objects given by language, are unchanging, while recurring essential natures cannot be an attribute of spatio-temporal entities.⁴¹

A reversal of essential natures in the case of words is not appropriate.
SVPV232

[For] reals completely lack recurring essential natures.
vrSVPV184p.90.24⁴²

These ideal objects and their essential natures given through a beginningless habit energy (*anādivāsanā*) are fictions (*mithyā*), because nothing exactly corresponding to them exists in the perceptual realm.⁴³ The understanding, therefore, screens what is given in the phenomenal realm. The contrast between Dignāga's theory and Dharmakīrti's can be made vivid by means of the following contrast:⁴⁴

A word causes its object to be conveyed by means of that [quality] alone which does not exceed over (*ati* + *vr*) its object, not by means of those qualities etc. which belong in the word.
PS5.13

and ⁴⁵

The understanding (lit. that) which has the appearance of a unitary thing, dependent upon entities which have distinctions, covers over (*sam* + *vr*), by its own form, the form of the other.
SVPV68

The essential nature of these ideal entities is a complex comprising both its causal and non-causal characteristics.⁴⁶ The non-causal essential features of fire, for instance, include fieriness, being hot to touch, being impermanent. The ability to produce smoke is part of its causal nature.⁴⁷ Being cold to the touch is part of its 'other nature' (*parabhāva*).

The essential nature of objects is connected with its other nature. They are both given in discursive imagination:⁴⁸

... the essential nature of a thing does not exceed the two discursive states: its nature (*tattvam*) and its other nature.

vrSVPV277Bp.147.1-2

Nothing is known regarding a thing which does not appear in cognition through its own form, disassociated from its other form.

vrSVPV277Bp.148.2-4⁴⁹

They are also mutually implicative.⁵⁰

On the basis of the *svabhāva* and the *parabhāva* (other nature) implicit in the abstract entity designated by a word, Dharmakīrti defined three relations: identity (*tādātmya*), causal necessity (*tadutpatti*) and incompatibility (*virodha*).

Identity is the relation which obtains between an ideal entity and its invariable characteristics. It can include its unique properties, such as skyness of sky, the properties which are shared or any other property which invariably belongs to it. Thus *śimśapā* includes within its essential nature, *śimśapāness*, being a tree, being an earth substance. It also includes having a leaf of a certain shape, and bearing a certain kind of fruit.

Casuality is the relation which obtains between an abstract entity and its causal nature. Thus fire has the causal ability of producing smoke.

Incompatibility is the relation which obtains between the essential nature of a thing and its other nature. According to Dharmakīrti the relation obtains between incompatible pairs such as permanent/impermanent, hot/cold and extends to incompatibilities which depend on cause. Thus fire and cold touch are considered incompatible, because fire causes heat and heat and cold are incompatible (see vrSVPV4p.6.3-5).

The *a priori* element in Dharmakīrti's thought is located in language, more precisely it is located in the ideal objects and their essential natures which are integral only to language and the understanding (*buddhi*). My justification for this conclusion can be summed up as follows:

1. The *anvayavyatireka* procedure is an empirical procedure and is by itself fallible; for mere observation does not rule out the pos-

sibility of counter examples which falsify the generalization. It follows that the notion of necessity (*avaśyaṃbhāva*) demanded by Dharmakīrti cannot be satisfied by a fallible procedure. Dharmakīrti's concept of essential nature cannot, therefore, be built out of observation alone, because essential natures belong invariably and necessarily to things.

2. Nor can the *anvayavyatireka* procedure, as formulated by Dignāga, establish that some essential natures, such as skyness, belong uniquely to indivisible individuals such as sky. For the Second Rule of the *Tairūpya* rules out arguments where the extension of the *pakṣa* and *hetu* coincide.
3. An empirical procedure has no access to essential natures of fictitious objects, such as sky flowers; Dharmakīrti maintained that they have essential natures.
4. The notion of an individual (*bheda*) exceeds what is perceptual; uniformities are not given by the senses. Dharmakīrti concluded on the basis of the 'excess' that the notion of objects or individuals is given through a beginningless habit-energy (*anādivāsanā*). The use of the word *anādi* (beginningless) is especially significant here, for it rules out attempts to explain the 'excess' on empiricist grounds.

I have in the course of this chapter tried to establish links between the two positions advocated by Dharmakīrti: that objects or individual things are given in language independently of external phenomena (*anapekṣitabāhyārtham*:SVPV66B) and that there are properties which belong to objects in an essential way. I have also tried to connect these two positions with Dharmakīrti's criticism of the *anvayavyatireka* method advocated by Dignāga, on the one hand, and the belief in external objects or individual things, on the other. Dharmakīrti's method of argument, as I have reconstructed it, consists in polarizing the case for and against the location of individual objects within language or outside it: either individual objects exist externally, in which case one has difficulties explaining talk with regard to fictional objects, mistakes regarding perceptual phenomena and claims that some property belongs to an individual object essentially and uniquely. Or, objects have been integral to language through beginningless time; we, therefore, have access, independently of experience, to a rich and complex content as well as to the interconnection between this content. The scales are tipped against belief in the existence of external objects as a result of the dogma that

phenomenal reality is momentary and that all uniformities have their source in language.

The reader will recall that Bhartṛhari had offered a choice of substitutes to replace the conception of phenomenal universals. In trJS92 he had declared that the concepts of similarity (*sādṛśya*) or that of innate capacity (*śakti*) could be substituted for universals. The latter, according to Helārāja's gloss, is the capacity of phenomena to impress themselves upon the understanding in terms of uniformities. Dharmakīrti adopted the second of the two alternatives offered by Bhartṛhari. He argued that the idea of uniformity is a fiction of the understanding. The gap between the ontologically distinct realms is bridged in his system through the relation of a pre-established relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva* or *janyajanakabhāva*).⁵² These relations have counterparts in Bhartṛhari's relations of fitness (*yogyatā*) and cause-effect (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*).⁵³ And even though Dharmakīrti did not describe language in terms of the analogy with crystals and mirrors,⁵⁴ the paraphernalia of indirect naming is part of his system.

Having thus traced Dharmakīrti's notion of *svabhāva* to its sources in *a priori* language and having defined the three relations: identity, causal necessity and incompatibility, which are based on *svabhāva*, having established the embryonic link between Dharmakīrti's theory and Bhartṛhari's, I feel I have sufficiently disentangled the *a priori* in Dharmakīrti to be able to proceed to the question posed by Steinkellner: why did Dharmakīrti recommend an empirical procedure at all, if the essential nature of objects is given *a priori*?

There are several levels at which Steinkellner can be answered.⁵⁵ The simplest way to do so is to observe that not all ideal objects given by language are represented in reality. And there is no way of knowing, on the basis of language alone, which objects are representations of real things and which are not.⁵⁶

Objects which belong to words, which are fixed [or appear, according to Dharmakīrti's and Manorathanandin's gloss of *pariniṣṭhitaḥ* as *pratibhāsamānaḥ*] in discursive imagination, springing from a beginningless habit-energy (*anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpa*), have three kinds of features: existence, non-existence and that which has the support of both [existence and non-existence]. When existence is not given in the object which is to be established (*sādhyā*), its non-apprehension [in phenomena] is accordingly the Reason; its very existence is not denied on the basis of the use of words.

SVPV205–206.

Unfortunately, Dharmakīrti did not illustrate his three features and we must, therefore, turn to Manorathanandin's illustrations. Manorathan-

andin regarded the beginningless habit-energy (*anādivāsanā*) as being of 3 kinds: the habit-energy belonging to the existent (*sadvāsanā*), the habit-energy belonging to the non-existent (*asadvāsanā*) and that which participates in both (*ubhayavāsanā*). A product of the first is cloth, that of the second is a sky-flower and that of the third is god or *pradhāna* (a metaphysical principle of the Sāṃkhyas). Given Dharmakīrti's oft-repeated statement that reality is never accidental (see n.V.5), one might be tempted to question Manorathanandin's scheme and, on the basis of different intuitions, illustrate the three features differently: audible sound, sons of barren women and red cloth, a tautologous, a contradictory and a contingent description could respectively be offered as better illustration of what Dharmakīrti had in mind. I do not think, however, that Dharmakīrti's intentions would be better served by our illustrations than by Manorathanandin's. Dharmakīrti's text is quite explicit on this matter. Every attribution of existence or non-existence has, in Dharmakīrti's system, to be on the basis of observation or non-observation. Even when such observation and non-observation are backed by the idea of an essential nature, the observational component cannot be dismissed. Thus⁵⁷

All negations belong to non-apprehension.

vrSVPV4p.5.9

and⁵⁸

Existence is apprehension only [not non-apprehension].

vrSVPV2p.4.10–11

Even though the statement, 'there is no fire here, because it is cold', draws its basic premise from the essential nature of fire, which is given *a priori*, its existence in space and time is a matter of observation. One can put the matter differently, whether an object is given or not given in nature is a matter of contingent fact requiring observation; however, once it is a fact that it is given, its essential nature is not a contingent matter; it is a necessity. And while its existence in space and time is established through apprehension (*upalabdhi*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), its essential nature is given on the basis of ideal objects, present in language and the understanding through beginningless time.

Truth, in Dharmakīrti's system, has two components of equal importance: an *a priori* component, which resides in language, and an *a posteriori* component, which is known through the senses. Or as Stecherbatsky put it, "Our knowledge will in that case have a double origin".

This view of the double origin of our knowledge enabled Dharmakīrti to reconcile Dignāga's empirical doctrines with Bhartṛhari's *a priori* ones, the *anvayavyatireka* procedure of establishing real concomitances with the *a priori* procedure of establishing necessary concomitances.

iv

I have in the course of this chapter argued that there is a systematic link between Dharmakīrti's dissatisfaction with Dignāga's criterion for the truth of universal sentences and the idea of essential natures from which Dharmakīrti derived his stronger criterion. Dharmakīrti's criterion is more stringent than Dignāga's because its source is *a priori*. There is evidence to suggest that Dharmakīrti, not satisfied with adopting this stronger criterion in the context of his own system, tried to force it onto selected fragments of Dignāga's text. There is evidence that his attempts were resisted in Buddhist circles. Finally, there is evidence that the meek mannered Īśvarasena of Bu-Ston's anecdote may have been among those who resisted Dharmakīrti. Stcherbatsky reported the problem in the following way:⁵⁹

Īśvarasena, the pupil of Dignāga, denied the possibility of strictly necessary and universal principles in our knowledge. According to him, no one short of an Omniscient Being could possess a knowledge strictly universal and necessary.

In a foot-note Stcherbatsky added:⁶⁰

Mahāpāṇḍita Īśvarasena's opinions are referred to in the commentary of Śākya-Bud-dhi's... He maintained that ordinary men... can never know that the reason is totally absent in the dissimilar cases; exceptions to the general proposition are always possible. This was rejected by pointing out six cases in which this opinion conflicts with different passages of the Nyāya-mukha and the Pr. Samucc.

It appears then that the dissatisfaction with Dignāga's criterion for the truth of universal sentences, was current among Buddhists of the time. Stcherbatsky's report on Īśvarasena's views suggests that there were several different ways of correcting Dignāga's 'mistake'; Īśvarasena's way of modifying the text was one way, Dharmakīrti's another. I shall now examine two instances of Dharmakīrti's method of modifying Dignāga's text.

Dharmakīrti built his interpretation around the following fragment:⁶¹

yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiśedhaḥ kṛiyate na ca so'pi yuktaḥ/

The fragment occurs in the PS in the context of a discussion with the Vaiśeṣika. A spokesman for the Vaiśeṣika seeks to establish the existence of the unseen substance wind on the ground that it possesses the quality of touch which, being invisible, resides in invisible substances. Dignāga rejects the argument on the ground that the quality of touch does indeed belong in visible, corporeal substances because wherever a substance is corporeal, visible and resistant it is observed as having the property of touch and, wherever it is not visible, corporeal or resistant, it lacks it. Dignāga's criterion for rejecting the Vaiśeṣika argument does not deviate from the empirical criterion Dignāga generally adopted. This is how the fragment reads in context. The reconstruction is Richard Hayes':⁶²

Q: Suppose one argues that touch is denied in visible substances just on the ground that it is invisible itself.

A: That also is incorrect. Touch cannot be denied as a quality of things that are visible, corporeal and resistant; in fact, the mind infers touch as a quality of those things because touch is observed when [those] other [properties] are observed, and it is not observed when they are not observed. Therefore touch does not belong in invisible things.

Dharmakīrti interprets the fragment to accord with the more stringent conditions of necessity as follows:⁶³

yady adarśanamātreṇa dr̥ṣṭebhyaḥ pratiśedhaḥ kṛiyate/ na ca so'pi yukta itī/ katham ayuktaḥ anupalambhād abhāvasiddheḥ/ nanūpalabdhiḥ lakṣaṇaprāpteh sparśasya yukta eva pratiśedhaḥ/ na yuktaḥ/ dr̥ṣyatatsvabhāvaviṣayamātrāpratiśedhāt/ prthivyādi sāmānyena gṛhītvā 'yam pratiśedham āha/ tatra ca tūlopalapallavādiṣu tadbhāve'pi sparśabhedadarśanāt/ asyāpi kvacid viśeṣe sambhavāśaṅkayā bhavitavyam itī sarvatrādarśanamātreṇayuktaḥ pratiśedha itī/ evam ācāryīyaḥ kaścid anupalambhād abhāvaṃ brūvāna upālambhaḥ/

Dignāga's fragment in the context of Dharmakīrti's interpretation is meant to be read as follows. So as not to prejudice the case, I offer the following translation of Dharmakīrti's passage by Nagasaki and Mookerji:

If negation were liable to be proved on the ground of non-perception, then what (Dignāga) says (would be unjustified); "If on the ground of mere non-perception the negation (of the neutral touch) is deduced from observed instances (of earth), then it would not be legitimate". Why should it not be legitimate? Because from non-perception negation is (supposed to be) proved. It may be urged that, touch being possessed of full conditions of being perceived (in other words, being perceptible), its denial is quite legitimate. No, it is not legitimate. The denial (of neutral touch) cannot possibly have reference to other instances (of earth) equally perceptible and possessed of the same nature (with observed ones). He (Vaiśeṣika) asserts this negation (of touch) in earth and the rest taken in their universal reference as class-concepts. Since among instances of them (there may be occurrences of

such a touch and they are not all open to observation) such as cotton, stone, twigs and leaves of tree (which are all admitted to belong to the class of earthy substances and thus) though possessed of the nature of earth, different kinds of touch are perceived. *Now the possibility of the occurrence of this (neutral touch) in some (unobserved) cases is open to doubt and, such being the case, the denial (of an entity) on the ground of mere non-perception is not legitimate in all classes. It follows that some (stupid) follower of Dignāga who has made (unqualified) non-perception the ground of inference of absence has been subjected to censure.* (emphasis is mine).

Mookerji and Nagasaki, 1964p.56–57.

Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's fragment expands the context of the original in the following way. He attributes to the Vaiśeṣika spokesman a stronger position—a unique sort of touch, which is not known to characterize any earthen substance, is experienced. It must belong to something. It cannot belong to anything visible. It, therefore, belongs to the invisible substance wind. Dharmakīrti makes Dignāga reject the argument on the following grounds. There is no guarantee that unobserved instances of earth substances will not be counterexamples. That no deviant examples have been observed is no guarantee that none will turn up in the future. Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's text cannot be sustained on the basis of the original context. In fact, the context shows Dignāga rejecting the Vaiśeṣika argument on purely empiricist grounds. That no deviant examples have been observed is no guarantee that none will turn up in the future, is Dharmakīrti's view not Dignāga's.

Another fragment of Dignāga's drawn from the *Nyāyamukha* similarly distorts the intention of the original: *arthāpattiyā vānyatareṇo-bhayapradarśanād*.⁶⁴ The fragment, partly based on Tucci's translations, reads: 'Or, because by implication either [example] displays both.'

The original fragment, I think, merely states proper contraposition: From 'All A are B' it follows that 'No nonB are NonA'. But Dharmakīrti reads it as under:⁶⁵

As has been said [by Dignāga]: "By implication (*arthāpatti*) either example displays both [the *anvayavyāpti* or the *vyatirekavyāpti*]"'. Even in that text, while endorsing the view that the example displays the relation of identity and that of causal necessity, he affirms that the statement of one necessarily implies a proof of the second [*vyāpti*]. And so, when the sentence, "whatever is a product is impermanent" is asserted, it being given that it is not another, it is evident that this [being impermanent] is the essential nature of that, [that] it is entirely linked with it, [and that] this is authoritatively seen on the basis of the principle of Identity. One who knows the essential nature of that which is a product (lit. its) knows by implication that what is permanent cannot be a product.

vrSVPV28p.18.17–23

Dharmakīrti's strategy in modifying Dignāga's text follows a pattern: to introduce the more stringent conditions on truth and to

underpin the stringent condition through the doctrine of essential natures and the relations definable on that basis. That Jinendrabuddhi used a similar systematic strategy can be seen from his interpolations of the ideal object doctrine at various crucial points in Dignāga's text. I believe that ideal objects in Dignāga's text exist only by the grace of Jinendrabuddhi's interpolations.⁶⁶

I have come full circle in my inquiry into the sources of Dignāga's 'mistake'. In the first section of this chapter, I located the 'mistake' in Dignāga's conditions on the truth of universal sentences. The Method of Agreement and Difference for Dignāga guaranteed the truth of universal sentences. Dharmakīrti felt that the guarantee was insufficient; because objects in nature are infinite they cannot all be open to inspection, the possibility of deviations to the universal sentence cannot, therefore, be ruled out.

In the course of this chapter, I also described the measures which Dharmakīrti adopted to rectify this 'mistake'. The measures included putting more stringent conditions on the truth of universal sentences, and guaranteeing these conditions by appealing to an *a priori* source of truth. They also included modifying selected fragments of Dignāga's text in accordance with these more stringent conditions and the source of their guarantee. That Jinendrabuddhi implicitly acquiesced in Dharmakīrti's scheme is suggested by the fact that he interpolated Dharmakīrti's ideal object doctrine between several crucial passages of the PS (see trPS5.34).

On the basis of information recorded by Stcherbatsky, I have suggested that the dissatisfaction with Dignāga's purely empirical conditions on the truth of universal sentences was shared by other Buddhists, including Īśvarasena, who held that only Omniscient Beings possess knowledge which is "strictly universal".

I do not feel that I have to choose between Dharmakīrti's modification of Dignāga's text and Īśvarasena's, unlike Stcherbatsky who felt obliged to:

But although Dignāga seems to have had in his head the system of relations which we find clearly stated in the works of Dharmakīrti, he was not sufficiently categorical in expressing it and it was left to his great follower to give to his theory its final formulation.

BLIp.268.

My concern in this essay has been to discover the fallible vision which lay at the source of Dignāga's thought. I have in Chapters II and III defined this vision on the basis of two coordinating perspectives: the historical perspective given in Bhartṛhari's theory of the *a priori* in

language and the religious perspective given in the *Upādāyaprajñapti-prakaraṇa*. I have argued that the two perspectives find their centre in a defence of Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, a defence of which is the *raison d'être* of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. I have delineated Dignāga's *apoha* mechanism and described its role in Dignāga's logical theories. I have developed an interpretation of Dignāga's logic in purely extensional terms. I have tried to describe how Dignāga tried to cut the ground from under Bhartṛhari's postulation of ideal objects by explaining the qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*) on the basis of class inclusion. I have contrasted this with Bhartṛhari who located the relation in ideal sentential objects, and Dharmakīrti who followed Bhartṛhari's lead (see trPS5.34; Ch.II.v., IV.v).

To impose Dharmakīrti's ideal object doctrine on this portrait would, I think, destroy its symmetry; the subsequent loss would be aesthetic as well as historical. The introduction of ideal objects into Dignāga's scheme nullifies his stance against the *a priori* in Bhartṛhari, and this stance is the source of his most ingenious ideas. Under these circumstances it would be very difficult to identify Dignāga's individual achievements. It would also be impossible to trace his influence on the systems of thought which came immediately after his: Uddyotakara's, Kumārila's and Praśastapāda's. The doubt raised by early scholars as to Dignāga's right to the *Tairūpya* and the *avinābhāva* relation could not be addressed properly, if Dignāga had had "in his head" Dharmakīrti's *a priori* framework.

In tandem with my independent portrait of Dignāga's, I have shown that Bhartṛhari is the source of the *a priori* in Dharmakīrti's thought. Dignāga was not unaware of the *a priori*, it was not a to-be-realized idea that had not been born before Dharmakīrti's appearance on the historical scene. The *a priori* is part of Bhartṛhari's doctrine, the source of his idea that the Brahman is at the root of our understanding. Dharmakīrti, I have argued, adopted the *a priori* from Bhartṛhari, but consigned it to the realm of illusion, an *anādivāsanā*.

It follows from Dharmakīrti's thought that all knowledge is an *anādivāsanā*, an illusion. No such consequences follow from Dignāga's thought: he took a stance against the *a priori* and tried to construct his epistemology on the basis of what is given in experience.

Nālandā, the university founded by the Buddhists and the university at which Dignāga lectured, does not seem, on the basis of what we know from Hiuan-Tsang's records, to have been fostered in the spirit that all knowledge is illusion.

NOTES (Chapter Five)

V.1. Cited as 1729 in *An Anthology of Sanskrit Court Poetry: Vidyākara's "Subhāṣitaratnaśā"* translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, H.O.S., vol.144, Cambridge, Mass.1965.

V.2. See Frauwallner, 1961 p.138.

V.3. See p. 2.

V.4. See Hattori, 1968 p.14; also see n.V.35; trPS5.34-35.

V.5. The Sanskrit words in brackets are from Dharmakīrti's and Dignāga's text. Dharmakīrti's use of *ākasmika* and its variations in the following instances add up to the view that reality cannot be accidental. SVPV195p.99.12-13: *na svabhāvanīyamo'rthānām ākasmiko yuktah*; SVPV266p.140.1-3: *sattāyā ākasmikatvāyogāt*; SVPV251Ap.129.24-25: *tathā hy ākasmikatve sattvasya deśādiniyamo na syād ity uktam*; SVPV282p.149.14-15: *ākasmikatve'py asyokto doṣaḥ*. The word *avaśyam* (necessarily) occurs in the following: SVPV28p.19.2-3: *yena dhūme'vaśyam agnir bhavati*; SVPV28p.19.10-12: *tathā'saty agnau dhūmo nāstīty ukte'gnir dhūme bhavaty avaśyam ity arthād anvayapratipattiḥ*. The phrase *deśakālāvinābhāvitvam* (an inseparable connection is space-time) is by contrast Dignāga's. See, for instance, trvPS2.33 and trPS2.33.

V.6. See trPS2.30-36 for Dignāga's critique of the Vaiśeṣika relations.

V.7. PS4.2:NCIt133.8-10:

*Sādhyenānugamo hetoḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā/
khyāpyate yatra dṛṣṭāntaḥ sa sādharmyetaro dvidhā/*

V.8. *viśayabhāsatāivāsya pramāṇam tena mīyate/*; cf. Hattori, 1968 p.29G.

V.9. *yadā tu bāhya evārthaḥ prameyaḥ tadā viśayābhāsatāivāsya pramāṇam/ tadā hi jñānasvasaṇvedyam api svarūpam anapekṣya arthābhāsatāivāsya pramāṇam/ yasmāt so'rthas tena mīyate/ yathā yathā hy arthasyākārah śubhrāśubhrādītena jñāne nivīṣate tattadrūpaḥ sa viśayaḥ pramīyate/*; cf. also Hattori, 1968 n.1.64.

V.10. In Dharmakīrti's system the conditions for the truth of negative sentences such as, "there is no fire here", are derived from two sources: an empirical source and an *a priori* source. The truth of the sentence partially depends upon the necessarily true sentence: "everything which is fiery is hot" or "everything which has smoke has fire" and the empirically true sentence: "there is no heat here" or "there is no smoke here". The source of necessity is essential nature which includes causal nature. I base my interpretation on the following: vrSVPV204p.105.1-3: *asattā punar atrānupalabdhir eva/ ata eveyam kārānāt kāryānumānalakṣaṇatvāt svabhāvahe'tāv antarbhavattīti vakṣyāmah/* "Non-existence is here non-apprehension only. That is why, because it is characterized [in this context] as the inference of the effect from the cause, we will say that it is included in essential nature"; vrSVPV197p.101.8-9: *tathā hy anupalabdhir evāsattvam ity uktam prak/ tac ca pratipat-tvāśān na vastuvaśāt/* "So it has already been said that non-existence is non-apprehension for it is subject to the speaker, not to the [perceptual] object." See also vrSVPV4-5. That the empirical Method of Agreement and Difference (*anvayavyatireka*) is inadequate to establish either the existence or non-existence of any object is suggested by vrSVPV184p.51.3-6: *kathamcid avyavasthāpīteṣu vidhipratīṣedhāyogāt/ tathā ca sarvatrayam anvayavya-rekāśrayo na syāt uṣṇasvabhāvo'gnir nānuṣṇa ity api/ svabhāvāntarasyāśataḥ kathamcid avyavasthāpanāt/* Thus all affirmation (*vidhi*) and negation (*pratīṣedha*) presuppose an appeal to essential nature, which I will argue, are given *a priori*, see Section iii.

V.11. SVPV31, text quoted under n.IV.76.

V.12. See also vrSVPV280p.149.19.

Dharmakīrti extended the image in PV367–369. Dharmakīrti's theory of *sārūpya* is much more complicated than Bhartṛhari's, I think, in order to get rid of the difficulties that Dignāga had pointed out in his criticism of the analogy between languages and crystals. See Ch.II.vi.

V.52. External phenomena though momentary and fragmented have the innate capacity to strike the understanding in terms of uniformities (*abhinnākāra*) – this relation is described in terms of the relation between producer and produced (*janyajanakabhāva*) as well as in terms of a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*): SVPV75; vrSVPV64p.35.2–4; vrSVPV227p.26–28. The origins of this idea lie in trJS92 where Bhartṛhari briefly mentions two ideas which can be substituted for the conception of universals (*jāti*). Helārāja in that context discusses Dharmakīrti's views. Dharmakīrti's doctrine is much more complicated than Bhartṛhari's original conception. See trPS5.34 where this aspect of Dharmakīrti's thought is discussed. Notice that Dharmakīrti rejects Bhartṛhari's other suggestion in that context, that similarity be considered a candidate for the status of universals. Dharmakīrti in SVPV108 explained similarity as *ekakāryatā* which roughly stands for uniform effects. See Ch.II.vi.

V.53. See Ch.II.vi.

V.54. Though the commentator Karṇakagomin had no such qualms. In his comments on SVPV154 (152 in Gnoli's enumeration) he cited the following stanza of Bhartṛhari's with approval:

*viruddhaparimāṇeṣu vajrādarśatalādiṣu//
parvatādisvabhāvānām bhāvānām nāsti sambhavaḥ//*

A very slightly modified version of the stanza as listed in VPI.100 in Iyer's edition. The stanza establishes an analogy between the mind and reflecting surface like mirrors and diamonds. External phenomena though fragmentary and momentary strike the mind in terms of universals, just as external objects undergo transformation of size when they are reflected in mirrors. The relation between the word and its external bearer is described in terms of *samsarga* (contact, cf. *pratyāsatti* in SVPV162, translated under trHJS93–94). This can very profitably be compared to Bhartṛhari's view in trJS7–8 and contrasted with Dignāga trvrPS5.5: *sarvo hi śābdah pratyayo saṃsargarūpeṇa vyavacchinnaḥ tataḥ sphṭika-pratyayavad ayathārthaḥ syāt/*

V.55. Another way of answering Steinkellner would be to inspect Dignāga's criticism of Bhartṛhari's theory of indirect naming (trPS5.2.8) and show how Dharmakīrti's strategy, of giving a step-by-step description of each cognitive moment, together with his conception, of *apoha*, manage to circumvent this criticism. In this context see trPS5.34.

V.56. *anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ/*

*śābdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ//
tasmin bhāvānupādane sādhye 'syānupalambhanam/
tathā hetur na tasyaivābhavaḥ śābdaprayogataḥ//*

V.57. *yāvān kaścit pratiśedhaḥ sa sarvo 'nupalabdheḥ*; also vrSVPV4p.6.7–8: *sarvatra cāsyām abhāvasādhanyām anupalabdhaḥ dīśyātmanām eva teṣāṃ tadviruddhānām ca siddhir asidhiḥ ca veditavyā/*

V.58. *tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva . . .*

V.59. BLip.268, Stcherbatsky added: "He [Īśvarasena] evidently was convinced that the works of Dignāga did not contain the theory which was found in them by Dharmakīrti and so it was left to the latter to clear up all doubt in this respect and finally to establish the Buddhist table of the Categories of relations".

V.60. BLip.268.fn.1

V.61. Identified by Muni Jambuvijaya as a question from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Peking Edition, fol.110a1.5), see fn.13 to vrSVPV20p.14–15. I would like to thank Professor S. Kastura of Hiroshima University for explicating the fragment on the basis of the Tibetan.

V.62. Richard Hayes, 1980 p.250. The emphasis is mine.

V.63. Nagasaki and Mookerji, 1964 p.124.

V.64. vrSVPV28p.18.17. The fragment is from NM, vr to stanza XII. The fragment is identified by Gnoli. Tucci's translation reads:

[the same thing happens], when by the mere internal evidence of the argument itself (*arthāpatti*) one single example is sufficient to declare both.

See n.IV.40.

V.65. *yad āha arthāpattya vānyatareṇobhayapradarśanād iti/ tatrāpi dṛṣṭāntena tad-bhāvaḥ tubhāvapradarśanam manyamāno 'rthāpattyaikavacanena dvitīyasiddhim āha/ tathā hi yat kṛtakam tad anityam ity ukte 'narthāntarabhāve vyaktam ayam asya svabhāva tanmātrānubandhī pramāṇadṛṣṭas tadbhāvanīyamād iti/ jñātataadbhāvasyārthāpattya 'nityatvā-bhāve kṛtakatvam na bhavatīti bhavati/*

V.66. See trPS5.34.

CONCLUSION

Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were the products of an age dominated by Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari's achievements in the realm of philosophical grammar were the source of many fundamentally important ideas in their thought. Bhartṛhari's vision of grammar as "the royal road" may even, because of its influence, be considered prophetic.

I have traced Bhartṛhari's progress, away from the more empirical substance-attribute metaphysics of the early grammarians, to an Ideal world metaphysics. Each of the Buddhist philosophers, I have argued, came to terms with Bhartṛhari's achievements in his own separate way. Dignāga interpreted Bhartṛhari's conclusions as a challenge to his Buddhist commitments. He attempted to show that there is a fragment of language which can be built "in dependence upon" the knowledge received from the senses. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, conceded Bhartṛhari's claim that all our knowledge about external reality rests in language which is prior to experience. While Dignāga freed himself from Bhartṛhari's conclusions by means of his techniques of logic and his techniques of *apoha*, Dharmakīrti purchased at least part of his freedom by re-labelling essential aspects of Bhartṛhari's doctrine of essential objects (what is *nitya* in Bhartṛhari becomes a product of an *anādivāsanā* for Dharmakīrti).

The distinction in philosophical temper between these three thinkers can be summed up in the following way: Bhartṛhari's metaphysical conclusions were dictated by his concerns with language, his desire to accommodate the analytic and the antonymic content of names and the qualifier-qualificand relation; Dignāga's techniques of analysis, on the other hand, were tools with which to implement a metaphysical vision. In contrast, Dharmakīrti had built his system partly on the basis of the technical achievements of his forebears.

Although I have not answered the question why India forgot one of "its foremost thinkers"? I have cast doubt on the verdict that India forgot Dignāga because what was essential in his thought survived intact in Dharmakīrti's. I have argued that Dignāga's thought is not encompassed by the greater depth of Dharmakīrti's, rather it is washed away by it.

Whether Dignāga was surpassed by Dharmakīrti or not, remains an

outstanding problem for future scholars. I have shown that, as far as philosophical techniques are concerned, Dharmakīrti is far less original than he has been given credit for. A meaningful comparison between the PS and the PV, however, demands a deeper analysis of both the systems than the one I have undertaken; it requires us to examine the PV for errors and to assess the achievements of the philosophers who intervened between the PV and the PS.

My efforts in this essay have been directed toward setting up resonances between the texts of opposing schools, my aim to restore the lost dialogue between Bhartṛhari and Dignāga. By identifying their separate replies to the same philosophical issues, I have tried to delineate their achievements in a more systematic manner. My feeling is that Bhartṛhari and Dignāga helped form the prolific age that followed. Many restorative efforts are required before it is possible to delineate the precise achievements of the age. My hope is that this essay will represent a small beginning.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudeva
A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, 2nd edition co-authored with J.M.Shukla.
 G.O.S., No. 134, Baroda, 1977.
Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, University of Poona, Poona, 1965.
- Aklujkar, Ashok
 1970 "The philosophy of Bhartṛhari's Trikaṇḍī".
 [Harvard University dissertation, unpublished.]
- Bhargavasastri, Bhikaji Joshi
Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya with Kaiyata's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota; vol. V, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1945.
- Bhattacharya, Kamaleshwar
 1971 "The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna". (VV) Translations of the 'Vigraha-vyāvartanī' from the original Sanskrit with Introduction and Notes, JIP, vol. 1, no.3, pp.217.
 1978 "Some notes on the Vigraha-vyāvartanī", JIP, vol.5, no. 3, pp. 237-243.
- Brough, John
 1951 "Theories of general linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians". TPS. 1951: [Reprint: Staal: 1972, pp.414-413].
 1953 "Some Indian theories of meaning", TPS. 1953: [Reprint: Staal: 1972, pp. 414-423].
- Cardona, George
 1967 "Negations in Pāṇinian rules", Lg. 43, pp. 34-56.
 1968 "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian grammar", Festschrift V. Raghavan, ABL 31-32, 1967-68, pp. 313-52.
 1974 "Pāṇini's Kāraṇas: Agency, Animation and Identity", JIP, vol. 2, no. 3/4, 1974, pp. 231-306.
 1976 *Pāṇini, A Survey of Research*, Mouton, The Hague-Paris, 1976.
- Charudev, Shastri
 1969-73 *Vyākaraṇa-candrodaya*, 5 vol., Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi.
 1969 *Kāraṇa Va Samāsa*, 1969.
 1970 *Kṛt Va Taddhita*, 1970.
- Chi, R.S.Y.
 1969 *Buddhist Formal Logic: Part I. A Study of Dignāga's Hetucakra and K'uei-chi's Great Commentary on the Nyāyapraveśa*. The Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1969.

- Cowell, E. B. and Gough, A. E.
Sarvadarśanasamgraha by Mādhavāchārya, Kegan Paul Trench Trubner and Company, London, 1914.
- De Jong, J. W.
 1948 "Le Problème de l'absolu dans l'école Madhyamaka", in *Revue philosophique de la France et l'étranger*, Paris, 1948.
- Dvarikadas, Śāstri (ed.)
 1968 *Pramāṇavārttika of Ācārya Dharmakīrti, with the Commentary 'Vṛtti' of Ācārya Manorathanandin*, Bauddha Bharati Series-3, 1968.
- Frauwallner, E.
 1959 "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung", *WZKO Bd. III* 1959, pp. 83-164.
 1961 "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", *WZKO Bd. V*, 1961, pp. 125-148.
- Forest, Denys
 1970 *Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu Sultan*, London; Chato and Windus, 1970.
- Gnoli, Raniero
 1960 *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter With the Auto Commentary, Text and Critical Notes*, Instituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, Roma, 1960.
- Hattori, Masaaki
 1958 "Fragments From Pramāṇasamuccaya", *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1958.
 1968 *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
 1972 "Prašastapāda and Dignāga", *WZKO Bd. XVI*, 1972, pp. 169-180.
 1980 "Apoha and Pratibhā", *Essays In Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls* (ed. Masatoshi Nagatomi et. al.) Dordrecht-Holland, 1980, pp. 61-75.
- Hayes, Richard
 1980 "Dignāga's Views on Reasoning (Svārthanumāna)", *JIP*, vol. 8, no. 3, 1980, pp. 219-277.
- Herzberger, Hans
 1975 "Double Negation in Buddhist Logic", *JIP*, vol. 3, no. 1/2, 1975, pp. 3-16.
- Herzberger, H. and R.
 1981 "Bhartṛhari's Paradox", *JIP*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1981, pp. 1-17.
- Iyengar, H. R. R.
 1950 "Bhartṛhari and Dignāga", *JBRAS*, new series 26 1950, pp. 147-149.
- Iyer, Subramania
 1948 "The Point of View of the Vaiyākaraṇa": *JOR* 18: pp. 84-96 Reprint: [Staal (1972: pp. 393-400)].
 1963 (ed.) *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentary of Helārāja; kāṇḍa III*, (VP. III) part I. Poona: Deccan College, 1963.

- 1965 *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti, Chapter I*; translation, Poona: Deccan College, 1965.
- 1966 *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentaries of Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*, Poona: Deccan College, 1966.
- 1969 *Bhartṛhari: a study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of Ancient Commentaries*, Poona: Deccan College, 1969.
- 1971 *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, chapter III, part I*; English translation, Poona: (VP. III) Deccan College, 1971.
- 1973 (ed.) *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Prakīrṇaparakāśa of Helārāja; kāṇḍa III*, (VP. III) part II, Poona: Deccan College, 1973.
- 1977 *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa II*. English Translation With Exigetical Notes, Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1977.
- Jambuvijaya, Muni
 1961 *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. G.O.S., (Vai.S.) No. 136, Baroda, 1961.
- 1966 *Dvādaśāraṇaḥ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Part I, Sri (NC1) Atmanand Jain Granthamala Series, No. 92, Bhavnagar, 1966.
- 1976 *Dvādaśāraṇaḥ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Sri Atmanand Jain Granthamala Series, No. 94, Bhavnagar, 1976.
- Jha, Ganganath
 1912-16 *Nyāyadarśana: Translation of the Nyāya-bhāṣya and the Nyāya-vārttika* published in *Indian Thought*, a quarterly. Allahbad: 1912-1916.
- 1925 (Khadyota)
Nyāya-Darshana, The Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana with Two Commentaries. The Khadyota by Jha and the Bhāṣyachandra of Raghuttama. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Nos. 281, 282, 288, 295, 302, 308, 318, 323, 332 and 336, 1925.
- Jha, Durgadhar
 1963 (ed.) *Praśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmaśamgraha) with the Commentary, Nyāyakandālī of Śrīdharaḥṭṭa*, Ganganath Jha Granthamala, Vol. 1, 1963.
- Joshi, S. D.
 1967 *The Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kaṇḍabhāṭṭa*; edited with introduction, and critical and exegetical notes, University of Poona, Poona, 1967.
- 1971 *Patañjali's Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya karmadhārayāhnikā* (P.2.1.51-2.1.72); edited with translation and explanatory notes; University of Poona, Poona, 1971.
- Katsura, Shoryu
 1975 "New Sanskrit Fragments of the Pramāṇasamuccaya", *JIP*, vol. 3, no. 1-3, 1975, pp. 67-78.
- Kitagawa, Hidenori
 1960 "A Note on the Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic", *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, vol. VIII, No. 1.
- 1965 "A Study of a Short Philosophical Treatise Ascribed To Dignāga" (an abridged

- English translation of the *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa* of Dignāga), Sino-Indian Studies, Vo. 5, Nos. 3-4. [Reprint: Indo-koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1965, app. A, II], pp. 430-439.
- Kosambi, Damodar
1962 *Myth and Reality*, Popular Prakasan, Bombay, 1962.
1970 *The Culture and Civilization of India in Historical Outline*, Vikas, New Delhi, 1970.
- Kielhorn, Lorenz Franz
(MB) *The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, 3 vol. 3rd edition, revised and furnished with additional readings, references and select critical notes by K.V. Abhyankar, Poona, 1962-1972.
- 1887 "Notes on the Mahābhāṣya"; 7. Some Devices of Indian Grammarians", IA XVI, pp. 178-284.
- Kudala, Sivadatta D.
Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya with Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota, vol. 2, Nirnaya-Sagar Press, Bombay, 1912.
- de La Vallée Poussin, Louis
1903 "Dogmatique Boudhique", JA, Tome II, 1903, pp. 358-450.
1913 *Mūlamadhyamakārikā de Nāgārjuna avec Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*. Bibliotheca Buddhica LV, St. Petersburg, 1931.
1937 "Les Deux, Les Quatre, Les Trois Verité", MCB. Vol.V.1937, pp. 159-187.
- Manavalli, Gangadhar Śāstri
1887 (ed.) *Vākyapadīya, A Treatise of the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar by Bhartṛhari*, with the Commentary of Punyārāja Benares, 1887.
- Malvania, Dalsukh
1949 *Nyāyāvatāravārttika-vṛtti, of Śrī Śānti Sūri*, Singhi Jain Series, No. 20, 1949.
1955 (ed) *Pañḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottara-pradīpa*, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1955.
- Masson, J. L. and Patwardan, M. V.
1969 *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*. Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona, 1969.
- Matilal, Bimal Krishna
1968 *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-Nyāya Philosophy*, Harvard Oriental Series No. forty-six. Cambridge, 1968.
1971 *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, Mouton, The Hague, 1971.
1977 "Ontological Problems in Nyāya, Buddhism and Jainism: A Comparative Analysis," JIP, vol. 5, no.1/2, 1977.
- Mimamsaka, Yudhisthira
Patañjalimuni-viracita Mahābhāṣyam, vol. 2-3, with an exposition and translation in Hindi, Sonipat, Haryana, 1973-1975.

- Mookerji, S. and Nagasaki, H.
1964 *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. An English Translation of the First Chapter with the Auto-commentary and with Elaborate Comments*. (Kārikās 1-L1), The Nava Nālandā Mahāvīra Research Publication Vol. IV, 1964.
- Obermiller, E.
1931 "The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation, being a manual of Buddhist Monism". Acta Orientalia IX 1931, pp. 81-30.
1932 *History of Buddhism* by Bu-Ston. 2 parts; Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 19, Heft, Heidelberg, 1932.
- Pande, R. C.
1967 *Yuktidīpika*, an Ancient Commentary on the Samkhyakarika, Motilal Banarsidas, 1967.
- Potter, Karl
1963 *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963.
1968 "Astīva, Jñeyatva, Abhidheyatva", WZKO, Bd. XII-XIII, 1968, pp. 275-280.
1977 *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology. The Tradition of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1977.
- Putnam, H.
1978 "Meaning, Reference and Stereotypes", in *Meaning and Translation* (ed. F. Guethner and M. Guethner-Reutter), Duckworth, 1978, pp. 61-81.
- Randle, H. N.
1924 "A Note On The Indian Syllogism", Mind N.S. 33, 1924.
1926 *Fragments from Dignāga*. The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1926.
1930 *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*. London/Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1930.
- Rau, Wilhelm
(VP2) *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya*, die Mūlakārikā nach den Handschriften Herausgegeben und mit Einem Pada-Index versehen, Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, 1977.
- Renou, Louis
La Durghaṭavṛtti de Śaraṇadeva, traité grammatical en Sanskrit du XII siècle, éditée et traduit, 2 vol. in 5 fascicles, Paris.
Terminologie Grammaticale du Sanskrit, Paris, 1957.
- Ruegg, D. Seyfort
1969 *Theorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra. Étude sur la Soteriologie du Bouddhisme*. Paris: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 1969.
- 1977 "The Uses of the Four Positions of the Catuskoṭi and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism". JIP, vol. 5, no. 1/2, 1977, pp. 1-71.

- Sankalia, H. D.
1934 *The University of Nālandā*. 2nd ed. revised and enlarged, Oriental Publishers, New Delhi, 1972.
- Śāstri, Kapila Deva
1964 "Bhartṛhari's discussion of Sāmānādhikarāṇya", ALB XXVIII, 1-2, 1964, pp. 41-54.
- Śāstri, Ramnatha S. K.
1971 (ed.) *Śloka-vārttikavyākhyā Tātparyatikā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa*, University of (SL.V.) Madras series 13, 1971.
- Stcherbatsky, Th.
1927 *The Central Conception of Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927.
1930-2 *Buddhist Logic*. 2 Vols., Bibliotheca Buddhica XXVI, Leningrad, 1930-32. (BLI & II)
- Shaw, J.L.
1978 "Negation and the Buddhist Theory of Meaning", JIP, vol. 6, no. 1, 1978, pp. 59-77.
- Steinkellner, Eric von
1973) "On the Interpretation of the Svabhāvahetuḥ", WZKO, Bd. XVIII, 1973, pp. 117-129.
- Thakur, Anantlal
1967 (ed.) *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, The Vārttika of Uddyotakara, The Tātparyatikā of Vācaspati and the Pārisuddhi of Udayana*, Part I. Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text, No. 20.
- Tucci, Giuseppe
1929a *Pre-Dignāga Buddhist texts on logic from Chinese sources*. G.O.S., XLIX, Baroda, 1929.
1929b "Buddhist Logic Before Dignāga (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Tarkaśāstra)", JRAS, 451-488, 870-871.
1930a *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, being the oldest Buddhist Text of logic after Chinese and Tibetan materials*, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 15 Heft, Heidelberg, 1930.
1930 *On Some Aspects of the Doctrine of Maitre [yānātha] and Asaṅga*, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1930.
1954 "Ratnākaraśānti on Āśraya-parāvṛtti", Asiatica Festschrift für Fr. Weller, Lipsia 1954, pp. 765-767 [Reprint: Tucci, 1971, pp. 529-532].
1971 *Opera Minora*, Part I and II. Studi Orientali Pubblicati A Cura Della Scuola Orientale, Roma, 1971.
- Vidyabhusana, Satish Chandra
1909 *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, Calcutta University Press, 1909.

INDEX

- Abhinavagupta: 1, 3, 12
Abhyankar, Kashinath V., II.25, 73, 91
Aklujkar, A., II.131, 82, IV.25
Ālambanaparīkṣā, 1, 166, IV.10
Bhartṛhari: on the analytic content in names, xviii, xxi, 14, 33-34, 36-37, 39, 40-41, 49, 57, 58-59, II.99, 128, III.31, 217, 218; on *apoha*, 58, II.134, 129-130, III.34; on Brahman, 10, 35, 41, 58-59, 96-97; his catholicity, 19, 15-16, 56-58, 101-105; on demonstratives, 39, II.79, II.81, 122-123, III.19, III.24, III.25, 168, IV.22; on external objects, 13, 17, 29, 32-33, 47-48, 50-51, 55-57, II.59, II.131, 82-83, 98; on ideal objects, 14, 23, 32, 46, 48-49, 50-51, 89, II.74, II.112, II.132, 125; on *karmadhāraya* compounds, 15, 37-38, 41-48, II.99, II.104-112; against Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, xvii-xviii, xxi, 13-14, 25-26, 30-33, 37-38, 40-41, 45, 46-49, II.43, II.129, 78, 124-125, III.31; on metaphor, 14, 17, 29-30, II.60, II.129; his metaphysics, 10-11, 14, 35, 41, 48, 56-59, II.8, II.88, II.132, 96-97; on the qualifier-qualificand relation, 15, 37-38, 42-48, 55, 98, 110-111, 125; on *sphoṭa*, 10, 20-23, 32, II.5, II.6, II.26, II.27, 84, 85, 89; on *upacārasattā*, 12-13, 26, 33, 48, II.119, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 125, V.36
Bhaṭṭojī, Dikṣita, 10, 59, II.1, II.7, II.71, III.1
Brough, J., 10, 28, 29, II.1, II.4, II.5, II.6, II.27, II.38, II.57, II.71, 79, III.1, 153
Buddhist Logic, I.1, I.3, I.19, III.3, III.39, 219, 233, V.51, V.59, V.60; see Stcherbatsky
Bu Ston, 1, 2, 211, 230
Candrakīrti, 3
Candrānanda, 203
Cardona, G., 42, II.24, II.43, II.51, II.52, II.53, II.54, II.55, II.56, II.63, II.75, II.89, II.91, II.92, II.93, II.94, II.109, III.17, III.18, III.19, III.29, 147, 149
Charudev, Shastri: II.30, II.33, II.65, 91
Chi, R.S.Y. 5, I.24, 181, IV.44, IV.45, IV.47
Dharmakīrti: on Dignāga's mistake, 2, 211-216, 224-225, 230-233, 234, V.5; doctrine of ideal objects, II.131, 82-83, III.35, 160-161, 213, 216-217, 218, 222, 223-228, 229, 233, V.35; influence of Bhartṛhari on, II.131, 81-83, 102-103, 104, 133-134, III.35, 152, 154, 212-213, 217-218, 222-223, 224, 228, 234, V.34, V.35, V.36, V.51, V.52, V.54; his concept of *svabhāva*, 5, II.133, III.35, IV.74, 212, 216-218, 225-227, 228-229, V.10, V.46, V.48, V.50.
Dignāga: on *anvaya-vyatireka*, II.35, 150, 160-162, 208, 215-217, 225-227; on *apoha*, 45, 108, 110, 117, 118-121, 123, 125-132, 133, 135, III.3, 146, 156-158, 169-170, 181, 186, IV.13, IV.27, IV.32, IV.56; on contraposition, 165, 173-174, 176, 177, 179, 181, IV.43; on demonstratives, 107-108, 118, 119, 121-124, 128, 132, 145-146, 164, III.18, 168, 169-170, 171-174, 175, 181, 186, IV.22, IV.23, IV.29, 195-200, 205-206; his logic, 5-6, 164-165, 170-189; on metaphor, 108, 136, III.3, 150-152, 162, 163, 167; on the qualifier-qualificand relation, 44, 112, 120-121, 133, 134, 135-136, 156, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 183, 185-187, IV.69, 195, 197, 234; on *trairūpya*, 177-181, 188, IV.45, IV.46, IV.47, IV.55, 225, 227, 234; on universals, 120-121, 122, 124, III.1, III.31, 132, 163, 164, 166-168, IV.13; against Vaiśeṣikas, 119, 120, III.1, 167, 171, 180-181, 187, 198, IV.14, 201-210, 230-232
Dharmottarapradīpa, V.30

- Durvekamiśra, V.30
 Dhavanyāloka, I.1
 Forest, D: xx
 Frauwallner, E., I.8, I.18, 114, IV.1, IV.7, IV.10, 200, V.2, V.31
 Gnoli, R.: I.3, V.64
 Helārāja: xxii, xxiii, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, 24, 26, 28, 35, 58, II.18, II.22, II.27, II.43, II.59, II.63, II.66, II.67, II.68, II.73, II.86; on *abrāhamāṇa*, 38-39, II.76, II.80; on crystals, 15, 50, 52-56, II.126, II.129, 82, 89-90; and Dharmakīrti, 12, 80-83, 102-105, V.22, V.35; and Dignāga, 12, 15, 50, 52-56, 94-95, 102-103; on inherence, 85-87, 92, 94-95; on Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, 27-28, 31-33, 46-47, II.38, II.45, II.51, II.109, 85-86, 97, 98-101; on metaphor, 29-30, 81, 82, 89-90, 94; on *saṃketa*, 55-56, II.86, 79, 81, 88, 94-95, 100-101
 Hastavālaprakaraṇa, IV.10
 Hattori, M., 2-3, I.10, I.11, I.13, I.14, II.43, 103, 109, 114-116, 119, 120, 128, 130, 131, III.11, III.12, III.16, III.18, III.31, 158, 195, IV.2, IV.3, IV.4, IV.6, IV.9, IV.10, IV.12, 195, 205, 211, 225, V.4, V.8, V.9, V.39
 Hayes R., 156, 159, 213, V.62
 Herzberger, H. III. 29
 Herzberger, R. and H. II. 122, 136, 150
 Hiun Tsang, 2, 211, 223, 234
 I-Ching, 107, 113, 116
 Indra, 17, II.17
 Ingalls, D., 2, V.1; see *Subhāṣitaratnaśoṣa*
 Īśvarasena, 2, 230, 233, V.59
 Iyer, Subramania, 10-11, 28-29, 59, II.8, II.9, II.21, II.29, II.31, II.38, II.45, II.58, II.104, II.109, II.129, 71, 78, 80
 Jambuvijaya, Muni: xxiii, III.16, 167, IV.32, 201
 Jāṭisamuddeśa (JS) translations: JS1: 16, II.13; JS2: 16-18, 23, 71-74; JS3: 19-20, 75-78; JS6: 28-33, 78-84; JS7-8: 32-35, 85-90; JS9: 34, 90-93; JS10: 34-35, 92-93; JS11: 37, II.73, 93-96; JS13: 37, 92-93; JS11: 37, II.73, 93-96; JS13: 37, II.74; JS33: 35, II.67, II.70, II.71; JS34: 35; 96-97; JS47: 98-101, 37-38; JS92: 57, 101-103; JS93-94: 58, 103-105, 136; JS95: 57; JS98: 58, 129-130; JS106: IV.11; JS89: 147-148
 Jinendrabuddhi, 2, II.131, 158-159, 160-161, III.5, III.31, III.35, IV.11, IV.69, 202, 205, 206, 211, 233
 Joshi, S.D., 10, 43-44, II.7, II.26, II.93, II.96, II.98, II.99, II.105
 Karṇakagomin, V.54
 Kielhorn, F., 24-25, II.42
 Kitagawa, H., 113-114, III.8, III.9, IV.8, IV.44, 195; see *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa*
 Kosambi, D.D., xx-xxi, 1.7
 Kaiyaṭa, 41, 43-45, II.39, II.40, II.43, II.45, II.99, II.105, III.1, III.18, III.31
 Kumārilabhaṭṭa, 3, 6, I.18, III.21, IV.70, 195, 198-200, 206, 234
 Keith, A.B., 165, 187-188
 Katsura, S., IV.51, IV.52
 Kātyāyana, 13-14, 17, II.17; on names, xvii-xviii, 23-28, 30-32, 37-38, 40, 48-49, II.43, II.51, II.89, 85, 120, 124-125, III.31, 157, 162, 183; on *karmadhāraya* compounds, 27-28, 38, 42-43, 45-47, II.52, 127; on the qualifier-qualificand relation, 27-28, 38, 42, 45-47, 127, 158, de La Vallée Poussin, 165, 187-188, IV.72
 Madhyamaka, IV.8
 Mahābhāṣya, 17, 21, 43, 55, II.16, II.20, II.27, II.45, II.93, II.97, 74, 76, 91, 98, 106, 110, III.1, III.4; see *Patañjali*
 Malvania, D., I.3, I.18
 Mallavādīn, 3, 4, I.18, 132, III.27, 170, 206
 Manjuśrī, 2, 6
 Matilal, B.K., 73
 Manorathanandin 223, 228-229, V.33
 Masson, J.L., I.2, I.16
 Mathura, 17, II.17
 Mimāṃsa, 219
 Mimāṃsaka, Y., II.124
 Nāgārjuna, 169, IV.25, IV.26
 Nālandā, 2, 234
 Nayacakra (NC), 3, I.20, I-23; see *Jambuvijaya*, Muni
 Nyāya, 6, 175, 182, 203, 213
 Nyāyabhāṣya (NB), I, IV.39
 Nyāyadarśana (ND) I.22, II.4, IV.39, IV.41, 195, 197, 203, V.16

- Nyāyabindu (NB), I, 3, V.51
 Nyāyamukha (NM) IV.16, IV.37, IV.43, IV.44, IV.49, IV.50, IV.52, 230, 232
 Nyāyāvatāra, 3
 Nyāyavārttika (NV), 3, 4, IV.41, IV.46, IV.47, IV.50, IV.55, IV.74, 188-189, 195, 197-198, 207
 Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā (NVTT), 3, 4, 195
 Padārthadharmasamgraha (PD), 3, 6, IV.55, 203, 207
 Pande, R.C., 3, I.15, 95
 Patañjali: xx, 10, 14, 15, 41, 55, II.17, II.26, II.91, II.129, 85, 110, 157; on *ekaśeṣa*, 90-91; on *karmadhāraya* compounds, 41, 43-48; on Kātyāyana's aphorism on names, 27, II.40, II.45, II.51, II.63, II.98, II.99, on universals, 16
 Pindārtha, 114, IV.7
 Potter, K., II.4, III.39, 175-176, IV.39, IV.42
 Pradīpa, II.39, II.40, III.1, III.18, see *Kaiyaṭa*
 Prakīrṇaparakāśa, 12; see *Helārāja*
 Peamāṇasamuccaya (PS) translations: PS1. 3-120; PS1.119-121; PS2.8-11, 196-197; PS2.14; II.35; PS2.15; II.35; PS2. 30-201; PS2.31; IV.51, 202-204; PS2. 33; 204-205; PS2.34; IV.35, 205-207; PS2.35; 207-209; PS2.36, 209-210; PS5. 1-123, 145-146; PS5.2-121, 146-148; PS5.3-128, 148-150, 170; PS5.4; 150-151; PS5.5, 151-153; PS5.6, 153-154; PS5.6-11, 154-155; PS5.12-13, 26, 111, 129, 131; III.5, 155-156; PS5.14-156; PS5.27, 185-187, IV.69; PS5.34; 156-161, 183; PS5.35; 161, 184-185; PS5. 36; PS5.36; 117, 128, 130-131, 162-163
 Pramāṇavārttika (PV), 82, 215, 233, V.35; see *Svārthānumānapariccheda*
 Randle, H.N., 5, I.25, III.1, IV.14, IV.45, IV.48, IV.70, IV.73, 165, 181, 187-188, 195, 206
 Renou, L., xvii, II.33
 Sādhanaśamuddeśa (VP3.7), 24, 27, II.23, II.36, II.43, 82-83, IV.22
 Saṃbandhaparīkṣā, I
 Saṃbandhasamuddeśa (SS) translations: SS2-79; SS38-118; SS39-51; SS40-41 50, 52, 53, 54; SS50-51 26, 49, 125
 Saṃgraha, II.26
 Sāṃkhya, 3, 6, 9, 35, 96, 229
 Śaṅkarānanda, I.3
 Śaṅkarasvāmin, 223
 Sarvadarśanasamgraha, III.1, IV.14
 Siddhasenadivākara, 3, III.37, IV.32
 Śiṃhasūri: I.18, III.27, 170
 Ślokaavārttika (SL.V), 3, 6, III.18, III.21, 195, 198-200, 207; see *Kumārilabhaṭṭa*
 Srughna, 17, II.17
 Stīramatī, 3
 Stecherbatsky, T., III.3, 211, 213, 218, 219-221, 229, 230, 233, V.51, V.59
 Steinkellner, E., 213, 219-222, 228, V.18-23, V.55
 Svārthānumānapariccheda (SVPV), I.3, 81-82, 102, 103, 104, 105, III.35, 159, 160, IV.21, IV.74, 215, 216, 221-222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, V.5, V.10, V.11, V.12, V.15, V.27, V.28, V.29, V.34, V.36, V.43, V.45, V.47, V.50, V.54, V.57, V.61, V.64
 Tucci, G., 3, I.12, I.17, III.10, IV.40, 232, V.64
 Uddyotakara, xix, 3, 4, II.4, 175, 178, 182, 189, IV.39, IV.46, IV.50, IV.55, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 206, 207, 216, 234, V.16; see *Nyāyavārttika*
 Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa, 107, 113-114, 116, 131, 169, IV.8, V.10
 Vaiśeṣika, 10, 18, 33, 35, 58, 92, 94, 95, 101, 103, 119, 120, III.1, 167, 171, 180, 182, 187, IV.14, IV.55, 198, 201-210, 213, 231, 232, V.6
 Vājapyāyana, 13, 23, II.32, 91, 106, 107, 110
 Vākyapadīya (VP1 and VP2) translations, 13, 17, 18, 23, 48, 51, 58, II.18, II.25, II.116, II.117, II.129, 119, 122
 Vasubandhu, xx
 Vātsyāyana, 175, IV.39
 Vidyabhusan, S., I.4, I.9
 Vṛṣabhadeva, 15, 16, 21, 23, 48, 50, 55, II.14, II.35, II.86, II.88, II.99, II.116, II.120, II.129, II.131, II.132, II.135, 152, 157, 206
 Vṛttisamuddeśa (VS) translations: VS6-27;

- VS8-148; VS9-II.104; VS12-45; VS15-46; VS88-46, II.109; VS91-47-48; VS92-93 47-48; VS102-103 130; VS280-39; VS314-II.76; VS316 16, II.129; VS317-22; VS340-121, 123; VS346-29; VS347-29; VS348-II.33; VS349-25; VS351-24, II.12, 117
 Vyādi, 13, 23, 73, 76, 101, 106, 107, 110, 111, III.1, III.4
 Yogācāra, IV.8
 Yogāvatāra, 165, IV.1, IV.7
 Yuktidīpikā, 3, 6, 207

STUDIES OF CLASSICAL INDIA

Volume 1

Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedānta:

Śrī Harṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*

by P. E. Granoff

ISBN 90-277-0878-9

Volume 2

Sanskrit and Indian Studies

edited by M. Nagatomi, B. K. Matilal, J. M. Masson, and E. C. Dimock Jr.

ISBN 90-277-0991-2

Volume 3

The Oceanic Feeling

by J. Moussaieff Masson

ISBN 90-277-1050-3

Volume 4

The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism

by Musashi Tachikawa

ISBN 90-277-1291-3

Volume 5

Nāgārjuna's 'Twelve Gate Treatise'

by Hsueh-li Cheng

ISBN 90-277-1380-4

✓ Volume 6

Tradition and Argument in Classical Indian Linguistics

by Johannes Bronkhorst

ISBN 90-277-2040-1

✓ Volume 7

Buddhist Logic and Epistemology

edited by Bimal Krishna Matilal and Robert D. Evans

ISBN 90-277-2222-6

